THE OIVI.Y CORRECT CHEAP EDITIOi^. 



THES R.E33ROI=tT 

OF 

MAJ. GEN. GEORGE B. M'CLELIAN, 

On the Organization of the Army of the Potomac, and of its Campaigns 
in Virginia and Maryland, while undnr his command, from July 2eth, 1861, to 

November 7th, 1862. 

CAREFULLY CORRECTED AND REVISED. 




THE HERO OF ANTIETAM AND SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 



WASHINGTON, D. C. 

OFFICE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNION, 

No. 330 E Street, near Grover'a Theatre. 

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LETTER 



OP 



THE SECRETARY OF WAR, ^^"^ 



TRANSMITTING REPORT ON THE 



ORGAXIZATIOI OF TUE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC 



ITS CAMPAIGiNS IN VIRGINIA AND MARYLAND, 



UNDER THE COMMAND OF 



Maj.-Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLA^N", 



JULY 26, 1861, TO NOVEMBER 7, 1862. 



WASHINGTON : 

CONSTITUTIONAL UNION OFFICE, 
18G4. 



ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



LETTER 



THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 



TRANSMITTING 



TVk- Report of Major-General George B. McCleUan upon the organization of the 
Army of the Potomac, and its campaigns in Virginia and Maryland, from July 
26, 1861, to November 7, 1862. 



Dkcbmber 23, 1863.— Laid on the table and ordered to be printed. 



War Department, 

Washington City, D. C, December 22, 1863. 

Sir :— In compliance with the resolution dated December 15, 1863, 1 have the honor 

to communicate herewith "the report made by Major-General George B. McClellan. 

concerning the organization and operations of the army of the Potomac while under 

Lis command, and of all army operations while he was commander-in-chief." 

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

EDWIN M. STANTON, 

Secretary of War. 
Hon. Schuyler Colfax, 

/, Speaker of the House of Representatives. 



In tue Senate of the United States, January 20, 1864. 
n>'!M>hed, That five thousand copies of the report of General George B. McOlel- 
Ian upon the operations of the army of the Potomac, recently communicated by the 
Secretary of War to the House of Representatives, be printed for the use of th« 
Seuatc, witliout the accompanying docmneuts and maps. 

In the House of Representatives, January 13, 1864. 
Resolved, That ten thousand copies of the official report of Major-General' McClel- 
lan (not including the accompanying documents,) be printed for the use of the 
members of the present House. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAl 



FIRST PERIOD, 



CHAPJ'ER I, 

New York, August 4, 1863. 
Sir : I have the honor to submit herein 
the oflicial report of the operations of the 
army of the Potomac while under my 
charge. Accompanying it are the reports 
of the corps, division, and subordinate 
commauders, pertaining to the various en- 
gagements, battles, and occurrences of the 
campaigns, and important documents con- 
nected with its organization, supply, and 
movements. These, with lists of maps and 
memoranda submitted,* will be found ap- 
pended, duly arranged, and marked for 
convenient reference. 

Charged, in the spring of 1861, with the 
operations in the department of the Ohio, 
which included the States of Illinois, In- 
diana. Ohio, and latterly Western Virginia, 
it had become my duty to counteract the 
liostile designs of the enemy in Western 
Virginia, which were immediately directed 
to the destruction of the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad and ftie possession of the 
Kanawha valley, with the ultimate oljject 
of gaining Wheeling and the control of 
the Ohio river. 

The successful affairs of Phillippi, Rich 
Mountain, Carrick's Ford, &c., had been 
fought, and I had acquired possession of 
all Western Virginia north of the Kana- 
wha valley, as well as the lower portion of 
that valley. 

I had determined to proceed to the re- 
lief of the upper Kanawha valley, as soon 
as provision was made for the permanent 
defence of the mountain passes leading 
from the east into the region under control, 
when I received at Beverley, in Randolph 
county, on the 21st of July, 1861, intelli- 
gence of the unfortunate result of the 
battle of Manassas, fought on that day. 

On the 22d 1 received an order by tele- 
graph, directing me to turn over my com- 
mand to Brig.-Gen. Rosecrans, and repair 
at once to Washington. 

1 had already caused reconnoissances to 
be made for intrenchments at the Cheat 
Mountain pass; also on the Huuterville 
(3) 



road, near Elkwaler, and at Red House, 
near the main road from Romuey to Gra^ 
ton. During the afternoi^n and at night 
of the 22d 1 gave the final instructions for 
the construction of these works, turned 
over the command to Brig.-Gen. Rosecrans, 
and started, on the morning of the 23d, for 
Washington, arriving there on the after- 
noon of the 26th. On the 2Tth. I assumed 
command of the division of the Potomac, 
comprising the troops in and around Wash- 
ington, on both banks of tiie river. 

With this brief statement of the events 
which immediately proceeded my being 
called to the command of the troops at 
Washington, I proceed to an account, from 
such authentic data as are at hand, of my 
military operations while commander of 
the army of the Potomac. 

The subjects to be considered naturally 
arrange themselves as follows : 

The organization of the army of the 
Potomac. The military events connected 
with the defences of Washington, from 
July, 1861, to ]SIarch, 1862. 'The cam- 
paign on the Peninsula, and that in Mary- 
land. 

The great resources and capacity for 
powerful resistance of the south at the 
breaking out of the rebellion, and the full 
proportions of the great conflict about to 
take place, were sought to be carefully 
measured; and I had also endeavored, by 
every means in my power, to impress upon 
the authorities the necessity for such im- 
mediate and full preparation as alone would 
enable the government to prosecute the 
war on a scale commensurate with the 
resistance to be offered. 

On the fourth of August, 1861, I ad- 
dressed to the President the following 
memorandum, prepared at his request. 

MEMORANDUM. 

The object of th^s present war differs 
from those in which nations are engaged, 
mainly in this : that the purpose of ordi- 
nary war is to conquer a peace, and make 
a treaty on advantageous terms : in this 
contest it has become necessary to crush 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAK 



a population sufficiently numerous, intelli- 
jrent and warlike to constitute a nation. 
We have not only to defeat their armed 
and organized forces in the field, but to 
display such an overwhelming strength as 
will convince all our antagonists, especially 
those of the governing, aristocratic class, 
of the utter impossiljility of resistance. 
Our late reverses make this course impe- 
rative, ifad we been successful in the 
recent battle, (Manassas.) it is possible 
that we might have been spared the labor 
and expenses of a great effort. 

Now we have no alternative. Their 
success M'ill enable the political leaders of 
the rebels to convince the mass of their 
people that we are inferior to them in force 
and courage, and to command all their re- 
sources. The contest began with a class, 
now it is with a people — our military suc- 
cess can alone restore the former issue. 

l>y thoroughly defeating their armies, 
t-aking their strong i)laces, and pursuing a 
rigidly protective policy as to private pro- 
perty and unarmed persons, and a lenient 
course as to private soldiers, we may well 
hope for a permanent restoration of a 
peaceful Union. But in the first instance 
tiie authority of the government must be 
supported by overwhelming physical force. 

Our foreign relations and financial credit 
also imperatively demand that the military 
action of the government should be prompt 
and irresistible. 

The rebels have chosen Virginia as their 
battle-field, and it seems proper for us to 
make the first great struggle there. But 
while thus directing our main efforts, it is 
necessary to diminish the resistance there 
oflfered us, by movements on other points 
both by land and water. 

Without entering at present into details, 
I would advise that a strong movement be 
made on the Mississippi, and that the re- 
bels be driven out of Missouri. 

As soon as it becomes perfectly clear 
that Kentucky is cordially united with us, 
1 would advise a movement through that 
State into Kastern Tennessee, for the pur- 
])0sc of assisting the Union men of that 
region and of seizing the railroads leading 
from Memphis to the east. 

'J'hc possession of those roads by us, in 
connexion with the movement on the Mis- 
sissippi, would go far towards determining 
the evacuation of Virginia by the rebels. 
In the meantime, all the passes into West- 
ern Virginia from the east should be se- 
curely guarded, but I would advise no 
movement from that ffiiarter towards Rich- 
mond, unless the political condition of Ken- 
tucky renders it impossible or inexpedient 
for us to make the movement upon Eastern 
Tennessee through that State. Every ef- 
fort should, however, be made to organize, 



equip and arm as many troops as possible 
in Western Virginia, in order to render 
the Ohio and Indiana regiments available 
for other operations. 

At as early a day as practicable, it would 
be well to protect and re-open the Balti- 
more and Ohio railroad. Baltimore and 
Fort Monroe should be occupied by gar- 
risons sufficient to retain them in our pos- 
session. 

The importance of Harper's Ferry and 
the line of the Potomac in the direction uf 
Leesburg will be very materially diminisliod 
so soon as our force in this vicinity be- 
comes organized, strong and efficient, be- 
cause no capable general will cross the 
river north of this city, when we have a 
strong army here ready to cut off his re- 
treat. 

To revert to the west. It is probable 
that no very large additions to the troops 
now in Missouri will be necessary to secure 
that State. 

I presume that the force required for 
the movement down the Mississippi will be 
determined by its commander and the Pre- 
sident. If Kentucky assumes the right 
position, not nior^ than 20,000 will be 
needed, together with those that can be 
raised in that State and Eastern Tennes- 
see, to secure the latter region and its 
railroads, as well as ultimately to occupy 
Nashville. 

The Western Virginia troops, with not 
more than five to ten thousand from Ohio 
and Indiana, should, under proper manage- 
ment, suffice ior its protection. 

When we have re-organized our main ar- 
my here, 10,000 men ought to be enough to 
protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad 
and the Potomac, 5,000 will garrison Bal- 
timore, 3.000 Fort Monroe, and not more 
than 20,000 will be necessary at the ut- 
most for the defence of Washington, 

For the main army of operations I urge 
the following composition : 

2.'i0 regiments of infantry, say 225,000 men. 

100 field batteries, 600 guns 15,000 " 

28 regiments of cavalry 25,500 " 

5 regiments engineer troops..:.' 7,500 " 

Total 273,000 

The force must be supplied with the 
necessary engineer and pontoon trains, and 
with transportation for every thing save 
tents. Its general line of operations should 
be so directed that water transportation 
can be availed bf from point to point, by 
means of the ocean and the rivers emptying 
into it. An essential feature of the plan 
of operations will be the employment of a 
strong naval force to protect the move- 
ment of a fleet of transports intended to 
convey a considerable body of troops from 
point to point of the enemy's sea-coast, 
thus either creating diversions and render- 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



ing it necessary for them to detach largely 
from their main body in order to protect 
such of their cities as may be threatened, 
or else landing and forming establishments 
on their coast at any favorable places that 
-opportunity might ofler. This naval force 
should also co-operate with the main army 
in its efforts to seize the important sea- 
board towns of the rebels. 

it cannot be ignored that the construc- 
tion of railroads has introduced a new and 
very important element into war, by the 
great facilities thiis given for concen- 
trating at particular positions large masses 
of troops from remote sections, and by cre- 
ating new strategic points and lines of 
operations. 

It is intended to overcome this difficulty 
by the partial operations suggested, and 
such others as the particular case may re- 
quire. We must endeavor to seize places 
on the railways in the rear of the enemy's 
points of concentration, and we must threa- 
ten their seaboard cities, in order that 
each State may be forced, by the necessity 
of its own defence, to diminish its contin- 
gent to the confederate army. 

The proposed movemont down the Mis- 
sissippi will produce important results in 
this conuexiftn. That advance and the 
progress of the main army in the east will 
materially assist each other by diminishing 
the resistance to be encountered by each. 

The tendency of the Mississippi move- 
ment upon all questions connected with 
cotton is too well understood by the Pre- 
sident and cabinet to need any illustration 
from me. 

There is another independent movement 
that has often been suggested and which 
has always recommended itself to my 
judgment. I refer to a movement from 
Kansas and Nebraska through the Indian 
territory upon Rod river and western 
Texas for the purpose of protecting and 
developing the latent Union and free-State 
sentiment well known to predominate in 
western Texas, and which, like a similar 
sentiment in Western Virginia, will, if 
protected, ultimately organize that section 
into a free State. How far it will be pos- 
sil.ile to support this movement by an ad- 
vance through Xew Mexico from Califor- 
nia, is a matter which I have not sufficiently 
examined to be able to express a decided 
opinion. If at all practicable, it is emi- 
nently desirable, as bringing into play the 
resources and warlike qualities of the 
Pacific States, as well as identifying them 
with our cause and connecting the bond 
of Union between them and the general 
government. 

If it is not departing too far from my pro- 
vince, I will venture to su£i-gest the policy 
of an ultimate alliance and cordial under- 



standing Tvith Mexico ; their sympathies 
and interests are with us — their antipa- 
thies exclusively against our enemies and 
their institutions. I tlihik it would not be 
difficult to obtain from the Mexican gov- 
eriunent the right to use, at least during 
the present contest, the road from Guay- 
mas to New Mexico; this concession 
would very materially reduce the obstacles 
of the column moving from the Pacific ; 
a similar permission to use their territory 
for the passage of troops between the Pa- 
nuco and the Rio Grande would enable us 
to throw a column of troops by a good 
road from Tampico, or some of the small 
harbors north of it, upon and across the 
Rio Grande, without risk and scarcely 
firing a shot. 

To what extent, if any, it would be desi- 
rable to take into service and employ Mexi- 
can soldiers, is a question entirely political, 
on which I do not venture to offer an opi- 
nion. 

The force I have recommended is large ; 
the expense is great. It is possible that 
a smaller force might accomplish the ob- 
ject in view, but I understand it to be the 
purpose of this great nation to're-establish 
the power of its government, and restore 
peace to its citizens, in the shortest possi- 
ble time. 

The question to be decided is simply 
this : shall we crush the rebellion at one 
blow, terminate the war in one campaign, 
or shall we leave it as a legacy for our 
descendants. 

When the extent of the possible line of 
operations is considered, the force asked 
for for the main army under my command 
cannot be regarded as unduly large ; every 
mile we advance carries us further from 
our base of operations and renders detach- 
ments necessary to cover our communica- 
tions, while the enemy will be constantly 
concentrating as he falls back. I propose, 
with the force which I liave requested, not 
only to drive the enemy out of Virginia 
and occupy Richmond, but to occupy 
Charleston. Savannah, Montgomery, Pen- 
sacola. Mobile and New Orleans ; in other 
words, to move into the heart of the ene- 
my's country and crush the rebellion in its 
very heart. 

By seizing and repairing the railroads 
as we advance, the difficulties of transpor- 
tation will bo materially diminished. It 
is perhaps unecessary to state that, in addi- 
tion to the forces named in this memoran- 
dum, strong reserves should be formed, 
ready to supply any losses that may occur. 

In conclusion, I would submit that the 
exigencies of the treasury may be lessened 
by making only partial payments to our 
troops, when in the enemy's country, and 
bv g-iving the obligations of the United 



6 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



States for sach supplies as may there be 
obtained. 

GEO. B. McOLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 

I do not think the events of the war 
have proved these views upon the method 
and plans of its conduct altogether incor- 
rect. They certainly have not proved my 
estimate o'f the number of troops and 
gcopc of operations too large. It is pro- 
bable that I did underestimate the time, 
necessary for the completion of arms and 
equipnu'iits. It was not strange, however, 
that by many civilians intrusted with au- 
thority tliere should have been an exactly 
opposite opinion held on both these par- 
ticular. 

The result of the first battle of Manas- 
gas had been almost to destroy the morale 
and organization of our army, and to alarm 
government and people. The national 
capital was in danger ; it was necessary, 
besides holding the enemy in check, to 
build works for its defence, strong and ca- 
pable of being held by a small force. 

It was necessary also to create a new 
army for active operations and to expedite 
its organization, equipment, and the accu- 
mulation of the material of war, and to 
this not inconsiderable labor all my ener- 
gies for the next three month were con- 
btantly devoted. 

'J'ime is a necessary element in the cre- 
ation of armies, and I do not, therefore, 
think it necessary to more than mention 
tlie impatience with which many regarded 
tlie delay in the arrival of new levies, 
though recruited and pressed forward with 
unexampled rapidity, the manufacture and 
supply of arras and equipment, or the vehe- 
mence with which an immediate advance 
upon the enemy's works directly in our 
I'font was urged by a patriotic but san- 
guine people. 

The President, too, was anxious for the 
speedy employment of our army, and, al- 
though possessed of my plans through fre- 
quent conferences, desired a pajDer from 
me upon the condition of the forces under 
my command and the immediate measures 
to be taken to increase their efficiency. 
Accordingly, in the latter part of October 
I addressed the following letter to the 
Secretary of War. 

Sir: In conformity with a personal un- 
derstanding with the President yesterday, 
1 have the honor to submit the following 
statement of the condition of the army 
under my command, and the measures re- 
quired fur the preservation of the govern- 
ment and the suppression of the rebellion. 

It will be remembered that in a memorial 
I had tlie honor to address to the Presi- 
dent soon after my arrival in Washington, 
and in my communication addressed to 



Lieut. Gen. Scott, under date of 8th of 
August ; in my letter to the President au- 
thorizing him, at his request, to withdraw 
the letter written by me to Gen. Scott ; 
and in letter of the 8th of September, an- 
swering your note of inquiry of that date, 
my views on the same subject are fully 
and frankly expressed. 

In these several communications I have 
stated the force I regarded as necessary to 
enable this army to advance with a reason- 
able certainty of success, at the same time 
leaving the capital and the line of the Po- 
tomac sufficiently guarded, not only to 
secure the retreat of the main army, in the 
event of disaster, but to render it out of 
the enemy's power to attempt a diversioQ 
in Maryland. 

So much tiipe has passed, and the win- 
ter is approaching so ra])idly, that but two 
courses are left to the government, viz. : 
either to go into winter quarters, or to as- 
sume the offensive with forces greatly in- 
ferior in numbers to the army I regarded 
as desirable and necessary, If political 
considerations render the first course un- 
advisable, the second alone remains. While 
I regret that it has not been deemed expe- 
dient, or perhaps possible, to concentrate 
the forces of the nation in this vicinity, 
(remaining on the defensive elsewhere,) 
keeping the attention and efforts of the 
government fixed upon this as the vital 
point, where the issue of the great contest 
is to be decided, it may still be that, by in- 
troducing unity of action and design among 
the various armies of the land, by determi- 
ning the courses to be pursued by the 
various commanders under one general 
plan, transferring from the other armies 
the superfluous strength not required for 
the purpose in view, and thus re-enforcing 
this main army, whose destiny it is to de- 
cide the controversy, we may yet be able 
to move with a reasonable prospect of suc- 
cess before the winter is fairly upon us. 

The nation feels, and I share that feel- 
ing, that the army of the Potomac holds 
the fate of the country in its hands. 

The stake is so vast, the issue so 
momentous, and the effect of the next 
battle will be so important throughout the 
future, as well as the present, that 1 con- 
tinue to iirge, as I have ever done since 1 
entered upon the command of this army, 
upon the government to devote its energies 
and its available resources towards in- 
creasing the numbers and efficiency of the 
army on which its salvation depends. 

A statement, carefully prepared by the 
chiefs of engineers and artillery of this 
army, gives us the necessary garrison of 
this city and its fortifications, 33,795 men 
—say 3.5,000. 

The present garrison of Baltimore and 



RErORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



its dependencies is about 10,000. I have 
sent the chief of ray staff to make a care- 
ful examination into the condition of these 
troops, and to obtain the information 
requisite to enable me to decide whether 
this number can be diminished, or the 
reverse. 

At least .'i,000 men will be required to 
watch the river hence to Harper's Ferry 
and its vicinity; probably 8,000 to giaard 
tiie lower Potomac. 

Aa you are aware, all the information 
we have from spies, prisoners, &c., agrees 
in showing that the enemy have a force 
oil the Potomac not less than 150,000 
Btrong, well drilled and equipped, ably 
commanded and strongly intrenched. It 
is plain, therefore, that to insure success, 
or to render it reasonably certain, the 
active army should not number less than 
150.000 efficient troops, with 400 guns, 
unless some material change occm-s in the 
force in front of us. 

'i'he requisite force for an advance move- 
ment by the army of the Potomac may be 
thus estimated : 

MEN. aCNS. 

("olumn of actis'e operations 150,000 400 

OmitUou of the city of Washington 35,000 40 

To iiuard the Potomac to Harper's Ferry... ,^,000 12 

To guard the lower Potomac S,000 24 

Garrison for Baltimore and Annapolis 10,000 VZ 



Total effective force required 2OS,00O 488 

or an aggregate, present and absent, of 
about '240,000 men, should the losses by 
sickness, &c., not rise to a higher percent- 
age than at present. 

Having stated what I regard as the 
requisite force to enable this army to 
advance, I now proceed to give the actual 
strength of the army of the Potomac. 

The aggregate strength of the army of 
the Potomac, by the official report on the 
morning of the 27th instant, was 168,318 
officers and men, of all grades and arms. 
This includes the troops at ]3altimorc and 
Annapolis, on the upper and lower Poto- 
mac, the sick, absent, &c. 

The force present for duty was 147,C0f>. 
Of this number, 4,268 cavalry were com- 
pletely unarmed, 3,16.3 cavalry only parti- 
ally armed. 5,979 infantry unequipped, 
making 13,410 unfit for the field, (irrespec- 
tive of those not yet sufficiently drilled.) 
and reducing the effective force to 134,285, 
and the number disposable for an advance 
to 76,285. The infantry regiments arc, to 
a considerable extent, armed with unser- 
viceable weapons. Quito a large number 
of good arms, which had been intended fbr 
this army, were ordered elsewhere, leaving 
the army of the Potomac insufficiently, 
and, in some cases, badly armed. 

On the 30th of September there were 
with this army 228 held guns, ready for 



the field ; so far as arms and equipments 
are concerned, some of the batteries are 
still quite raw, and unfit to go into action. 
I have intelligence that eight New York 
batteries are en route hither ; two others 
are ready for the field. 1 will still (if the 
New York batteries have six guns each) 
be 112 guns short of the number required 
for the active column, saying nothing, for 
the present, of those necessary for the gar- 
rison and corps on the Potomac, which 
would make a total deficiency of 200 guns. 

I have thus briefly stated our present 
condition and wants ; it remains to sug- 
gest the means of supplying the defi- 
ciencies. 

First, that all the cavalry and infantry 
arms, as fast as procured, whether maua- 
factured in this country or purchased 
abroad, be sent to this array until it is 
fully prepared for the field. 

Second, that the two companies of the 
fourth artillery, now understood to be en 
route from Fort Randall to Fort Monroe, 
be ordered to this army, to be mounted at 
once; also, that the companies of the third 
artillery, en route from California, be sent 
here. Had not the order for Smcad's 
battery to come here from Harrisburg, lo 
replace the battery I gave Gen. Sherman, 
been so often countermanded, I woui(l 
again ask for it. 

Third, that a more elTective regulati<'u 
may be made authorizing the transfer of 
men from the volunteers to the regular 
batteries, infantry and cavalry; that we 
may make the best possible use of the 
invaluable regular "skeletons." 

Fourth, I have no official information as 
to the United States forces elsewhere, but, 
from the best information I can obtain 
from the "War Department and otht^r 
sources, I ara led to believe that the 
United States troops are : 

In We.stern Virginia, about 30,000 

In Kentucky 40,000 

In Missouri, 80,000 

In FortroBs Monroe 11,000 

Total 101,000 

Besides these, I am informed that more 
than 100,000 are in progress of organiza- 
tion in other northern and western States. 

I would therefore reconnnend that, not 
interfering with Kentucky, there should 
be retained in Western Virginia and Mis- 
souri a sufficient force for defensive pur- 
poses, and that the surplus troops be sent 
to the army of the Potomac, to enable it 
to assume the ofi'ensive ; that the same 
course be pur.sued in respect to Fortress 
Monroe, and that no further outside exfte- 
ditions be attempted until we have fought 
the great battle in front of us. 

Fifth, that every nerve be strained to 
hasten the enrolment, organization and 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX. 



8 

armament of new batteries and regiments j 
of infautrv. . i 

Sixth, that all the battalions now raised 
for new regiments of retrular infantry be j 
nt once ordered to this army, and that the | 
old infantry and cavalry en route from | 
California be ordered to this army unme- 
diati'ly on their arrival in New York. 

I have thus indicated, in a general man- 
ner, the objects to be accomplished, and 
the' means by which we may gain our 
ends. 

A vigorous employment of these means 
will, in my opinion, enable the army of 
the Potomac to assume successfully this 
season the offensive operations which, 
ever since entering upon the command, it 
has been my anxious desire and diligent 
effort to prepare for and prosecute. The 
advance should not be postponed beyond 
the '25th of November, if possible to 
avoid it. 

Unity in councils, ihe utmost vigor and 
energy in action are indispensable. The 
entire military field should be grasped as 
a whole, and not in detached parts. 

One plan should be agreed upon and 
pursued ; a single will should direct and 
carry out these plans. 

The great object to be accomplished, 
the crushing defeat of the rebel army 
(now) at Manassas, should never for one 
instant be lost sight of, but all the intel- 
lect and means and men of the govern- 
ment poured upon that point. The loyal 
States possess ample force to effect all 
this and more. The rebels have displayed 
energy, unanimity, and wisdom worthy of 
the most desperate days of the French 
revolution. Should we do less? 

The unity of this nation, the preserva- 
tion of our institutions, are so dear to me 
that 1 have willingly sacrificed my private 
hai>])iness with the single object of doing 
iny duty to my country. When the task is 
accomplished, I shall be glad to return to 
the obscurity from which events have drawn 
me. 

Whatever the determination of the gov- 
ernment may be, I will do the best I can 
with the army of the Potomac, and will 
ahare its fate, whatever may be the task 
imposed upon me. 

Permit me to add that, on this occasion 
as heretofore, it has been my aim neither 
to exaggerate nor underrate the power of 
the enemy, nor fail to express clearly the 
means by which, in my judgment, that 
power may be broken. Urging the energy 
of i)reparation and action, which has ever 
belu my choice, but with the fixed purpose 
by no act of mine to expose the govern- 
ment to hazard by premature movement, 
and requesting that this communication 
may be laid before the President, 



I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
your obedient servant, 

G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 
Hon. Simon Cameron, Sec. of War. 

When I assumed command in Washing- 
ton, on he 2Tth of July, 18G1, the number 
of troops in and around the city was about 
,50,000 infantry, less than 1,000 cavalry, 
and G50 artillerymen, with nine imperfect 
field batteries of thirty pieces. 

On the Virginia bank of the Potomac 
the brigade organization of Gen. McDowell 
still existed, and the troops were stationed 
at and in rear of Fort Corcoran. Arling- 
ton, and Fort Albany, at Fort Runyan, 
Roach's Mills, Cole's Mills, and in the 
vicinity of Fort Ellsworth, with a detach- 
ment at the 'J'heological Seminary. 

There were no troops south of Hunting 
creek, and many of the regiments were 
encamped on the low grounds bordering the 
Potomac, seldom in the best positions for 
defence, and entirely inadequate in num- 
bers and condition to defend the long line 
from Fort Corcoran to Alexandria. 

On the Maryland side of the river, upon 
the heights overlooking the Chain bridge, 
two regiments were stationed, whose com- 
manders were independent of each other. 

There were no troops on the important 
'Tenallytown road, or on the roads entering 
the city from the south. 

The camps were located without regard 
to purposes of defence or instruction, the 
roads were not picketed, and there was no 
attempt at an organization into brigades. 

In no quarter were the dispositions for 
defence such as to offer a vigorous resist- 
jmce to a respectable body of the enemy, 
either in the position and numbers of the 
troops, or the number and character of 
I the defensive works. Earth-works, in the 
nature of tetes de pout, looked upon the 
approaches to the Georgetown aqueduct 
and ferry, the long bridge and Alexandria, 
by the Little river turnpike, and some 
simple defensive arrangements were made 
at the Chain bridge. With the latter 
exception not a single defensive work had 
been commenced on the Maryland side. 

There was nothing to prevent the enemy 
shelling the city from heights within easy 
range, which could be occupied by a hostile 
column almost without resistance. Many 
soldiers had deserted, and the streets of 
Washington were crowded with straggling 
officers and men, absent from their stations 
without authority, whose behavior indi- 
cated the general want of discipline and 
organization. 

I at once designated an efficient staff, 
afterwards adding to it as opportunity 
was afforded and necessity required, who 
zealously co-operated with me ia the labor 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. MCLELLAN. 



of bringing order out of confusion, re- 
assigning troop.s and commands, ])rojecting 
and throwing up det'eusive worlcs, receiv- 
iag and organizing, equipping and provid- 
ing for the new levies arriving in the city. 

The valuable services of these ofticers in 
ther various departments, during this and 
throughout the subsequent periods of the 
history of the army of the Potomac, can 
hardly be sufficiently appreciated. Their 
names and duties will be given in another 
part of this report, and they are com- 
mended to the favorable notice of the War 
Department. 

The restoration of order in the city of 
Washington was eflected through the ap- 
pointment of a provost marshal, whose 
authority was supported by the few regular 
troops within my command. These troops 
were thus in position to act as a reserve, 
to be sent to any point of attack where 
their services might be most wanted. The 
energy and ability displayed by Col. A. 
Porter, the provost marshal, and his assist- 
ants, and the strict di.^charge of their duty 
by the troops, produced- the best results, 
and Washington soon became one of the 
most quiet cities in the Union. 

The new levies of infantry, upon arriving 
in Washington, were formed into pro- 
visional brigades and placed in camp in the 
suburlis of the city for equipment, instruc- 
tion, and discipline. As soon as regiments 
were in a fit condition for transfer to the 
forces across the Potomac, they were 
assigned to the brigades serving there. 
Brig. Gen. F. J. Porter was at first as- 
signed to the charge of the provisional 
brigades. Brig. Gen. A. E. Burnside was 
the next officer assigned this duty, from 
which, however, he was soon relieved by 
Brig. Gen. S. Casey, who continued hi 
charge of the newly arriving regiments 
until the army of the Potomac departed 
for the Peninsula, in March, IBfi'i. The 
Bewly arriving artillery troops reported to 
Brig. Gen. AVilliara F. Barry, the chief of 
artillery, and the cavalry to Brig. Gen. 
George Stoneman, the chief of cavalry. 

By the 15th of October, the number of 
troops in and about Washington, inclusive 
of the garrison of the city and Alexandria, 
the city guard and the forces on the Mary- 
land shore of the Potomac below Wash- 
ington, and as far as Cumberland above, 
the troops under the command of Gen. 
I>ix at Baltimore and its dependencies, 
were as follows : 

Total present for duty 1.33,201 

" sick 9,290 

'• in confinement 1,1.56 

Aggregate present 14.3,647 

" absent 8,404 

Gruud aggregate 162,0dl 



The following table exhibits similar 
data for the periods stated, including 
the troops in Maryland and l^elaware : 





Present. 






Datb. 


3 

•a 
o 




lu con- 
finement. 


Absent. 

Total pro- 
Sflnt and 
absent. 


Dec. 1, 1861... 
J.^^. 1, 1862... 
Feb. ], 1S62... 
Mar. 1, 1862... 


169,452 
191, 4S0 
190,806 
193,142 


1.5,102 
14.790 
14,363 
13,167 


2,1S9 11,470198,213 
2,260111,707 219,7il7 
2,917 14,110 222,196 
2,1081 13,o70 221,987 



For convenience of reference the strength 
of the army of the Potomac at subsequent 
periods is given. 





Present. 


Absent. 






1 In 






^ 




For Duty. 


Sick, larrest or 






o 


Date. 






confine- 




>. 










ment. 


i 


o 
.a 


3 




. I 












i> 




It 


1 £ 


0^ 


3 

< 


3 




1 




^ 


« ! 6 " 




^ 


^ 




=> 


^ 


O 1 1^ \ O \^ 


<! 


a 




April 30 


4,72.5104,610 


i i I 1 
233 5,.'5S.5' 41 3i6n.'!„3.i0 


n.OR-' 


.lune 2C 


4 6B.') 101, 160' 496]0,.i41' 44 1 3V0 I17,2-'G 


27 -W 887 


July lU 


;3,S34; S5,713! 695,15,959; 60 1 213 10(J,46U 

1 '■ \ 1 1 ' 


34,fi.'3S3,?S2 



Grand Aogkeoate, prksest and absent. 
April 30. 12fi.387. Inchiding Franklin. 
June 2(1. H.s.HlS. Inclnrtiii? McCaU and Dix. 
July 10. 144>SG. Including two brigades of Shiel'e dj- 
vitiou absent, 5,354 men. 

In organizing the array of the Potomac, 
and preparing it for the field, the first step 
taken was to organize the infantry inta 
brigades of four regiments each ; retaining 
the newly arrived regiments on the Mary- 
land side until their armament and equip- 
ment were issued and they had obtained 
some little elementary instruction, before 
assigning them permanently to brigades. 
When the organization of the brigades 
was well established, and the troops some- 
what disciplined and instructed, division-s. 
of three brigades each were gradually 
formed, as is elsewhere stated in this 
report, although I was always in favor of 
the organization into army corps as an 
abstract principle. I did not desire to 
form them until the army had been for 
some little time in the field, in order to 
enable the general officers first to acquire 
the requisite experience as division com- 
manders on active service, and that I might 
be able to deride from actual trial who 
were best fitted to exercise these impor- 
tant commands. 

For a similar reason I carefully abstained 
from making any recommendations for the 
promotion of officers to the grade of major- 
general. 

When new batteries of artillery arrived 
they alio were retained iu Washington 



10 llErORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



until their armament and equipment were 
completed, and their iuritruotion sufiiciently 
advanced to juslily their bein<r assigned to 
divisions The s^ame course was pursued 
in regard to cavalry. 1 regret tliat circuni- 
Btances have delayed the chief of cavalry, 
(]en. George Stoiieman. in furnishing his 
report upon the organization of that arm 
of service. It will, however, be forwarded 
an soon as completed, and will, doubtless, 
ahow that the difficult and important duties 
intruited to him were efficiently performed. 
He encountered and overcame, as far as 
it was possible, continual and vexatious 
obstacles arising from the great deficiency 
ijf cavalry arms and ecpiipments, and the 
entire inellicieucyof many of the regimental 
otlicers first ap])ointed ; this last difficulty 
W!is, to a considerable extent, overcome in 
ihe cavalry, as well as in the infantry and 
artillery, by the continual and prompt 
action of courts-martial and boards of 
examination. 

As rapidly as circumstances permitted, 
every cavalry soldier was armed with a 
sabre and revolver, and at least two 
siiuadrous in every regiment with carbines, 
it was intended to assign at least one 
regiment of cavalry to each division of the 
active army, besides forming a cavalry 
re,-?erve of the regular regiments and some 
picked regiments of volunter cavalry. Cir- 
cumstances beyond my control rendered it 
impossible to carry out this intention fully, 
and the cavalry force serving with the 
army in the field was never as large as it 
ought to have been. 

It was determined to collect the regular 
infantry to form the nucleus of a reserve. 
The advantage of such a body of troops at 
a critical moment, especially in an army 
constituted mainly of new levies, imper- 
fectly disciplined, has been frequently 
illustrated in military history, and was 
brought to the attention of the country at 
the first battle of Manassas. I have not 
been disappointed in the estimate formed 
of the value of these troops. 1 have 
always found thein to be relied on. When- 
ever they have been brought under fire 
they have shown the utmost gallantry and 
tenacity. 'J'he regular infantry, which had 
been collected from distant posts and 
wliich had been recruited as rapidly as the 
iiow progress of recruiting for the regular 
aervice would allow, added to the small 
battalion with McDowell's army, which I 
found Ht Washington on ray arrival, 
amounted, on the HOth of August, to i,040 
men ; on the 2Hth of Februarv, 1862, to 
2.682. and on the Hnth of Apni, to 4,603. 
On the 17th uf May. 1862, they were 
attfiigned to (ieii. Torter's corps for organi- 
sation as a division, with the filth regiment 
New York volunlecrtf, which joined Mav 



4, and the tenth New York volunteer?, 
which joined subsequently. Theyremained 
from the commencement under the com- 
mand of Brig. Gen. George Sykes, major, 
third infantry, United States army. 

ARTILLERY. 

The creation of an adequate artillery 
estal)lishmcnt for an army of so large 
proportions was a formidable undertaking ; 
and had it not been that the country 
possessed in the regular service a body 
of accomplished and energetic artillery 
officers, the task would have been almost 
hopeless. 

The charge of organizing this most im- 
portant arm was confided to Major (after- 
wards Brig.-Geu.) William F. Barry, chief 
of artillery, whose industry and zeal 
achieved the best results. The report of 
Gen. Barry is appended among the ac- 
companying documents. By referring to 
it, it will be observed that the following 
principles were adopted as the basis of 
oi'ganization : 

*' 1. That the proportion of artillery 
should be in proportion of at least two and 
one-half pieces to l.OUO men, to be ex- 
panded, if possible, to three pieces to 1,000 
men. 

'• 2. That the proportion of rifled guns 
should be restricted to the system of the 
United Statesordnauce department; and of 
Parrot and the ' smooth bores' (with the 
exception of a few howitzers for special 
service) to be exclusively the twelve- 
pounder gun, of the model of 1857, 
variously called the • gun-howitzer,' the 
' light twelve-pounder,' or the ' Napoleon.' 
" 3. That each field battery should, if 
practicable, be composed of six guns, and 
I none to be less than four guns, and in all 
' cases the guns of each battery should be 
of uniform calibre. 

"4. That the field batteries were to be 
assigned to divisions, and not to brigades, 
and in proportion of four to each division, 
of which one was to be a battery of regulars, 
the remainder of volunteers, the captain of 
the regular battery to be the commandant 
of artillery of the division. In the event 
of several divisions constituting an army 
corps, at least one-half of the divisional 
artillery was to constitute the reserve 
artillery of the corps. 

"5. That the artillery reserve of the 
whole army should consist of one hundred 
guns, and should comprise, besides a suffi- 
cient number of light 'mounted batteries,' 
all the guns of position, and until the 
cavalry were massed, all the horse artil- 
lery. 

" 6. That the amount of ammunition to 
accompany field batteries was not to be 
loss than four hundred rounds per gnn. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



11 



" 7. A siege train of fifty pieces. This 
was subsequently expanded for special 
service at the siege of Yorktown, to very 
nearly one hundred pieces, and comprised 
-the unusual calibres and enormously heavy 
weight of metal of tM'o 200-pouuders, five 
lOO-pouiiders, and ten 13-inch sea-coast 
mortars." 

As has been before stated, the chief of 
artillery reports the whole of the field 
artillery of the army of the Potomac, 
July 28, 1861, was comprised of nine im- 
perfectly equipped batteries, of thirty guns, 
G50 men, and 400 horses. In ilarch. 1862, 
when the whole army took the field, it con- I 
sistcd of ninety-two batteries, of 520 guns, | 
12,500 men, and 11,000 horses, fully 
equipped and in readiness for active field 
service ; of the whole force thirty batteries ! 
were regulars, and sixty-two batteries 
volunteers. During the short period of 
seven months, all of this immense amount 
of material was issued by the ordnance 
department and placed in the hands of the 
artillery troops after their arrival in 
Washington. About one-fourth of all the \ 
volunteer batteries brought with them from ' 
their respective States a few guns and i 
carriages, but they were nearly all of such j 
peculiar calibre as to lack uniforiuity with 
the more modern and more serviceable 
ordnance with which the other batteries i 
Wt^ro armed, and they therefore had 1o be j 
withdrawn and replaced by more suitable 
material. While about one-sixth came 
supplied with horses and harness, less than 
one-tenth were apparently fully equipped 
for service when they reported ; and every 
one of these re-cjuired the supply of many 
deficiencies of material, and very extensive 
instruction in the theory and practice of 
xJieir special arm. 

The operations on the Peninsula by the 
Rrmy of the Potomac commenced with a 
full field artillery force of fifty-two batte- 
ries of tM'o hundred and ninety-nine guns. 
To this must be added the field artillery of 
Franklin's division of McDowell's corps, 
which joined a few days before the capture 
of Yorktown, but was not disembarked 
from its transports for service until after 
the battle of Williamsburg, and the field 
artillery of McCall's division of McDowr 
ell's corps, (fo'ur batteries, twenty-two 
guns,) which joined in June, a few days 
before the battle of Mechanicsville, (June 
26, 1862,) making a grand total of field 
artillery, at any time with the army of the 
Peninsula, of sixty batteries of three hun- 
dred and forty-three guns. AVith this 
large force, saving in six corps d'armee of 
eleven divisions, and the artillery reserve, 
the only general and field officers were one 
brigadier general, four colonels, three lieu- 
tenant colonels, and three majors, a num- 



I ber obviously insuflScient, and which ira- 
! paired to a great degree, in consequence 
of the want of rank and oificial influence 
of the commanders of corps and division 
artillery, the efficiency of the arm. As 
this faulty organization can be suitably 
corrected only by legislative action, it is 
earnestly hoped that the attention of the 
proper authorities may at an early day be 
invited to it. 

When there were so many newly or- 
ganized volunteer field batteries, many of 
whom received their first and only instruc- 
tion in the intrenched camps covering 
Washington during the three or four in- 
clement months of the winter of 1861-62, 
there was, of course, much to be improved. 
Many of the volunteer batteries, however, 
evinced such zeal and intelligence, and 
availed themselves so industriously of the 
instructions of the regular officers, their 
commanders, and the example of the regu- 
lar batteries, their associates, that they 
made rapid progress, and attained a de- 
greee of proficiency highly creditable. 

The designations of the different bat- 
teries of artillery, both regular and volun- 
teer, follow within a few pages. 

The following distribution of regiments 
and batteries was made, as a preliminary 
organization of the forces at hand, shortly 
after my arrival in AVashington. 'J'he in- 
fantry, artillery, and cavalry, as fast as 
collected and brought into primary organi- 
zation, were assigned to brigades and 
divisions, as indicated in the subjoined 
statements. 

Organization of division of the Potomac, 
August 4, 1861. 

Brig. Gen. Hunter's Brigade. — 23d, 
25th, 35th, and 37th regiments Xew York 
volunteers. 

Brig. Gen. Hcintzelman's Brigade. — ' 
5th regiment Maine volunteers, 16th, 26th, 
and 27th regiments New York volunteers, 
and Tidball's battery,(A,) 2d United States 
artillery. 

Brig. Gen. W. T. Sherman's Brigade. 
9th and 14th regiments Massachusetts vol- 
unteers, DeKalb regiment New York vol- 
unteers, 4th regiment Michigan volunteer?. 
Hamilton's battery. (E.) 3d United States 
artillery, and company I, 2d United States 
cavalry. 

Brig. Gen. Kearney's Brigade. — Ist 
2d, and 3d regiments New Jersey volun- 
teers. Green's battery, (G,) 2d United 
States artillery, and company G, 2d United 
States cavalry. 

Brig. Gen. Hooker's Brigade. — Island 
11th regiments Massachusetts volunteers, 
2d regiment New Hampshire volunteers, 
and 26th regiment Pennsylvania volunteers. 

Col. Key's Brigade.— 22A, 24th, and 



12 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAK 



80th regiment New York volunteers, and 
14th regiment New York State militia. 

Brig. Gen. Franlcliri's Brigade. — 15th, 
18th, 31st, and 32d regiments New York 
volunteers. Piatt's battery, (M,) 2d United 
States artillery, and company C, New 
York (Lincoln) cavalry. 

Col. Blenker's Brigade. — 8th and 27th 
regiments New York volunteers, 27th regi- 
ment Pennsylvania volunteers, and Gari- 
haldi Guard,"^ New York volunteers. 

Col. Richardson's Brigade. — 12th regi- 
ment New York volunteers, and 2d and 3d 
regiments Michigan volunteers. 

Brig. Gen. Stone's Brigade. — 34th and 
Tammany regiments New York volunteers, 
1st regiment Minnesota volunteers, and 2d 
reginaent New York State Militia. 

Col. Wm. F. Smith's Brigade. — 2d and 
3d regiments Vermont volunteers, 6th 
regunent Maine volunteers, 33d regiment 
New York volunteers, company H, 2d 
United States cavalry, and Captain Mott's 
New York battery. 

Col. Couch's Brigade. — 2d regiment 
Rhode Island volunteers, 7th and 10th 
regiments Massachusetts volunteers, and 
3bth regiment New York volunteers. 

The 2d regiment Maine, the 2d regiment 
Wisconsin, and the 13th regiment New 
York volunteers, stationed at Fort Corco- 
ran. 

The 21st regiment New York volunteers, 
stationed at Fort Runyon. 

The 17th regiment New York volun- 
teers, stationed at Fort Ellsworth. 

By October the new levies had arrived 
in sufficient numbers, and the process of 
organization so far carried on that the con- 
struction of divisions had been effected. 

The following statement exhibits the 
composition of the army," October 15, 1861. 

Organization of army of the Potomac, 
October 15, 1861. 

1. Brig. Gen. George Stoneman's cav- 
alry command.— ^th. United States cav- 
alry. 4th Pennsylvania cavalry, Oneida 
cavalry, (one company,) 11th Pennsylva- 
nia cavalry, (Harlan's,) and Barker's Illi- 
nois cavalry, (one company.) 

2. Col. H. J. Hunt's artillery reserve. — 
Batteries L, A, and B, 2d United States 
artillery, batteries K and F, 3d United 
States artillery, battery K, 4th United 
States artillery, battery H, 1st United 
States artillery, and battery A, 5th United 
States artillery. 

3. CITY GUARD, BRIO. GEN, ANDREW PORTER. 

^ Cavalry. — Companies A and E, 4th 
United States cavalry. 

Arullery.—B'jiiiQTy K,5th United States 
artillery. 

Infantry.— 2(\ and 3d battalions. United 



States infantry, 8th and 1st companies 
United States infantry, and Sturgis' rifles, 
(Illinois volunteers.) 

4. bank's division. 

Cavalry. — Four companies 3d regiment 
New York cavalry, (Van Allen's.) 

Artillery.— Best's battery E, 4th United 
States artillery, detachment 9th New York 
artillery, Matthew's battery E, 1st Penn- 
sylvania artillery, Tompkin's battery A, 
1st Rhode Island artillery. 

//y^anirj/.— Abercrombie's brigade : 12th 
Massachusetts, 12th and 16th Indiana, and 
30th Pennsylvania volunteers. Stiles's 
brigade : 3d Wisconsin, 29th Pennsylva- 
nia, and 13th Massachusetts volunteers, 
and 9th New York State militia. Gor- 
don's brigade : 2d Massachusetts, 28th and 
19th New York, 5th Connecticut, 46th and 
28th Pennsylvania, and 1st Maryland vol- 
unteers. 

m'dowell's division. 

Cavalry. — 2d New York cavalry, (Har- 
ris's Light,) Col. Davis. 

Artillery. — Battery M, 2d, and battery 
G, 1st United States artillery. 

Infantry. — Keys's brigade : 14th New 
York State Militia, and 22d, 24th, and 
30th New York volunteers. Wadsworth's 
brigade: 12th, 21st, 23d, and 35th New 
York volunteers. King's brigade : 2d, 6th, 
and 7th Wisconsin, and 19th Indiana vol- 
unteers. 

heintzeljian's division. 

Cavalry. — 1st New Jersey cavalry, Col. 
Halsted. 

Artillery. — Thompson's battery C, United 
States artillery. 

Infantry. — Richardson's brigade: 2d, 3d, 
and 5th Michigan, and 37th New York 
volunteers. Sedgwick's brigade : 3d and 4th 
Maine, and 38th and 40th New York 
volunteers. Jameson's brigade ; 32d, 6od, 
61st, and 45th Pennsylvania volunteers, 
and Wild Cat reserves, (Pennsylvania 
Volunteers.) 

F. J. porter's division. 

Cavalry. — 3d Pennsylvania cavalry, Col. 
Averill, and 8th Pennsylvania cavalry. Col. 
Gregg. 

Artillery. — Battery E, 2d, and battery 
*E, 3d United States artillery. 

Infantry. — Morell's brigade : 33d Penn- 
sylvania, 4th Michigan, 9th Massachusetts, 
and 4th New York volunteers. Martin- 
dale's brigade : 13th New York, 2d Maine, 
and 18th Massachusetts volunteers, and 
DeKalb regiment New York volunteers. 
Butterfield's brigade : 50th New York, 
83d Pennsylvania, (Col. McLean,) 17th 

*This battery was transferred to Sherman's expedition 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAK 



i; 



and 25th New York volunteers, and Stock- 
ton's independent Michigan regiment. 

frank-lin's division. 

Cavalry. — let New York cavalry, Col. 
McReynolds. 

Artillery. — Batteries D and Gr, 2d United 
States artillery, and Hexamer's battery, 
(New Jersey volunteers.) 

Infantry. — Kearney's brigade : 1st, 2d, 
3d, and 4th New Jersey volunteers. Slo- 
c urn's brigade; 16th, 2Gth, and 27th New 
York, and 6th Maine volunteers. Newton's 
brigade: 15th, 18th, 31st, and 32d New 
York volunteers. 

stone's division. 

Cavalry. — Six companies 3d New York 
(Yan Allen) cavalry. 

Artillery. — Kirby's battery 1, 1st United 
States, Vaughn's battery B, 1st Rhode 
Island artillery, and Bunting's 6th New 
York independent battery. 

Infantry. — (xorman's brigade : 2d New 
York State Militia, 1st Minnesota, 15th 
Massachusetts, and 34th New Yprk volun- 
teers and Tammany regiment, (New York 
volunteers.) Lander's brigade ; 19th and 
20th Massachusetts, and 7tli Michigan 
volunteers, and a company of Massachu- 
Betts sharpshooters. Baker's brigade : 
Pennsylvania volunteers, (1st, 2d, 3d, 
California.) 

buell's division. 

Artillery. —B^iiQnQs D and H, 1st Penn- 
sylvania artillery. 

Infanfry. — Couch's brigade: 2d Rhode 
Island, 7th and 10th Massachusetts, and 
36th New York volunteers. Graham's 
brigade: 23d and 31st Pennsylvania, and 
67th (1st Long Island) and 65th (1st Uni- 
ted States chasseurs) New York volun- 
teers. Peck's brigade : 13th and 21st 
Pennsylvania, and 62d (Anderson Zou- 
aves) and 55th New York volunteers. 

m'call's division. 

Cavalry.— \?,i Pennsylvania reserve cav- 
alry. Col. Bayard. 

-4r<i7/er?/.— Easton's battery A, Cooper's 
battery B, and Kein's battery G, 1st Peun- 
Bylvania artillery. 

Infantry. — Meade's brigade : 1st rifles 
Pennsylvania reserves, 4th, 3d, 7th, 11th. 
and 2d Pennsylvania reserve infantry. 
■ brigade: 5th, 1st, and 8th Pennsyl- 
vania reserve infantry. brigade : 10th, 

6th, 9th, and 12th Pennsylvania reserve 
infantry. 

hookkr's division. 

Cavalry. — Eight companies 3d Indiana 
cavalry, Lieut. Col. Carter. 

Artillery. — Elder's battery E, 1st Uni- 
ted States artillery. 



Infantry. brigade: 1st and 11th 

Massachusetts, 2d New Hampshire, 26th 
Pennsylvania, and 1st Michigan volun- 
teers. Sickles's brigade : 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 
and 5th regiments Excelsior brigade. New 
York volunteers. 

blenker's brigade. 

Cavalry. — 4th New York cavalry, 
(mounted rifles,) Col. Dickel. 

Artillery. — One battery. 

Infantry.-Sih and 29th New York. 27th, 
and 35th Pennsylvania, Garibaldi Guarcl 
and Cameron rifles, (New York volun- 
teers.) 

smith's division. 

Cavalry. — 5th Pennsylvania Cavalry, 
(Cameron dragoons,) Col Friedman. 

Artillery. — Ayres' battery F, 5th United 
States artillery, Mott's 2d New York in- 
dependent battery, and Barr's battery E, 
1st Pennsylvania artillery. 

Infantry. brigade : 2d, 3d, 4th, 

and 5th Vermont volunteers. Steven's 
brigade : 35th and 49th New York and 
6th Maine volunteers, and *79th New York 
State militia. Hancock's brigade : *47th 
and 49th Pennsylvania, 43d New York, 
and 5th Wisconsin volunteers. Companies 
B and E, Berdan's sharpshooters. 

Casey's provisional brigades. — 5th, 6th, 
and 7th New Jersey volunteers, *Round-' 
Head regiment, (Pennsylvania volunteers.) 
battalion District of Columbia volunteers, 
40th Pennsylvania, 8th New Jersey, and 
4th New Hampshire volunteers. 

5. Garrison of Alexandria. — Brig. Gen. 
Montgomery, military governor. Cameron 
Guard, (Pennsjivania volunteers.) 

Garrison of Fort Albany. — 14th Mas- 
sachusetts volunteers. 

Garrison of Fort Richardson. — 4th 
Connecticut volunteers. 

Garrison of Fort Washington. — Com- 
pany D, 1st United States artillery, com- 
panies H and I, 37th New York volunteers, 
and United States recruits unassigned. 

6. DIX'S division, BALTIMORE. 

Cavalry. — Company of Pennsylvania 
cavalry. 

Artillery. — Battery I, 2d United States 
artillery, 2d Massachusetts light battery, 
and a battery of New York artillery. 

Infantry. — 3d, 4th, and 5th New York, 
17th and 25th Massachusetts, 21st Indiana, 
6th Michigan, 4th Wisconsin, 7th Maine, 
2d Maryland battalion, and Reading city 
guard, volunteers. 

On the 8th of March, 18ft2, the Presi- 
dent directed, by the following order, the 
organization of the active portion of the 

* The 79th Now York State militia, the 47th Penn- 
sylvania volunteers, and the Round-Head regiment, 
were transferred to Gen. Sherman's expedition. 



14 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



army of the Potomac into four army 
corps, and the formation of a fifth corps 
from th(; division of Banks and Shields. 

The following is the text of the Presi- 
dent's order: 

" [President's (Jeneral War Order No. 2.] 
" Executive Mansion, 

■ " Washinfrton, March 8. 1862. 

" Ordored. 1st. That the major-general I 
coniinaiiding the army of the Potomac j 
proceed forthwith to organize that part 
of the said army destined to enter upon 
active operations, (including the reserve, 
but excluding the troops to be left in the 
fortifications about Washington,) into four 
army corps, to be commanded according 
to seniority of rank, as follows : 

" First corps to consist of four divisions, [ 
and to 1)0 commanded by Major Gen. I. 
McDowell. Second corps to consist of 
three divisions, and to be commanded by 
Brig. iicn. E. Y. Sumner. Third corps to 
consist of three divisions, and to be com- 
manded by Brig. Gen. S. P. Heintzehnan. 
Fourth corps to consist of three divisions, 
and to be commanded by Brig. Gen. E. D. 
Keyes. 

"2. That the divisions now commanded 
by. the officers above assigned to the com- 
mands of army corps shall be embraced 
iu and form part of their respective corps. 

"3. The forces left for the defence of 
Washington will be placed in command 
of Brig. Gen. James Wadsworth, who shall 
also be military governor of the District 
of Columbia. 

"4. That this order be executed with 
auch promptness and despatch as not to 
delay the commencement of the operations 
already directed to be undertaken by the 
army of the Potomac. 

" 5. A fifth army corps, to be com- 
manded by Major Gen. N. P. Banks, will 
be formed from his own and Gen. Shields's 
(late Gen. Lander's) division. 

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN." 

The following order, which was made as 
soon as circumstances permitted, exhibits 
the steps taken to carry out the require- 
ments of the President's war order No. 2 : 

"ARMY CORPS. 

'• Ukahqt-artkus Army of the Potomac, 

"Fairfax C. IL, Va., March 13, 1862. 
[(jK.vERAL Orders No. 151.] 

"In compliance with the President's 
war order No. 2, of March 8, 1862, the 
active portion of the army of the Potomac 
is formed into army corps, as follows : 

"First corps, Major Glen. Irwin Mc- 
Dowell, to consist for the present of the 
divisions of Franklin, McCall, and King. 
Second corps, Brig. Gen. E.V.Sumner; 



divisions, Richardson, Blenker, and Sedg- 
wick. Third corps. Brig. Gen. S. P. 
ileintzelman ; divisions, F. J. Porter, 
Hooker, and Hamilton. Fourth corps. 
Brig. Gen. E. D. Koyes ; divisions, Couch, 
Smith, and Casey. Fifth corps. Major 
Gen. N. P. Banks ; divisions, Williams, 
and Shields. 

" The cavalry regiments attached to 
divisions will, for the present remain so. 
Subsequent orders wall provide for these 
regiments, as well as for the reserve artil- 
lery. Regular infantry and regular cav- 
alry arrangements will be made to unite 
the divisions of each army corps as 
promptly as possible. 

"The commanders of divisions will at 
once report in person, or where that it 
is impossible, by letter, to the commander 
of their army corps. 

" By command of Major Gen. McClellan. 
"A. V. COLBURN. 
Assist. Adj. Gen. 

I add a statement of the organization 
and composition of the troops on April 1, 
commencing with the portion of the army 
of the Potomac which went to the Penin- 
sula, giving afterwards the regiments and 
batteries left on the Potomac, and in 
Maryland and Virginia after April 1, 
1862. 
Troops of the army of the Potomac seni 

to the Peninsula in March and early 

in April 1862. 

1st. Cavalry reserve. Brig. Gen. P. St. 
.G. Cooke.— Emery's brigade : 5th United 
States cavalry ; 6th United States cavalry ; 
6th Pennsylvania cavalry. Blake's brig- 
ade : 1st United States cavalry ; 8th Penn- 
sylvania cavalry ; Barker's squadron Illi- 
nois cavalry. 

2d. Artillery reserve. Colonel Henry J. 
Hunt : Graham's battery K and G, 1st 
United States, 6 Napoleon guns ; Ran- 
dall's battery E, 1st United States, 6 
Napoleon guns ; Carlisle's battery B, 2d 
United States, 6 20-pounder Parrott guns ; 
Robertson's battery, 2d United States. 6 
3-inch ordnance guns ; Benson's battery 
M, 2d United States, 6 3-inch ordnance 
guns; Tidball's battery A, 2d United 
States, 6 3-inch ordnance guns ; Edward's 
battery L and M, 3d United States, 6 10- 
pounder Parrott guns ; Gibson's battery C 
and G, 3d United States, 6 3-inch ord- 
nace guns; Livingston's battery F and K, 
3d United States, 4 10-pound'er Parrott 
guns ; Howe's battery G, 4th United States, 
6 Napoleon guns ; De Russey's battery K, 
4th United States, 6 Napoleon guns ; 
Weed's battery I, 5th United States, 6 
3-inch ordnance guns ; Smead's battery K, 
5th United States, 4 Napoleon guns ; 
Ames's battery A, 5th United States, 



KEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



15 



6 — 4 lO-pounder Parrott and 2 Napoleon 
guns ; Diedrick's battery A, New York 
artillery and battalion, 6 20-pounder Par- 
rott guns ; Vog-elie's battery B, New 
York artillery and battalion, 4 20-pounder 
"Parrott guns ; Knicrim's battery C, New 
York artillery and battalion, 4 20-poufider 
Parrott guns ; Grimm's battery 1), New 
York artillery and battalion, 6 32-pounder 
howitzer guns. Total, 100 gnns. 

3d. Volunteer engineer troops, Gen. 
Woodbury : l.ith New York volunteers ; 
50th New York volunteers. 

Regular engineer troops. Captain Du- 
ane : Companies A, B, and C, United 
States engineers. 

Artillery troops, with siege trains : 1st 
Connecticut heavy artillery, Col. Tyler. 

4th. Infantry reserve, (regular brigade,) 
Gen. Sykes : 9 companies 2d United States 
infantry, 7 companies 3d United .States 
infantry, 10 companies 4th United States 
infantry, 10 companies 6th United States 
infantry. 8 companies 10th and ITth United 
States infantry, 6 companies 11th United 
States infantry, 8 companies 12th United 
States infantry, 9 companies 14th United 
States infantry, and 5th New York volun- 
teers. Col. AVarren. 

SECOND CORPS, GEN. SUMNER. 

Cavalry. — 8th Illinois cavalry. Col. 
Farnsworth, and one squadron 6th New 
York cavalry. 

Richardson's division. 

Artillery. — Clark's battery A and G, 
4th United States, 6 Napoleon guns ; 
Frank's battery G, 1st New York, 6 10- 
pounder Parrott guns ; Petitt's battery B, 
1st New York, 6 10-pounder Parrott 
guns ; Hogan's battery A, 2d New York, 
6 10-pounder Parrott guns. 

Infantry. — Howard's brigade : 5th New 
Hampshire, 81st Pennsylvania, and 61st 
and 64th New York volunteers. Meagh- 
er's brigade : 69th, 63d, and 8Sth New 
York volunteers. French's brigade : .'i2d, 
57th, and 66th New York, and 53d Penn- 
sylvania volunteers. 

Sedgwick's division. 

A rtillery. — Kirby's battery 1, 1st United 
States, 6 Napoleon guns ; "Tonipkin's bat- 
tery A, 1st Rhode Island, 6 4 10-pounder 
Parrott and 2 12-pounder howitzer guns ; 
Bartlett's battery B, 1st Rhode Island, 6 
4 10-pounder Parrott and 2 r2-pounder 
• howitzer gims; Owen's battery G, 6 3-inch 
ordnance guns. 

Infantry. — Gorman's brigade : 2d New 
York State militia, and 151h ^lassa- 
chusetts, 34th New York, and 1st Maine 
volunteers. Burns's brigade : 69th, 71st, 
72d, and 106th Pennsylvania volunteers. 
Dana's brigade: 19th and 20th Massa- 



chusetts. 7th Michigan, and 42d New York 
volunteers. 

Note. — Blenker's division detached and 
assigned to the mountain department. 

THIRD CORPS, GEN. HEINTZEL- 
MAN. 

Cavalry. — 3d Penn.sylvania cavalry, Col. 
Averill. 

portkr's division. 

Artillery. — Griffin's battery K, 5th 
United States, 6 10-pounder Parrott gnus : 
Weedeu's battery C, Rhode Island ; Mar- 
tin's battery C, Massachusetts, 6 Napoleon 
guns ; Allen's battery E, Massachusetts, 6 
3-inch ordnance guns. 

Ivfantry. — Martindale's brigade : 2d 
Maine, 18th and 22d Massachusetts, and 
25th and 13th New York volunteers. 
Morell's brigade: 14th New York, 4th 
Michigan, 9th Massachusetts, and 62d 
Pennsylvania volunteers. Butterfield's 
brigade : 17th, 44th. and 12th New York, 
83d Pennsylvania, and Stockton's Michi- 
gan volunteers. 

First Berdan sharpshooters. 

hooker's division. 

Artillery.— BfiWii battery H. 1st United 
States. 6 4 10-pounder Parrott and 2 
12-pounder howitzer guns; Smith's bat- 
tery, 4th New York. 6 10-pounder Par- 
rott guns ; Barmhall's battery, 6th New 
York, 6 3-inch ordnance guns ; Osborn's 
battery D, 1st New York artillery, 4 3-inch 
ordnance guns. 

Infantry. — Sickle's brigade : 1st, 2d, 3d, 
4th, and 5th p]xcelsior, New York. Na- 
glee's brigade : 1st and 11th Massachusetts, 
26th Pennsylvania, and 2d New Hamp- 
shire volunteers. Col. Starr's brigade : 
5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th New Jersey volun- 
teers. 

hamii-ton's division. 

Artillery. — Thompson's battery G, 2d 
United States, 6 Napoleon guns ; Beam's 
battery B, New Jersey, 6 4 10-pounder 
Parrott and 2 Napoleon guns ; Ran- 
dolph's battery E, Rhode Island, 6 4 
10-pounder Parrott and 2 Napoleon 
guns. 

/??/a??/rt/.— Jameson's brigade : 105th. 
63d, and 57th Pennsylvania, and 87th 
New York volunteers. Birney's brigade : 
38th and 40th New York, and 3d and 4th 

Maine volunteers. brigade : 2d, 

3d. and 5th Michigan, and 37th New York 
volunteers. 

FOURTH CORPS, (3EN. KBYES. 

couch'.s division. 

Artillery. — McCarthy's battery C, Ist 

Pennsylvania, 4 10-pounder Parrott guns ; 

Flood's battery D, 1st Pennsylvania, 4 

10-pouuder Parrott guns ; Miller's battery 



16 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



E, 1st Tcnnsylvania, 4 Napoleon puns; 
Brady's battery F, 1st Feunsylvauia, 4 
10-po'under Farrott guns. 

Infantry. — Uraliam's brigade : 6Tth (1st 
Long Island) and (ir)tli (1st United States 
chasseurs) New York, 23d. :Ust, and 61st 
Pennsylvania volunteers. Peek's brigade : 
ybth. 102d. and ^'M\ Pennsylvania, and 62d 
nnd Giltli New York volunteers. 



brigade : 2d Rhode Island, 7th and 10th 
Massachusetts, and 36th New York volun- 
teers. 

smith's division. 

Artillery.— \}-\'g'?. battery F, 5th United 
States, 6 4 lO-pounder Farrott and 2 
Napoleon guns ; Mott's battesy, 3d New 
York. 6 4 lO-pounder Parrott and 2 Na- 
poleon guns ; "Wheeler's battery f], 1st 
New York, 4 3-mch ordnance gnns; Ken- 
nedy's battery, 1st New York, 6 3-inch 
OJ'diiance guns. 

Infantry. — TIancock's brigade: 4th Wis- 
consin, 49th Pennsylvania, 43d New York, 
and 6th Maine volunteers. Brook's bri- 
gade : 2d, 3d. 4th. .")th. and Gth Vermont ' 
volunteers. Davidson'sbrigade: 33d, TTth, 
and 49th New York, and 7th Maine volun- 
teers. 

Casey's division. 

Artillery. — Regan's battery, 7th New 
York, 6 3-inch ordnance guns; Fitch's 
sth New York, 6 3-inch ordnance guns ; 
Bates's battery A, 1st New York, 6 Na- 
jioleon guns ; Spratt's battery H, 1st New 
York, 4 3-inch ordnance guns. 

Infantry. — Keim's brigade : 8.5th, 101st, 
and 103d Pennsylvania, and 96th New 
York volunteers. Palmer's brigade : S.oth, 
•JHth. 92d, 81st, and i)3d New York volun- 
teers. brigade : 104th, and 52d 

Pennsylvania, .56tii and 100th New York, 
ajid 11th Maine volunteers. 

5th. Provost guard : 2d United States 
ottvalry ; battalions 8th and 17th United 
States infantry. 

At general headquarters : 2 companies 
4th United States cavalry; 1 company 
Oneida cavalry, (New York Volunteers ;) 
and 1 company Sturgcs's rifles, (Illinois 
volunteers.) 

The following troops of the army of the 
Potomac, were left behind, or detached on 
and in front of tlie Potomac for the de- 
fence of that line. April 1, 1862. Frank- 
lin's and McCall's divisions, at subsequent 
and diilcriMit dates, joined the active por- 
tion of the army on the Peninsula. Two 
brigades of Shield's division joined at 
Harrison's landing : 

FIRST CORPS, GEN. McDOWELL. 

Cavalry.— l^i. 2d, and 4th New York, 
and 1st Pennsylvania. 

Sharpsltooters.— 2d regiment Berdan's 
eharpsliootcrs. 



FRANKLIN S DIVISION. 

./I rj'27/erv.— Piatt's battery D, 2d United 
States, 6 Napoleon guns ; Porter's battery 
A, Massachusetts, 6 — 4 10-pounder Parrott 
and 2 12-pounder howitzer — guns ; Hex- 
amer's battery A, New Jersey, 6 — 4 10- 
pounder Parrott and 2 12-pounder howit- 
zer—guns ; Wilson's battery F, 1st New 
York artillery. 4 3-inch ordnance guns. 

Infantry. — Kearney's brigade : 1st, 2d, 
3d, and 4th New Jersey volunteers. Slo- 
cum's brigade : 16th and 27th New York, 
5th Maine, and 96th Pennsylvania volun- 
teers. Newton's brigade : 18th, 31st, and 
32d New York, and 95th Pennsylvania 
volunteers. 

m'call's division. 

^r/i'Z/e?-?/.— Seymour's battery C, 5th 
United States, 6 Napoleon guns ; Easton's 
battery A, 1st Pennsylvania, 4 Napoleon 
guns ; Cooper's battery B, 1st Pennsyl- 
vania, 6 — 2 10-pounder and 4 12-pounder 
Parrott — guns. 

Infantry. — Reynold's brigade : 1st, 2d, 
5th, and 8tli Pennsylvania reserve regi- 
ments. Meade's brigade : 3d, 4th, 7th, and 
llth Pennsylvania reserve regiments. 
Ord's brigade : 6th, 9th, 10th, and 12th 
Pennsylvania reserve regiments. 

1st Pennsylvania reserve rifles. 

king's division. 

Artillery. — Gibbon's battery B, 4th 
United States, 6 Napoleon guns ; Mon- 
roe's battery D, 1st Rhode Island, 6 10- 
pounder Parrott guns ; Gerrish's battery 
A, New Hampshire, 6 Napoleon guns ; 
Durrell's battery, Pennsylvania, 6 10-poun- 
der Parrott guns. 

Infantry. brigade : 2d, Gth, and 

7th Wiscon.sin, and 19th Indiana volun- 
teers. Patrick's brigade : 20th, 21st, 23d, 
and 25th New York State militia. Augur's 
brigade : 14th New York State militia, 
and 22d, 24th, and 30th New York volun- 
teers. 

FIFTH CORPS, GEN. BANKS. 

Cavalry. — 1st Maine. 1st Vermont, 1st 
Michigan, 1st Rhode Island, 5th and 8th 
New York, Keyes battalion of Pennsyl- 
vania, 18 companies of Maryland, 1 squad- 
ron of Virginia. 

Unattached . — 28th Pennsylvania volun- 
teers, and 4th regiment Potomac home 
brigade, (Maryland volunteers.) 
Williams's division. 

Artillery.— ^Q&Vs, battery F, 4th United 
States, 6 Napoleon guns ; Hampton's 
battery. Maryland, 4 10-pounder Parrott 
guns ; Thompson's battery, Maryland, 4 
lO-pounder Parrott guns; Mathew's battery 
F, Pennsylvania, 6 3-inch ordnance guns; 

battery M, 1st New York, 6 10 

pounder Parrq^t guns ; Knapp's battery, 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



17 



Pennsylvania. 6 10-pounder Parrott f^nns ; 
McMahon's battery, New York, 6 o-iacli 
ordnance guns. 

Infantry. — Abercrombie's brigade : 12th 
and 2d Massachusetts, and IGth Indiana. 
1st Potomac home brigade, (Maryland.) 
1 company Zouaves D'Afrique, (Pcnn.syl- 

vania) volunteers. brigade : 9th 

New York State militia, and 29th Penn- 
sylvania, 29th Indiana, and 3d Wisconsin 

volunteers. brigade : 28th New 

York, 5th Connecticut, 46th Pennsylvania, 
1st Maryland, 12th Indiana, and 13th 
Massachusetts volunteers. 

shield's division. 

Artillery. — Clark's battery E,4th United 
States, 6 10-pounder Parrott guns ; Jenk's 
V)attery A, 1st Virginia, 4 10-pounder 
Parrott and 2 6-pounder guns ; Davy's 
battery B, 1st Virginia, 2 10-pounder 
Parrott guns ; Huntington's battery A, 
1st Ohio, 6 13-pounder James's guns ; 
Robinson's battery L, 1st Ohio, 2 12- 
pouudcr howitzers and 4 (5-pounder guns ; 
and battery, 4th Ohio Artillery. 

Infantry. — brigade : 14th 

Indiana, 4th, 8th, and 6Tth Ohio, 7th 
Virginia, and 84th Pennsylvania volun- 
teers. brigade : 5th, 62d, and 

6Gth Ohio, 13th Indiana, and 39th Illinois 

volunteers. — ■ brigade : 7th and 

29th Ohio, 7th Indiana, 1st Virginia, 
and 11th Pennsylvania volunteers. An- 
drew sharpshooters. 

GEN. WADSWORTIl's COMMAND. 

Cavalry. — 1st New Jersey cavalry, at 
Alexandria, and 4th Pennsylvania cavalry, 
east of the Capitol. 

Artillery and Infantry. — 10th New 
Jersey, volunteers, Bladensburg road ; 
104th New York volunteers, Kaloratna 
heights ; 1st AVisconsin heavy artillery. 
Fort Cass, Virginia ; 3 batteries of New 
York artillery, Forts Ethan Allen and 
Marcy ; depot of New York light artillery, 
Camp Barry ; 2d District of Columbia 
volunteers, Washington city ; 26th Penn- 
sylvania volunteers, (i street wharf; 26th 
New York volunteers, Fort Lyon ; 95th 
New York volunteers. Camp Thomas ; 
94th New York and detachment of 88th 
Pennsylvania volunteers, Alexandria : 91st 
Pennsylvania volunteers, Franklin Square 
barracks; 4th New York artillery. Forts 
Carrol and Creble ; 112tli Pennsylvania 
volunteers. Fort Saratoga ; 76th New 
Y'ork volunteers. Fort Massachusetts ; 
59th New York volunteers, Fort Pennsyl- 
vania; detachment of 88th Pennsylvania 
volunteers. Fort Glood Hope ; 99th Penn- 
sylvania volunteers. Fort Mahon ; 2d New 
York light artillery, Forts Ward, Worth, 
and Bleaker ; 107th and 54th Pennsylva- 



nia volunteers, Kendall Green ; Dicker- 
son's light artillery, 86th New York, and 
detachment of 88th Pennsylvania voh;n- 
teers, east of the Capitol; 14th Massachu- 
setts (volunteers) heavy artillery and 56th 
Pennsylvanux volunteers, Forts Albany, 
Tillinghast, Richardson, Runyon, Jack- 
son, Barnard, Craig, and Scott; detach- 
ments of 4th United States artillery and 
37th New York volunteers. Fort Wash- 
ington; 97th, 101st, and 91st New York, 
and 12th Virginia volunteers, Fort Cor- 
coran. 

In camp near Washington. — 6th and 
10th New York, Swain's New York, and 
2d Pennsylvania cavalry, all dismounted. 

These troops (3,359 men) were ordered 
to report to Col. Miles, commanding the 
railroad guard, to relieve 3.306 older troops 
ordered to be sent to Manassas to report 
to Gen. Abercrombie. 

GEN. DIX'S COMMAND, BALTIMORE. 

Cavalry. — 1st Maryland cavalry and de- 
tachment of Purnell legion cavalry. 

Artillery .—Bn.iiGrY 1, 2d United States ; 
battery — , Maryland; battery L, 1st New 
York, and two independent battei'ies of 
Pennsylvania artillery. 

Infantry. — 3d and 4th New York, 11th, 
87th, and 111th Pennsylvania, detachment 
21st Massachiisetts, 2d Delaware. 2d Mary- 
land, 1st and 2d Eartern Shore (Maryland) 
home gu.ards, and Purnell legion (two bat- 
talions) Maryland volunteers. 

In a staff charged with labors so various 
and important as that of the army of the 
Potomac, a chief was indispensable to 
supervise the various departments and to 
relieve the commanding general of details. 
The officer of chief of staff, well known in 
European armies, had not been considered 
necessary in our small peace establisjimeut. 
The functions of the office were not defined, 
and. so far as exercised, had been included 
in the Adj. General's department. The 
small number of officers in this department, 
and the necessity for their employment in 
other duties, have obliged commanding 
generals, during this war, to resort to 
other branches of the service to furnish 
suitable chiefs of staff. 

On the 4th of September, 1861, I ap- 
pointed Col. II. B. Marcy, of the inspector 
general's department, chief of staff", and he 
entered upon service immediately, discharg- 
ing the various and important duties with 
great fidelity, industry, and ability, fi'om 
this period until I was removed from com- 
mand at Rectortown. Many improvements 
have been made daring the war in our 
system of staff administration, but much 
remains to be done. 

Our own experience, and that of other 
armies, agree in dotermiiiiug the neceseity 



18 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



for an cfficirnt and able staff. To obtain 
this, our staff establishment should be 
based on correct principles, and extended 
to be adequate to the necessities of the 
service, and should include a systeua of 
staff and line education. 

Tlie affairs of the Adj. General's depart- 
ment, while I commanded the army of the 
Potdinac, were conducted by Brig.-Gen.- 
S. AViiliams, assisted by Lieut.-Col.' James 
A. Hardie, aide-de-camp. Their manage- 
ment of the department during the organi- 
zation of the army in the fall and winter 
of 18(il, and during its subsequent opera^ 
tions in the field, was excellent. 

They were, during the entire period, 
assisted by Capt. Richard B. Irwin, aide- 
de-camp, and during the organization of 
the army by the following-named officers : 
Capts. Joseph Kirkland, Arthur McClellan, 
M. T. Mc^lahon, William P. Mason, and 
\Viliiam F. Biddle, aides-de-camp. 

ilv personal staff, when we embarked 
for the Peninsula, consisted of Col. Tho- 
mas M. Key. additional aide-de-camp; Col. 
E. ir.Wriglit, additionai aide-de-camp and 
major, 6th United States cavalry ; Col. 
T. T. Gantt, additional aide-de-camp ; Col. 
J. J. Astor, jr., volunteer aide-de-camp ; 
Lieut.-Col. A. V. Colburn, additional aide- 
de-camp and captain, Adj. General's de- 
partment ; Lieut.-Col. N. B. Sweitzer, ad- 
ditional aide-de-camp and captain, 1st 
United States cavalry ; Lient.-Col. Edward 
McK. Hudson, additional aide-de-camp and 
captain l-tth United States infantry ; Lieut.- 
Col. Paul Von Radowitz, additional aide- 
de-camp ; Major H. Von Hammerstein, 
additional aide-de-camp ; Major W. W. 
Russell, United States marine corps ; Ma^ 
jor P. LeOompte, of the Swiss army, volun- 
teer aide-de-camp ; Capts. Joseph K irk- 
land. Arthur McClellan, L. P. D'Orleans, 
R. D'Orleans M. T. McMahon, William 
P. Mason, jr., William F. Biddle, and E. 
A. Raymond, additional aides-de-camp. 

To this numl)er I am tempted to add the 
Prince de Joiuville, who constantly ac- 
companied me through the trying .cam- 
paign of the Peninsula, and frequently 
rendered important services. Of these offi- 
cers Capt. McMahon was assigned to the 
personal staff of 15rig.-Gen. Fr'anklin, and 
Capts. Kirklund ami Mason to that of 
Brig.-(ien. F. J. I'ortor during the siege 
of Yorktown. They remained subsequently 
•with those general officers. Major Le- 
Conipte left the army during the siege of 
Yorktown ; Cols. Gantt and Astor, Major 
Russell, Capts. L. P. D'Orleans, R. D'Or- 
leans, and Raymond at the close of the 
Peninsula campaign. Before its termina- 
tion Capts. W. S. Abort and Charles R. 
Lowell, of the Gth United Statos cavalry, 
joined my staff as aides-de-camp, and re- 



mained with me until I was relieved from 
the command of the army of the Potomac. 
All of these officers served me -A'ith great 
gallantry and devotion ; they were ever 
ready to execute any service, no matter 
how dangerous, difficult, or fatiguing, 

ENGINEERS. 

When I assumed command of the army 
of the Potomac I found Maj. J. G. Bar- 
nard, United States engineers, subsequently 
brigadier general of volunteers, occuyping 
the position of chief engineer of that army. 
I continued him in the same office, and at 
once gave the necessary instructions for 
the completion of the defences of the ca- 
pital, and for the entire reorganization of 
the department. 

Under his direction the entire system of 
defences was carried into execution. This 
was completed' before the army departed 
for Fort Monroe, and is a sufficient evi- 
dence of the skill of the engineers and the 
diligent labor of the troops. 

For some months after the organization 
of the army of the Potomac was commenced 
there were no engineer troops with it. At 
length, however, three companies were 
assigned. Under the skilful management 
of Capt. J. C. Duane, United States en- 
gineers, these new companies rapidly be- 
came efficient, and, as will be seen, ren- 
dered most valuable service during the en- 
] suing campaigns 

The number of engineer troops being 
j entirely inadequate to the necessities of 
the army, an effort was made to partially 
I remedy this defect by detailing the 15th 
and 50th New York volunteers, -which con- 
I tained many sailors and mechanics, as 
I engineer troops. They were first placed 
under the immediate superintendence of 
Lieut.-Col. B. S. Alexander, United States 
engineers, by whom they were instructed 
in the duties of pontoniers, and became 
somewhat familiar with those of sappers 
and miners. Previous to the movement of 
the army for the Peninsula this brigade 
was placed under the command of Brig.- 
Gen. D. P. Woodbury, major United States 
engineers. 

The labor of preparing the engineer and 
bridge trains devolved chiefly upon Capt. 
Duane, who was instructed to procure the 
new model French bridge train, as I was 
satisfied that the India-rubber pontoon 
was entirely useless for the general pur- 
poses of a campaign. 

The engineer department presented the 
following complete organization when the 
army moved for the Peninsula : 

Brig.-Gen J. G. Barnard, chief engineer; 
First Lieut. H. C. Abbott, topographical 
engineers, aide-de-camp. Brigade volun- 
teer engineers, Brig.-Gen. Woodbury com- 



RErORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 




manding: 15th New York volunteers 
Col. McLeod irurphy ; 50tli New York 
volunteers, Col. C. B. Stewart. Battalion, 
three companies United States engineers,' 
Capt. J. C. Duane commanding; "conipa! 
nies respectively commanded by First 
Lieuts. C. B. Reese, C. E. Cross, and 0. E 
Babcock, United States engineers. The 
chief engineer was ablv assisted in his du- 
ties by Lieut.-Col B. "S. Alexander, and 
First Lieuts. C. R. Comstock, M D Mc- 
Alester, and Merrill, United States en- 
gineers. Capt. C. S. Stewart and Second 
Lieut. F. U. Farquhar, United States en- 
gineers, joined after the army arrived at 
Fort Monroe. 

The necessary bridge equipage for the 
operations of a large armv had been col- 
lected, consisting of bateaux with the 
anchors and flooring material, (French 
model,) trestles, and engineers' tools, with 
the necessary wagons for their transpor- 
tation. 

The small niunber of officers of this 
corps available rendered it impracticable 
to detail engineers permanentiy at the 
headquarters of corps and divisions. The 
companies of regular engineers never had 

their ""--■""•• '- " "" 

nece 

of 

whenever their services were required. 

TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS, 

Td the corps of topographical engineers 
was intrusted the collection of topographi- 
cal information and the preparatfon of 
campaign maps. Until a short time pre- 
vious to the departure of the army for 
Fort Monroe, Lieut.-Col. John W. Macomb 
was in charge of this department, and pre- 
pared a large amount of valuable material 
He was succeeded by Brig.-Gen. A. A 
Humphreys, who retained the position 
throughout the Peninsula campaio-n These 
officers were assisted bv Lieuts. H. L Ab- 
bott, O. G. Wagner, N. Bowen, John M. 
Wilson, and James H. Wilson, topogra- 
phical engineers. This number, beiuf^ the 
greatest available, was so small that much 
of the duty of the department devolved 
upon parties furnished by Prof. Bache 
Superintendent of the Coast Survey and 
other gentlemen from civil life. 

Owing to the entire absence of reliable 
topographical maps, the labors of this 
corps were difficult and arduous in the ex- 
treme. Notwithstanding the energv and 
ability displayed by Gen. Humphreys, 
Lieut.-Gol. Macomb, and their subordi- 
nates, who frequently obtained the neces- 
sary information under fire, the movements 
of the army were sometimes unavoidably 
delayed by the difficulty of obtaining 
knowledge of the country in advanct^ 



19 

The result of their labors has been the 
preparation of an excellent series of maps 
which will be invaluable to any army tra- 
versing the same ground. 

During the campaign it was impossible 
to draw a distinct line of demarcation be- 
tween the duties of the two corps of en- 
gineers so that the labors of reconnoissances 
of roads, of lines of intrenchments, of fields 
lor battle, and of the position of the enemy, 
as well as the construction of siege and 
defensive works, were habitually performed 
by details from either corps, as the con- 
venience of the service demanded. 

I desire to express my high appreciation 
the skill, gallantry, and devotion dis- 
played by the officers of both corps of 
engineers, under the most trying circum- 
stances. 

During the Maryland campaign I united 
the two corps under Capt. J. C. Duane, 
United States engineers, and found great 
advantages from the arrangement. 

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT. 

For the operations of the medical de- 
partment I refer to the reports, transmitted 
herewith, of Surg. Charles S. Trijiler and 
surg. Jonathan Letterman, who, in turn 
perlorined the duties of medical director 
of the army of the Potomac, the former 
from August 12, 1861, until. July 1 1S62 
and the latter after that date. The diffil 
culties to be overcome in organizing- and 
making effective the medical department 
were very great, arising principally from 
the inexperience of the regimental inedical 
officers, many of whom were physicians 
taken suddenly from civil life, who, accord- 
mg to Surg. Tripler, " had to be instructed 
in their duties from the very alphabet " 
and from the ignorance of the line officers 
as to their relations with the medical offi- 
cers which gave rise to confusion and 
conflict of authority. Boards of examina- 
tion were instituted, by which many igno- 
rant officers were removed; and by "the 
successive exertions of Surgs. Tripler and 
Letterman, the medical corps was brought 
to a very high degree of efficiency. With 
regard to the sanitary condition of the ar- 
my while on the Potomac, Dr. Tripler says 
that the records show a constantly in- 
creasing immunity from disease. " In Oc- 
tober and November, 1861, with an army 
averaging 130,000 men, we had 7,9;}2 cases 
of fever of all sorts; of these, about 1,000 
were reported as cases of typhoid fever. 
I know that errors of diagnosis were fre- 
quently committed, and therefore this must 
be considered as the limit of typhoid cases. 
If any army in the world can show such a 
record as this, I do not know when or 
where it was assembled." From September 
18G1, to February, 1862, while the army 



20 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



was incrcasinj)^, the number of sick de- 
creased from 7 per cent, to 6.18 per cent. 
Of these, tlie men sick in the regimental 
and general hosjiitals were less than one- 
half; the rcniainiler were slight cases, 
under treatment in quarters. "During 
this time, so far as rumor was concerned, 
tlie army was being decimated by disease 
every month." Of the sanitary condition 
of the army during the Peninsula cam- 
j)aign, up to its arrival at Harrison's 
landing, Jh-. Tripler says: "During this 
campaign the army was favored with ex- 
cellent health. No epidemic disease ap- 
j)cared. Those scourges of modern armies 
— dysentery, typhus, cholera — were almost 
nnkiiown. ' We had some typhoid fever 
and more inahirial fevers, but even these 
never prevailed to such an extent as to 
create any alarm. The sick reports were 
sometimes larger than we cared to have 
thom ; but the great majority of the cases 
reported were such as did not threaten life 
or permanent disability. I regret that I 
have not before me the retained copies of 
the monthly reports, so that I might give 
accurate statistics. I have endeavored to 
recover them, but have been unsuccessful. 
My recollection is, that the whole sick re- 
port never exceeded 8 per cent, of the force, 
and this including all sorts of cases, the 
trivial as well as the severe. The army 
of the Potomac must be conceded to have 
been the most healthy in the service of the 
United States." 

His remark.s at the conclusion of his re- 
])0rt upon our system of medical adminis- 
tration, and his suggestions for its improve- 
ment, are especially worthy of attention. 

The service, labors, and privations of 
the troops during the seven days' battles 
had, of course, a great effect upon the 
health of the army, after it reached Har- 
rison's landing, increasing the number of 
sick to about 20 per cent, of the whole 
force. 

The nature of the military operations 
had also unavoidably placed the medical 
department in a very unsatisfiictory con- 
dition. .Supplies had been almost entirely 
exhausted or necessarily abandoned ; hos- 
pital tents abandoned or destroyed, and 
the medical officers deficient in numbers 
ami broken down by fatigue. 

All the remarkable energy and ability 
of Surg. Lottennan were required to re- 
store the elTiciency of his department; l)ut 
l)efore we left Harrison's landing he had 
succeeded in fitting it out thoroughly with 
the supplies it required, and the health of 
the army was vastly improved by the 
sanitary measures which were enforced at 
his suggestion. 

The great haste with which the army 
was removed from the Peninsula made it 



necessary to leave at Fort Monroe, to be 
forwarded afterwards, nearly all the bag- 
gage and transportation, including medical 
stores and ambulances, all the vessels being 
required to transport the troops themselves 
and their ammunition ; and when the army 
of the Potomac returned to Washington 
after Gen. Pope's campaign, and the medi- 
cal department came once more under 
Surg. Letterman's control, he found it in 
a deplorable condition. The officers were 
worn out by the labors they had performed, 
and the few supplies tliat had been brought 
from the Peninsula had been exhausted or 
abandoned, so that the work of reorgani- 
zation and resupplying had to be again 
performed, and this while the army was 
moving rapidly, and almost in the face of 
the enemy. That it was successfully ac- 
complished is shown by the care and atten- 
tion which the wounded received after the 
battles of South Mountain and Antietam. 
Among the improvements introduced 
into his department by Surgeon Letterman, 
the principal are the organization of an 
ambulance corps, the system of field hos- 
pitals, and the method of supplying by 
brigades, all of which were instituted dur- 
ing the Maryland campaign, and have 
jsince proved very efficient. 

quartermaster's department. 

On assuming command of the troops 
in and around Washington, I appointed 
Capt. S. Van Vliet, assistant quartermas- 
ter, (afterwards brigadier general,) chief 
quartermaster to my command, and gave 
him the necessary instructions for organ- 
izing his department, and collecting the 
supplies requisite for the large army then 
called for. 

The disaster at Manassas had but re- 
cently occurred, and the army was quite 
destitute of quartermaster's stores. Gen. 
Van Vliet. with great energy and zeal, 
set himself about the task of furnishing 
the supplies immediately necessary, and 
preparing to obtain the still larger amounts 
which would be required by the new troops, 
which were moving in large numbers to- 
wards the capital. The principal depot 
for supplies in the city of Washington 
was under charge of Col. D. H. Rucker, 
assistant quartermaster, who ably per- 
formed his duties. Lieut. Col. R. Ingalls, 
assistant quartermaster, was placed in 
charge of the department on the south 
side of the Potomac. I directed a large 
depot for transportation to be established 
at Perryville, on the left of the Susque- 
hanna, a point equally accessible by rail 
and water. Capt. C. G. Sawtelle, assis- 
tant quartermaster, was detailed to organ- 
ize the camp, and performed his duties to 
my entire satisfaction. Capt. J. J. Daua, 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



21 



&i<sistant quartermaster, had immediate 
cliarge of tho transportation in and about 
Washington, as well as of the large num- 
ber of horses purchased for tho use of the 
artillery and cavalry. The principal difii- 
culties which Gen. Van Vliet had to en- 
counter arose from the inexperience of the 
majority of the oflicers of his department 
in the new regiments and brigades. 

The necessity of attending personally to 
minor details rendered his duties arduous 
and harassing in the extreme. All obstiv 
cles, however, were surmounted by the 
untiring industry of the chief quartermas- 
ter and his immediate subordinates, and 
when the army was prepared to move the 
organization of the department was found 
to be admirable. 

When it was determined to move the 
army to the Peninsula, the duties of pro- 
viding water transportation were devolved 
by the Secretary of War upon his assist- 
ant, the Hon. John Tucker. The vessels 
were ordered to Alexandria, and Lieut. 
Col. Ingalls was placed in immediate 
charge of the embarkation of the troops, 
transportation, and material of every de- 
scription. Operations of this nature, on 
so extensive a scale, liad no parallel in 
the history of our country. 

The arrangements of Lieut. Col. Ingalls 
were perfected with remarkable skill and 
energy, and the army aud its material 
were embarked and transported to Fort- 
ress Monroe in a very short space of time, 
aud entirely without loss. 

During the operations on the Peninsula, 
until the arrival of troops at Harrison's 
Lauding, Gen. Van A^liet retained the po- 
sition of chief quartermaster, and main- 
tained the thorough organization and 
efficiency of his department. The princi- 
pal depots of supplies were under the 
immediate charge of Lieut. Cols. Ingalls 
and Sawtelle. 

On the 10th of July, 18G2, Gen. Van 
Vliet having requested to be relieved from 
duty with the army of the Potomac, I ap- 
pointed Lieut. Col. Ingalls chief quarter- 
master, and he continued to discharge the 
duties of that office during the reuuiinder 
of the Peninsula and the Maryland cam- 
paigns in a manner which fully sustained 
the high reputation he had previously 
acquired. 

The immediate amount of labor ac- 
complished, often under the most difficult 
circumstances, the admirable systenmnder 
which the duties of the department were 
performed, and the entire success which 
attended the efforts to supply so large an 
army, reflect the highest credit upon the 
officers upon whom these onerous duties 
devolved. The reports of Gen. Van Vliet 
and Lieut, Col. Ingalls, with the accom- 



panying documents, give in detail the 
history of the department from its organi- 
zation until I was relieved from the com- 
mand of the army of the Potomac. 

SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMEXT. 

On the 1st of August. 1861, Col. H. F. 
Clark, commissary of subsistance, joined 
my staff, and at once entered upon his 
duties as chief commissary of the army of 
the Potomac. In order to realize the 
responsibilities pertaining to this office, as 
well as to form a proper estimate of the 
vast amount of labor which must neces- 
sarily devolve upon its occupant, it is only 
necessary to consider the unprepared state 
of the country to engage in a war of such 
magnitude as the present, and the lack of 
practical knowledge, on the part of the 
officers, with reference to supplying and 
suljsisting a large, and at that time, unor- 
ganized army. Yet, notwithstanding the 
existence of these great obstacles, the 
manner in which the duties of the com- 
missary department were discharged was 
such as to merit and call forth the com- 
mendation of the entire army. 

During the stay of the army of the Po- 
tomac in the vicinity of Washington, prior 
to the Peninsula campaign, its subsistence 
was drawu chiefly from the depots which 
had been established by the commissary 
department at Washington, Alexandria, 
Forts Corcoran and Runyon. In the im- 
portant task of designathig and establish- 
ing depots of supplies. Col. Clarke was 
ably seconded by his assistants. Col. Amos 
Beckwith, commissary of subsistence, U. 8. 
A.; Lieut. Col. George Bell, commissary of 
subsistence, U. S. A. ; Lieut. Col. A. P. 
Porter, commissary of subsistence, U. S. 
A. ; Capt. Thomas Wilson, commissary of 
subsistence, U. S. A.; Capt. Brownell 
Granger, commissary of subsistence, U. 8. 
volunteers; Capt. W. H. Bell, commissary 
of subsistence, U. S. A.; Capt. J. H. 
Woodward, commissary of subsistence. U. 
S. volunteers; and Capt. W. R. Murphy, 
commissary of subsistence, U. S. volun- 
teers. 

For a full knowledge of the highly cred- 
itable manner in which each and all of the 
above-mentioned officers discharged their 
duties, I invite attention to the detailed 
report of Col. Clarke. The remarks and 
suggestions contained in his report are 
worthy of attention, as affording valuable 
rules for the future guidance of the sub- 
sistence department in sup])Iying armiea 
in the field. The success of the subsist- 
ence department of the army of the Poto- 
mac was in a great measure attributable 
to the fact that the subsistence depart- 
ment at Washington made anii)le provi- 
sion for sending supplies to the I'eniusula, 



22 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



and that it always exorcised the most iii- 
tellipent i'orosi-,^lit. It moreover gave its 
advice and conntenance to the officers 
diarged with its duties and reputation in 
the field, and those officers, I am happy to 
sav, worked with it, and together, in per- 
fect harmony for the public good. During 
the entire period that I was in command 
of the army of the Potomac there was no 
instance wi'thin my knowledge where the 
troops were without their rations from 
any fault of the officers of this depart- 
ment. 

ORDNANCE DETARTMENT. 

This very important branch of the ser- 
vice was placed under the charge of Capt. 
(,'. P. Kingsbury, ordnance corps, colonel 
and aid-de-camp. (Jreat difficulty existed 
in the ))roper organization of the depart- 
ment for the want of a sufficient numlier 
of suitable officers to perform the duties 
at the various head-quarters and depots of 
supply. But far greater obstacles had to 
1)8 surmounted, from the fact that the 
supply of small arms was totally inade- 
quate to the demands of a large army, and 
a vast proportion of those furnished were 
of such inferior quality as to be unsatis- 
factory to the troops, and condemned by 
their officers. The supply of artillery was 
more abundant, l>ut of great variety. 
Kifled ordnance was just coming into use, 
for the first time in this country, and the 
description of gun and kind of projectile 
which would ])rove most effective, and 
should, therefore, be adopted, was a mere 
matter of theory. To obviate these diffi- 
culties, large quantities of small arms of 
foreign manufacture were contracted for ; 
private enterprise in the construction of 
arms and ammunition was encouraged ; 
and by the time the army was ordered to 
move to the Peninsula the amount of ord- 
nance and ordnance stores was ample. 
Much also liad been done to bring the 
quality, both of arms and ammunition, up 
to the proper standard. Boards of officers 
were in session continually during the 
autumn and winter of IHGI, to test the 
relative merits of now arms and projectiles. 
'I'he reports of these boards, confirmed 
by subsequent experience in the field, have 
done much to establish the respective 
claims of different inventors and manufac- 
turers. During the campaigns of the Pen- 
insula and Maryland the officers connected 
with the department were zealous and en- 
ergetic, and kept the troops well supplied, 
notwithstanding the perplexing and ar- 
duous nature of their duties. One great 
scource of perplexity was the fact tliat it 
had been necessary to isssue arms of all 
varieties and calibres, giving un equal 
diversity in the kinds of anununition re- 



quired. Untiring watchfulness was there- 
fore incumbent upon the officers in charge 
to prevent confusion and improper distri- 
bution of cartridges. Col. KingsBury dis- 
charged the duties of his office with great 

efficiency until the day of July, 1862, 

when his healtli required that he should 
be relieved. First liieut. Thomas G. Bay- 
lor, ordnance corps, succeeded him, and 
performed his duty during the remainder 
of the Peninsula and Maryland campaigns 
with marked ability and success. > 

The want of reports from Col. Kings- 
bury and Lieut. Baylor renders it impossi- 
ble for me to enter at all into the details 
of the organization of the department. 

PROVO.ST marshal's DEPARTMENT. 

Immediately after I was placed in com- 
mand of the " Division of the Potomac," 
I appointed Col. Andrew Porter, 16th regi- 
ment infantry, provost marshal of AVash- • 
ington. All the available regular infantry, 
a battery and a squadron of cavalry were 
placed under his command, and by his en- 
ergetic action he soon corrected the seri- 
ous evils which existed, and restored order 
in the city. 

When the army was about to take the 
field. Gen. Porter was appointed Provost 
Marshal General of the army of the Poto- 
mac, and held that most important posi- 
tion until the end of the Peninsula cam- 
paign, when sickness, contracted in the 
untiring discharge of his duties, compelled 
him to ask to be relieved from the position 
he had so ably and energetically filled. 

The Provost Marshal General's depart- 
ment had the charge of a class of duties 
which had not before, in our service, been 
defined and grouped under the manage- 
ment of a special department. The follow- 
ing subjects indicate the sphere of this 
department : suppression of maurading 
and depredations, and of all brawls and 
disturbances, preservation of good order, 
and suppression of disturbances beyond 
the limits of the camps. 

Prevention of straggling on the march. 

Suppression of gambling houses, drink- 
ing houses, or bar-rooms, and brothels. 

Kegulation of hotels, taverns, markets, 
and places of public ainusement. 

Searches, seizures, and arrests. Execu- 
tion of sentences of general courts-martial, 
involving imprisonment or capital punish- 
ment. Enforcement of orders prohibiting 
the sale of intoxicating liquors, whether 
by tradesmen or sutlers, and of orders re- 
specting passes. 

Deserters from the enemy. 

Prisoners of war taken from the enemy. 

Countersigning safeguards. 

Passes to citizens within the lines, and 
for purposes of trade. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



23 



Complaints of citizens as to the conduct 
of the soldiers. 

Geu. Porter was assisted by the follow- 
ing named officers. 

Maj. W. 11. ^Vood. 17th United States 
infantry; Capt. James McMillom, actitiir 
assistant adjutant-general, 17th United 
States infantry ; Capt. W. T. Gentry, 17th 
United States infantry; Capt. J. \V. For- 
surth, isth United States infantry; Lieut. 
J. W. Jones, 12Th United States infantry; 
Lieut. C. F. Trowbridge, 16th United States 
infantry; and Lieut. C. D. Mehaffey, 1st 
United States infantry. 

The provost guard was composed of the 
2d United States cavalry, Maj. Pleasonton, 
and a battalion of the 8tli and 17th Uni- 
ted States infantry, Maj. Willard. After 
Gen. Porter was relieved, Maj. Wood was 
in charge of this deparment until after the 
battle of Antietara. when Brig. Gen. Pat- 
rick was appointed Provost Marshal Gene- 
ral. 

COMMAXDAXT OF GENERAL HEADQUAKTERS. 

When the army took the field, for the 
purpose of securing order and regularity 
in the camp of headquarters, and facilita- 
ting its movements, the office of command- 
ant of general headquarters was created, 
and assigned to Maj. G. 0. Haller, 7th 
United States infantry. Six companies 
of infantry were placed under his orders 
for guard and police duty. Among the 
orders appended to this report is the one 
defining his duties, which were always 
satisfactorily performed, 

JUDGE ADVOCATE. 

From August, 1861, the position of 
judge advocate was held by Col. Thomas 
T. Gantt, aide-de-camp, until compelled by 
ill health to retire, at Harrison's landing, 
in August, 1862. His reviews of the de- 
cisions of courts-martial during this period 
were of great utility in correcting the 
practice in military courts, diffusing true 
notions of discipline and subordination, 
and setting before the army a high stand- 
ard of soldierly honor. Upon the retire- 
ment of Col. Gantt, the duties of judge 
advocate M'cre ably performed by Col. 
Thomas M. Key, aide-de-camp. 

SIGNAL CORPS. 

The method of conveying intelligence 
and orders, invented and introduced into 
the service by Maj. Albert J. Myer, signal 
officer United States army, was first prac- 
tically tested in large operations during 
the organization of the army of the Poto- 
mac. 

Under the direction of Maj. Myer a 
■signal corps was formed by detailing offi- 
cers and men from the different regiments 
of volunteers and instructing them in the 



use of the flags by day and torches by 
night. 

The chief signal officer was indefatigable 
in his exertions to render his corps effec- 
tive, and it soon became available for ser- 
vice in every division of the army. In 
addition to the flags and torches, Maj. 
Myer introduced a portable insulated 
telegraph wire, which could be readily laid 
from point to point, and which could br 
used under the same general system. In 
front of Washington, and on the Lower 
Potomac, at any point within our lines not 
reached by the military telegra))h, the 
great usefulness of this system of signals 
was made manifest. 15nt it was not until 
after the arrival of the army upon the 
Peninsula, and during the siege and bat- 
tles of that and the Maryland cani])aigns 
that the great benefits to be derived from 
it on the field and under fire were fully 
appreciated. 

There was scarcely any action or skir- 
mish in which the signal corps did not 
render important services. Often under 
heavy fire of artillery, and not unfreiiuently 
while exposed to musketry, the officers 
and men of this corps gave information of 
the movements of the enemy, and trans- 
mitted directions for the evolutions of our 
own troops. 

The report of the chief signal officer, 
with accompanying documents, will give 
the details of the services of this corps, 
and call attention to those members of it 
who were particularly distinguished. 

TELEGRAPHIC. 

The telegraphic operations of the army 
of the Potomac w^re superintended by 
Maj. Thomas J. Eckert, and under the im- 
mediate direction of Mr. Caldwell, 

who was, with a corps of operators, 
attached to my headquarters during the 
entire campaigns upon the Peninsula and 
in Marylanil. 

The services of this corps were arduous 
and efficient. Under the admiral)le ar- 
rangements of Maj. Eckert they were con- 
stantly provided with all the material for 
constructing new lines, which were rapidly 
established whenever the army change<l 
position ; and it was not unfrequently the 
case that the operatives worked under the 
fire from the enemy's guns ; yet they in- 
variably performed all the duties required 
of them with great alacrity and cheerful- 
ness, and it was seldom that I was without 
the means of direct telegraphic communi- 
cation with the War Department and with 
the corps commanders. 

From the organization of the army of 
the Potomac up to Nov. 1, 1862. including 
the Peninsula and Maryland campaigns, 
upwards of twelve hundred (1,200) miles 



24 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAK 



of military telegraph line had been con- 
structod in connexion with the operations 
of the army, and the number of operatives 
and buihk'i-s employed was about two 
hundred, ('iOO.) 

To Prof. Lowe, the intelligent and en- 
terprising aeronaut, who had the manage- 
ment of the balloons, I was greatly indebted 
for the valuable information obtained 
during his ascensions. 

1 have more than once taken occasion to 
recommend the members of my staff, both 
general and personal, for promotion and 
reward. I beg leave to repeat these 
recommendations, and to record their 
names in the history of the army of the 
Potomac, as gallant soldiers, to whom their 
country owes a debt of gratitude still un- 
paid, for the courage, ability, and untiring 
zeal they displayed during the eventful 
campaigns in which they bore so prominent 
a part. 

» 

CHAPTER II. 

On the 15th day of October the main 
body of the army of the Potomac was in 
the "immediate vicinity of Washington, 
with detachments on. the left bank of the 
Potomac as far down as Liverpool point, 
and as far up as Williamsport and its 
vicinity. The different divisions were 
pt)stedas follows : Hooker atBudd's ferry, 
Lower Potomac ; Heintzelman at Fort 
Lyon and vicinity; Franklin near the 
'i'heological Seminary ; Blenker near Hun- 
ter's chapel; McDowell at Upton's hill 
and Arlington ; F. J. Porter at Hall's and 
Miner's hills; Smith at Mackall's hill; 
McCall at Langley ; Buell at Tenallytown, 
Meridian Hill, Emory's chapel, &c., on the 
left bank of the river ; Casey at Washing- 
ton ; Stoneman's cavalry at Washington ; 
Hunt's artillery at Washington; Banks at 
Darnestown, with detachments at Point of 
Rocks, Sandy Hook, Williamsport, &c., 
Stone at Poolesville ; and Dix at Baltimore, 
with detachments on the Eastern Shore. 

On the 19th of October, 18G1, Gen. 
McCall marched to Drainesville with his 
division, in order to cover reconnoiasances 
to be made in all directions the next day, 
for the purpose of learning the position of 
the enemy, and of covering the operations 
of the topographical engineers in making 
maps of that region. 

On the 2Uth, acting in concert with Gen. 
McCall, Gen. Smith pushed strong parties 
to Freedom hill, Vienna, Flint hill. Peacock 
hill. <fec., to accomplish the same purpose 
in that part of the front. These recon- 
noissances were successful. 

On the morning of the 20th I receive 
the following telegram from Cicn. Bank's 
headrjuarters : 



"Darnestown, Oct. 20, 1861. 

" Sir : The signal station at Sugar Loaf 
telegraphs that the enemy have moved 
away from Leesburg. All quiet here. 
"R. M. COPELAND, 

Assist. Adj. Gen. 

" Gen. Marcy." 

Whereupon I sent to Gen. Stone, at 
Poolsville, the following telegram : 

"Camp Griffin, Oct. 20, 1861. 

" Gen. McClellan desires me to inform 
you that Gen. McCall occupied Drains- 
ville yesterday, and is still there. Will 
send out heavy reconnissances to-day in all 
directions from that point. The general 
desires that you will keep a good look-out 
upon Leesburg, to see if this movement 
has the effect to drive them away. Perhaps 
a slight demonstration on your jjart would 
have the effect to move them. 

"A. V. COLBURN, 

Assist. Adj. Gen. 

"Brig.-Gen. C. P. Stone, Poolsville." 

Deeming it possible that Gen. McCall's 
movement to Drainsville, together with the 
subsequent reconnoissances, might have 
the effect of inducing the enemy to 
abandon Leesburg, and the despatch from 
Sugar Loaf appearing to confirm this view, 
I wished Gen. Stone, who had only a line 
of pickets on the river, the mass of his 
troops being out of sight of, and beyond 
range from, the Virginia bank, to make 
some display of an intention to cross, and 
also to watch the enemy more closely than 
usual. I did not direct him to cross, nor 
did I intend that he should cross the river 
in force for the purpose of fighting. 

The above despatch was sent on the 20th, 
and reached Gen. Stone as early as 11 a. 
m. of that day. I expected him to ac- 
complish all that was intended on the same 
day; and this he did, as will be seen from 
the following despatch, received at luy 
headquarters in Washington from Pools- 
ville on the evening of October 20 : 

" Made a feint of crossing at this place 
this afternoon, and at the same time started 
a reconnoitring party towards Leesburg 
from Harrison's island. The enemy's 
pickets retired to intrenchments. Report 
of reconnoitring party not yet received. 
I have means of crossing one hundred and 
twenty-men once in ten minutes at each of 
two points. River falling slowly. 

"C. P. STONE, 
" Brig.-Gen. 

" Maj.-Gen. McClkllan." 

As it was not foreseen or expected that 
Gen. McCall would be needed to co-operate 
with (icn. Stone in any attack, he was 
directed to fall back from Drainsville to 
his original camp, near Prospect hill, a.s 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX. 25 



800n as the required reconnoissanccs were | 
completed. 

Accoruinj^ly Le left Drainsvillc, on his i 
return, at about 8} a.m. of the 21st, reaching i 
his old camp at about 1 p. m. 

In the mean time I was surprised to hear 
from Gen. Stone that a portion of his 
troops were cnfjasjed on the Virginia side 
of the river, and at once sent instructions 
to Gen. McOall to remain at Drainsville, if 
he had not left before the order reached 
him. 

The order did not reach him until his 
return to his camp at Lansjlcy. He was 
tlien ordered to rest his men, and hold his 
division in readiness to return to Drains- 
ville at a moment's notice, should it become 
necessary. Similar instructions were given 
to other divisions during the afternoon. 

The first iniimation I received from 
Gen. Stone of the real nature of his move- 
ments was in a telegram, as follows : 

" Edward's Ferry, Oct. 21—11.10 a. m. 

" The enemy have been engaged opposite 
Harrison's island ; our men are behaving 
admirably. " C. P. STONE, Brig. Gen. 

" Maj. Gen. McClellan." 

At 2 p. M. Gen. Banks's Aju. Gen. sent 
the following : 

" Darnestown, Oct. 21, 1861—2 p. m. 

" Gen. Stone safely crossed the river 
this morning. Some engagements have 
taken place on the other side of the river — 
how important is not known. 

" R. M. COPELAND, Act. Assist. Ad. 
Gen. 

'• Gen. R. B. Marcy." 
' Gen. Stone sent the following despatches 
on the same day at the hours indicated : 

Edward's Ferry, Oct. 21, 1861—2 p. m. 

"There has been sharp firing on the 
right of our line, and our troops ai)pear to 
be advancing under Baker. The left, 
under Gorman, has advanced its skirmish- 
ers nearly one mile, and, if the movement 
continues successful, will turn the enemy's 
right. C. P. STONE, Brig. Gen. 

" Maj. Gen. McClellan." 
"Edward's Ferry, Oct. 21, 1861—4 p. m. 

" Nearly all my force is across the river. 
Baker on the right ; Gorman on the left. 
Right, sharply engaged. 

C. P. STONE, Brig. Gen. 

" Gen. McClellan." 

"Edward'sFerry, Oct. 21, 1861— 9.30 p.m. 
" I am occupied in preventing further 
disaster, and try to get into a position to 
redeem. We have lost some of our best 
commanders — Baker dead. Cogswell a pris- 
oner or secreted. The wounded are being 



carefully and rapidly removed ; and Gor- 
man's wing is being cautiously withdrawn. 
Any advance from .Drainsville must be 
made cautiously. 

" All was reported going well up to 
Baker's death, but, in the confusion fol- 
hnving that, the right wing was outflanked. 
In a few hours I shall, unless a night 
attack is made, be in the same position as 
last night, save the loss of many good men. 
" C. P. STONE, Brig. Gen. 

"Maj. Gen. McClellan." 

Although no more fully informed of the 
state of ailairs, I had, during the afternoon, 
as a precautionary measure, ordered Gen. 
Banks to send one brigade to the support 
of the troops at Harrison's island, and to 
move with the other two to Seneca mills, 
ready to support Gen. Stone if necessary. 
The 9.80 p. m. despatch of Gen. Stone did 
not give me an entire understanding of the 
state af the case. 

Aware of the difficulties and perhaps 
fatal consequences of recrossing such a 
river as the Potomac after a repulse, and 
from these telegrams supposing his whole 
force to be on the Virginia side, I directed 
Gen. Stone to intrench himself, and hold 
the Virginia side at all hazards until re- 
enforcements could arrive, when he could 
safely withdraw to the Maryland side, or 
hold his position on the Virginia side, 
should that prove advisaltle. 

Gen. Banks was instructed to move the 
rest of his division to Edwards's ferry, and 
to send over as many men as possible 
before daylight to re-enforce Stone. He 
did not arrive in time to effect this, and 
was instructed to collect all the canal- 
boats he could find, and use them for 
crossing at Edwards's ferry in sufficient 
force to enable the troops already there to 
hold the opposite side. 

On the 22d I went to the ground in per- 
son, and reaching Poolsville, learned -for 
the first time the full details of the affair. 

The following extract from the evidence 
of Gen. Stone before the " Committee on 
the Conduct of the War" on the 5th of 
January, 1862, will throw further light on 
this occurrence. 

Gen. Stone says he received the order 
from my headquarters to make a slight 
demonstration at about 11 o'clock a. m. on 
the 20th, and that, in obedience to that 
order, he made the demonstration on the 
evening of the same day. 

In regard to the reconnoissance on the 
21st, which resulted in the battle of Ball's 
Bluff, he was asked the following ques- 
tions : 

Ques. " Did this reconnoissance originate 
with yourself, or had you orders from the 
generul-in-chief to make it ?" 



26 



EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAK 



To which lie replied, " It originated with 
myself — the reconnoissance." 

Quos. "The order did not proceed from 
Gen. MoClellun?" 

Ans. " I was directed the day before to 
make a demonstration ; that demonstra- 
tion was made the day previous." 

Qucs. " Did you receive an order from 
the general-in-chief to make the recon- 
noissance ?" Ans. "No, sir." 

Making a personal examination on the 
23d, I found that the position on the 
Virginia side at Edwards's ferry was not 
a tenable one, but did not think it wise to 
withdraw the troops by daylight. I there- 
fore caused more artillery to be placed in 
position on the Maryland side to cover the ; 
approaches to the ground held by us, and 
crossed the few additional troops that the 
high wind permitted us to get over, so as 
to be as secure as possible against any 
attack during the day. Before nightfall 
all the precautions were taken to secure an 
orderly and quiet passage of the troops 
and guns. 

The movement was commenced soon 
after dark, under the personal supervision 
of Gen. Stone, who received the order for 
the withdrawal at 7.15 p. m. 

By 4 A. M. of the 24th everything had 
reached the Maryland shore in safety. 

A few days afterwards I received infor- 
mation which seemed to be authentic, to 
the effect that large bodies of the enemy 
had been ordered from Manassas to Lees- 
burg, to cut off our troops on the Yirgiuia 
side. Their timely withdrawal had proba- 
bly prevented a still more serious disaster. 

I refer to Gen. Stone's report of this 
battle, furnished the War Department, 
and his published testimony before the 
" Committee on the Conduct of the War" 
for further details. 

The records of the War Department 
show my anxiety and efforts to assume ac- 
tive defensive operations in the fall and 
early winter. It is only just to say, how- 
ever, that the unprecedented condition of 
the roads and Virginia soil would have 
delayed an advance till February, had the 
dicipline, organization, and equipment of 
the army been as complete at the close of 
the fall as was necessary, and as I desired 
aud labored against every impediment to 
make them. 

While still in command only of the army 
of the Potomac, namely, in early Septem- 
ber, I proposed the formation of a ct)rps 
of New Englanders for coast service in the 
bays and inlets of the Chesapeake and 
I'otomac, to co-operate with my own com- 
mand, from which most of its material was 
drawn. 

On the first of November, however, I was 
called to relieve Lieut. Gen. Scott in the 



chief and general command of the armies 
of the Union. The direction aud nature 
of this coast expedition, therefore, were 
somewhat changed, as will soon appear in 
the original plan submitted to the Sec- 
retary of War, and the letter of instructions 
later issued to Gen. Burnside. its com- 
mander. The whole country indeed, had 
now become the theatre of military op- 
erations from the Potomac to beyond 
the Mississippi, and to assist the navy in 
perfecting and sustaining the blockade, 
it became necessary to extend these ope- 
rations to points on the sea-coast, Roa- 
noke island. Savannah, and New Orleans. 
It remained also to equip and organize the 
armies of the west, whose condition was 
little better than that of the army of the 
Potomac had been. The direction of the 
campaigns in the west, and of the opera- 
tions upon the seaboard, enabled me to 
enter upon larger combinations and to 
accomplish results, the necessity and ad- 
vantage of which had not been unforeseen, 
but which had been beyond the ability of 
the single army formerly under my com- 
mand to effect. 

The following letters, and a subsequent 
paper addressed to the Secretary of War, 
sufficiently indicate the nature of those 
combinations to minds accustomed to rea- 
son upon military operations : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
"Washington, Sep. 6, 1861, 
" Sir : I have the honor to suggest the 
following j^roposition, with the request 
that the necessary authority be at once 
given me to carry it out: to organize a force 
of two brigades of five regiments each, of 
New England men, for the general service, 
but particularly adapted to coast service — 
the officers and men to be sufficiently 
conversant with boat service, to manage 
steamers, sailing vessels, launches, barges, 
surf-boats, floating batteries, &c. To char- 
ter or buy for the command a sufficient 
number of propellers or tug-boats, for 
transportation of men and supplies, the 
machinery of which should be amply pro- 
tected by timber ; the vessels to have 
permanent experienced officers from the 
merchant service, but to be manned by de- 
tails from the command. A naval officer 
to be attached to the staff of the com- 
manding officer. The flank companies of 
each regiment to be armed with Dahlgren 
boat guns, and carbines with water-proof 
cartridges ; the other companies to have 
such arms as I may hereafter designate ; 
to be uniformed and equipped as the Rhode 
Island regiments are. Launches and float- 
ing batteries with timber parapets of suf- 
ficient capacity to land or bring into action 
the entire force. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



21 



"The entire manajrement and organiza- 
tion of the force to be iioder my control, 
and to form an integral part of the army 
of the Potomac. 

" The immediate object of tliis force is 
for operations in the inlets of Chesapeake 
bay and the Potomac; by enabling me 
thus to land troops at points where they 
are needed, this force can also be used in 
conjunction with a naval force operating 
against points on the sea-coast. This 
coast division to be commanded by a gene- 
ral officer of my selection ; the regiments 
to be organized as other land forces ; the 
disbursement for vessels, etc., to be made 
by the proper department of the army 
upon the requisitions of the general com- 
manding the division, with my approval. 

" I think the entire force can be orga- 
nized in thirty days, and l)y no means the 
least of the advantages of this proposition 
is the fact that it will call into the service 
a class of men who would not otherwise 
enter the army. 

" You will immediately perceive that 
the object of this force is to follow along 
the coast, and up the uilets and rivers, 
the movements of the main army when it 
advances. "I am res'y, your ob't sorv't, 
'• G. B. McCLELLAN, 
Major-Gen. Comnuinding. 
"Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War. 

Owing chiefly to the difficulty in procu- 
ring the requisite vessels, and adapting 
them to the special purposes contempla- 
ted, this expedition was not ready for ser- 
vice until January. 1862. Then in the 
chief command, I deemed it best to send 
it to North Carolina, with the design indi- 
cated in the following letter. 

"Headquarters of the Army, 

•• Washington, Jan. 7, 1862. 
"Gexkral: In accordance with ver- 
bal instructions heretofore given you, you 
will after uniting with Flag-officer Golds- 
Ijorough at Fort Monroe, proceed under 
his convoy to Hatteras inlet, where you 
will in connection with him take the most 
prompt measures for crossing the fleet 
over the Bulkhead into the waters of the 
sound. Under the accompanying general 
order constituting the department of 
North Carolina, you will assume command 
of the garrison at Hatteras^ inlet, and 
make such dispositions in regard to that 
place as your ulterior operations may ren- 
der necessary, always being careful to pro- 
vide for the safety of that very important 
station in any contingency. 

'• Your first point of attack will be Roa- 
noke island and its dependencies. It is 
presumed that the navy can red;jce the 
batteries on the marshes and fovcr the 
landing of your troops on the main island, 



by wliich, in connexion with a rapid move- 
ment of the gunboats to the northern ex- 
tremity, as soon as the marsh battery is 
reduced, it may be hoped to capture the 
entire garrison of the place. Having oc- 
cupied the island and its dependencies, 
you will at once proceed to the erection 
of the batteries and defences necessary 
to hold the position with a small force. 
Should the flag-officer require assistance 
in seizing or holding the debouches of the 
canal from Norfolk, you will please afford 
it to him. 

"The commodore and yourself having 
completed your arrangements in regard to 
Roanoke island, and the waters north of 
it, you will please at once make a descent 
upon Newbern, having gained possession 
of which and the railroad passing through 
it, you will at once throw a sufficient force 
upon Beaufort, and take the steps neces- 
sary to reduce Fort Macon and open that 
port. When you seize Newbern, you will 
endeavor to seize the railroad as far west 
as Goldsborough, should circumstances 
favor such a movement. The temper of 
the people^ the rebel force at hand, &c., 
will go far towards determining the ques- 
tion as to how far west the railroad can 
be safely occupied and held. Should cir- 
cumstances render it advisable to seize 
and hold Raleigh, the main north and south 
line of railroad passing through Goldsbo- 
rough should be so effectually destroyed 
for considerable distances north and south 
of that point, as to render it impossible 
for the rebels to use it to your disadvan- 
tage. A great point would be gained, in 
any event, by the effiectual destruction of 
the AVilmington and Weldon railroad. 

" I would advise great caution in moving 
so far into the interior as upon Raleigh. 
Having accomplished the objects men- 
tioned, the next point of interest would 
probably be Wilmington, the reduction of 
which may require that additional means 
shall be afforded you. I would urge great 
caution in regard to proclamations. In no 
case would I go beyond a moderate joint 
proclamation with the naval commander, 
which should say as little as possible about 
politics or the negro ; merely state that 
the true issue for which we are fighting is 
the preservation of the Union, and uphold- 
ing the laws of the general government, 
and stating that all who conduct them- 
selves properly will, as far as possible, be 
13rotected in their persons and property. 

"You will please report your o])erations 
as often as an opportunity offers itself. 

" With my best wishes for your success, 
I am, &c., &c., " G. B. McCLKLLAN, 

" Maj. Gen. Commanding in Chief. 

" Brig. Gen. A. E. Burnside, 

" Commanding Expedition." 



28 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



) 



Tho followinff letters of instruction were 
pent to OciiK. llallcck, Buell, Sherman, and 
Butler ; and 1 also commiinieatpd verbally 
to these officers ray views in full regarding 
the field of operations assigned to each, 
and gave them their instructions as much 
in detail as was necessary at that time : 

" Headqcakters of the Army, 
"Washington, D. C, Nov. 11, 1861. 

" Gkneral : In assigning you to the com- 
mand of the department of Missouri, it is 
probably unnecessary for me to state that 
1 have intrusted to you a duty which re- 
quires the utmost tact and decision. 

'•You have not merely the ordinary 
duties of a military commander to per- 
form ; but the far more difficult task of 
reducing chaos to order, of changing pro- 
bably the majority of the personnel of the 
staff of the department, and of reducing 
to a point of economy, consistent with the 
interests and necessities of the State, a 
system of reckless expenditure and fraud, 
perhaps unheard of before in the history 
of the world. 

"You will find in your department many 
general and staff officers holding illegal 
commissions and appointments, not recog- 
nised or approved by the President or Sec- 
retary of War. You will please at once 
inform these gentlemen of the nullity of 
their appointment, and see that no pay or 
allowances are issued to them until such 
time as commissions may be authorized by 
the President or Secretary of War. 

" If any of them give the slightest trou- 
ble, you will at once arrest them and send 
them, under guard, out of the limits of 
your department, informing them that if 
they return, they will be placed in close 
confinement. You will please examine into 
the legality of the organization of the 
troops serving in the department. When 
you find any illegal, unusual, or improper 
organizations, you will give to the officers 
and men an opportunity to enter the legal 
military estal)lishment under general laws 
and orders from the War Department ; re- 
porting in full to these headquarters any 
officer or organization that may decline. 

" You will ])lease cause competent and 
reliable staff" officers to examine all exist- 
ing contracts immediately, and suspend all 
payments upon them until you receive the 
report in each ca^e. Where there is the 
slightest doubt as to the propriety of the 
contract, you will be good enough to refer 
the matter, with full explanation, to these 
head(iuarters, stating in each case what 
would be a fair compensation for the ser- 
vices or materials rendered under the con- 
tract. Discontinue at once the reception 
of material or services under uny doubtful 
contract. Arrest and bring to prompt 



trial all officers who have in any way vio- 
latcd their duty to the government. In 
regard to the political conduct of affairs, 
you will please labor to impress upon the 
inhabitants of Missoiiri and the adjacent 
States that we are fighting solely for the 
integrity of the Union, to uphold the power 
of our national government, and to restore 
to the nation the blessings of peace and 
good order. 

" With respect to military operations it 
is probable, from the best information in 
my possession, that the interests of the 
government will be best served by fortify- 
ing and holding in considerable strength, 
Rolla, Sedalia, and other interior points, 
keeping strong patrols constantly moving 
from the terminal stations, and concentrar- 
ting the mass of the troops on or near the 
Mississippi, prepared for such ulterior 
operations as the public interests may de- 
mand. 

" I would be glad to have you make, as 
soon as possible, a personal inspection of 
all the important points in your depart- 
ment, and report the result to me. I can- 
not too strongly impress upon you the 
absolute necessity of keeping me constantly 
advised of the strength, condition, and lo- 
cation of your troops, together with all 
facts that will enable me to maintain that 
general direction of the armies of the 
United States which it is my purpose to 
exercise. I trust to you to maintain 
thorough organization, discipline, and 
economy throughout your department. 
Please inform me as soon as possible of 
everything relating to the gunboats now in 
process of construction, as well as those 
completed. 

" The militia force authorized to be raised 
by the State of Missouri for its defence 
will be under your orders. 

"I am, general, &c., &c., 

GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 
Maj. Gen. Commanding U. S. A. 

" Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, U. S. A. 
" Commanding Department of Missouri." 

Headquarters of the Army, 
Washington, Nov. 7, 1862. 
"General: In giving you instructions 
for your guidance in command of the de- 
partment of the Ohio, I do not design to 
fetter you. I merely wish to express 
plainly the general ideas which occur to 
me in relation to the conduct of operations 
there. That portion of Kentucky west of 
the Cumberland river is by its position so 
closely related to the States of Illinois and 
Missouri, that it has seemed best to attach 
it to the department of Missouri. Your 
operations there, in Kentucky, will be con- 
fined to that portion of the State east of 
the Cumberland river. 1 trust I need not 



REPOUT of general GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



29 



rcpoat to you tliat I regard the importance 
of the territory committed to your care as 
second only to that occupied by the army 
under my immediate command. It is ab- 
sohitely necessary that we sliall hold all 
the State of Kentucky; not only that, but 
the majority of its inhabitants shall be 
warmly in favor of our cause, it being that 
which best subserves their interests. It 
is possible that the conduct of our politi- 
cal affairs in Kentucky is more hnportant 
than that of our military operations. I 
certainly cannot overestimate the impor- 
tance of the former. You will please con- 
stantly to bear in mind the precise issue 
for which we are fighting : that issue is 
the preservation of the Union and the re- 
storation of the full authority of the gene- 
ral government over all portions of our 
territory. We shall most readily suppress 
this rebellion and restore the authority of 
the government by religiously respecting 
the constitutional rights of all. I know 
that I express the feelings and opinions 
of the President when I say that we are 
fighting only to preserve the integrity of 
the Union and the constitutional authority 
of the general government. 

" The inhabitants of Kentucky may rely 
upon it that their domestic institutions 
will in no manner be interfered with, and 
that they will receive at our hands every 
constitutional protection. I have only to 
repeat that you will in all respects care- 
fully regard the local institutions of the 
region in which you command, allowing 
nothing but the dictates of military ne- 
cessity to cause you to depart from the 
spirit of these instructions. 

'' So much in regard to political consid- 
erations. The military j^roblem would be 
a simple one could it be entirely separated 
from political influences ; such is not the 
case. Were the population among which 
you are to operate wholly or generally 
hostile, it is probable that Nashville should 
be your first and principal objective point. 
It so happens that a large majority of the 
inhabitants of eastern Tennessee are in 
favor of the Union ; it therefore seems 
proper that you should remain on the de- 
fensive on the line from Louisville to 
Nashville, while you throw the mass of 
your forces, by rapid marches, by Gumlicr- 
laud Gap or Walker's Gap, on Knoxville, 
in order to occupy the railroad at that 
point, and thus enable the loyal citizens 
of eastern Tennessee to rise, while you at 
the same time cut off the railway comnm- 
nications between eastern Virghiia and 
the Mississippi. It will be prudent to 
fortify the pass before leaving it in your 
rear. ' 

•' Brig. Gen. D. C. Buell." 



" Headquarters of the Army, 
" Washington, Nov. 12, 186B. 
"General: Upon assuming command 
of the department, I will be glad to have 
you make as soon as possible a careful 
report of the condition and situation of 
your troops, and of the military and po- 
litical condition of your command. The,, 
main point to which I desire to call your 
attention is tbe necessity of entering east- 
ern Tennessee as soon as it can be done 
with reasonable chances of success, and I 
hope that you will, with the least possible 
delay, organize a column for that purpose, 
sufficiently guarding at the same time the 
main avenues by which the rebels may in- 
vade Kentucky. Our conversations on 
the subject of military operations have 
been so full, and my confidence in your 
judgment is so great, that I will not dwell 
further upon the subject, except to urge 
upon you flie necessity of keeping me fully 
informed as to the state of affairs, both 
military and political, and your move- 
ments. In regard to political matters, 
bear in mind that we are fighting only to 
preserve the integrity of the Union and to 
uphold the power of the general govern- 
ment ; as far as military necessity will 
permit, religiously respect the constitu- 
tional rights of all. Preserve the strictest 
discipline among the troops, and while 
employing the utmost energy in military 
movements, be careful so to treat the un- 
armed inhabitants as to contract, not 
widen, the breach existing between us and 
the rebels. 

" I mean by this that it is the desire of 
the government, to avoid unnecessary irri- 
tation by causeless arrests and persecution 
of individuals. Where there is good rea- 
son to believe that persons are actually 
giving aid, comfort, or information to the 
enemy, it is of course necessary to arrest 
them ; but I have always found that it is 
the tendency of subordinates to make 
vexatious arrests on mere suspicion. You 
will find it well to direct that no arrests 
shall be made except by your order or 
that of your generals, unless in extraor- 
dinary cases, always holding the party 
making the arrest responsible for the pro- 
priety of his course. It should be our 
constant aim to make it apparent to all 
that their property, their comfort, and 
their personal safety will be best pre- 
served by adhering to the cause of the 
Union. 

'•If the military suggestions I have 
made in this letter prove to have been 
founded on erroneous data, you are of 
course perfectly free to change the plans 
of operations. 

" Brig. Gen. D. C. Buell, 
" Commanding Department of the Ohio." 



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k.l-.. - :..--.. .. -^ ;.^^ -T ^--r^- 

K>!4ts io r-i'aeJa tine JSaTauamaiia riiv . 
Fu-rl! Fula.->kii. tw\> owfrAtiuias s - .- .. - 
themselves t«> mj nuoia as its iiuuuKexUih&e 
resalts. 

•^ First. The eaptimir^ of Savatmah by a 
' «w«p tie mamj' — ttee resmlli ^>f am iui&taja- 
taaeO'Cts advaaac© ajBid attack fej tke arfflay 
4tid carr. ■" 

-The"' ■ ■ '' '^ ' ;- -v^^- ■ ■-• ' ^- ■- 
letter i: 

.■:, OE the coitttrajry^ y©ia 
; ., J , .. . . . . . . .- .. -. .' .-.atiages- 

■' ;Secoiiti '1\> isolate Fort PtilaskL eat 
off i:.s >'■.•.:•':■:>. a:vl at 'vii^t facjilitiate its 
r\- '. ' .:. 

•■-^ delay to de- 
plore, iiiie c^i(;r«;-ii<i cc-urse nkll reEiaius open 
to OS; and I stromorlly advise thie.eto^je 
btookade of Pnlaski. aud its bo-mbantoeEt 
as soou as tiie IS-iaeh mortar? and heavy 
gTDUiis reach yoa. I ana eoniSdemt yoo eau 
thus retrace it. "With Pulaski, yoa g^tia 
■'' ''■■•' •-" --''y essential; you obtain 
.if tlie harbor; yow re- 
... -v ..... . . ...vLiQg- lieetv aiad nnider the 

uiaiit body of your force disposable for 
other opeiMtioiiis, 

" I do not consider the possession of 
Savannah worth a siege after Pmtaski is in 
ottr hands. Bat the possession, of Palaski 
is of the Erst importauee. The expedition 
to Fernandina is well, and I shall be glad 
to learu that it is oars. 

"Bnt. after all, the greatest moral effect 
woald be produced by the rednction of 
Charleston and its defences. There the 
rebellion had its birth : there the xumatu- 
ral hatred of our government is most in- 
tense ; there is the "centre of th« boasted 
power and courage of the rebels, 

" To gain Fort Snmter and hold Charles- 
ton is a task well worthy of our greatest 
efforts.^ and considerable' sacrifices. That 
is theYr»Jblem I would be glad to have 
yoQ stndy. Some time mast elapse Ivefore 
we can be in all respects ready to ac- 
complish that purpose. Fleets' are en 
route and armies in motion which have 
certain pr-Umuiary objects to accomplish 
before we are ready to take Charleston in 



;■* -will before loojt «n 

nve wiaeu i s.iftaiii bo, pmcpared to. makv 

that Huoveiuerat. .In the rnaean thwe, it is 

luy advic^e aad wish that mo attempt b« 

makie ©jwini Savamnah, anless it can b« 

i cairried xdih eertamtty by a • c©m|> «?« 

j «.'.-'.• --.^te TOKtir attemtion a«d 

forv.- . - ~ ■ ■. auM^ Fertiiaiiiidttiiax St» 

: ^ ... . ^..:.. ^ .^ ,;ds 

, lis everywhere at ppc^semt. 
■^ Tery triali v. '• ,• •.-. r-j, 

■*OKiX !-■ '■ " ""uLAX, 
•■ Major 6e'n. i^. ■ c I'. S, A. 

I "Brig. iJen. T. "VV. SitKsjtAX. 
I ** Comttvanding at Pott Royal,, ite." 

" Hbabqutartkrs; of thk Armt, 
I " Washiugtou, Feb, 23. 1662. 

I "Gksterai,: You are assiffned to the 

^^ npon 

->!:.•> V ..■; .-....?. i - .:i..S 

to keep yoiwr destv ■. '. <;- 

ciet. even tfirom you: ,-.,.:. . .'. ■ -'-.o 

exception of yoiur chief of st;i r.t. 

WeitzelL of tlie engineers. . at 

your disj>os.aI wilt consist of tije erst shir. 
tee^n regiments ntuued in your memoran- 
dffim handed to me im person, the 2Uj la- 
dianiia, 4th Wisconsin, and (5lh Mk-iiigjm, 
(old and good regiments from Baltimore.) 

" The 2Ist Indiana, 4th AViscousiu. and 
6;th Michigan, will await your oitters at 
Fort Monroe. 

" Tw-o ■ ■ ? of the 21st Indiana are 

welldril'. - y artillery. The cavalry 

forc-.^ ■"■ ■■•■■■ ''.^r S"hcp island will 

be > -joses. 

'■_'-.-.. — -. ..-...,. ;:ou with officers 
well acquainted with the country in which 
it is propc^:-! to cvo'-ite. I :;;ive arrived at 
the cone' - _ ' _-ht batteries 

fully eq". . _ . .-.iiont horses, 

will be alt iiiii; sure urxessaiv. 

" This will make your force abont 14.400 
infantry, 2T5 cavjvtry, 380 artillery : total, 
15,255 men. ITie commanding g-eneral of 
the department of Key "West is authorized 
to loan you. temporarOy, two regiments ; 
Fort Pickens can, probably, give you ano- 
ther, which w-iU bring vour force to nearly 
18,000. 

-'The object of your expedition is one 
of vital importance — the capture of New 
Orleans. The route selected is up the 
Mississippi river, and the first obstacle to 
be encountered (perhaps the only one) is 
in the resistance offered by Forts St. Philip 
and Jackson. It is expected that the 
navy can reduce these works : in that case 
you will, after their capture, leave a suffi- 
cient garrison in them to render them per- 



REPORT OF GKM^AL GZOKGE B MCXELLj^K. Zl 



Y 



t^ , . 



nsmvT'!^ 



.'ifyh. ■riD Vs near tb<£ i 






re letter* 



:> Ji liiii i-i_iv»l^,^ ;,i * ' ^ 






^ ^.^_^,.t, v^_ 5^ J y. 



ROOD after Me entratuse irpg>n oS'js 



tions of toe nortaem 
themsclTfrs. 

"I maj brieSy '-" 
objects of tJLfe fei;. - 






32 



REPORT OF GENERAL 



the Uuited States apainst the insurgent 
forces. That especially the army at and 
about Fortress Monroe, the army of the 
Potomac, the army of Western Virginia, 
the army near Miinfordsville, Kentucky, 
the army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval 
force in the (Julf of Mexico, be ready to 
move on that day. 

'•'j'hat alt other forces, both land and 
naval, with their respective commanders, 
obey existing orders for the time, and be 
ready to obey additional orders when duly 
given. 

•'That the heads of departments and 
especially the Secretaries of War and of 
the Navy, with all their subordinates, and 
the general-in-chief, with all other com- 
Inauders and subordinates of land and 
naval forces, will severally be held to their 
strict and full responsibilities for prompt 
execution of this order. 

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN." 

The order of January 31, 18G2, was as 
follows : 
[President's Special War Order No. 1.] 
" Executive Mansion, 
" Washington, Jan. 31, 1862. 

" Ordered, That all the disposable force 
of the army of the Potomac, after pro- 
viding safely for the defence of Washing- 
ton, be formed into an expedition for the 
immediate object of seizing and occupying 
a point npon the railroad southwestward 
of what is known as Manassas Junction,- 
all details to be in the discretion of the 
commander-in-chief, and the expedition to 
move before or on the 22d day of February 
next. 

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN." 

I asked his excellency whether this 
order was to be regarded as final, or 
whether I could be permitted to submit in 
writing my objections to his plan, and my 
reasons for preferring my own. Penoission 
was accorded, and I therefore prepared 
the letter to the Secretary of War, which 
is given below. 

Before this had been submitted to the 
President he addressed me the following 
note : 

" Executive Mansion. 
" Washington, Feb. 3, 1862. 
" My Dear Sir : You and I have 
distinct and different plans for a movement 
of the army of the Potomac : yours to be 
done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappa- 
hannock to Urbana, and across land to the 
terminus of the railroad on the York 
river; mine to move directly to a point on 
the railroad southwest of Manassas. 

" If you M'ill give satisfactory answers 
to the following ([uestions, I shall gladly 
yield my plan to yours : 

" lat." Does not your plan involve a 



GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 

greatly larger expenditure of time and. 
money than mine ? 

" 2d. Wherein is a victory more certain 
by 3^our plan than mine ? 

" 3d. Wherein is a victory more valuable 
by your plan than mine ? 

"4th. In fact, would it not be Jess valu- 
able in this : that it would break no great 
line of the enemy's communications, while 
mine would ? 

" 5th. In case of disaster, would not a 
retreat be more difficult by your plan than 
mine ? 

"Your, truly, 

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 

"Major-Gen. McClellau." 

These questions were substantially an- 
swered by the following letter of the same 
date to the Secretary of War : 

" Headquarters of the Army, 
" Washington, Feb. 3, 1862. 

" Sir : I ask your indulgence for the 
following papers rendered necessary by 
circumstances. 

" I assumed command of the troops in 
the vicinity of Washington on Saturday. 
July 27, 1861, six day after the battle of 
Bull run. 

" I found no army to command ; a mere 
collection of regiments cowering on the 
banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, 
others dispirited by the recent defeat. 

"Nothing of any consequence had been 
done to secure the southern approaches to 
the capital by means of defensive works : 
nothing whatever had been undertaken to 
defend the avenues to the city on tlie 
northern side of the Potomac. 

"The troops were not only undisciplined, 
undriUed, and dispirited ; they were not 
even i)laced in military positions. The 
city was almost in a condition to have been 
taken by a dash of a regiment of cavalry. 

" Without one day's delay I undertook 
the difficult task assigned to me ; that task 
the honorable Secretary knows was given 
to me without solicitation or foreknowledge. 
How far I have accomplished it will best 
be shown by the past and the present. 

" The capital is secure against attack, 
the extensive fortifications erected by the 
labor of our troops enable a small garrison 
to hold it against a numerous army, the 
enemy have been held in check, the State 
of Maryland is securely in our possession, 
the detached counties of Virginia are 
again within the pale of our laws, and all 
apprehension of trouble in Delaware is at 
an end ; the enemy are confined to the 
positions they occupied before the disaster 
of the 21st July. More than ah this, I 
have now under my command a well-drilled 
and reliable army, to which the destinies 
of the country may be confidently com 



KEPORT OF GEXEKAL GEORGE B. :NE'CLELLAX. 



33 



aaitted. This army is voniii; and untried | 
in battle ; but it is animatod by thebiirhest 
spirit, and is capable of great deeds. j 

•• That so much has been accomplished 
and such an army created in so short a 
time, from nothing will hereafter be re- 
garded as one of flhe highest glories of [ 
the administration and the nation. | 

■• Many weeks. I may say many months ' 
ago. this army of the Potomac was fully 
in condition to repel any attack ; but there 
is a vast difl'erence between that and the 
efficienc^^ required to enable troops to attack 
successfully an army elated by victory and 
intrenched in a position long since selected, 
studied, and fortilied. ' 

" In the earliest papers I submitted to 
the President, I asked for an effective and 
movable force far exceeding the aggregate 
now on the banks of the Potomac. I have 
not the force I asked for. 

" Even when in a subordinate position. I 
always looked beyond the operations of 
the army of the Potomac ; I was never 
satisfied in my own mind with a barren 
victory, but looked to combined and 
decisive operatious. 

•• TVhen I was placed in command of ' 
the armies of the United States. I imo.edi- 
ately turned m^' attention to the whole field 
of operatious, regarding the army of the 
Potomac as only one, while the most im- 
portant, of the masses under my command. 

'• I confess that I did not appreciate the i 
total absence of a general plan which had 
before existed, nor did I know that utter 
disorganization and want of preparation 
pervaded the western armies. 

" I took it for granted that they were 
nearly, if not quite, in conditiou to move 
towards the fulfilment of my plans. I 
acknowledge that I made a great mistake. 

•' I sent at once — with the approval of 
the Executive — officers I considered com- 
petent to command in Kentucky and 
Missouri. Their instructions looked to 
prompt movements. I soon found that 
the labor of creation and organization had 
to be performed there ; transportation — 
arms — clotluug — artillery — disciphne. all 
were wanting. These things required time 
to procure them. 

•■ The generals in command have done 
their work most creditably, but we are still 
delayed. 1 had hoped that a general 
advance could be made during the good 
weather of December ; I was mistaken. . 

•• yiy wish was to gain possession of the 
eastern Tennessee railroad, as a prelimi- 
nary movement, thc^n to follow it up im- 
mediately by au attack on Nathville and 
Richmond, as nearly at the same time as 
possible. 

"• I have ever regarded our true policy 
i\s bein<r that of fuuy prcpaiing ourselves, 
^3 



and then seeking for the most deci.''ive 
results. I do not wish to waste life in use- 
less battles, but prefer to strike at the 
heart. 

" Two bases of operation seem to present 
themselves for the advance of the army ot 
the Potomac : 

" 1st. That of "Washington — its present 
position — involving a direct attack upcm 
the intrenched positions of the enemy at 
Centreville. Manasses, vtc. or else a move- 
ment to turn one or both flanks of those 
positions, ot a combination of the two 
plans. 

•• Tlfc relative force of the two armies 
will not justify an attack on both flanks : 
an attack on his left flauk alone involves a 
long line of wagon communication, and 
cannot prevent him from collecting for the 
decisive battle all the detachments now on 
his extreme right and left. 

" Should we attack his right flank by 
the line of the Oocoquan. and a crossing of 
the Potomac below that river, aud near his 
batteries, we could perhaps prevent the 
junction of the enemy's right with his 
centre, (we might destroy the former;) 
we would remove the obstructions to the 
navigation of the Potomac, reduce the 
lensrth of wagon transportation by estab- 
lishing new depots at the nearest points of 
the Potomac, and strike more directly his 
main railway commmiication. 

" The fords of the Occoipian below the 
mouth of the Bull run are watched by the 
rebels : batteries are said to be placed on 
the heights in the rear.' (concealed by the 
woods.) and the arrangement of his troops 
is such that he can oppose some consider- 
able resistance to a passaire of that stream. 
Information has just been received, to the 
effect that the enemy are intrenching a line 
of heights extending from the vicinity of 
Sangsters (Union mills') towards Evans- 
port. Early in January. Spriggs's ford 
was occupied by Gen. Rhodes, with 3.(j0(i 
men and eight (8) guns ; there are strong 
reasons for believing that Davis's ford is 
occupied. These circumstances indicate 
or prove that the enemy anticipates the 
movement in question, and is prepared to 
resist it. Assuming for the present that 
this operation is determined upon, it may 
be well to examine briefly its probable 
progress. In the present state of aflairs, 
our column i^t'or the movement of so larire 
a force must be made in several cohimus. 
at least five or six) can reach the Acca- 
tinck without danger ; during the march 
thence to the Occoquan. our right flank 
becomes exposed to au attack from Fairfax 
station, Sangster's, and L'uiou mills. This 
danger must be made by occupying in some 
force either the two first named places, or 
better, the point of junction of the roads 



34 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M-CLELLAX. 



leading thence to the village of Occoquan ; 
this occupation must be continued so long 
as we can continue to draw supplies by the 
roads from this city, or until a battle is 
won. 

•■ The crossing of the Occoquan should 
be made at all the fords from Wolf's run to 
the mouth ; the points of crossing not 
being necessarily confined to the fords 
themselves. Should tlie enemy occupy 
this line in force, we must, with what 
a.ssistance that flotilla can afford, endeavor 
to force the passage near the mouth, thus 
forcing the enemy to abandon the whole 
line, or be taken in flank himself. 

" Having gained the line of the Occo- 
quan, it would be necessary to throw a 
column by the shortest route to Dumfries ; 
partly to force the enemy to abandon his 
batteries on the Potomac ; partly to cover 
our left flank against an attack from the 
direction of Aquia ; and lastly, to estab- 
lish our communications with the river by 
the best roads, and thus give us new 
depots. The enemy would by this time 
have occupied the line of the Occoquan 
above Bull run, holding Erentsville in 
force, and perhaps extending his lines 
somewhat further to the southwest. 

" Our next step would then be to pre- 
vent the enemy from crossing Occoquan 
between Bull run and Broad run, to fall 
upon our right flank while moving on 
Brentsville. This might be effected by 
occupying Bacon Race church and the 
cross-roads near the mouth of Bull run, or 
still more effectually by moving to the fords 
themselves, and preventing him from de- 
bouching on our side. 

" These operations would possibly be 
resisted, and it would reipiire some time to 
effect them, as. nearly at the same time as 
possible, we should gain the fords neces- 
sary for our purposes above Broad run. 
Having secured our right Hank, it would 
become necessary to carry Brentsville at 
any cost, for we could not leave it between 
the right flank and the main body. The 
final movement on the railroad must be 
determined by circumstances existing at 
the time. 

"'I'his brief sketch brings out in bold 
relief the great advantage possessed by 
the enomy in the strong central position 
he occupies, with roads diverging in every : 
direction, and a strong line of defence 
enabling him to remain on the defensive. 
with a small force on one Hank, while he 
concentrates everything on the other for a 
decisive action. i 

'• Should we place a portion of our 
force in front of Centreville, while the rest 
crosses the Occfxiuan, we commit the 
error of dividing our army by r very diffi- 
cult obbtacle, and by ;i 4i»ta"u,e iuu great 



to enable the two parts to support each 
other, should either be attacked by the 
masses of the enemy, while the other is 
held in check. 

'• I should perhaps have dwelt more 
decidedly on the fact that the force left 
near Sangster's must be allowed to remain 
somewhere on that side of the Occoquan 
until the decisive battle is over, so as to 
cover our retreat in the event of disaster, 
unless it should be decided to select and 
intrench a new base somewhere near 
Dumfries, a proceeding involving much 
time. 

" After the passage of the Occoquan by 
the main army, this covering force could 
be drawn into a more central and less ex- 
posed position — say Brimstone hill or 
nearer the Occoquan. In this latitude the 
weather will for a considerable period be 
very uncertain, and a movement com- 
menced in force on roads in tolerably firm 
condition will be liable, almost certain, to 
be much delayed by rains and snow. It 
will, therefore, be next to impossible to 
surprise the enemy, or take him at a dis- 
advantage by rapid manoeuvers. Our slow 
progress will enable him to divine our 
purposes, and take his measures accord- 
ingly. The probability is, from the best 
information we possess, that the enemy 
has improved the roads leading to his lines 
of defence, while we have to work as we 
advance. 

"Bearing in mind what has been said, 
and the prepent unprecedented and im- 
passible condition of the roads, it will be 
evident that no precise period can be fixed 
upon for the movement on this line. Nor 
can its duration be closely calculated ; it 
seems certain that many weeks may elapse 
before it is possible to commence the 
march. Assuming the success of this 
operation, and the defeat of the enemy as 
certain, the question at once arises as to 
the importance of the results gained. I 
think these results would be confined to 
the possession of the field of battle, the 
evacuation of the line of the upper Poto- 
mac by the enemy, and the moral effect of 
the victory ; important results, it is true, 
but not decisive of the war, nor securing 
the destruction of the enemy's main army, 
for he could fallback upon other positions, 
and fight us again and again, should the 
condition of his troops permit. If he is in 
no condition to fight us again out of the 
range of the intrenchments at Richmond, 
we would find it a very difficult and tedious 
matter to follow him up there, for he would 
destroy his railroad bridges and otherwise 
impede our progress through a region 
where the roads are as bad as they well 
can be, and we would probably find our- 
selves forced at last to change the whole 



RErORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 35 



theatre of war, or to seek a shorter land 
route to Richmond, with a snialk^r avail- 
able force, and at an expenditure of much 
more time, than were we to adopt the 
short line at once. We would also have 
forced the enemy to concentrate his forces 
and perfect his defensive measures at the 
very points where it is desirable to strike 
him when least prepared. 

•' II. The second base of operations avail- 
able for the army of tho Potomac is that 
of the lower Chesapeake bay, which affords 
the shortest possible land route to Rich- 
mond, and strikes directly at the heart of 
the enemy's power in the east. 

" The roads in that region are passable 
'at all seasons of the year. 

"The country now alluded to is much 
more favorable for offensive operations 
than that in front of Washington, (which 
is very unfavorable,) much more level, more 
cleared land, the woods less dense, the soil 
more sandy, and the spring some two or 
three weeks earlier. A movement iu force 
on that line obliges the enemy to abandon 
his intrenched position at Manassas, in 
order to hasten to cover Richmond and 
Norfolk. He must do this ; for should he 
permit us to occupy Richmond, his de- 
struction can be averted only by entirely 
defeating us in a battle, in which he must 
be the assailant. This movement, if suc- 
cessful, gives us the capital, the communi- 
cations, the supplies of the rebels ; Norfolk 
would fall ; all the waters of the Chesa- 
peake would be ours ; all Virginia would 
be in our power, and the enemy forced to 
abandom Termessee and North Carolina. 
Tho alternative presented to the enemy 
would be. to beat us in a position selected 
by ourselves, disperse, or pass beneath the 
Candine forks. 

" Should we be beaten in a battle, we 
have a perfectly secure retreat down the 
Peninsula upon Fort Monroe, with our 
flanks perfectly covered by the fleet. 

" During the whole movement our left 
flank is covered by the water. Our right 
is secure, for the reason that the enemy is 
too distant to reach us in time ; he can only 
oppose us in front; we bring our fleet into 
full play. 

•' After a successful battle our position 
would be — Burnside forming our left — 
Norfold held securely — our centre connect- 
ing Burnside with Buell, both by Raleigh 
and Lynchburg — Buell in eastern Ten- 
nessee and North Alabama — Halleck at 
Nashville and Memphis. 

" The next movement would be to con- 
nect with Sherman on the left, by reduc- 
ing Wilmington and Charleston ; to ad- 
vance our centre into South Carolina and 
Georgia ; to push Buell either towards 
Montgomery, or to unite with the main 



army in Gleorgia ; to throw Halleck south- 
ward to meet the naval expedition from. 
New Orleans. 

" We should then be in a condition to 
reduce at our leisure all the southern sea- 
ports ; to occupy all the avenues of com. 
munication ; to use the great outlet of the 
jSIississippi ; to re-establish our government 
and arms in Arkansas, Louisiana and 
Texas ; to force the slaves to labor for our 
subsistence, instead of that of the rebels ; 
to bid defiance to all foreign interference. 
Such is the object I have ever had in view 
— this is the general plan which I hope to 
accomplish. 

"For many long months I have labored 
to prepare the army of the Potomac to play 
its part in the programme ; from the day 
when I was placed in command of all our 
armies, I have exerted myself to place all 
the other armies in such a condition that 
they, too, could perform their allotted 
duties. 

" Should it be determined to operate 
from the lower Chesapeake, the point of 
landing which promises the most brilliant 
result is Urbana, on the lower Rappahan- 
nock. This point is easily reached by 
vessels of heavy draught ; it is neither oc- 
cupied nor observed by the enemy — it is 
but one march from West Point, the key 
of that region, and thence but two marches 
to Richmond. A rapid movement from 
Urbana would probably cut off Magruder 
in the Peninsula, and enable us to occupy 
Richmond, before it could he strongly re- 
enforced. Should we fail in that, we 
could, with the co-operation of the navy, 
cross the James and throw ourselves in 
rear of Richmond, thus forcing the enemy 
to come out and attack us, for his position 
would be untenable, with us on the south- 
ern bank of the river. 

" Should circumstances render it not ad- 
visable to land at Urbana, we can use Mob- 
jack bay; or, the worst coming to the 
worst, we can take Fort Monroe as a base, 
and operate with complete security, 
although with less celerity and brilliancy 
of results — up the Peninsula. 

" To reach whatever point may be se- 
lected as a base, a large amount of cheap 
water transportation must be collected, 
consisting mainly of canal-boats, barges, 
wood-boats, schooners, &c., towed by 
small steamers, all of a very different char- 
racter from those reipiired for all previous 
expeditious. This can certainly be accom- 
plished within thirty days from the timo 
the order is given, i pro])ose, as the best 
possible plan that can, in my judgment, bo 
adopted, to select Urbana as a landing 
place for the first detachment ; to transport 
l)y water four divisions of infantry with 
their batteries, the regular infantry, a few 



36 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX. 



wasfon?. one bridge train and a few squad- 
rons of cavalry, makin? the vicinity of 
Hooker's position the place of embarkation 
for as many as possible ; to move the regu- 
lar cavalry and reserve, artillery, the re- 
niftinin.cr bridge trains and wagons, to a 
point somewhere near Capo Lookout, then 
ferry them over the river by means of 
North Kiver ferry-boats, march them over 
to the Rappahannock, (covering the move- 
ment by an infantry force neat Heaths- 
ville.) and to cross the Rappahannock in a 
similar way. The expense and difiBciilty 
of the movement will then be very much 
diminished, (a saving of transportation of 
about 10,000 horses,) and the result none 
the less certain. 

" The concentration of the cavalry. &c., 
on the lower counties of Maryland can be 
effected without exciting suspicion, and the 
movement made without delay from that 
cause. 

" This movement, if adopted, will not at 
all expose the city of Washington to dan- 
ger. 

"The total force to be thrown upon the 
new line would be, according to circum- 
stances, from 110.000 to 140.000. I hope 
to use the latter number by bringing fresh 
troops into "Washington, and still leaving 
it quite safe. 1 fully realize that in all 
projects offered, time will probably be the 
most valuable consideration. It is my de- 
cided opinion that, in that point of view, 
the second plan should be adopted. It is 
possible, nay. highly probable, that the 
weather and state of the roads may be such 
as to delay the direct movement from 
Washington, with its unsatisfactory results 
and great risks, far beyond the time re- 
quired to complete the second plan. In 
the first care we can fix no definite time 
for an advance. The roads have gone 
from bad to worse. Nothing like their 
present condition was ever known here 
before ; they are impassable at present. 
We are entirely at the mercy of the 
weather. It is by no means certain that 
we can beat them at Manassas. On the 
other line I regard success as certain by 
all the chances of war. We demoralize the 
enemy by forcing him to abandon his pre- 
I>ared position for one which we have 
chosen, in which all is in our favor, and 
where success must produce immense re- 
sults. 

" My judgment, as a geiicral, is clearly 
in favor of this project. Nothing is cer- 
tain in war, but ail the chances are in 
favor of this movement. So much am I in 
favor of the southern line of operations, I 
that I would prefer the move from Fortress 
ISIonroe as a base— as a certain though less 
brilliant movement than that from Urbana, 
to an attack upon Manassas. 



" I know that his excellency the Presi- 
dent, you, and I, all agree in our wishes ; 
and tiiat these wishes are, to bring this 
war to a close as promptly as the means in 
our possession will permit. I believe that 
the mass of the people have entire confi- 
dence in us — I am sui-e of it. Let us, then, 
look only to the great result to be accom- 
plished, and disregard everything else. 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient 
servant. 

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Maj. Gen. Commanding. 
" E. M. Stanton. 

" Sec. of War." 

This letter must have produced some 
effect upon the mind of the President, since' 
the execution of his order was not required, 
although jjt was not revoked as formally as 
it had been issued. Many verbal confer- 
ences ensued, in which, among other things, 
it was determined to collect as many canal- 
boats as possible, with a view to employ 
them largely in the transportation of the 
army to the lower Chesapeake. The idea 
was at one time entertained by the Presi- 
dent to use them in forming a bridge across 
the Potomac near Liverpool point, in order 
to throw the army over that point ; but 
this was subsequently abandoned. It was 
also found by experience that it would re- 
quire much time to prepare the canal- 
boats for use in transportation, to the 
extent that had been anticipated. 

Finally, on the 27th of February, 1862, 
the Secretary of War, by the authority of 
the President, instructed Mr. John Tucker. 
Assistant Secretary of War, to procure at 
once the necessary steamers and sailing 
craft to transport the army of the Potomac 
to its new field of operations. 

The following extract from the report 
of Mr. Tucker, dated April 5, will show 
the nature and prtigress of this well-exe- 
cuted service : 

***** 

" I was called to Washington by tele- 
graph, on 17th January last, by Assistant 
Secretary of War, Thomas A. Scott. I 
was informed that Maj. Gen. McClellan 
wished to see me. From him I learned 
that he desired to know if transportation 
on smooth water could be obtained to 
move at one time, for a short distance, 
about 50,000 troops, 10,000 horses, 1,000 
wagons, 13 batteries, and the usual equip- 
ment of such an army. He frankly stated 
to me that he had always supposed such 
a movement entirely feasible, until two ex- 
perienced quartermasters had recently re- 
ported it impracticable, in their judgment. 
A few days afterwards, I reported to Gen. 
McClellan that I was entirely confident 
the transports could be commanded, and 
stated the mode by which his object could 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



3Y 



be accomplished. A week or. two after- 
wards I bad the honor of an interview 
with the President and Gen. McClellan, 
when the subject was further discussed, 
especially as to the time required. 

'• 1 expressed the opinion that, as the 
movement of the horses and wagons would 
have to be made chiefly by schooners and 
barges, that as each schooner would re- 
quire to be properly fitted for the pro- 
tection of the horses, and furnished with a 
supply of water and forage, and each trans- 
port for the troops provided with water, I 
did not deem it prudent to assume that 
such an expedition could start within thirty 
days from the time the order was given. 

"The President and Gen. McClellan 
both urgently stated the vast importance 
of an earlier movement. I replied that if 
fiivorable winds prevailed, and there was 
great despatch in loading, the time might 
be materially diminished. 

"On the 14th February you (Secretary 
of War) advertised for transports of var- 
ious descriptions, inviting bids on the 27th 
February. I was informed that the pro- 
posed movement by water was decided 
upon. That evening the Quartermaster 
Gen. was informed of the decision. Direc- 
tions were given to secure the transporta- 
tion — any assistance was tendered. He 
promptly detailed to this duty two most 
efficient assistants in his department. Col. 
Rufus Ingalls was stationed at Annapolis, 
where it was then proposed to embark the 
troops, and Capt. Henry C. Hodges was 
directed to meet me in Philadelphia, to 
attend to chartering the vessels. With 
these arrangements 1 left Washington on 
the 28th February. * * * 

'• I beg to hand herewith a statement, 
prepared by Capt. Hodges, of the vessels 
chartered, which exhibits the prices paid, 
and parties from whom they were taken : 

113 steamers, at an average price per day $215 10 

ISS schooacrs, " " " 24 iH 

SS barges, " " '• 14 27 

" In thirty-seven days from the time I 
received the order in Washington, (and 
most of it t^'as accomplished in thirty days,) 
these vessels transported from Perryville, 
Alexandria and Washington to Fort Mon- 
roe (the place of departure having been 
changed, which caused delay,) 121,500 
men, 14,592 animals, 1,150 wagons, 44 
batteries, 74 ambulances, besides pontoon 
bridges, telegraph materials, and the enor- 
mous quantity of equipage, &c., required 
for an army of such magnitude. The only 
loss of which I have heard is eight mules 
and nine barges, which latter went ashore 
in a gale within a few miles of Fort Mon- 
roe — the cargoes being saved. With this 
trifling exception, no^ ihe slightest acci- 
dent has occurred, to my knowledge. 



"I respectfully, but confidently, submit 
that, fr)r economy and celerity of move- 
ment, this expedition is without a parallel 
on record. 

* * * * * 

"JOHN TUCKER, 

" Assistant Sec. of War." 

In the mean time the destruction of the 
batteries on the lower Potomac, by crossing 
our troops opposite them, was considered, 
and preparations were even made for throw- 
ing Hooker's division across the river, to 
carry them by assault, Finally, however 
after an adverse report from Brig. Gen. J. 
G. Barnard, Chief Engineer, given below, 
who made a reconnoissance of the posi- 
tions, and in view of the fact that it was 
still out of the power of the Navy Depart- 
ment to furnish suitable vessels to co-oper- 
ate with land troops, this plan was aban- 
doned as impracticable. A close exami- 
nation of the enemy's works and their ap- 
proaches, made after they were evacuated, 
showed that the decision was a wise one. 
The only means, therefore, of accomplish- 
ing the capture of these works, so much 
desired by the President, was by a move- 
ment by land, from the left of our lines, on 
the right bank of the Potomac — a move- 
ment obviously unwise. 

The attention of the Navy Department, 
as early as August 12, 1861, had been 
called to the necessity of maintaining a 
strong force of efficient war vessels on the 
Potomac. 

"HKADQr.4.RTERS DiVISTOX OF THE 

PoTO.MAC, Washington, Aug. 12, 1861. 

"Sir : I have to-day received additional 
information which convinces me that it is 
more than probable that the enemy will, 
within a very short time, attempt to throw 
a respectable force from the mouth of 
Aquia creek into Maryland. 'I'his attempt 
will probably be preceded by the erection 
of batteries at Matthias and White House 
points. Such a movement on the part of 
the enemy, in connection with others prob- 
ably designed, would place Washington in 
great jeopardy. I most earnestly urge that 
the strongest possible naval force be at 
once concentrated near the mouth Of Aquia 
creek, and that the most vigilant watch be 
maintained day and night, so as to render 
such passage of the river absolutely im- 
possible. 

" I recommend that the Minnesota, and 
any other vessels available from Hampton 
Roads, be at once ordered up tliere, and 
that a great quantity of coal be sent to that 
vicinity, sufficient for several weeks' sup- 
ply. At least one strong war vessel should 
be kept at Alexandria, and I again urge 
the concentration of a strong naval force 
on the Potomac without delay 



S8 



RErORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



"If the Naval Department will render it 
fcbsolutely impossible for the eueciy to 
cross the river below "Washington, the se- 
curity of the capital will be greatly in- 
creased. 

" I cannot too earnestly urge an imme- 
diate compliance with these requests. 
' I am, sir, very respectfully, 

■'Your obedient servant, 
" GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

*' Maj. Gen. Commanding. 
" Hon. Gideon Wkllks, Secretary of 
'Kiivy." 

It was on the 27th of September, 1861, 
that Gen. Barnard. Chief Engineer, in com- 
pany with Capt. Wyman, of the Potomac 
flotilla, had been instructed to make a re- 
connoissance of the enemy's batteries as far 
as Matthias point. In his report of his 
observations, he says : 

"Batteries at High point and Cockpit 
point, and thence down to Chopawampsic, 
cannot be prevented. We may, indeed, 
prevent their construction on certain 
points, but along here somewhere the 
enemy can establish, in spite of us, as 
riany batteries as he chooses. What is the 
remedy? Favorable circumstances, not to 
l>e anticipated nor made the basis of any 
calculations, might justify and render suc- 
cessful the attack of a particular battery. 
To suppose that we can capture all, and 
by mere attacks of this kind prevent the 
navigation being molested, is very much 
the same as to suppose that the hostile 
iirmy in our own front can prevent us build- 
ing and maintaining tield-works to protect 
Arlington and Alexandria by capturing 
them, one and all, as fast as they are 
built," 

In another communication upon the sub- 
ject of crossing troops for the purpose of 
destroying the batteries on the Virginia 
Bide of the Potomac, Gen. Barnard says : 

" The operation involves the forcing of a 
very strong line of defence of the enemy, 
aud all that we would have to do if we 
we were really opening a campaign against 
them there. 

" It is true we hope to force this line by 
turning it, by landing on J'reestone point. 
AVith reason to believe that this may be 
successful, it cannot be denied that it 
involves a risk of failure. Should we, 
then, considering all the consequences 
which may be involved, enter into the ope- 
ration, merely to capture the Potomac 
batteries? 1 think not. "Will not the 
Ericsson, assisted by one other gunboat 
capable of keeping alongside these bat- 
teries, so far control their tire as to keep 
the navigation suiliciently free as long as 
wo require it? Capt. Wyman savs yes." 

It was the opinion of competent naval 



ofGcers, and I concur with them, that had 
an adequate force of strong and well-armed 
vessels been acting on the Potomac from 
the beginning of August, it would have 
been next to impossible for the rebels to 
have constructed or maintained batteries 
upon the bank of the river. The enemy 
never occupied Matthias point, nor any 
other point on the river, which was out of 
supporting distance from the main army. 

When the enemy commenced the con- 
struction of these batteries, the army of 
the Potomac was not in a condition to pre- 
vent it. Their destruction by our army 
would have afforded but a temporary relief 
unless we had been strong enough to hold 
the entire line of the Potomac. I'his could 
be done either by driving the enemy from 
Manassas and Aquia creek, by main force, 
or by manoevring to compel them to vacate 
their positions. The latter course was 
finally pursued, and with success. 

About the 20th of February, 1862, addi- 
tional measures were taken to secure the 
reopening of the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
road. 'J'he preliminary operations of Gen. 
Lander for this object are elsewhere des- 
cribed. 

1 have often observed to the President 
and to members of the cabinet that the 
reconstruction of this railway could not be 
undertaken until we were in a condition 
to fight a battle to secure it. I regarded 
the possession of Winchester and Stras- 
burg as necessary to cover the railway in 
the rear, and it was not till the month of 
Feljruary that I felt prepared to accom- 
plish this very desirable but not vital pur- 
pose. 

The whole of Banks division and two 
brigades of Sedgwick's division were thrown 
across the river at Harper's Ferry, leaving 
one brigade of Sedgwick's division to ob- 
serve aud guard the Potomac from Great 
Falls to the mouth of the Monocacy. A 
sufficient number of troops of all arms 
were held in readiness in the vicinity of 
Washington, either to march via Leesburg 
or to move by rail to Harper's Ferry, 
should this become necessary in carrying 
out the objects in view. 

The subjoined notes from a communica- 
tion subsequently addressed to the War 
Department, will sufficiently explain the 
conduct of these operations. 



" When I started for Harper's Ferry, I 
plainly stated to the President and Secre- 
tary of War, that the chief object of the 
operation would be to open the Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad by crossing the river in 
force at Harper's Ferry ; that I had col- 
lected the material for making a permanent 
bridge by means of canal-boats ; tha^ from 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX 



39 



the nature of the river, it was donhtful 
whether such a bridge could be constructed ; 
that if it could not. I would at least occupy 
the ground in front of Harper's Ferry, in 
order to cover the rebuilding of the rail- 
road bridge ; and finally, when the com- 
munications were perfectly secure, move 
on Winchester. 

" When I arrived at the place I found 
the batteau bridge nearly completed ; the 
holding-ground proved Ijetterthan had been 
anticipated; the weather was favorable, 
there being no wind. I at once crossed 
over the two brigades which had arrived, 
and took steps to hurry up the other two, 
belonging respectively to Banks's and 
Sedgwick's divisions. The dilliculty of 
crossing supplies had not then become ap- 
parent. That night 1 telegraphed for a 
regiment of regular cavalry and four bat- 
teries of heavy artillery to come up the 
next day (Thursday), besides directing 
Keyes's division of infantry to be moved up 
on Friday. 

" Next morning the attempt was made 
to pass the canal boats through the lift- 
lock, in order to commence at once the 
constrnction of the permanent bridge. It 
was then found for the first time that the 
lock was too small to permit the passage 
of the boats, it having been built for a class 
of boats running on the Shenandoah canal, 
and too narrow by some four or six inches 
for the canal boats. The lift-locks, above 
and below, are all large enough for the 
ordinary boats. I had seen them at Ed- 
wards"s ferry thus used. It has always been 
represented to the engineers by the mili- 
tary railroad employees, and others, that 
the lock tvas large enough, and the differ- 
euce being too small to be detected by the 
eye. no one had thought of measuring it, 
or suspecting any difficulty. I thus sud- 
denly found myself unable to b-.iild the 
permanent bridge. A violent gale had 
arisen, which threatened the safety of our 
only means of communication; the narrow 
approach to the bridge was so crowded and 
clogged with wagons that it was very clear 
that, under existing circumstances, nothing 
more could be done than to cross over the 
baggage and supplies of the two brigades. 
Of the others, instead of being aljle to cross 
both during the morning, the last arrived 
only in time to go over just before dark. 
It was evident that the troops under orders 
would only be in the way, should they 
arrive, and that it would not be possible 
to subsist them for a rapid march on Win- 
chester. It was therefore deemed neces- 
sary to countermand the order, content 
ourselves with covering the reopening of 
the railroad for the present, and in the 
meantime use every exertion to establish, 
as promptly as possible, depots of forage 



and subsistence on the Virginia sidf^, to 
supply the troops, and enable them to move 
on Winchester, independently of the bridge. 
'I'he next day (Friday), I sent a strong re- 
connoissance to Charlestown. and under its 
protection, went there myself. I then de- 
termined to hold that place, and to move 
the troops composing Lander's and Wil- 
liams's commands at once on Martiusburg 
and Bunker Hill, thus efifectually covering 
the reconslruetion of the railroad, 

'■ Having done this, and taken all the 
steps in my power to insure the rajjid trans- 
mission of supplies «ver the river. I re- 
turned to this city, well satisfied with what 
had been accomplished. While up the 
river I learned that the President was dis- 
satisfied with the state of atTairs ; but on ' 
my return here, understood from the Sec- 
retary of War that upon learning the 
whole state of the case the President was 
fully satisfied. I contented myself there- 
fore with giving to the Secretary a brief 
statement, as I have written here." 

The design aimed at was entirely com- 
passed, and before the first of April, the 
date of my departure for the Peninsula, 
the railroad was in running order. As a 
demonstration upon the left flank of the 
eneray,4his movement no doubt assisted in 
detenniniDg the evacuation of his lines on 
the 8th and 9th of Mai-eb. 

On my return from Harper's Ferry, on 
the 28th of February, the preparations 
necessary to carry ont the wislies of the 
President and Secretary of War in regard 
to destroying the batteries on the lower 
Potomac were at once undertaken. Mature 
reflection convinced me that this operation 
would require the movement of the entire 
army, for I felt sure that the enemy would 
resist it with his whole strength. 1 under- 
took it Avith great reluctance, both on 
account of the extremely unfavorable 
condition of the roads and my firm con- 
viction that the proposed movement to the 
lower Chesapeake would necessarily, as it 
subserpiently did, force the enemy to 
abandon allhis positions in front of Wash- 
ington. Besides, it did not forward my 
plan of campaign to precipitate this evacua- 
tion by any direct attack, nor to subject 
the array to any needless loss of life and 
material by a battle near AVashington, 
which could produce no decisive results. 
The preparations for a movement towards 
the Occoquan, to carry the batteries, were, . 
however advanced as rapidly as the season 
permitted, and I had invited the com- 
manders of divisions to meet at head- 
quarters on the 8th of March, for the 
purpose of giving them their instructious, 
and receiving their advice and opinion in 
regard to their commands, when an inter- 
view with the President indicated to 



40 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX, 



jnc the possiliilty of a cliange in my 
orders. 

Ilis excellency sent for me at a veiT early 
hour on the morning- of the 8tli, and re- 
newed his expressions of dissatisfaction 
with the afTair of Harper's Ferry, and 
Avith my plans for the new movement down 
the Chesapeake. Another recital of the 
same facts which had Ijefure given satisfac- 
tion to his excellency again produced, as 
1 supposed, the same result. 

The views which I expressed to the 
President were re-enforced by the result of 
a meeting of my gerteral officers at head- 
((uarters. At that meeting my plans were 
laid before the division commanders, and 
were approved by a majority of those 
present. Nevertheless, on the same day 
two important orders were issued by the 
President, without consultation with me. 
The first of these was the general war 
order No. 2, directing the formation of 
army corps, and assigning their com- 
manders. 

I had always been in favor of the 
principle of an organization into army 
corps, but preferred deferring its practical 
execution until some little experience in 
campaign and on the field of battle should 
show what general officers we* most 
competent to exercise these high com- 
mands, for it must be remembered that we 
then had no officers whose experience in 
war on a large scale was sufficient to prove 
that they possessed the necessary qualifi- 
cations. An incompetent commander of 
an army corps might cause irreparable 
damage, while it is not probable that an 
incompetent division connnander could 
cause any very serious mischief. These 
views had frequently been expressed by 
me to the President and members of the 
cabinet ; it was therefore with as much 
regret as surprise that I learned the ex- 
istence of this order. 

The first order has been given above ; 
the second order was as follows : 

[President's General War Order No. 3.] 
" Executive ^Iansion, 
" Washington, March 8, 1862. 

" Ordered, That no change of the base 
of operations of the army of the Potomac 
shall bo made without leaving in and 
about Washington such a force as, in the 
opinion of the general-in-chief and the 
commanders of army corps, shall leave 
said city entirely secure. 

"That no more than two army corps 
(about fifty thousand troops) of said army 
of the Potomac shall be moved en route 
for a new base of operations until the 
navigation of the Potuniac. from Wushing- 
lon to the Chesapeake bay. shall be freed 
from enemy's l>atteries, and other obstruc- 



tions, or until the President shall hereafter 
give express permission. 

'• That any movemeiit as afoi-esaid, en 
route for a new base of operations, which 
may be ordered by the general-in-chief, 
and which may be intended to move upon 
the Chesapeake bay, shall begin to move 
upon the day as early as the 18th March, 
instant, and the general-in-chief shall be 
responsible that it moves as early as that 
day. 

'• Ordered, That the army and navy co- 
operate in an immediate effort to capture 
the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac 
between Washington and the Chesapeake 
biiy. 

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN 

" L. Thomas, Adj. Gen." 

After what has been said already in 
regard to the effect of a movement to the 
lower Chesapeake it is unnecessary for me 
to comment upon this document, further 
than to say that the time of beginning the 
movement depended upon the state of 
readiness of the transports, the entire 
control of which had been placed by the 
Secretary of War in the hands of one of 
the Assist. Secretaries, and not under the 
Quartermaster General ; so that even if 
the movement were not impeded by the 
condition imposed, in regard to the 
batteries on the Potomac, it could not 
have been in my power to begin it before 
the 18th iSfarch, unless the Assist. Secre- 
tary of War had completed his arrange- 
ments by that time. 

Meanwhile important events were oc- 
curring which materially modified the 
designs for the subsequent campaign. The 
appearance of the Merrimack off Old Point 
Comfort, and the encounter with the United 
States squadron on the 8th of March, 
threatened serious derangement of the 
plan for the Peninsula movement. But 
the engagement between the Monitor and 
Merrimack on the 9th of March, demon- 
strated so satisfactorily the power of the 
former, and the other naval preparations 
were so extensive and formidable, that the 
security of Fort Monroe, as a base of 
operations, was placed beyond a doubt; 
and although the James river was closed 
to us, the York river, with its tributaries, 
was still open as a line of water communi- 
cation with the fortress. The general plan, 
therefore, remained undisturbed, although 
less promising in its details than when the 
James river was in our control. 

On Sunday, the 9th of March, informa- 
tion from various sources made it apparent 
that the enemy was evacuating his positions 
at Centreville and ^lanassas as well as on 
the upper and lower Potomac. The 
President and Secretary of War were 



REPORT or GEXERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX. 



41 



present when the mo?t positive information 
reached me, and I expressed to them my 
intention to cross the river immediately, 
and there gain the most authentic int'orma- 
tiou, prior to determining what course to 
pursue. 

The retirement of the enemy towards 
Richmond had been expected as the natural 
consequence of the movement to the 
Peninsula, but the adoption of this course 
immediately on ascertaining that such a 
movement was intended,, while it i^lieved 
me from the results of the undue anxiety 
of my superiors, and attested the character 
of the design, was unfortunate in that the 
then almost impassable roads Itetween our 
positions and theirs deprived us of the 
ojiportunity for inflicting damage usually 
afforded by tiie withdrawal of a large army 
in the face of a powerful adversary. 

The retirement of the enemy and the 
occupation of the abandoned positions 
which necessarily followed presented an 
opportunity for the troops to gaiu some 
experience on the march and bivouac ])re- 
paratory to the campaign, and to get rid 
of the superfluous baggage and other " im- 
pediments" which accumulate so easily 
around an army encamped for a long time 
iu one locality. 

A march to Manassas and back would 
produce no delay iu embarking for the 
lower Chesapeake, as the transports could 
not be ready for some time, and it afforded 
a good intermediate step between the 
(iuiet and comparative comfort of the 
camps around Washington, and the rigors 
of active operations, besides accomplish- 
ing the important object of determhiing 
the positions and perhaps the future de- 
signs of the enemy, with the possibility of 
being able to harass their rear. 

I therefore issued orders during the 
night of the 9th of March for a general 
movement of the army the next morning 
towards Centreville and Manassas, sending 
iu advance two regiments of cavalry under 
Col. Averill with orders to reach Manas- 
sas if possible, ascertain the exact condi- 
tion of affairs, and do whatever he could 
to retard and annoy the enemy if really in 
retreat ; at the same time I telegraphed 
to the Secretary of AVar that it would be 
necessary to defer the organization of the 
army corps until the completion of the 
projected advance upon Manassas, as the 
divisions could not be brought together in 
time. The Secretary replied, requiring 
immediate compliance with the President's 
order, but on my again representing that 
this would compel the abandonment or 
postponement of the movement to Manas- 
gas, he finally consented to its postpone- 
ment. 

At noon on the 10th of March the cav- 



alry advance reached the enemy's lines at 
Centreville, passing through bis recently 
occupied camps and works, and finding 
still burning heaps of military stores and 
nuich valuable property. 

Immediately after being assigned to the 
command of the troops around Washing- 
ton, I organized a secret service force, 
under Mr. E. J. Allen, a very experienced 
and efficient person. This force, up to 
the time I was relieved from command, 
was continually occupied in procuring 
from all possible sources information re- 
garding the strength, positions and move- 
ments of the enemy. 

All spies, "contrabands," deserters, 
refugees, and many prisoners of war, com- 
ing into our lines from the front, were 
carefully examined, first by the outpost 
and division commanders, and then by my 
chief of staff" and the Provost Marshal 
General. Their statements, taken in 
writing, and in many cases under oath, 
from day to day, for a long period previous 
to the evacuation of Manassas, comprised 
a mass of evidence which, by careful di- 
gests and collations, enabled me to esti- 
mate with considerable accuracy the 
strength of the enemy before us. Sum- 
maries ^T owing the character and results 
of the labors of the secret service force 
accompany this report and I refer to 
them for the facts they contain, and as a 
measure of the ignorance which led some 
journals at that time and persons in high 
office unwittingly to trifle with the reputa- 
tion of an army, and to delude the country 
with Quaker gun stories of the defences 
and gross understatements of the numbers 
of the enemy. 

The following orders were issued for the 
examination of persons coming from the 
direction of the enemy : 

[" Circular.] 
"Headquartkrs Akmy of the Potomac, 
•• Washington, Dec. 16, 1861. 
"The major general commanding di- 
rects that hereafter all deserters, prisoners, 
spies, ' contrabantls,' and all other persons 
whatever coming or brought Mdthin our 
lines from Virginia, shall be taken imme- 
diately to the quarters of the commander 
of the division within whose lines they 
may come or be brought, without previous 
examination by any one, except so far as 
may be necessary for the officer command- 
ing the advance guard to elicit informatioa 
regarding his particular post; that the 
division commander examine all such per- 
sons himself, or delegate such duty to a 
proper officer of his staff, and allow no 
otlier persons to hold any conununication 
with them : that he then "immediately send 
them, with a sufficient guard, to the pro- 



42 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



vost marshal in this city for further exam- 
ination and saie-keepinR, and tliat strin- 
gent orders be given to all guards having 
such persons in charge not to hold any 
communication with them whatever; and 
further, that the information elicited from 
such persons shall be immediately commu- 
nicated to the major general commanding, 
or the cliief of staff, and to no other person 
whatever. 

'•The major general commanding fnr- 
tJier directs that a sufficient guard be 
placed around every telegraph station 
pertaining to this army, and that such 
guards be instructed not to allow any 
person, except the regular telegraph 
corps, general officers, and such staff offi- 
cers as may be authorized by their chief, 
to enter or loiter around said stations 
within hearing of the sound of the tele- 
graph instruments. 

"By command of Maj. Gen. McCi.kllan. 
" S. WILLIAMS, 
"Assistant Adj. Gen." 

'"Headquarters Army of tue Potomac, 

"Washington, Feb. 26, 1862. 

"General Order No. 27. 

* * * ****■?(- 

"All deserters from the enemy, prison- 
ers, and other persons coming within our 
lines, will be taken at once to the provost 
marshal of the nearest division, who will 
examine them in presence of the division 
coroniander or an officer of his staff desig- 
nated for the purpose. This examination 
will only refer to such information as may 
affect the division and those near it, es- 
pecially those remote from general head- 
quarters. 

"As soon as this examination is com- 
pleted — and it must be made as rapidly as 
possible — the person will be sent, under 
proper guard, to the Provost Marshal 
General, with a statement of his replies to 
the questions asked. Upon receiving him, 
the Provost Marshal General will at once 
send him, with his statement, to the chief 
of staff of the army of the Potomac, who 
■will cause the necessary examination to be 
made. The I'rovost Marshal General will 
have the custody of all such persons. Li- 
vision commanders will at once conununi- 
cate to other division commanders all 
iaformation thus obtained which affects 
them. 
******** 

"By command of Maj. Gen. McCleu.a.n. 
"S. WILLIAMS, 
"Assistant Adj. (^en." 

In addition to the foregoing orders, the 
division commanders were instructed, when- 
ever they desired to send out scouts to- 
wards the enemy, to make known the 
object at headquarters, in order that I 



might determine whether we had tlie infor- 
mation it was proposed to obtain, and that 
I might give the necessary orders to other 
commanders, so that the scouts should 
not be molested by the guards. 

It will be seen from the report of the 
chief of the secret service corps, dated 
March 8, that the forces of the rebel army 
of the Potomac, at that date were as 
follows: 

At Manassas, Centreville, Bull run, Upper 

OccotiiiaQ, and vicinity 80,000 men. 

At Brooks"s station, Dumfries, Lower Oc- 

coquau, and vicinity , 18,000 men. 

At Leesburg and vicinity 4,500 men. 

In the Shenandoah valley 13,000 men. 

llo.-'iOO men. 

About three hundred field guns and from 
twenty-six to thirty siege guns were with 
the rebel army in front of Washington . 
The report made on the 17th of March, 
after the evacuation of Manassas and Cen- 
treville, corroborates the statements con- 
tained in the report of the 8th, and is 
fortified by the affidavits of several rail- 
road engineers, constructors, baggage-mas- 
ters, &c., whose opportunities for forming 
correct estimates were unusually good. 
These affidavits will be found in the ac- 
companying reports of the chief of the 
secret service corps. 

A reconnoissance of the works at Centre- 
ville, made by Lieut. McAlester, United 
States engineers, on March 14, 1862, and a 
survey of those at Manassas, made by a 
party of the United States coast survey, 
in April, 1862, confirmed also my conclu- 
sions as to the strength of the enemy's de- 
fences. Those at Centreville consisted of 
two lines, one facing east and the other 
north. The former consisted of seven 
works, viz : one bastion fort, two redoubts, 
two lunettes, and two batteries ; all con- 
taining embrasures for forty guns, and con- 
nected by infantry parapets and double ca- 
ponieres. It extended along the crest of 
the ridge a mile and three quarters from its 
junction with the northern front to ground 
thickly wooded and impassable to an at- 
tacking column 

The northern front extended about one 
and one-fourth mile to Great Rocky run. 
and thence three-fourths of a mile further 
to thickly wooded, impassable ground iu 
the valley of Cub run. It consisted of six 
lunettes and batteries with embrasures for 
thirty-one guns, connected by an infantry 
pnrapet in the form of a cremaillfere line 
with redans. At the town of Centreville, 
on a high hill commanding the rear of all 
the works within range, was a large hexa- 
gonal redoubt with ten embrasures. 

Manassas station was defended in all di- 
rections by a system of detached works, 
with platforms for heavy guns arranged for 
marine carriages, and often coauected by 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'GLELLAN. 



43 



infaulry parapets. This system was ren- 
dered complete by a very large work, with 
sixteen embrasures, which commanded the 
highest of the other works by about fifty 
feet. 

Sketches of the reconnoissances above 
referred to will be found among the maps 
appended to this report. 

From this it will be seen that the posi- 
tions selected by the enemy at Centreville 
and Manassas were naturally very strong, 
with impassable streams and broken ground, 
affording ample protection for their flanks, 
and that strong lines of intrenchments swept 
all the available approaches. 

Although the history of every former war 
has conclusively shown the great advan- 
tages which are possessed by an army act- 
ing on the defensive and occupying strong 
positions, defended by heavy earthworks ; 
yet, at the commencement of this war, but 
few civilians in our country, and, indeed, 
uot all military men of rank, had a just ap- 
preciation of the fact. 

New levies that have never been in bat- 
tle cannot be expected to advance without 
cover under the murderous fire from such 
defences, and carry them by assault. This 
is work in which veteran troops frequently 
falter and are repulsed with loss. That an 
assault of the enemy's positions in front of 
"Washington, with the new troops com- 
posing the army of the Potomac, during 
the winter of 1861-'62, would have resulted 
in defeat and demoralization was too prob- 
able. 

The same army, though inured to war in 
many battles, hard fought and bravely won, 
has twice, under other generals, suffered 
such disasters as it was no excess of pru- 
dence then to avoid. My letter to the Sec- 
retary of War, dated February 3, 1862. and 
given above, expressed the opinion that the 
movement to the Peninsula would compel 
the enemy to retire from his position at 
Manassas and free Washington from dan- 
ger. When the enemy first learned of that 
plan, they did thus evacuate Manassas. 
I)uring the Peninsula campaign, as at no 
former period, northern Virginia was com- 
pletely in our possession, and the vicinity 
of Washington free from the presence of 
the enemy. The ground so gained was not 
lost, nor Washington again put in danger, 
until the enemy learned of the orders for 
the evacuation of the Peninsula, sent to 
me at Harrison's bar, and were again left 
fi'ee to advance northward and menace the 
national capital. Perhaps no one doubts 
that the best defence of Washington is a 
Peninsula attack on Richmond. 

My order for the organization of the 
army corps was issued on the 13th of 
March ; it has been given above. 

While at Fairfax Court-house, on March 



12. I was iiifornied through the telegraph, 
by a member of my staff', that the follow- 
ing document had appeared in the Na- 
tional intelligencer of that morning : 

[President's War Order, No. 3.] 

" Executive Mansion, 
"Washington, March 11, 1862. 

" Maj. Gen. McClelhm having person- 
ally taken the field at the head of the 
array of the Potomac, until otherwise or- 
dered, he is relieved from the command of 
the other military departments, he retain- 
ing command of the department of the 
Potomac. 

" Ordered further, That the depart- 
ments now under the respective commands 
of Gens. Halleck and Hunter, together 
with so much of that under Gen. Buell as 
lies west of a north and south line indefi- 
nitely drawn through, Knoxville, Tennes- 
see, be consolidated and designated the de- 
partment of the Mississippi ; and that, un- 
til otherwise ordered, Maj. Gen. Halleck 
have command of said department. 

" Ordered, also, That the country west 
of the department of the Potomac and east 
of the department of the Mississippi be a 
military department, to be called the moun- 
tain department, and that the same be com- 
manded by Maj. Gen. Fremont. 

" That all the commanders of depart- 
ments, after the receipt of this order by 
them, respectively report severally and di- 
rectly to the Secretary of War, and that 
prompt, full and frequent re])urts will be 
expected of all and each of them. 

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN." 

Though unaware of the President's in- 
tention to remove me from the position of 
general-in-chief, I cheerfully acceded to the 
disposition he saw fit to make of my ser- 
vices, and so informed him in a note on the 
12th of March, in which occur these words : 

" I believe I said to you some weeks 
since, in connection with some western 
matters, that no feeling of self-interest or 
ambition should ever prevent me from de- 
voting myself to the service. 1 am glad to 
have the opportunity to prove it, and you 
will find that, under present circumstances, 
I shall work just as cheerfully as before, 
and that no consideration of self will in 
any manner interfere with the discharge of 
my public duties. Again thanking you for 
the official and personal kindness you have 
so often evinced towards me, 1 am," &c., &c. 

On the 14th of March a reconnoissance 
of a large body of cavalry with some in- 
fantry, under command of Gen. Stoneman, 
was sent along the Orange and Alexandria 
railroad to determine the position of the 
enemy, and, if possible, force his rear 
across the Rappahannock, but the roads 
were in such condition that, finding it im- 



44 RErORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX. 



possible to sul>pist his men, Gen. Stoneman 
■was forced to return after reaching Cedar 
run. 

The following despatch from him recites 
the result of this expedition. 

"Headquarters, Union Mills, 
" March 16, 1862. 
" We arrived here last evening about 
dark. AVe got corn for horses ; no pro- 
visions for men. Bull run too high to 
cross. Had we stayed an hour longer we 
should not have got here to-day, owing to 
the high water in the streams. Felt the 
enemy cautiously, and found him in force 
at Warrenton Junction. Saw two regi- 
ments of cavalry and three bodies of in- 
fantry on the other side of Cedar run. 
Had we crossed, should not have been able 
to get back for high water. Had three 
men of 5th cavah-y hit driving in enemy's 
pickets; one slightly wounded in the head. 
E]nemy acted confidently, and followed us 
some W'ay back on- the road, but did not 
molest us in any way. Enemy's force con- 
sisted of Stuart's and Ewell's cavalry, a 
battery of artillery, and some infantry. 
Railroad bridges all burned down up to 
Warrenton Junction ; still entire beyond, 
but all in readiness to burn at a moment's 
warning, having dry wood piled upon them. 
Heard cars running during night before 
last ; probably bringing up troops from 
Rappahannock. Heard of two regiments 
of infantry at Warrenton engaged in im- 
pressing the militia and securing forage. 
Heard of a large force of infantry this 
side of Rappahannock river, having come 
up to Warrenton Junction from Aquia 
creek day before yesterday. Bridges all 
destroyed this side of Broad run. The 
aides who take this will give you further 
particulars. 

" Very respectfully. &c., 

'■' GEOROE STONEMAN, 
" Brig.-Gen. Comd'g. 

" Col. COT.BURN." 

The main body of the army was, on the 
l.jth of March, moved back to the vicinity 
of Alexandria to be embarked, leJiving a 
part of Gen. Sumner's corps at Manassas 
mitil other troops could be sent to relieve 
it. Before it was withdrawn a strong 
reconnoissance, under (ien. Howard, was 
sent towards the Rappahannock, the re- 
sult of which appears in the following 
despatch : 

'• Warrknton Junction, 
" March 29, 1862. 
" Express just received from Gen. How- 
ard. He drove the enemy across the 
Rappahannock bridge, and is now in camp 
on this bank of and near the Rappahan- 
nock river. 



"The enemy blew up the bridge in his 
retreat. There was skirmishing during 
the march, and a few shots exchanged by 
the artillery, without any loss on our part. 
Their loss, if any, is not known. Gen. 
Howard will return to this camp to-morrow 
morning. 

"E. V. SUMNER,Brig.-Gen. 

"Gen. S. Williams." 

The line of the Rappahannock and the 
J^Ianassas Gap railroad was thus left rea- 
sonably secure from menace by any consi- 
derable body of the enemy. 

On the 13th of March a council of war 
was assembled at Fairfax Court-house to 
discuss the military status. The Presi- 
dent's order No. .3. of March 8th, w'as con- 
sidered. The following is a memorandum 
of the proceedings of the council : 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Fairfax, March 13, 1863. 

" A council of the genei'als commanding 
army corps, at the headquarters of the ar- 
my of the Potomac, were of the opinion — 

"I. That the enemy having retreated 
from Manassas to Gordonsville, behind the 
Rappahannock and Rapidan, it is the 
opinion of the generals commanding army 
corps that the operations to be carried on 
will be best undertaken from Old Point 
Comfort, between the York and James 
rivers : Provided, 

" 1st. That the enemy's vessel, Merri- 
mac, can be neutralized. 

" 2d. That the means of transportation, 
sufficient for an immediate transfer of the 
force to its new base, can be ready at 
Washington and Alexandria to move down 
the Potomac : and, 

" 3d. That a naval auxiliary force can 
be had to silence, or aid in silencing the 
enemy's batteries on the York river. 

"4th. That the force to be left to cover 
Washington shall be such as to give an 
entire feeling of security for its safety 
from menace. (Unanimous.) 

" II. If the foregoing cannot he, the 
army should then be moved against the 
enemy, behind the Rappahannock, at the 
earliest possible moment, and the means 
for reconstructing bridges, repairing rail- 
roads, and stocking them with materials 
sufficient for supplying the army, should 
at once be collected, for both the Orange 
and Alexandria and Aquia and Richmond 
railroads. (Unanimous.) 

" N. B. — That M-ith the forts on the right 
bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and 
those on the left bank occupied, a covering 
force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 
men would suffice. (Keys, Heintzelman, 
and McDowell.) A total of 40,000 men 
for the defence of the city would suffice. 
(Sumner.") 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE R. M'CLELLAX, 



45 



Tliip was assented to liy myself, iinJ 
immediately communicated to the War 
Department. The I'oUowiug reply was 
received the same day : 

"War Dkpartment, March 13. 1BC2. 

"The President having considered the 
plan ot" operations agreed upon by yourself 
and the commanders of army corps, makes 
no objections to the same, but gives the 
following directions as to its execution ; 

" I. Leave such force at Manassas Junc- 
tion as shall make it entirely certain that 
the enemy shall not repossess himself of 
that position and line of communication. 

"2. Leave Washington entirely secure. 

"3. Move the remainder of the force 
down the Potomac, choosing a new base 
at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between 
here and there, or, at all events, move such 
remainder of the army at once in pursuit 
of the enemv by some route. 

''EDWIN M. STANTON, 
" Sec. of War. 

" Major-Gen. G. B. McClellan." 

My preparations were at once begun in 
accordance with these directions, and on 
the 16th of March the following instruc- 
tions were sent to Gens Banks and Wads- 
worth : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" March 16th, 1862. 
" Sir ; You will post your command in 
the vicinity of Manassas, intrench yourself 
strongly, and throw cavalry pickets well 
out to the front. 

" Your first care will be the rebuilding 
of the railway from Washington to Manas- 
sas and to Strasburg, in order to open 
your communications with tlie valley of 
the .Shenandoah. As soon as the Manas- 
sas (xap railway is in running order, in- 
trench a brigade of infantry, say four regi- 
ments, with two batteries, at or near the 
point where the railway crosses the She- 
nandoah. Something like two regiments 
of cavalry should be left in that vicinity to 
occu])y Winchester, and thoroughly scour 
the country south of that railway and up 
the Shenandoah valley, as well as through 
Chester gap, which might perhaps be ad- 
vantageously occupied by a detachment 
of infantry, well intrenched. Block-houses 
should be built at all the railway bridges. 
Occupy by grand guards VVarrenton Junc- 
tion and Warrenton itself, and also some 
little more advanced point on the Orange 
and Alexandria railroad, as soon as the 
railway bridge is repaire<l. 

'• Great activity should be observed by 
the cavalry. Besides the two regiments 
at Manassas, another regiment of cavalry 
will be at your disposal, to scout towards 
the Occoquan, and probably a fourth to- 
wards L.'csbur!^. 



"To recapitulate, the most important 
points which should engage your attention 
are as follows : 

" 1. A strong force, well intrenched, in 
the vicinity of Manassas, perhaps even 
Centreville, and another force, (a brigade,) 
also well intrenched, near Strasburg. 

" 2. Block-houses at the railway bridges. 

" 3. Constant employment of the cav- 
alry well to the front. 

"4. Grand guards at Warrenton Junc- 
tion and in advance, as far as the Rappa- 
hannock, if possible. 

" 5. Great care to be excercised to ob- 
tain full and early information as to the 
enemy. 

" 6. The general object is to cover the 
line of the Potomac and Washington. 

" The above is communicated by com- 
mand of Maj. Gen. McClellan. 

'• S. AVILLIAMS, 
"Assistant Adj. Gen. 
"Major-Gen. N. P. Baxks, 
" Commanding Fifth Corps, Army of the 

Potomac." 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" March 16, 1862. 

" Sir : The command to which you have 
been assigned, by instructions of the 
President, as military governor of the 
District of (;olumbia, embraces the geo- 
graphical limits of the District, and will 
also include the city of Alexandria, the 
defensive works south of the Potomac 
from the Occoquan to Difficult creek, and 
tli* post of Fort Washington. 

" I enclo.se a list of the troops and of 
the defences embraced in these limits. 

'• General Banks will command at Ma- 
nassas Junction, with the divisions of Wil- 
liams and Shields, composing the fifth 
corps, but you should, nevertheless, exer- 
cise vigilance in your front, carefully 
guard the approaches in that quarter, and 
maintain the duties of advanced guards. 
You will use the same precaution on either 
flank. 

" All troops not actually needed for the 
police of Washington and Ceorgctown, 
for the garrison north of the Potomac, and 
for other indicated special duties, should 
be moved to the south sitle of the river. 

"In the centre of your front you should 
post the main body of your troops, and 
proper proportions at suitable distances 
toward your right and left flanks. Care- 
ful patrols will be made, in order tho- 
roughly to scour the country in front, from 
right to left. 

" It is specially joined upon you to main- 
tain the forts and their ariuamcnls in the 
best possible order, to look carefully to 
the instruction and discipline of their gar- 
risons, as well as all other troops under 



46 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



your command, and, by frequent and rigid 
inspections, to insure the attainment of 
these ends. 

••The care of the railways, canals, de- 
pots, bridges and ferries, within the above- 
named limits, will devolve upon you, and 
you are to insure their security and pro- 
vide for their protection by every means 
in your power. You will also protect the 
depots of 'the public stores and the transit 
of stores to troops in active service. 

"By means of patrols you will thoroughly 
scour the neighboring country, south of 
the Eastern Branch, and also on your right, 
and you will use every precaution to inter- 
cept mails, goods and persons passing un- 
authorized to the enemy's lines. 

" The necessity of maintaining good or- 
der within your limits, and especially in 
the capital of the nation, cannot be too 
strongly enforced. 

•• You will forward and facilitate the 
movements of all troops destined for the 
active part of the army of the Potomac, 
and especially the transit of detachments 
to their proper regiments and corps. 

" The charge of the new troops arriving 
in Washmgton, and of all troops tempora- 
rily there, will devolve upon you. You 
will form them into provisional brigades, 
promote their instruction and discipline, 
and facilitate their equipment. Report all 
arrivals of troops, their strength, compo- 
sition and equipment, by every opportu- 
nity. 

■' Besides the regular reports and re- 
turns, which you will be required to ren- 
der to the Adjutant-General of the army, 
you will make to these headquarters a con- 
solidated report of your command, every 
Sunday morning, and monthly returns on 
the first day of each month. 

" The foregoing instructions are com- 
municated by command of Maj. Gen. Mc- 
Clellan. 

"S. WILLIAMS, 
" Assistant Adj. Gen. 
" Brig. Gen. J. S. Wadsworth, 

" Military Governer, Dist. of Columbia." 

The Secretary of War had expressed a 
desire that I should communicate to the 
War Department my designs with regard 
to the employment of the army of the Po- 
tomac in an official form. I submitted, on 
the 19th day of March the following: 

" IIeadquartrrs Army of the Potomac, 

" Theo. Sem., Va., March 19, 1862. 

" Sir : I have the honor to submit the 

following notes on the proposed operations 

of the active portion of the army of the 

Potomiu;. 

'•The proposed plan of campaign is to 
assume Fort Monroe as the first'base of 
operations, taking the line of Yorktown 



and West Point upon Richmond as the 
line of operations, Richmond being the 
objective point. It is assumed that the 
fall of Richmond involves that of Norfolk 
and the whole of Virginia ; also, that we 
shall fight a decisive battle between West 
Point and Richmond, to give which battle 
the rebels will concentrate all their avail- 
able forces, understanding, as they will, 
that it involves the fate of their cause. It 
therefore follows — 

" 1st. That we should collect all our 
available forces and operate upon adjacent 
lines, maintaining perfect communication 
between our columns. 

"2d. That no time should be lost in 
reaching the battle field. 

" The advantages of the Penninsula be- 
tween York and James rivers are too ob- 
vious to need e.xplanation ; it is also clear 
that West Point should as soon as possi- 
ble be reached, and used as our main depot, 
that we may have the shortest line of land 
transportation for our supplies, and the 
use of York river. 

" There are two methods of reaching 
this point — 

"1st. By moving directly from Fort 
Monroe as a base, and trusting to the 
roads for our supplies, at the same time 
landing a strong corps as near Yorktown 
as possible, in order to turn the rebel lines 
of defence south of Yorktown ; then to 
reduce Yorktown and Gloucester by a 
siege, in all probability involving a delay 
of weeks, perhaps. 

"2d. To make a combined naval and 
land attack upon Yorktown, the first ob- 
ject of the campaign. This leads to the 
most rapid and decisive results. To ac- 
complish this, the navy should at once 
concentrate upon the York river all their 
available and most powferful batteries : its 
reduction should not in that case require 
many hours. A strong corps would 
be pushed up the York, under cover 
of the navy, directly upon West Point, 
immediately upon the fall of Yorktown, 
and we could at once establish our new 
base of operations at a distance of some 
twent3"-five miles from Richmond, with 
every facility for developing and bringing 
into play the whole of our available forces 
on either or both banks of the James. 

" It is impossible to urge too strongly 
the absolute necessity of the full co-operar- 
tion of the navy as a part of this pro- 
gramme. Without it the operations may 
be prolonged for many weeks, and we may 
be forced to carry in front several strong 
positions which by their aid could be turned 
without serious loss of either time or men. 

" It is also of first importance to bear in 
mind the fact already alluded to, that the 
capture of Richmond necessarily involves 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



47 



the prompt fall of Norfolk, while an opera- 
tion against Norfolk, if successful, as the 
beginniu": of the campaif^n, facilitates the 
reduction of Richmond merely by the de- 
moralization of the rebel troops involved, 
and that after the fall of Norfolk we should 
be obliged to undertake the capture of 
Richmond by the same moans which would 
liave accomplished it in the beginning, 
having meanwhile afforded the rebels am- 
ple time to perfect their defensive arrange- 
ments, for they would well know, from tlie 
moment the army of the Potomac changed 
its base to Fort Monroe, that Richmond 
must be its ultimate object. 

•' It may be summed up in a few words, 
that, for the prompt success of this cam- 
paign, it is absolutely necessary that the 
navy sliould at once throw its whole avail- 
able force, its most powerful vessels, 
against Yorktown. There is the most im- 
portant point — there the knot to be cut. 
An immediate decision upon the subject- 
matter of this communication is highly 
desirable, and seems called for by the exi- 
gencies of the occasion. 

" I am, sir, very respectfully, your obe- 
dient servant, 

" GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major-Gen. 

" Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Sec. of War." 

In the mean time the troops destined to 
form the aotive army were collected in 
camps convenient to the points of embar- 
cation, and every preparation made to em- 
bark them as rapidly as possible when the 
transports were ready. 

A few days before sailing for Fort Mon- 
roe, while still encamped near Alexandria, 
I met the President, by appointment, on a 
steamer. He there informed me that he 
had been strongly pressed to take Gen. 
Blenker's division from my command and 
give it to Gen. Fremont. His excellency 
was good enough to suggest several reasons 
for not taking Blenker's division from me. 
I assented to the force of his suggestions, 
and was extremely gratified by his decision 
to allow the division to remain with the 
army of the Potomac. It was therefore 
•vith surpri.se that I received, on the 31st, 
tlie following note : 

" ExECUTivK Mansion, 
"Washington, March 31, IHC/i. 

"My Dear Sir: This morning I felt 
constrained to order Blenker's division to 
Fremont, and I write this to assure you 
that I did so with great pain, understand- 
ing that you would wish it otherwise. If 
you could know the full pressure of the 
case, I am confident that you would justify, 
it. even beyond a mere acknowledgment 



that the commander-in-chief may order 
what he pleases. 

" Yours, very truly, 

"A. LINCOLN. 
"Maj. Gen. McClellan." 

To this I replied, in substance, that I 
regretted the order, and could ill afford to 
lose ten thousand troops which had been 
counted upon in forming my plan of cam- 
paign, but as there was no remedy I would 
yield, and do the best I could without 
them. In a conversation with the Presi- 
dent a few hours afterwards I repeated 
verbally the same thing, and expressed my 
regret that Blenker's division had been 
given to Gen. Fremont from any pressure 
other than the requirements of the national 
exigency. I was partially relieved, how- 
ever, by the President's positive and em- 
phatic assurance that I might be confident 
that no more troops beyond these ten thou- 
sand should in any event be taken from 
me, or in any way detached from my com- 
mand. 

At the time of the evacuation of Manas- 
sas by the enemy, Jackson was at Win- 
chester, our forces oocupying Charlcstown, 
and Shield's reaching Bunker Hill on the 
11th. On the morning of the 12th, a 
brigade of Gen. Bank's troops, under Gen. 
Hamilton, entered Winchester, the enemy 
having left at 5 o'clock the evening before, 
his rear guard of cavalry leaving an hour 
before our advance entered the place. The 
enemy having made his preparations for 
evacuation some days before, it was not 
possible to intercept his retreat. On the 
13th the mass of Bank's corps was concen- 
trated in the immediate vicinity of Win- 
chester, the enemy being in the rear of 
Strasburg. 

On the 19th Gen. Shields occupied 
Strasburg, driving the enemy twenty miles 
south to Mount Jackson. 

On the 2()th the first division of Bank's 
corps commenced its movement towards 
Manassas, in compliance with my letter of 
instructions of the 16th. 

Jackson probably received information 
of this movement, and supposed that no 
force of any consequence was left in tlio 
vicinity of Winchester, and upon the fall- 
ing back of Shields to that place, for the 
purpose of enticing Jackson in pur.>?uit, the 
latter ])roin])tly followed, whereupon en- 
sued a skirmish on the 22d, in which (Jen. 
Shields was wounded, and an affair at ^Vin- 
chester on the 23d, resulting in the defeat 
of Jackson, who was pursued as rapidly ag 
the exhaustion of our troops and the diili- 
culty of obtaining supplies permitted. It 
is presumed that the full reports of the 
battle of Winchester were forwarded direct 
to tho AVar Department by (Jen. Banks. 



48 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



It bciug now clear that the enemy had 
no intention of returning by tlie Manassas 
route, the following letter of April 1, was 
written to Gen. Banks : 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" On board the Commodore, April 1, 1862. 

" Genkral : The change in afitiirs in the 
valley of the Shenandoah has rendered 
necessary a corresponding departure, tem- 
porarily at least, I'rora the plan we some 
days since agreed upon. 

" In my arrangements I assume that you 
have with you a force amply sufficient to 
drive Jackson before you, provided he is 
not re-enforced largely. I also assume that 
you may find it impossible to detach any- 
thing towards Manassas for some days, 
probably not until the operations of the 
main army have drawn all the rebel force 
towards liiclimond. 

" You are aware that Gen. Sumner has 
for some days been at Manassas Junction 
with two divisions of infantry, six batteries, 
and two regiments of cavalry, and that a 
reconnoissance to the Eappahannock 
forced the enemy to destroy the railway 
In-idge at Rappahannock Station, on the 
Orange and Alexandria railroad. Since 
that time our cavalry have found nothing 
on this side the Rappahannock in that di- 
rection, and it seems clear that we have no 
reason to fear any return of th6 rebels in 
that quarter. Their movements near 
Fredericksburg also indieale a final aban- 
donment of that neighborhood. I doubt 
whether Johnson will now re-enforce Jack- 
sou with a view of offensive operations. 
'I'he thne is probably passed when he could 
have gained anything by doing so. I have 
ordered in one of Sumner's division (that 
of Richardson, late Sumner's) to Alexan- 
dria for embarcation. Blenker's has been 
detached from the army of the Potomac 
and ordered to report to Gen. FiTmont. 

" Abercrombie is probably at Warren- 
ton junction to-day. (Jeary is at White 
Ploms. 

' Two regiments of cavalry have been 
ordered out, and are now on the way to 
relieve the two regiments of Sumner. 

'■ Four thousand infantry and one battery 
leave Washington at once for Manassas. 
Some three thousand more will move in one 
or two days, and soon after some three 
thousand additional. 

•■ I will order Blenker to march on 
Strasburg and to report to you for tem- 
])orary duty, so that should you find a 
large force in your front you can avail 
yourself of his aid as soon as possible. 
Please direct him to Winchester, thence 
to report to the Adj. Uen. of the army for 
orders ; but keep him until you are sure 
what you have in front. 



" In regard to your own movements, the 
most important thing at present is to 
throw Jackson well back, and then to 
assume such a position as to enable you to 
prevent his return. As soon as the rail- 
way communications are re-estabtished it 
will be probably important and advisable 
to move on Staunton, but this would re- 
(piire secure communications, and a force 
of from twenty-five thousand to thirty thou- 
sand for active operations. It should also 
be nearly coincident with my own move on 
Richmond, at all events not so long before 
it as to enable the rebels to concentrate on 
you, and then return on me. 1 fear that 
you cannot be ready in time, although it 
may come in very Avell with a force less 
than that I have mentioned, after the main 
battle near Richmond. When Gen. Sum- 
ner leaves Warrenton Junction, Geii. 
Abercrombie will be placed in immediate 
command of Manassas and Warrenton 
Junction, under your general oi'ders. 
Please inform me frequently by telegraph 
and otherwise as to the state of things in 
your front. 

" I am very truly yours, 

" GEO. B. McCLELLAN. 

Maj. Gen. Com. 

Maj. Gen. N. P. Banks, 

Com. Fifth Corps. 
" P. S. — From what I have just learned, 
it would seem that the regiments of cavalry 
intended for Warrenton Junction have 
gone to Harper's Ferrj-. Of the four ad- 
ditional regiments placed under your 
orders, two should as promptly as possible 
move by the shortest route on Warrenton 
Junction. 

" I am sir, very respectively, your obedi- 
ent servant, 

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

Maj. Gen. Com." 

This letter needs no further explanation 
than to say that it was my intention, had 
the operations in that quarter remained 
under my charge, either to have resumed 
the defensive positioti marked out in the 
letter of March 16, or to have advanced 
Gen. Banks upon Staunton as might in the 
progress of events seem advisible. 

It is to be remembered that when I 
wrote the preceding and following letters 
of April 1. 1 had no expectation of being 
relieved from the charge of the operations 
in the Shenandoah valley, the President's 
war order No. 3 giving no intimation of 
such an intention, and that so far as refer- 
ence was made to final operations after 
driving Jackson back and taking such a 
position as to prevent his return, no posi- 
tive orders were given in the letter, the 
matter being left for further consideration, 



RErORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'll i-LLAX. 



49 



vrhen the proper time arrived for a de- 
cision, i 
From the following letter to the Adj. 
Gen., dated April 1. 18(52. it will he seen | 
that I left for the defence of the national I 
capital and its approaches, when I sailed 
for the Peninsula, T3.4o6 men. with 109 
pieces of li<rht artillery, including the 32 
pieees in \Va.>hington alluded to. but not 
enumerated in my letter to the Adj. Gen. 
It will also be seen that I recommended , 
other available troops in New York (more ; 
than -4,000) to be at once ordered forward 
to re-enforce them. 1 

•• HeaDQCARTERS AB3tT OF THE PoTOMAC, 

" Steamtr Covimodare, April 1, 1862. i 

'• Gen"Eral : I have to request that you 
will lay the following connnnnicatioa be- 
fore the Hon. Secretary of War. 

"The approxiiuttte numbers and posi- 
tions of the troops left near and in rear of 
the Potomac are as follows : 

•• Gen Pix has. after guarding the rail- 
roads under his charge, sufficient to give 
him 5,000 for the defence of Baltimore, and 
1.9S3 available for the Eastern Shore. 
Annapolis. Jcc. Fort Delaware is very 
well garrisoned by about 400 men. 

•• The garrisons of the forts around 
Washington amount to 10.600 men ; oiher 
disposable troops now with Gen. Wads- 
worth about 11.400 men. 

•• The troops employed in guarding the 
various railways in Maryland amount to 
some 3.359 men. These it is designed to 
relieve, beinar old regiments, by dismounted 
cavalry, and to send forward to Manassas. 

'• Gen. Abercrombie occupie? Warren- 
ton with a force, which, including Col. 
(icary. at White Plains, and the cavalry to 
be at his disposal, will amount to some 
7.780 men. with 12 pieces of artillery. 

•• I have the honor to request that all 
the troops orc^^nized for service in Penn- 
sylvania and N'ew York, and in any of the 
Eastern States, may be ordered to AVash- 
ington. I learn tVora Gov. Curt in that 
there are some 3.500 men now ready in 
Pennsylvania. This force I should be 
glad to have sent to Manassas. Four 
thousand men from Gen. Wadsworth 1 
desire to be ordered to Manassas. These 
troops, with the railroad guards above 
a.iuded to, will make up a force under the 
command of l.^n. Abercrombie of some- 
thing like 18.639 men. 

•• It is my desitrn to push Gen. Blenker's 
division from Warrenton upon Strasbnrg. 
Ho should rem:un at Strasburg long 
enouirh to allow matters to assume a 
definite form in that region before pro- 
ce^'ding to his ultimate destination. 

"The troops in the valley of the Shan- 
aadoah will thus, iccludiug Bloaker"s divi- 



sion. 10.02'* strone. wi'.h 24 pieces of artil- 
lery ; Banks's 5lk oorpts, which embraces 
the command of Gen. Shield's 19.687 
strong, with 41 guns, some 3.6.V2 dispo.^- 
able cavalry, and the lailroad guards, 
about 2.100 men, amount tj Ji'jaut 35,467 
men. 

•• It !s desieneU to relieve G'-n. Hooker 
by one regiment, say 850 m<ri, being, with 
some 500 cavalry, 1.350 meu on the lower 
Potomac. 

" Til recapitn'at*" . 

" AcWarrent.iathsrels tobe T.TSi m«a 

■■ At Maua.s.-<as. »»*• 10,S-^9 " 

" la the valley of the Sheaaadoah 35,467 '• 

•' On the lotrer Potomac I.-IIO " 

"In all...- 5o,«4S " 

" There would thus be left for the garri- 
sons and the front of Washinarton. under 
Gen. Wadsworth. some 18.000. inclusive of 
the batteries under instruction. The troops 
organizing or ready for service in New 
York, I learn, will probably number more 
than four thousand. These should be 
assembled at Washington, subject to di.«- 
position where their services may be most 
required. 

" I am. very respectfully, your obedient 
servant, 

•GEO. B. McCLELLAX. 

Maj. Gen. Com. 
'•Brig. Gen. L. Tuomas. Adj. Geu. U. S. 

Army." 

The following letter from Gen. Barry 
shows that thirty-two (32) field gims. with 
men, horses, and equipments, were also 
lett in Washington city when the army 
sailed. These were the batteries under 
instruction referred to above : 

•'HEADQrAKTERS INSPECTOR OF ARTILLERY, 

••Washington. Dec. 16. 1862. 
"General: It having been stated in 
various public prints, and in a speech of 
Senator Chandler, of Michigan, in his place 
in the Unite<i States Senate, quoting what 
he stated to be ai» portion of the testimony 
of Brier. Gen. Wadsworth. military gover- 
nor of Washington, before the joint Senate 
and House committee on the conduct of 
the war. that Major Gen. McClellan had 
left an insufficient force for the defence of 

; Washington, and not a gun on wheels. 

\ •• I have to contradict this charge a.s 

; follows: 

■•From official reports made at the 

j time to me. (the chief of artillery of the 

': army of the Potomac.) and now in my pos- 
session, by the commanding officer of the 
liirht artillery troops left in camp in the 
city of Washington by your orders, it ap- 
pears that the following named field bat- 
teries were left: 

' •Battery C. 1st New York artillery. 

\ Capi. Barnes, 2 guns ; battery K., 1st New 



50 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN". 



Ynrk artillery, Capt. Crounse, 6 guns ; 
hattery L, 2d New York artillery, Capt. 
Robinson, 6 guns; 9th New Y'ork inde- 
pendent battery. Capt. Monzordi, 6 guns; 
16th New York independent liattery. Capt. 
Locke : battery A. 2d battalion New York 
artillery, ('apt. Hogan, 6 guns; battery B, 
2d liat'talion New York artillery, Capt. 
McMalioii, 6 guns; total of batteries, 32 
guns. 

'•With the exception of a few horses 
which could have been procured from the 
quartermaster's department in a few hours, 
tlie batteries were all fit for immediate 
service, excepting the 16th New York 
battery, which having been previously or- 
dered, on Gen. Wadsworth's application, 
to report to him for special service, was 
unequipped with either guns or horses. 

"I am. general, very respectfully, your 
9bedient servant, 

" W. F. BARRY, 

"Brig. Gen., Insp. of Art. U. S. Army. 

" Maj. Gen. McClellan, U. S. A. 

It is true that Blenker's division, which 
»^ uiclnded in the force enumerated by 
me. was under orders to re-enforce Gen. 
^'remont, but the following despatch from 
the Secretary of War, dated March 31, 
1862. will show that I was authorized to 
detain him at Strasburg until matters as- 
sumed a definite form in that region, be- 
fore proceeding to his ultimate destina- 
tion ; in other words, until Jackson was 
disposed of. And had he been detained 
there, instead of moving on to Harper's 
Ferry and Franklin, under other orders, 
it is probable that Gen. Banks would have 
defeated Jackson, instead of being himself 
obliged subsequently to retreat to Wil- 
liamsport. 

" War Pepartment, 

"Washington, D. C, March 31, 1862. 

" The order in respect to Blenker is not 
designed to hinder or delay the movement 
of Richardson, or any other force. He 
can remain wherever you desire him as 
long as rfHjuired for your movements, and 
in any position you desire. The order is 
simply to place him in position for re- 
cnfurcing Fremont, as soon as your dispo- 
sitions will permit, and he may go to Har- 
per's Ferry by such route and at such 
time as you shall direct. State your own 
wishes as to the movement, when and how 
it shall be made. 

"EDWIN M. STANTON, 

" Secretary of War. 

"IMaj. Con. McClkllax." 

Without including Gen. Blenker's divi- 
sion, there were left 67,428 men and 85 
pieces of light artillery, which, under ex- 
isting circumstances. 1 deemed more than 
adequate to insure the perfect security of 



Washington against any force the enemy 
could bring against it, for the following 
reasons : 

'I'he light troops I had thrown forward 
under Gen. Stoneman in pursuit of the 
rebel army, after the evacuation of Manas- 
sas and Centreville, had driven their rear 
guard across Cedar run, and subsequent 
expeditions from Sumner's corps had 
forced them beyond the Rappahannock. 
They had destroyed all the railroad bridges 
behind thern, thereby indicating that they 
did not intend to return over that route. 
Indeed, if they had attempted such a 
movement, their progress must have been 
slow and difficult, as it would have in- 
volved the reconstruction of the bridges ; 
and if my orders for keeping numerous 
cavalry patrols well out to the front, to 
give timely notice of any a])proach of the 
enemy, had been strictly enforced (and I 
left seven regiments of cavalry for this ex- 
press purpose) they could not by any pos- 
sibility have reached Washington before 
there would have been ample time to con- 
centrate the entire forces left for its de- 
fence, as well as those at Baltimore, at 
any necessary point. 

it was clear to my mind, as I reiterated 
to the authorities, that the movement of 
the army of the Potomac would have the 
effect to draw off the hostile army from 
Manassas to the defence of their capital, 
and thus free Washington from menace. 
This opinion M^as confirmed the moment 
the movement commenced, or rather as 
soon as the enemy became aware of our 
intentions ; for with the exception of Jack- 
son's force of some 15,000, which his in- 
structions show how to have been hitended 
to operate in such a way as to prevent Mc- 
Dowell's corps from being sent to re-enforce 
me, no rebel force of any magnitude made 
its appearance in front of Washington 
during the progress of our operations on 
the Peninsula ; nor until the order was 
given for my return from Harrison's Land- 
ing was Washington again threatened. 

Surrounded, as Washington was, with 
numerous and strong fortifications, well 
garrisoned, it was manifest that the enemy 
could not afford to detach from his main 
army a force sufficient to assail them. 

It is proper to remark, that just pre- 
vious to my departure for Fort Monroe, I 
sent my chief of staff to Gen. Hitchcock, 
who at that time held staff relations with 
his excellency the President and the Sec- 
retary of War, to submit to him a list of 
the troops I proposed to leave for the de- 
fence of Washington, and the positions in 
which I designed posting them. Gen. 
Hitchcock, after glancing his eye over the 
list, observed that he was not the judge of 
what was required for defending the capi- 



l^EPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX. 51 



tal ; that Gen. McClellan's position was 
euch as to enable him to understand the 
subject much better than he did, and he 
presumed that if the force desitrnated was, 
in his judtcment, sufiQcient, nothing more 
v.'ould be required. He was then tokl by 
the chief of staff that I wouUl be ghid to 
Lave his opinion, as an oUl and experienced 
oflicer ; to this he repHed, that as I liad 
had the entire control of the defences for 
a long time, I was the best judge of what 
was needed, and he declined to give any 
other expression of opinion at that time. 

On the 2d of April, the day following 
my departure for Fort Monroe, Gens. 
Hitchcock and Thomas were directed by 
the Secretary of War to examine and re- 
port whether the President's instructions 
to me, of March 8 and 13 had been com- 
plied with ; on the same day their report 
was submitted, and their decision was — 

" That the requirement of the President, 
that this city (Washington) sliall be left 
entirely secure, has not been fully com- 
plied with." 

The President, in his letter, to me on the 
9th of April, eays : "And now allow me to 
n.sk, do you really think I should permit 
the line from Richmond, via Manassas 
Junction, to this city, to be entirely open, 
except what resistance could be presented 
by less than twenty thousand unorganized 
troops ?" 

In the report of Gens. Hitchcock and 
Thomas, alluded to, it is acknowledged 
that there was no danger of an attack from 
the direction of Manassas, in these words : 
" In regard to occupying Manassas Junc- 
tion, as the enemy have destroyed the 
railroads leading to it, it may be fair to 
a-ssume that they have no intention of re- 
turning for the reoccupation of their late 
position, and therefore no large force would 
be necessary to hold that position." 

That as remarked before, was precisely 
the view that I took of it, and this was on- 
forced by the subsequent movements of 
the enemy. 

In another paragraph of the report it is 
stated that fifty-five thousand men was the 
number considered adequate for the defence 
of the capital. That Gen. McClellan, in 
his enumeration of the forces left, had in- 
cluded Banks's army corps, operating in the 
Khenandoah valley, but whether this corps 
sliould be regarded as available for the 
protection of Washington, they decline to 
express an opinion. 

At the time this report was made, the 
only enemy on any approach to Washing- 
ton was Jackson's force, in front of i^anks 
in the rfhenandoah valley, with the Man- 
assas Gap railroad leading from this valley 
to Washington; and it will be admitted, 
I presume, that Banks, occuiiying the 



the Shenandoah valley, was in the best 
position to defend not only that approach 
to Washington, but the roads to Harper's 
Ferry and above. 

The number of troops left by me for 
the defence of Washington, as given in my 
letter to the Adju. Gen., were taken from 
the latest ofQcial returns of that date, an<l 
these, of course, constituted the most trust- 
worthy and authentic source from which 
such hiformation could be obtained. 

Another statement made by Gen. Hitch- 
cock before the "Committee on the Con- 
duct of the War," in reference to this same 
order, should be noticed. He was asked 
the following question: "Do you tmder- 
stand now that the movement made by 
Gen. McClellan to Fort Monroe, and up 
the York river, was in compliance with 
the recommendation of the council of 
generals commanding corps, and held at 
Fairfax Court-house on the 13th of March 
last, or in violation of it?" 

To which he replied as follows : " I 
have considei-ed, and do now consider, 
that it was in violation of the recommenda- 
tion of that council in two important par- 
ticulars ; one particular being that portion 
of this report which represents the coun- 
cil as agreeing to the expedition by way 
of the Peninsula, provided the rebel 
steamer Merrimac could first be neutra- 
lized. That important provision Gen. Mc- 
Clellan disregarded. 

******** 

The second particular alluded to by 
Gen. Hitchcock was in reference to the 
troops left for the defence of Washington, 
which has been disposed of above. 

In regard to the steamer Merrimac, I 
have also stated that, so far as our opera- 
tions on York river were concerned, the 
power of this vessel was neutralized. I 
now proceed to give some of the evidence 
which influenced me in coming to that 
conclusion. 

Previous to our departure for the Penin- 
sula, Mr. Watson, Assistant Secretary of 
^\''ar, was sent by the President to Fort 
Monroe to consult with Flag-officer Golds- 
borough.'upon this subject. The result of 
that consultation is contained in the follov- 
ing extract from the evidence of Admiral 
Goldsborough before the ''■Committee on 
the Conduct of the AVar," viz. : " I told 
Mr. Watson, Assistant Secretary of War, 
that the President might make his mind 
perfectly easy about the Merrimac going 
up York river ; that she could never get 
there, for I had ample means to prevent 
that." 

Cap. G. Y. Fox, Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy, testifies before the Committee 
as follows : 

'Gen. McClellan expected the Navy to 



52 



REPOrvT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAJf. 



neutralize the Merriniac, and I promised 
that it should be done." 

Gon. Keycs, comniaiiding the 4t.h army 
corps, testifies as follows before the Com- 
mittee : 

" During the time that the subject of 
the cliauge of base was discussed, I had 
refused to consent to the Peninsula line of 
operations until I had sent word to the 
Navy department and asked two questions : 
First, wliether the Merrimac was certainly 
neutralized, or not ? Second, whether the 
navy was in a condition to co-operate effi- 
ciently with the army to break through be- 
tween Yorktowu and Gloucester point? 
To both of these, answers were returned in 
the afiirmative ; that is the Merrimac was 
neutralized, and the navy was in a condi- 
tion to co-operate efficiently to break 
through between Yorktown and Glouces- 
ter point." 

Before starting for the Peninsula. I in- 
Btructed Lieut. Col. B. S. Alexander, of 
the United States corps of engineers, to 
visit Manassas Junction and its vicinity 
for the purpose of determining upon the 
defensive works necessary to enable us to 
liold that place Avith a small force. The 
accompanying letters from Col. Alexander 
will show what steps were taken by him to 
carry into effect this important order. 

1 regret to say that those who succeeded 
me in command of the region in front of 
AVashington, whatever were the fears for 
its safety did not deem it necessary to 
carry out my plans and instructions to 
them. Had ftlanassas been placed in con- 
dition for a strong defence, and communi- 
cations secured as recommended by Col. 
Alexander, the result of Gen. Pope's cam- 
paign would probably have been different. 

" Washington, I). C, April 2, 1862. 

"Sir : You will proceed to Manassas at 
as early a moment • as practicable and 
mark on the ground the works for the de- 
fence of that place, on the positions which 
I indicated to you yesterday. You will 
lind two carpenters, experienced in this 
kind of work, ready to accompany you, by 
calling on Mr. Dougherty, the master car- 
penter of the Treasury extension. 

" The genei^l idea of the defence of 
this position is, to occupy the fringe of 
elevation which lies about half way be- 
tween Manassas depot and the junction of 
tlie railroad, with a series of works open 
to the rear, so that they may be commanded 
by the work hereafter to be described. 

There will be at least four of these works, 
three of thon being on the left of the rail- 
road leading ironi Alexandria, at the posi- 
tions occupied by the enemy's works. The 
oihci- on the right of this road, ol the po- 



sition we examined yesterday. Tlie works 
of the enemy to the north of this latter 
position, numbered 1 and 2 on Lieut. Cora- 
stock's sketch, may also form a part of the 
front line of our defence; but the sides of 
these works looking towards Manassas 
station should be levelled, so that the in- 
terior of the works may be seen from the 
latter position. 

" Embrasures should be arranged in all 
these works for Jield artillery. 'J'he ap- 
proaches should be such that a battery 
can drive into the works. The number of 
embrasures in each battery will depend 
upon its size and the ground to be com- 
manded. It is to be supposed there will 
be from four to eight embrasures in each 
battery. 

" The other works of the enemy looking 
towards the east and south may be strength- 
ened so as to afford sufficient defence in 
these directions. The work No. 3 Lieut. 
Comstock's sketch may be also strength- 
ened and arranged for field artillery, when 
time will permit. This work is in a good 
position to cover a retreat, which would be 
made down the valley in which the rail- 
road runs towards Bull run. 

"At Manassas station there should be a 
fort constructed. The railroad will pass 
through this fort, and the depot, if there 
should be one built, should be placed in its 
rear. This latter work should be regarded 
as the key to the position. It should be as 
large as the nature of the ground will 
permit. 

" By going down the slopes, which are 
not steep, it may be made large enough to 
accommodate 2,000 or 3,000 men. The 
top of the position need not be cut away ; 
it will be better to throw up the earth into 
a large traverse, which may also be a bomb- 
proof. Its profile should be strong, and its 
ditches should be flanked. It should re- 
ceive a heavy armament of 24 or 32 
pounders, with some rifled (Parrott) 20 or 
30 pounders. Its guns should command 
all the exterior works, so that these works 
could be of no use to the enemy should he 
take them. In accommodating the fort to 
the ground this consideration should not 
be lost sight of. 

" After tracing these works on the 
ground, you will make a sketch embracing 
the whole. of them, showing their relative 
positions and size. This sketch should 
embrace the junction of the railroads and 
the ground for some distance around the 
main work. It need not l)e made with 
extreme accuracy. The distances may be 
paced, or measured, with a tape line. 
The bearings may be taken by compass. 

" Having located the works and pre- 
pared your sketch, you will report to Capt. 
Frederick E. Prime, of the corps of 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAK 



53 



engineers, who will furnish you the means 
of construction. 

" It is important that these works should 
be built with the least yiossible delay. 
You will, therefore, expedite matters as 
fast as possible. 

"Very respectfully, vonr oliedient ser- 
vant, "B. S. ALEXANDER, 

" Lieut.-CoL, Aide-de-Camp. 

"Capt. Fred. R. Muntukr, Present" 
" Washi.vctox, April 6, 1862. 

"Sir: I enclose you herewith a copy of 
the instructions which I gave to Capt. 
]\[unt.her, in reference to the defences of 
Manassas. 

" As there has been a new department 
created, (that of the Rappahannock,) it is 
possible that you and I, as well as Gen. 
McClellan. are relieved from tha- further 
consideration of this subject at the present 
time. 

'• I will, however, state foi^'your informa- 
tion, should the subject ever come before 
you again, that in my opinion the comnni- 
nication with Manassas by land should be 
secured. 

^" To effect this in the best manner, so 
far as my observations extended, I think 
the bridge over Bull run, near Union mills 
and just above the railroad bridge, should 
be rebuilt or thoroughly repaired, and 
that a small work, or two or three open 
l)atteries, should be erected on the adja- 
cent heights to protect it as well as the 
railroad bridge. 

•' The conununications by land would 
theu be through or near Centreville, over 
the road used l)y the enemy. 

'*1 write this for fear something should 
detain me here ; but I hope to leave here 
to join you to-morrow. My health is 
much improved. 

" Very respectfully, vonr obedient ser- 
vant, "B. 8. ALEXANDER. 

" Lieut.-Col.. Aide-de-t.'amp. 

" Brig.-Gcn. J. G. Barnard, 
" ('hief Eng., Army of the Potomac. 

I maybe permitted also to mention that 
the plans (also unexecuted by my suc- 
cessor) indicated \n my letter of instruc- 
tions to Gen. Banks, dated March 16, 1862, 
for intrenching Chester Gap and the point 
where the Manassas raih-oad crosses the 
Shenandoah, were for the purpose of pre- 
venting even the attempt of such a raid as 
that of Jackson in the month of May fol- 
lowing. 

MILITARY INCIDKNTS OF THK FIRST PERIOD. 

Before taking up the history of the em- 
barcation and Peninsula campaign, I should 
remark that during the fall and winter of 
1861-62, while the army of the Potomac 
was in position in front of Washington, 
recoanoissances were made from time to 



time, and skirmishes frequently occurred, 
which were of great importance in the 
education of the troops, accustoming them 
to the presence of the enemy, and giving 
them confidence under fire. There were 
many instances of individual gallantry dis- 
played in these affairs ; the reports of 
tJiem will be found among the documents 
which accompany this report. 

One of the most brilliant of these aRair«! 
was that which took phice at Drainsville 
on December 20, 1H61, when the ikl brigade 
of McCall's division, under Brig.-Gen. E. 
O. C. Ord, with Easton's battery, routed 
and pursued four regiments of infantry, 
one of cavalry, and a battery of six pieces. 

'J'he operations of Brig.-lxcn. F. W. 
Lander on the upper Potomac, during the 
months of January and Fel>ruary, IHC'i, 
frustrated the attempts of Gen. Jackson 
against the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, 
Cumberland, &<:., and obliged him to fail 
back to Winchester. His constitution 
was impaired by the hardships he had ex- 
perienced, and on the 2d of March the 
fearless Gen. Lander expired, a victim to 
the excessive fatigue of the campaign. 



SECOND PERIOD. 



CHAPTER T. 

The council composed of the four corps 
commanders, organized by the President 
of the United States, at its meeting on the 
i;Uh of March, adopted Fort ISIonroe as 
the base of operations for the movement 
of the army of the Potomac upon Rich- 
mond. For the prompt and successful 
execution of the projected operation, it 
was regarded by all as necessary that the 
whole of the four corps should be employed, 
with at least the addition of ten thousand 
men drawn from the forces in the vicinity 
of Fortress Monroe, that position and its 
dependencies being regarded as nm]>ly 
protected by the naval force in its neigh- 
borhood, and the advance of the main ariuy 
up the Peninsula, so that it could be safely 
left with a small garrison. 

In addition to the land forces, the co- 
operation of the navy was desired in tlio 
projected attack upon the batteries at 
Yorktown and Gloucester, as well as in 
controlling the York and James rivers for 
the protection of our flanks, and the use 
of the transports bringing supplies to tlie 
army. With these expectations, and for 
reasons stated elsewhere in this report, my 
original plan of moving by Urbana and 
West Point was abandoned, and the line 
with Fort Monroe as a base adopted. In 
the arrangements for the transportation 
of the army to the Peninsula by water, 



u 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAI^. 



the vessels were orisfiiially ordered to 
rendezvous mainly at Annapulis ; but upon 
the evacuation 'of Manassas and the 
batteries of the lower Potomac by the 
enemy, it became more convenient to 
embark the troops and meterial at Alex- 
andria, and orders to that effect were at 
cnce given. 

In makinjrlhe preliminary arrangements 
for the movement it was determined that 
the first cor]is, Gen. McDowell's, should 
move as a unit first, and effect a landing 
either at the Sand-box, some four miles 
south of Yorktown, in order to turn all 
the enemy's defences at Ship point, How- 
ard's bridge, Big Bethel, &c., or else, should 
existing circumstances render it preferable, 
land on the Gloucester side of York river 
and move on "West Point. 

The transports, however, arrived slowly 
and few at a time. In order, therefore, to 
expedite matters, I decided to embark the 
army by divisions, as transports arrived, 
keeping army corps together as much as 
possible, and to collect the troops at Fort 
Monroe. In determining the order of em- 
barcation, convenience and expedition were 
especially consulted, except that the first 
corps was to be embarked last, as I inten- 
ded to move it in mass to its point of dis- 
embarcation, and to land it on either bank 
of the York, as might then be determined. 

On the 17th of March, Hamilton's divi- 
sion, of the 3d corps, embarked at Alexan- 
dria, and proceeded to Fort Monroe, with 
the following orders : 

" Washington, D. C, March 17, 1862. 

"You will, on your arrival at Fort Mon- 
roe, report to Gen. Wool, and request him 
to assign you ground for encamping your 
division. You will remain at Fort Mon- 
roe until further orders from Gen. McClel- 
lun. Should Gen. AV^ool require the services 
of your division in repelling an attack, you 
will obey his orders and use every effort to 
carry out his views. 

." R. B. MARCY, Chief of Staff. 

" Gen. C. S. Hamilton, Com. Division." 

On the 22d of March, as soon as trans- 
portation was ready, Gen. Fitz John 
Porter's division, of the same corps, em- 
barked. Gen. Heiutzelraan was ordered | 
to accompany it under the following in- > 
structions : 

•• Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Seminary, March 22d, 1862. 
"General: Upon the disembarcation of 
Porter's division at Fort Monroe, I have 
to request that you will move your two 
divisions, Porter's and Hamilton's, some 
three or four miles out from the fort to find 
good camping pUices, where wood and 
water can be readily obtained, and where 



your positions will be good in a defensive 
point of view. You may find it advisable 
to ])lace one division on or near the road 
leading to Yorktown from Newport News 
—the other upon that leading to Yorktown 
direct from Furt Monroe. If you find that 
the nature of the country will permit easy 
communication and mutual support between 
the two divisions, it will be best to place 
one on each road. It will be best to re- 
main pretty near the fort for the present, 
in order to give the impression that our 
object is to attack Norfolk rather than 
Yorktown. • You will do well, however, 
to push strong recounoissances well to the 
front to ascertain the position of the enemy 
and his pickets. I will, as soon as possi- 
ble, re-enforce you by the 3d division of 
your corps, and it is probable that a part 
or the whole of the 4th corps will also move 
from Fort Monroe. This will probably be 
determined before your disembarcation is 
completed, and you will be informed accor- 
dingly. 

" My desire would be to make no impor- 
tant move in advance until we are fully 
prepared to follow it up and give the enemy 
no time to recover. 

"The quartermaster of your corps will 
receive detailed instructions in regard to 
laud transportation from Gen. Van Yliet. 

"It will be advisable to mobilize your 
corps with the least possible delay, and 
have it prepared for an advance. I have 
directed extra clothing, ammunition. &c., 
to be sent to Fort Monroe, so that all de- 
ficiencies may be supplied without delay. 

" Please report to me frequently and 
fully the condition of things on the new 
field of operations, and whatever intelli- 
gence you gain as to the enemy. 

" Engage guides in sufficient numbers at 
once, and endeavor to send out spies. 
" I am very truly vours, 

" GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

"Major-Gen. Com. 

"Brig.-Gen. S. P. Heintzelman, 

" Com. 3d Corps." 

The remaining divisions embarked as 
rapidly as transports could be supplied. 

On the 1st of April I embarked with the 
headquarters on the steamer Commodore, 
and reached Fort Monroe on the afternoon 
of the 2d. 

In consequence of the delay in the arri- 
val of the horse transpo'rts at Alexandria, 
but a small portion of the cavalry had 
arrived, and the artillery reserve had not 
yet completed its disembarcation 

I found there the 3d Pennsylvania 
cavalry and the .0th regular cavalry ; the 
2d regular cavalry and a portion of the 1st 
had arrived, but not disembarked- So few 
wagons had arrived that it was not possi- 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



55 



ble to move Casey's division at all for 
several days, while the other divisions were 
obliged to move with scant supplies. 

As to the force and position of the enemy 
the information then in our possession was 
vague and untrnstworthy. Aluch of it was 
oluained from the staff ofiicers of Gen. 
Wool, and was simply to the effect that 
Yorktown was surrounded by a continuous 
line of earthworks, with strong water bat- 
teries on the York river, and garrisoned by 
not less than 15,000 troops, under cummand 
of Gen. J. B. Magruder. Maps which had 
been prepared by the topographical engi- 
neers under Gen. AVool's command, were 
furnished me, in which the Warwick river 
was represented as flowing parallel to, but 
not crossing the road from Newport News 
to Williamsburg, making the so-called 
Mulberry Island a real island ; and we had 
no information as to the true course of the 
Warwick across the Peninsula, nor of the 
formidable line of works which it covered. 

Information which I had collected during 
the winter placed Gen. Magruder's com- 
mand at from 1.5,000 to 20,000 men, inde- 
pendently of Gen. Huger's force at Norfolk, 
estimated at about 15,000 

It was also known that there were 
strong defensive works at or near Williams- 
burg. 

Knowing that General Huger could 
easily spare some troops to re-enforce 
Yorktown, tj^at he had indeed done so, and 
that Johnston's army of Manassas could be 
brought rapidly by the James and York 
rivers to the same point, I proposed to 
invest that town without delay 

The accompanying map of Col. Cram, 
U. 8. Topographical Engineers, attached 
to Gen. Wool's staff, given to me as the 
result of several months' labor, indicated 
the feasibility of the design. It was also 
an object of primary importance to reach 
the vicinity of Yorktown before the enemy 
was re-enforced -sufficiently to enable him 
to hold in force his works at Big Bethel, 
Howard's bridge, Ship point, itc, on the 
direct road to Yorktown and Young's mills, 
on the road from Newport News. This 
was the more urgent, as it was now evident 
that some days must elapse before the 
trst corps could arrive 

Everything possible was done to hasten 
the disembarcation of the cavalry, artillery, 
and wagons in the harbor; and on the 3d 
the orders of march were given for the 
following day. 

There were at Fort Monroe and in its 
vicinity on the 3d, ready to move, two 
divisions of the 3d corps, two divisions of 
the 4th corps, and one division of the 2d 
corps, and Sykes's brigade of regular in- 
fantry, together with Hunt's artillery re- 
serve and the regiments of cavalry before 



named, in all about 58.000 men and 100 
guns, besides the division of artillery. 

Richardson's and Hooker's divisions of 
the 2d and 3d corps had not arrived, and 
Casey's division of the 4th corps was una- 
ble to move for want of wagons. 

Before I left Washington an order had 
been issued by the War Department plac- 
ing Ft. Monroe and its dependencies under 
my control, and authorizing me to draw 
from the troops under (ien. Wool a division 
of about 10,000 men, which was to be as- 
signed to the 1st corps. 

During the night of the 3rd I received a 
telegram from the Adj. Gen. of the army, 
stating that, by the President's order, I 
was deprived of all control over (4en. 
Wool and the troops under his command, 
and forbidden to detach any of his troops 
without his sanction. 

.This order left me without any base of 
operations under my control, and to this 
day I am ignorant of the causes which led 
to it. 

On my arrival at Fort Monroe the 
James river was declared by the naval 
authorities closed to the operations of their 
vessels by the combined influence of the 
enemy's batteries on its banks and the con- 
federate steamers Merrimac, Yorktown. 
Jamestown, and Teazer. Flag-Officer 
Goldsborough, then in command of the 
United States squadron in Hampton roads, 
regarded it (and no doubt justly) as his 
highest and most imperative duty to watch 
and neutralize the Merrimac ; and as he 
designed using his most powerful vessels 
in a contest with her, he did not feel able 
to detach to the assistance of the army a 
suitable force to attack the water batteries 
at Yorktown and Gloucester. All this was 
contrary to what had been previously sta- 
ted to me, and materially affected my 
plans. 

At no time during the operations against 
Yorktown was the navy prepared to lend 
us any material assistance in its reduction 
until after our land batteries had partially 
silenced the works. 

I had hoped, let me say, by rapid move- 
ments, to drive before me or capture the 
enemy on the Peninsula, open the James 
river, and press on to Kichinond before h(! 
should be materially re-enforced from other 
portions of the territory. As the narrative 
proceeds the causes will be developed 
v,hich frustrated these apparantly well- 
grounded expectations. 

I determined then to move the two divi- 
sions of the 4th corps by the Newport 
News and Williamsburg road, to take up a 
position between Yorktown and Williams- 
burg', while the two divisions of the 3d 
corps moved direct from Fort Monroe 
upon Yorktown ; the reserves moving so a.-» 



56 



REFORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAK 



to support cither corps as might prove ne- 
c<?ssi'rv. I (icsisrned. should the works at 
Yorktown and Williaiiishurg offer a seri- 
ous resistance, to land the 1st corps, re-en- 
forced if necessary, on the left Vjank of the 
York or on the Severn, to move it on 
Gloucester and West Point, in order to take 
in reverse wliatever force the enemy might 
have on the IVninsnlu, and compel him to 
ftbandon his positions. 

In the commencement of the movement 
from Fort Monroe, serious difficulties were 
encountered from the want of precise topo- 
craphica! information as to the country in 
in advance. Correct local maps were not 
to be found, and the country, though 
knowo in its general feature, we found to 
lie inaccurately descrilied in essential par- 
ticulars in the only maps and geographi- 
cal n\emoirs or papers to which access 
could be had. Erroneous courses to 
streams and roads were frequently given, 
and no dependence could be placed on the 
int'ormation thus derived. This difficulty 
has been found to e.\ist with respect to 
most portions of the State of Virginia, 
tJirough which my military operations have 
extended. Keconnoissances, fre(pKM)t]y 
under lire, proved the only trustworthy 
sources of informatiotv. Negroes, liowever 
truthful their reports, possessed or were 
able to commuiucate very little accurate 
and no comprehensive topographical infor- 
mation. 

On the ,3d, the following orders were 
given for the movement of the 4lh : 

'• Porter's and Hamilton's divisions and 
Averill's cavalry of the i)d corps, and Sed- 
wick's division of the 2d cor[)s, under Brig- 
adier General lieintzelman, commanding 
3d corps, will move to-morrow in the fol- 
lowing order: Porter's division with Aver- 
iils's cavalry, at 6 a. m., over the Newmar- 
ket and New bridges to liig Bethel and 
iloward's bridge. This division will send 
forward to the batteries where the Ship 
Point road intersects the main Yorktown 
road, a suffi. lent force to hold that jjoint, 
and cut off the garrision of the Ship Puint 
batteries. I'he wluile division may be used 
for this purpose if necessary, and if possi- 
Ide the batteries should be occupied by our 
■troops to-morrow. 'I'he portion of the di- 
vision not necessary for this purpose will 
encamp at Howard's bridge 

" Hauiilt(Uis division will march at 7 a. 
m, by liie New bridge road to Big Bethel, 
and will encani]) ou Iloward's creek, 

••Sedwick's division will march at 8 a. 
m , by the Newmarket bridge, taking the 
direct road to J-Jig Bethel, and will also en- 
camp at Howard's bridge. 

•• Brig. (Jen. Keyes, commanding 4th 
corps, will move with Smith's and Couch's 
divibioa at 6 a. m., (Smith's division in ad- 



vance,) by the James river road. The .5th 
reg-ular cavalry, temporarily assii^med to 
this corps, will move with Smith's division, 
which will encamp at Younu's mills, 
throwing forward at leas^t one brigade to 
the road from Big Bethel to Warwick, 
Couch's division will encamp at Fisher's 
creek. 

" The reserve cavalry, artillery and in- 
fantry will move at 8.30 a. m., by the New- 
market bridge, to Big Bethel, where it will 
encamp. Ou the march, it will keep in 
rear of Sedgwick's division," 

'I'he following is an extract from the or 
der issued on the 4th, for the march of the 
5tb: 

"The following movements of the army 
will be carried out to-morrow (5th:) 

"Gen IC eyes will move -forward Smith's 
division at G a. m., rid Warwick Court 
House and the road leading near the old 
ship yard, to the 'Half-way house' on the 
Yorktown and Williamsburg road. 

*' Gen. Couch's division will march at 6 
a. ra., to close up on Gen. Smith's division 
at the ' Half-way House.' 

" Gen. Keyes's command will occupy and 
hold the narrow dividing ri<lge near the 
' Half-way House,' so as to prevent the es- 
cape of the garrison at Yorktown \;y laud 
and prevent re-enforcenvnts being thrown 
in. 

•'Gen. Heintzelman will move forward 
(jen. Porter's two rear briga(^'s at 6 a. ra,, 
upon the advance guard, when the entire 
will advance to a point about two and 
three quarters miles from Yorktown, where 
the road turns abruptly to the north, and 
where a road comes in from Warwick 
Court House. 

"Gen, Hamilton's division, will move at 
6 a. m , and follow Gen. Porter's divi.sion, 
camping as near it as possible. 

Gen. Sedgwick's division, will march a.t 
fi a. m., as far as the Warwick's road, 
which enters the main Yorktown road near 
Dr. Power's house, and will await I'unher 
orders. 

"The reserve will march at 6 a. m., npon 
the main Yorktown road, halting for i'ltr- 
ther orders at Dr. I'owers's house; the in- 
fantry leading, the artillery following next, 
and the cavalry in rear. 

"Gen. Sedgwick's division, will for the 
present, act with the reserve, and he will 
receive orders from headcpiarters.' 

In giving these orders of march for the 
4th and .")th, it was expected that there 
would be no serious opposition at Big 
jiethel, and that the advance of the 3d 
corps beyond that point would force the 
enemy to evacuate the works at Young's 
mills, while our possession of the latter 
would make it necessary for him to aban- 
don those at Howard's bridge, and tiie 



REPORT or GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



51 



arlvance tliencp on Yorktown would place 
Ship point in our possession, tofrother with 
its sjarrison, unless they abandoned it 
promptly. The result answered the ex- 
pectation. 

During- the afternoon of the 4tli, Gen. 
Keyes obtained information of the presence 
of some 5,000 to 8.000 of the enemy in a 
strong position at Lee's mills. Tlw nature 
of that position in relation to the Warwick 
not beinti' at that time understood. I -in- 
structed Gen. Keyes to attack and carry 
this position upon coming in front of it. 

Early in the afternoon of the .5th the 
advance of each column was brought to a 
halt, that of Heintzelman (I'orter's di- 
vision) in front of Yorktown, alter over- 
coming some resistance at Big liethel and 
Howard's bridge; that of Keyes (Smith's 
division) unexpectedly before the enemy's 
works at Lee's mills, wliere the road from 
Newport News to Williamsburg crosses 
Warwick river. 

The progress of each column had been 
retarded by heavy rains on that day, which 
had made the roads almost impassable to 
the infantry of Keyes's cohimn. and im- 
passable to all but a small portion of the 
artillery, while the ammunition, provisions 
and forage could not be brought up at all. 

When Gen. Keyes approached Lee's 
mills his left tlank was exposed to a .'jharp 
artillery fire from tlie further bank of the 
Warwick, and upon reaching the vicinity 
of the mill he found it altogether stronger 
than was ex])ected, unapproachable by 
reason of the Warwick river, and incapable 
of being carried by assault. 

The troops composing the advance of 
each cohunn were, during the afternoon, 
under a warm artillery fire, the sharp- 
shooters even of Hie right column being 
engaged when covering rcconnoissances. 

It was -at this stage and moment' of the 
campaign that the following telegram was 
sent to me : 

"Adjutant Gekeral's Officr, 
April 4, 18(i2. 
"By direction of the President, Gen. 
McDowell's army corps has been detaciied 
from tlie force under your immediate com- 
mand, and the general is ordered to report 
to tiie Secretary of War. Letter by mail. 
" L. THOMAS, 

" Adj. Gen. 
" Gen. McCi.ELi.AN." 
The President having promised, in an 
interview following his order of March HL 
withdrawing Blenker's division of 10 000 
men from my command, that nothing of 
the sort should be repeated — that 1 might 
rest assured that the campaign should 
proceed, with no further deductions from 
the fore ■ upon which its operations had 



been planned — I may confess to liaving 
been shocked at tliis order, which, with 
that of the 31st ultimo and that of the 3d, 
removed nearly 60.000 men from my com- 
mand, and reduced my force by more than 
one-third, after its task had been assigned ; 
its operations planned ; its fighting begun. 
To me the blow was most discouraging. 
It frustrated all my plans for impending 
operations. It fell when I was too deeply 
committed to w-ithdraw. It left me inca- 
pable of continuing operations which had 
been begun. It compelled the adoption 
of another, a different and a less effective 
plan of campaign. It made rapid and 
brilliant operations impossible. It was a 
fatal error. 

It was now, of course, out of my power 
to turn Yorktown by West Point. I had, 
therefore, no choice left but to attack it 
directly in front, as I best could with the 
force at mj' command. 

Reconnoissances made under fire on that 
and the following day determined that the 
sources of the Warwick river were near 
Yorktown, commanded by its guns, while 
that stream, for some distance from its 
mouth on the James river, was controlled 
by the confederate gunboats; that the 
fords had been destroyed by dams, the 
approaches to which were generally 
through dense forests and deep swamps, 
and defended by exrensive and formidable 
works ; that timber felled for defensive 
purposes and the flooding of the roads, 
caused by the dams, had made these works 
apparently inaccessible and impossible to 
turn ; that Yorktown was strongly forti- 
fied, armed and garrisoned, and connect-ed 
with the defences of the Warwick by forts 
and intrenchments, the ground in I'ront of 
which was swept by the guns of Yorktown. 
It was also ascertained that the garrisons 
had been, and were daily being re-enforced 
by troops from Norfolk and the army 
under Gen. J. E. Johnston. Heavy rains 
made the roads to'Fort Monroe impassable, 
and delayed the arrival of troops, ammuni- 
tion and supplies, while storms prevented 
for several days the sailing of transports 
from Hampton roads, and the establish- 
ment of depots on the creeks of York 
river, near the army. 

The ground bordering the Warwick river 
is covered by very dense and extensive 
forests, the clearings being small and few. 
This, with the comparative flatness of the 
country, and the alertness of the enemy, 
everywhere in force, rendered thorough 
reconnoissances slow, dangerous and diffi- 
cult, yet it was impossible otherwise to 
determine whether an assault was any- 
where practicable, or whether the mure 
tedious but sure operations of a siege must 
be resorted to. 



58 HErORT OF GEXERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



I made, on the 6th and Tth, close per- 
sonal reconnoissances of the rioht and left 
of the enemy's positions, which, with infor- 
mation acquired already, convinced me 
that it was best to prepare for an assault 
by the preliminary emjiloynient of heavy 
guns, and some siope operations. Instant 
assault would have been simple folly. On 
the Tth 1 telegraphed to the President as 
follows : 

"Headquarters Army of tije Potomac. 
"April 7, 1862. 

" Your teletrram of yesterday is received. 
In reply, I have the honor to state that 
my entire force for duiy amounts to only 
about (85,000) eighty-five thousand men. 
Gen. Wool's command, as you will observe 
from the accompanying order, has been 
taken out of my control, although he has 
most cheerl'ully co-operated with me. The 
only use that can be made of his command 
is to protect my communications in rear 
of this point. At this time only fifty-three 
thousand men have joined me, but they 
are coming up as rapidly as my means of 
transportation will permit. 

"Please refer to my dispatch to the 
Secretary of War to-night, for the details 
of our present situation. 

"GEO. B. McCLKLLAX. Major-Gen. 
"To the President, Washington D. C." 

On the same day I sent the following : 

** Headquarters Army op the Potomac, 

" In front of Yorktown, 

" April 7, 1862 — 7 p. ra. 

" Your telegram of yesterday arrived 
here while I was absent, examining the 
enemy's right, which I did pretty closely. 

" The whole line of the Warwick, which 
really heads within a mile of Yorktown, is 
strongly defended by detached redoubts 
and other fortifications, armed with heavy 
and light guns. The approaches, except 
at Yorktown, are covered by the Warwick, 
over which there is but one, or, at most, 
two passages, both of which are covered 
by strong batteries. It will be necessary 
to resort to the use of heavy guns, and 
some siege operations, before we assault. 
All the prisoners state that Gen. J. E. 
Johnston arrived at Yorktown yesterday 
with strong re enforcements. It seems 
dear that I shall have the whole force of 
the enemy on my hands — probably not less 
than (lUO.OOO) one hundred thousand men, 
and probably more. In consequence of the 
loss of lilenker's division and the 1st corps, 
my force is probably less than that of the 
enemy, while they have all the advantage 
of position, 

" 1 am under great obligations to you for 
the ofl'er that the whole force and material 
of the government will be as fully and as 



speedily under my command as heretofore, 
or as if the new departments had not been 
created. 

" Since my arrangements wore made for 
this campaign, at least {.50,Ui'O) fifty thou- 
sand men have been taken fn^m my com- 
mand. Since my despatch of the 5th inst., 
five divisions have been in close observa- 
tion of the enemy, and frequently ex- 
changing shots. When my present com- 
mand all joins, 1 shall have about (85,000) 
eighty-five thousand men for duty, from 
wiiich a large force must be taken for 
guards, scouts, &c. With this army I could 
assault the enemy's works, and perhaps 
carry them ; but were I in possession of 
their intrenchments, and assailed by double 
my numbers, I should have no fears as to 
the result 

" Under the circumstances that have 
been developed since we arrived here, I 
feel fully impressed with the conviction 
that here is to be fought the great battle 
that is to decide the existing contest. I 
shall, of course, commence the attack as 
soon as I can get up my siege train, and 
shall do all in my power to carry the 
enemy's works, but to do this with a rea- 
sonable degree of certainty requires, in my 
judgment, that I should, if possible, have 
at least the whole of the 1st corps to land 
upon the Severn river and attack Glouces- 
ter in the rear. 

"My present strength will not admit of 
a detachment sufficient for this purpose, 
without materially impairing the efficiency 
of this column. Flag-Officer Goldsbo- 
rough thinks the works too strong for his 
available vessels, unless I can turn Glou- 
cester. I send, by mail, copies of his let- 
ter and one of the commander of the gun- 
boats here. 

" GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major Gen. 

" Hon. E. M. Stanton, Sec. of War." 

I had provided a small siege train and 
moderate supplies of intrenching tools for 
such a contingency as the present. Imme- 
diate steps were taken to secure the neces- 
sary additions. While the engineer officers 
were engaged in ascertaining the char- 
acter and strength of all the defences, and 
the configuration of the ground in front 
of Yorktown. in order to determine the 
point of attack and to develop the ap- 
proaches, the troops were occupied in open- 
ing roads to the depots established at the 
nearest available points, on branches of 
York river. Troops were brought to the 
front as rapidly as possilile, and on the 
lOth of April the army was posted as fol- 
lows : , 

Heintzelmau's corps, composed of Por- 
ter's, Hooker's, and Hamilton's divisions, 



REPOKT or GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



59 



in front of Yorktown. extending in the 
order named, from the mouth of Wcrnjlev's 
creek to the Warwick road, opposite Winn's 
miils. Sumuer'e coryis — Sed^Trick's divig- 
ion only having arrived — on the left of 
Hamilton, eitendinp down to Warwick 
and opposite to Winn's mills works. 
Keves's corps (Smith's, Couch's and Casej's 
divibions,) on the left of Sedg-wiek, facing 
the works at the one-gun battery, Lee's 
mills, <fec., on the west bank of the War- 
wick. Bumner, after the 6th of April, 
commanded the left wing, composed of his 
oviL and Keyes's corps. I 

Throughout the preparation? for, and | 
duriijg the siege of Yorktown. I kept the 
corps under G^en. Keyes, and afterwards ' 
the left win^-, under Gen. Sumner, en- ! 
gaged in ascertaining the character of the j 
obstacles presented by the Warwick, and i 
the enemy intrenched upon the right bank, i 
with the inteution, if possible, of overcom- 1 
ing them and breaking that line of defence, 
60 ^s to gain possession of the road to 
Williamsburg, and cut off Yorktown from 
its supports and supplies. The feirces under 
Gen. Heiotzelman were engaged in similar 
efforts upon the works between Winn's 
mills and Yorktown. Gen. Keyes's report 
of the 16th of April, enclosing reports of 
brigade commanders engaged in reconnois- 
Bances up to that day, said, •• that no part 
of his (the enemy's line opposite his own) 
line. 60 far as discovered, can be taken by 
assault without an enormous waste of life." 

Eeconuoissances on the right flank dem- 
onstrated the fact that the Warwick was 
not passable in ftiat direction, except over 
a narrow dam, the approaches to which 
were swept by several batteries, and in- 
tren'ihments which could be filled quickly 
with supports, sheltered by the timber im- 
medialeiy in rear. 

Gen Barnard, chief engineer of the army 
of the Potomac, whose position entitled his 
opinions to the hiL'-hest consideration, ex- 
pressed the judgment that those formi- 
dable works could not, with any reasonable 
degree of certainty, be carried by assault. 
Gen. Keyes, commanding 4th army corps, 
after the eiamination of the enemy's de- 
fences on the left, before alluded to, adr 
dressed the follotving letter to Hon. Ir* 
Harris, United States Senate, and gave me 
a copy. Although not strictly official, it 
describes the situation at that time in 
some respects so well, that I have taken 
the liberty of introducing it here : 

" Headquaetees, 4th Coeps, 
" Warwick C H., Ya., April 7, 1662. 
" Mt Dear Senator: The plan of cam- 
paign on this line was made with the dis- 
tinct understanding that /oht army corps 
should be employed, and that the navy 



should co-operate in the taking of York- 
town, and also (as 1 understood it) support 
us on our left bymoving gunboats up James 
river. 

" To-day I have learned that the 1 st corps, 
which by the President's order was to em- 
brace four divisions, and one division 
(Blenker's) of the 2d corps, have been 
witlidrawn altogether from this line of 
operations, and from the army of the Poto- 
mac. At the same time, as 1 am informed, 
the navy has not the means to attack York- 
town, and is afraid to send gunboats up 
James river, for fear of the Merrimac. 

•'The above plan of campaign was 
adopted unanimously by Maj. Gen. Mc- 
Dowell and Brig. Grer.s. Sumuer. Heintzel- 
man, and Keyes. and was concurred in by 
Maj. Gen. McClellan, who first proposed 
Urbana as our base. 

'* This army being reduced by forty-five 
thousand troops, some of them among the 
best in the service, and without the support 
of the navy, the plan to which we are re- 
duced bears scarcely any resemblance to 
the one I voted for, 

" 1 command the James river column, 
and I left my camp near Newport News 
the tnorning of the 4lh instant. I only suc- 
ceeded in getting my artillery ashore the 
afternoon of the day before, and one of my 
divisions had not all arrived in camp the 
day I left, and for the want of transporta- 
tion has not yet joined me. So you -R-ill 
observe that BOt a day was lost in the ad- 
vance, and in fact we marched so quickly, 
and so rapidly, that many of our animals 
were twenty-four and forty-eight hours 
without a ration of forage. But notwith- 
standing the rapidity of our advance, we 
were stopped by a line of defence nine or 
ten miles long, strongly fortified bj' breast- 
works, erect-ed nearly the whole distance 
behind a stream, or succession of ponds, 
nowhere fordable, one terminns being 
Yorktown, and the other ending in the 
James river, which is commanded by the 
enemy's gunboats. Yorktown is fortified 
all around with bastioned works, and on 
the water side it and Gloucester are so 
strong that the navy are afraid to attack 
either. 

" The approaches on one side are gene- 
rally through low, swampy, or thickly 
wooded ground, over roads which we are 
obliged to repair or to make beTore we can 
get forward our carriages. The enemy is 
in great force, and is constantly receiving 
re-enforcements from the two rivers. The 
line in front of us is therefore one of the 
strongest ever opposed to any invading 
force in any country. 

" You will, then, ask why I advocated 
such a line for our operations ? My rea- 
sons are few, but I think good. 



60 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN". 



"With proper assistance from the navy 
■we could take Yorktown, and then with 
gunboats on both rivers we could beat any 
force opposed to ns on Warwick river, be- 
cause tiie shot and shell from the gunboats 
would nearly overlap across the Peninsula; 
so that if the enemy should retreat — and 
retreat he must — he would have a long 
way to go without rail or steam trauspor- 
tation, and every soul of his army must 
full into our hands or be destroyed. 

•' Another reason for my supporting the 
new base and plan was, that this line, it 
was expected, would furnish water trans- 
portation nearly to Richmond. 

" Now, supposing we succeed in break- 
ing through the line in front of us, what 
can we do next? The roads are very 
bad, and if the enemy retains command of 
James river, and we do not first reduce 
Yorktown, it would be impossible to sub- 
sist this army three marches beyond where 
it is now. As the roads are at present, it 
is with the utmost difliculty that we can 
subsist it in the position it now occupies. 

" You will see, therefore, by what I have 
said, that the force originally intended for 
the capture of Richmond should be all 
sent forward. If I thought the four army 
corps necessary when I supposed the navy 
would co-operate, and when I judged of 
the obstacles to be encountered by what 
I learned from maps and the opinions of 
officers long stationed at Fort Monroe, and 
from all other sources, how much more 
should I think the full complement of 
troops requisite now that the navy cannot 
ci>operale. and now that the strength of 
the enemy's lines and the number of his 
guns and men prove to be almost immeasu- 
rably greater than I had been led to ex- 
pect. The line in front of us, in the opi- 
nion of all military men here, who are at 
all eompetent to judge, is one of the 
strongest in the world, and the force of 
t!ie enemy capable, of being increased be- 
yond the numbers we now have to oppose 
to him. Independently of the strength 
of the lines in front of us, and of the force 
of the enemy behind them, we cannot ad- 
vance until we get command of either 
York river or James river. The efficient 
co-o])cration of the navy is, therefore, ab- 
solutely essential, and so I considered it 
when 1 voted to change our base from 
the Potomac to Fort Monroe. 

" An iron-clad boat must attack York- 
town; and if several strong gunboats 
could be sent up the James river also, our 
success will be certain and complete, and 
the rel)ellion will soon be put down. 

" On the other hand, we must butt 
against the enemy's works with heavy ar- 
tillery, and a great waste of time, life, 
and material. 



" If we break through and advance, both 
our flanks will be assailed from two great 
water-courses in the hands of the enemy ; 
our supplies would give out, and the ene- 
my, equal if not superior in numbers, 
would, with the other advantages, beat and 
destroy this army. 

" The gi'catest master of the art of war 
has said, ' that if you would invade a coun- 
try successfully you must have one line of 
operations, and one army, under one gene- 
ral.' But what is our condition ? The ' 
State of Virgiuia is made to constitute 
the comnuxnd, in part or wholly, of some 
six generals, viz. : Fremont, Banks, Mc- 
Dowell, Wool, Burnside, and McCIellan, 
besides the scrap over the Chesapeake, in 
the care of Dix. 

'■ The great battle of the war is to come 
off here. If we win it, the rebellion will 
be crushed — if we lose it, the consequences 
will be more horrible than I care to tell. 
The plan of campaign I voted for, if carried- 
out with the means proposed, will certainly 
succeed. If any part of the means pro- 
posed are withheld or diverted, I deem it 
due to myself to say that our success will 
be uncertain. 

" It is no doubt agreeable to the com- 
mander of the 1st corps to have a separate 
department, and as this letter advocates 
his return to Gen. McClellan's command, 
it is proper to state that I am not at all 
influenced by personal regard or dislike to 
any one of my seniors in rank. If I were 
to credit all the opinions which have beea 
poured into my ears, I must believe that, 
in regard to my present fine command, I 
owe nmch to Gen. McDowell and nothing 
to Gen. McCllellan. But I have disre- 
garded all such officiousness, and I have 
from last July to the present day sup- 
ported Gen. McCIellan, and obeyed all his 
orders with as hearty a good will as though 
he had been my brother or the friend to 
whom I owed most. I shall continue to 
do so to the last, and so long aS he is my 
commander. And I am not desirous to dis- 
place him, and would not if I could. He 
left Washington with the understanding 
that he was to execute a definite jilan of 
campaign with certain prescribed means. 
The plan was good and the means suffi- 
cient, and without modification the enter- 
prise was certain of success. But with 
the reduction of force and means, the plan 
is entirely changed, and is now a bad plan, 
with means insufficient for certain success. 

" Do not look upon this communication 
as the offspring of despondency. I never 
despond ; and when you see me working 
the hardest, you may be sure that fortune 
is frowing upon me. I am working now 
to my utmost. 

" Please show this letter to the Presi- 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



61 



dent, and I should like also that Mr. Stan- 
ton should know its contents. Do me the 
honor to write to me as soon as you can, 
and believe me, with perfect respect, 
" Your most obedient servant. 

" E. 1). KEYES, 
" Brig. Gen. Com'dg 4th Army Corps. 
'• Hon. Ira Harris, U. S. Senate." 

On the 7th of April, and before the 
arrival of the divisions of Gens. Hooker, 
Richardson and Casey, I received the fol- 
lowing despatches from the President and 
isccretary of War : 

" Washington, April 6,1862—8 p. m. 

" Yours of 11 A. M. to-day received. 
Secretary of War informs me that the for- 
warding of transportation, ammunition, 
and Woodbury's brigade, under your 
orders, is not, and will not be. interfered 
with. You now have over one hundred 
thousand troops with you, independent 
of Gen. Wool's command. I think you 
better break the enemy's line from York- 
town to Warwick river at once. This wiU 
probably use time as advantageously a? 
you can. 

" A. LINCOLN, President. 

" Gen. G. B. AIcClellan." 
"Washington, April 6, 1862 — p. m. 

" The President directs me to say that 
your despatch to him has been received. 
Gen. Sumner's corps is on the road to join 
you, and will go forward as fast as possible. 
Franklin's division is now on the advance 
towards Manassas. There is no means of 
transportation here to send it forward in 
time to be of service in your present opera- 
tions. Telegraph frequently, and all in the 
power of the government shall be done to 
sustain you as occasion may require. 

"E. M. STANTON, Sec. of War. 

" Gen. G. B. McClki.lax." 

By the 9th of April I had acquired a 
pretty good knowledge of the position and 
strength of the enemy's works, and the ob- 
stacles to be overcome. On that day I 
received the following letter from the Pre- 
sident : 

" Washington, April 9, 1862. 

" My Dear Sir : Your despatches com- 
plaining that your are not properly sus- 
tained, while they do not oifend me, do 
pain me verj^ much. 

'• Blenker s division was withdrawn from 
you before you left here, and you know 
the pressure under which I did it, and. as 
I thought, acquiesced in it — certainly not 
without reluctance. 

•• After you left I ascertained that less 
than 20,000 unorganized men, without a 
single field battery, were all you designed 
to be left for the defence of Washington 
and Manassas Junction, and part of this 



even was to go to Gen. Hooker's old posi- 
tion. (Jen. Banks's corps, once designed 
for Manassas Junction, was diverted and 
tied up on the line of Winchester and 
Strasburg, and could not leave it without 
again exi)osing tlie up])er Potomac and 
the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. 'I'liis pre- 
sented, or would present, when McDowell 
and Sumner should be gone, a great temp- 
tation to the enemy to turn back from the 
Rappahannock and sack Washington. My 
implicit order that Washington should, by 
the judgment of all the commanders ot 
army corps, be left entirely secure, had 
been neglected. It was precisely this that 
drove me to detain McDowell. 

" I do not forget that I was satisfied 
with your arrangement to leave Banks at 
Manassas Junction ; but when that arrange- 
ment was broken up, and nothing was sub- 
stituted for it, of course I was constrained 
to substitute something for it myself. And 
allow me to ask, do you really think I 
should permit the line from Richmond, via. 
Manassas Junction, to this city, to be en- 
tirely open, except what resistance could 
he presented by less than 20,000 unor- 
ganized troops ? This is a question 
which the country will not allow me to 
evade. 

"There is a curious mystery about the 
number of troops now with you. When I 
telegra])hed you on the 6lh, saying you 
had over a hundred thousand with you, I 
had just obtained from the Secretary of 
War a statement taken, as he said, from 
your own returns, making 108,000 then 
with you and en route to you. You now 
say you will have but 85,000 when all en 
route to you shall have reached you. How 
can the discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted 
for? 

" As to Gen. Wool's command, I under- 
stand it is doing for you precisely what a 
like numl)er of your own would have to do 
if that command was away. 

" I suppose the whole force which has 
gone forward for you is with you by this 
time. And if so, I think it is the precise 
time for you to strike a blow. By delay 
the enemy will relatively gain upon you — 
that is, he will gain faster by fortifications 
and re-enforcements than you can be re- 
enforcements alone. And once more Fet 
me tell you, it is indispensable to you that 
you strike a blow. I am powerless to help 
this. You will do me the justice to re- 
member I always insisted that going down 
the bay in search of a field, instead of 
fighting at or near Manassas, was only 
shifting, and not surmounting, adifhcnlty; 
that we would find the same enemy, and 
the same or equal intrenchments, at either 
place. The country will not fail to note, 
is now noting, that the present hesitatiou 



C2 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX. 



-/ 



to move upon an intrenched enemy is but 
the story of Manassas repeated. 

•• I beg to assure you that I have never 
written you or spoken to you in greater 
kindness of feeling than now, nor with a 
fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as, in 
my most anxious judgment, I consistently 
can. But you must act. 
'• Yours, very trulv, 

'•A. LINCOLN. 

" Maj. Gen. McClrllan." 

With great deference to the opinions 
and wishes of his excellency the President, 
I most respectfully beg leave to refer to 
the facts which I have presented and those 
contained in the accompanying letter of 
Gen. Keyes. with the reports of Gen. Ber- 
naitl and other officers, as furnishing a re- 
ply to the above letter. His excellency 
(uiuld not judge of the formidable charac- 
ter of the works before iis as well as if he 
had been on the ground ; and whatever 
might have been his desire for prompt ac- 
tion, (certainly no greater than mine,) I 
feel confident if he could have made a per- 
sonal inspection of the enemy's defences, he 
would have forbidden me risking the safety 
of the army and the possible successes of 
the campaign on a sanguinary assault of 
an advantageous and formidable position, 
which, even if successful, could not have 
been followed up to any other or better 
result than would have been reached by 
the regular operations of a siege. Still 
less could I forego the conclusions of my 
most instructed judgment for the mere 
sake of avoiding the personal consequences 
intimated in the President's despatch. 

The following extracts from the report 
of the chief engineer (Brig. Gen. J. G. 
Bernard) embody the result of our recon- 
noissanccs, and give, with some degree of 
detail, the character and strength of the 
defences of Yorktown and the Warwick, 
and some of the obstacles which the army 
contended against and overcame. 

Extracts from Gex. Barnard's report. 

" The accompanying drawing (map No. 
2) gives with accuracy the outline and 
armament of the fortitica'tions of Yorktown 
proper, M'ith the detached works immedi- 
ately connected with it. 

"The three bastioned fronts, looking to- 
wards our approaches, appear to have been 
earliest built, and have about fifteen feet 
thickness of parapet and eight feet to ten 
feet depth of ditch, the width varying 
much, but never being less at top of scarp 
than fifteen feet — I think generally much 
more. 

"The works extending around the town, 
from the western salient of fronts just men- 
tioned, appear to have been finished dur- 
ing the past winter and spring. 'J'hey have 



formidable profiles, eighteen feet thickness 
of parapet, and generally ten feet depth of 
ditch. 

" The water batteries had generally 
eighteen feet parapet, the guns in barbette. 

" They were (as well as all the works 
mentioned) carefully constructed with well- 
made sod revetments. 

"There were numerous traverses be- 
tween the guns, and ample magazines ; 
how sufficient in bomb-proof qualities I 
am unable to say, 

" The two first guns of the work on the 
heights bear upon the water as well as the 
land, and were of heavy calibre. 

" The list herewith gives all the guns in 
position, or for which there Mere emplace- 
ments. The vacant emplacements Avere 
all occupied before the evacuation by 
siege guns, rifled 4^-iuch 24-pounders, and 
18-pounders. 

"In Fort Magruder (the first exterior 
work) there were found one 8-inch colum- 
biad, one 42-pounder, and one 8-inch siege 
howitzer ; the two former in barbette. The 
sketch will show the emplacements for 
guns on field and siege carriages : making, 
I think, with the foregoing, twentj^-two. 
Two of these were placed behind traverses, 
with embrasures covered by blindages. . 

"The two external redoubts, with the 
connecting parapets, formed a re-entrant 
with the fronts of attack, and all the guns 
bore on our approaches. 

" It will be seen, therefore, that our ap- 
proaches were swept by the fire of at least 
forty-nine guns, nearly all of which were 
heavy, and many of them the most for- 
midable guns known. Besides that, two- 
thirds of the guns of the water batteries 
and all the guns of Gloucester bore on 
our right batteries, though under disad- 
vantageous circumstances. 

" The ravine behind which the left of 
the Yorktown fronts of attack was placed 
was not very difficult, as the heads formed 
depressions in front of their left, imper- 
fectly seen by their fire, and from which 
access could be had to the ditches ; but 
we could not be sure of the fact before 
the evacuation. The enemy held, by means 
of a slight breastwork and rifle trenches, 
a position in advance of the heads of these 
ravines as far forward as th(> burnt house. 

" The ravines which head Ijetween the 
Yorktown fortifications and the exterior 
works are deep and intricate. The^ were 
tolerably well seen, however, by the works 
which run westwardly from the Yorktown 
works, and which were too numerous and 
conijilicated to be traced on paper. 

" Fort INLagruder, the first lunette on 
our left, appears to have been built at an 
early period. 

" The external connexion between this 



PvEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX. 



■work was first a ride trciioh. proliably 
afterwards enlarged into a parapet, with 
external ditch and an enijilaeenieut for 
four guns in or near the small redan in 
the centre. 

" Behind this they had constructed 
numerous epaulmeuts, with connecting 
l>oyaus not fully arranged for infantry 
lires, and mainly intended probably to 
protect their camps and reserves against 
the destructive effects of our artillery. 

" From the ' red redoubt' these trenches 
and opaulments ran to the woods and 
rivulet which forms one head of the War- 
wick, and continue almost without break 
to connect with the works at AVynn's mill. 
This stream, just mentioned, whatever be 
its name, (the term ' Warwick,' according 
to some, applying only to the tidal channel 
from the James river up as high as Lee's 
mill.) was inundated by a number of dams 
frum near where its head is crossed by the 
epaulments mentioned down to Lee's mill. 

" Below Lee's mill the Warwick follows 
a tortuous course through salt marshes 
of two hundred yards or three hundred 
yards in width, from which the land rises 
up boldly to a height of thirty or forty 
feet. 

" The first group of works is at Wynn's 
mill, where there is a dam and bridge. 
The next is to guard another dam between 
Wynn's and Lee's mill ; (this is the point 
attacked by Gen. Smith on th 16th ultimo, 
and where Lieut. ]\[errill was wounded ; 
the object of the attack was merely to 
prevent the further construction of works 
and feel the strength of the position.) A 
work, of what strength is not known, was 
at the sharp angle of the stream just above 
Lee's mill, and a formidable group of 
works was at Lee's mill, where there was 
also a dam and bridge. 

" From Lee's mill a line of works ex- 
tends across Mulberry island, or is sup- 
posed to do so. 

'• At Southal's landing is another for- 
midable group of works, and from here, 
too. they extend apparently across to the 
James river. 

" These groups of field-works were con- 
nected by rifle trenches or parapets for 
nearly the whole distance. 

"Tiiey are far more extensive than may 
be supposed from the mention of them I 
make, and every kind of obstruction which 
the country affords, such as abattis, marsh, 
inundation, <fec., was skilfully used. The 
line is certainly one of the most extensive 
known to modern times. 

•• The country on both sides of the War- 
wick, from near Yorktown down, is a 
dense forest with few cieariufrs. It was 
swampy, and the roads impas«ali]e during 
the heavy rains we have constantly had, 



except where our own lal)ors had cordu- 
royed them. 

'• If we could have broken the enemy's 
line across the isthmus we could have in- 
vested Yorktown, and it must, with its 
garrison, haVe soon fallen into our hands. 
It was not deemed practicable, considering 
the strength of that line and the difficulty 
of handling our forces, (owing to the im- 
practicable character of the country.) to 
do so. 

"If we could take Yorktown, or drive 
the enemy out of that place, the enemy's 
line was no longer tenable. This we could 
do by siege operations. It was deemed 
too hazardous to attempt the reduction 
of the place by assault." 

The plan of the approaches and their 
defences as determined upon and finally 
executed is exhibited on the accompanying 
map. (No. — .) It was, in words, to open 
the first parallel as near as possible to the 
works of the enemy, and under its protec- 
tion to establish almost simultaneously 
batteries along the whole front, extending 
from the York river on the right to the 
AVarv.ick on the left, a cord of about one 
mile in length. The principal approaches 
wer,i directed against the east end of the 
main work, which was most heavily armed 
and bore both on the water and land, and 
lay between Wormley's creek and York 
river. There also were placed the most 
of the batteries designed to act against 
the land front to enfilade the water bat- 
teries, and to act upon Gloucester. 

I designed at the earliest moment to 
open simultaneously with several batteries, 
and as soon as the enemy's guns, which 
swept the neck of land between AV'ormley's 
creek and the AVarwick, were crippled and 
their fire kept doMii, to push the trenches 
as far forward as necessary and to assault 
YorktoAvn and the adjacent works. 

Thfe approaches to the batteries, the 
necessary bridges, and the roads to the 
depots, had been vigorously pushed to 
completion by the troops under (.tens, 
Ileintzelman and Sumner, and were avail- 
able for infantry, and in some instances 
for artillery, on the 17th of April, when 
the batteries and their connexions were 
commenced, and lal)or upon them kept up 
night and day until finished. Some of the 
batteries on easy ground and concealed 
from the view of the enemy were early 
completed and armed, and held ready for 
any enu'-rgency, but not permitted to open, 
as the return fire of the enemy would in- 
terfere too much with the labor on other 
and more important works. The comple- 
tion of tlie more exposed and heaviest' 
batteries was delayed by storms, prevent- 
ing the landing of guns and annnunition. 

It having been discovered that the enemy 



64 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE R. M'CLELLAN. 



were receiving artillery stores at the 
wharf in Yorktown, on May 1, battery No. 
1 was opened with eifect upon the wharf 
and town. 

On the 22d of April, Cen. Franklin, with 
his division from Gen. McDowell's corps, 
had arrived and reported to me. The. 
garrison of Gloucester point had been re- 
enforced and the works strengthened ; but 
as this division was too small to detach to 
the Severn, and no more troops could be 
spared, I determined to act on Gloucester 
by disembarking it on the north bank of 
the York river, under the protection of 
the gunboats. The troops were mainly 
kept on board ship while the necessary 
])reparations' were made for landing them, 
and supporting them in case of necessity. 
For a full account of this lalior I refer to 
the report of Lieut. Col. B. S. Alexander, 
of the engineer corps, detailed for this 
expedition. 

While the siege works were being 
rapidly completed, the roads on the left 
wing necessary for communication and ad- 
vance were opened and corduroyed over 
the marshes, batteries were erected to 
silence the enemy's guns, and drive him 
from his works at Wynn's and Lee's mills, 
preparatory to the general attack. Active 
reconnoissances were continually going on, 
and attempts in force made to drive the 
enemy from the banks. 

The result of various reconnoissances 
made under the immediate direction of 
(len. W. F. Smith, commanding second 
division fourth corps, led to the belief that 
the weakest point of that jiart of the 
enemy's lines was opposite a field where it 
was ascertained that there was a dam 
covered by a battery known to contain at 
least one gun. 

It was determined to push a strong re- 
connoissance on this point to silence the 
enemy's fire, and ascertain the actual 
strength of the position. Being prepared 
to sustain the reconnoitring party by a 
real attack, if found expedient, Gen. W. 
l'\ Smith was directed to undertake the 
operation on the 16th of April. He 
silenced the tire of the enemy's guns, dis- 
covered the existence of other works pre- 
viously concealed and unknown, and sent 
a strong party across the stream, which 
wa.s finally forced to retire with some loss. 
Smith intrenched himself in a position im- 
mediately overlooking the dam and the 
enemy's works, so as to keep them under 
control, and prevent the enemy from using 
the dam as a means of crossing the War- 
wick to annoy us. 

Many times towards the end of the 
month the enemy attempted to drive in 
(■nr pickets, and take our rif.e-pits near 
Yorktown, but always without success. 



As the siege progressed, it was with 
great difficulty that the rifle-pits on the 
right could be excavated and held, so 
little covering could be made against the 
hot fire of the enemy's artillery and in- 
fantry. Their guns continued firing up to 
a late hour of the night of tne 3d of 
May. 

Our batteries would have been ready to 
open on the morning of the (jth May at 
latest; but on the morning of the 4th it was 
discovered that the enemy had already 
been compelled to evacuate his position 
during the night, leaving behind him all 
his heavy guns, uninjured, and a large 
amount of ammunition and supplies. For 
the details of the labor of the siege 1 re- 
fer to the accompanying reports and jour- 
nals of Brig. Gen. J. G. Barnard, chief 
engineer, charged with the selections, lay- 
ing out, and completion of the approaches 
and Inxtteries ; of J^rig. Gen. AVm. F. Barry, 
chief of artillery, charged with arming and 
supplying with ammunition all the siege 
and field batteries ; and of Brig. Gen. Fitz- 
John Porter, director of the siege, to whom 
were assigned the guarding of the trenches, 
the assembling and distribution of the 
working parties, &c., &c. 

Early in the morning of the 4th, on the 
enemy's abandoning his lines at Yorktown, 
I ordered all the available cavalry force, 
with four batteries of horse artillery, under 
Brig. Gen. Stoneman, chief of cavalry, in 
innnediate pursuit by the Yorktown and 
Williamsburg road, with orders to harass 
the enemy's rear, and try to cut off such 
of his forces as had taken the Lee's mill 
and Williamsburg road. 

Gen. Heintzelman was directed to send 
Hooker's division forward on the York- 
town and Williamsburg road to support 
Gen. Stoneman; and Smith was ordered to 
proceed with his division upon the Lee's 
mill and Williamsburg road for the same 
purpose. Afterwards, the divisions of 
Gens. Kearney, Couch, and Cas(n', were 
put en route — the first on the Yorktown 
road, and the others on the Lee's mill 
road. These roads unite about a quarter 
of a mile south of Fort Magruder, and are 
connected by cross-roads at several points 
between Yorktown and Williamsburg. 
After these directions had been given. 
Gen. Sumner (the officer second in rank in 
the army of the Potomac) was ordered to 
proceed to the front and take immediate 
charge of operations until my arrival. 

Gen. Stoneman moved forward promptly 
with his command, consisting of four bat- 
teries of horse artillery under Lieut. Col. 
Hays, the 1st and 61 h United States cav- 
alry, the 3d Pennsylvania and 8th Illinois, 
and Barker's squadron, meeting with but 
little opposition until he arrived iu front 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE C. M'CLELLAX. 



65 



of the enemy's works about two miles east 
of Williamsburg. 

At a point about eight miles from York- 
town, in accordance with my instructions, 
he detached Gen. Emory with Benson's 
battery, the 3d Pennsylvania cavalry, 
(Col. Averill,) and Barker's s(|aadr(>u, to 
gain the Lee's mill road, and endeavor, 
with the assistance of Gen. t^mith, to cut 
off the portion of the enemy's rear guard 
which has taken that route. Gen. Emory 
had some sharp skirmishes with a regiment 
of cavalry and a battery under Gen. Stuart, 
and drove them in the direction of Lee's 
mill. 

Gen. Smith having met with obstruc- 
tions in his front, had transferred his 
column, by a cross-road, to the Yorktown 
and Williamsburg road, so that General 
Emory, finding no force to co-operate with 
him, was unable to cut off the rear guard, 
and they succeeded in escaping by a cir- 
cuitous route along the bank of the James 
river. 

The position in which Gen. Stonemart 
encountered the enemy is about four miles 
in extent, the right resting on College 
creek, and the left on Queen's creek ; 
nearly three-fourth of its front being 
covered by tributaries of these two creeks, 
upon which there are ponds. 

The ground betM'cen the heads of the 
boundary streams is a cultivated plain, 
across which a line of detached works had 
been constructed, consisting of Fort Ma- 
grudcr, a large work in the centre with a 
bastion front, and twelve other rcdoulits 
and epanlments for field guns. 

The parapet of Fort Magrudcr is about 
six feet high and nine feet thick : the ditch 
nine feet wide and nine feet deep, filled 
with water. The length of the interior 
crest is about 600 yards. The redoubts 
have stron'g profiles, but are of small di- 
mensions, having faces of about forty 
yards. The woods in front of the position 
were felled, and the open ground in front 
•)f the works was dotted with numerous 
•ifle-pits. 

The roads leadin'i' from the lower part of 
the Peninsula to AVilliamsburg, one along 
the York river, (the Yorktown road.) and 
the other along the James, (the Lee's mill 
road,) unite between the heads of the 
tributary streams a short distance in front 
of Fort Magruder, by which they are com- 
manded, and debouch from the woods just 
before uniting. A branch from the James 
river road leaves it about one-aiid-thre •- 
fourths of a mile below Fort Magruder 
and unites with the road from Allen's 
landing to Williamsburg, which crosses 
the tributary of College creek over a dam 
at the outlet of the pond, and passes just 
in the rear of the line of works, bc;n^ 
5 



commanded by the Ihree redoubts on the 
right of the line, at about the same dis- 
tanc^e from Fort Magruder. A branch 
leaves the York river road and crosses 
the tributary of Queen's creek on a dam, 
and passing over the position and through 
the works in its rear, finally enters Will- 
iamsburg; this road is commanded by re- 
doubts on the left of the line of works. 

Gen. Stoueman debouched from the 
woods with his advanced guard, (consist- 
ing of a part of the 1st United States 
cavalry, and one section of Gibson's bat- 
tery under the command of Gen. Cooke.) 
and the enemy immediately ojjened on him 
with several field-pieces from Fort Magru- 
der, having the correct range, and doing 
some execution. Gibson's battery was 
brought into position as rapidly as the 
deep mud would permit, and returned the 
fire ; while the 6th United States cavalry 
was sent to feel the enemy's left. This 
regiment passed one redoubt, which it 
found unoccupied, and appeared in the 
rear of the second, when a strong cavalry 
force, with infantry and artillery, came 
down upon it, whereupon the regiment was 
withdrawn. The rear squadron, und'-r 
Capt. Saunders, repelled a charge of the 
enemy's cavalry in the most gallant man- 
ner. In the meantime, the enemy was 
being re-inforced by infantry, and the artil- 
lery fire becoming very hot. Gen. Stone- 
man, having no infantry to carry the 
works, ordered the withdrawal of the bat- 
tery. This was accomplished, with the 
exception of one piece, which could not be 

I extricated from the mud. The enemy at- 
tempted to prevent the movement, but 

I their charges were met by the 1st United 
Slates cavalry, under command of Lieut. 
Col. Grier, and they were driven back, lo.s- 
ing several ofiicers and one stand of colors. 
Gen. Stoueman then took a defensive posi- 
tion a short distance in the rear of the 
first, to await the arrival of the infantry. 
The advance of Gen. Smith's column 
reached Skiff's creek about 11| o'clock, 
aiul found the bridge over that stream in 
flames, and the road impassable. A prac- 
ticable route to the Yorktown road having 
l)een discovered, the division, by order (f 
Gen. Sumner, moved on by that road, and 
reached (Jen. Stoneman's ])osition abo'-t 
oi- o'clock. Gen. Sumner, arriving with it, 
assumed command. 

Gens. TIeintzelman and Keyes also ar- 
rived. During the afternoon of the 4th, 
near the ILilfway House, tliQ head of (Jen. 
^looker's column encountered Smith's 
division filing into the road, and was 
obliged to halt between three and four 
hours until it had passed. Gen. Hooker 
then followed on. and at t'heesecake church 
turned o'*', hy Gen. Heintzelman's dircc- 



66 



REPOHT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX. 



lion. taldniT a cross-road, and moved out j 
on the Leo's mill road, thus changing I 
])laces ^vith (5en. Smith. Marching part | 
of the night, he ciinie in sight of Fort Ma- j 
gruder ctirly in the morning of the 5th. i 

Gen. Smith's division having been de- 1 
ployed. Gen. Snmner ordered an attack ou i 
the works in his front ; but the lines hav- , 
iug lieen thrown into confusion while mov- | 
ing through the dense forest, and darkness i 
coming on, the attempt for that night was | 
abandoned. The troo]is bivouacked in the 
woods, and a heavy rain began, wliich con- \ 
tinued until the morning of the 6th, mak- ! 
ing the roads, already in very bad condi- 
tion, almost impassable. 

During the morning of the 5th Gen. ' 
Sumner reconnoitered the position in his 
liis front, and at 11 o'clock ordered Ilan- ; 
cock's brigade, of Smith's division, to take | 
])Ossession of a work on the enemy's lei't, ] 
which had been found to be unoccupied, j 
The remainder of Smith's division occupied i 
the woods in front without being actually j 
engaged. I 

The divisions of Couch and Casey had | 
received orders during the night to march ; 
at daylight ; but on account of the terrible \ 
condition of the roads, and other impedi- j 
jnents, were not able to reach the field : 
until after 1 o'clock p. m.. at which time I 
the first brigade of Couch's division ar- ' 
rived, and was posted in the centre, on i 
Hooker's right. The other two brigades j 
came up during the afternoon, followed by 
(lasey's division. j 

In the meantime Gen. Hooker, having 
reconnoitred the enemy's position, began i 
the attack at 1-^ a. m., and for a while 1 
silenced the guns of Fort Magruder. and 
ideared the ground in his front ; but the 
ihe enemy being continually re-inforced, 
until their strength greatly exceeded his, 
made attack after attack, endeavoring to 
turn his left. 

For several hours his division struggled 
gallantly against the superior numbers of 
the enemy. Five guns of AVebber's bat- 
tery were lost, and between three and four 
o'clock his ammunition began to give out. 
Tlie loss had lieen heavy, and the exhaus- 
tion of the troo])h was very great. At this 
time the division of Hen. Kearney came 
up. who. at 9 a. m., had received orders to 
re-inforce Hooker, and who had succeeded 
by the greatest exertions, in passing Casey's 
troops, and pushing on to the front, 
llirough the deep nmd. Gen. Kearney at 
once gallantly attacked, and thereby pre- 
vented the loss of another battery, and 
drove the enemy back at every point, en- 
abling iWn. Hooker to extricate himself 
from his position, and withdraw his wearied 
troops. Peck's brigade, of (^ouch's division, 
as Las been mentioned befiire was, imme- 



diately on its arrival, ordered by Gon. 
Sumner to deploy on Hooker's right. This 
was»promptly done, and the attacks of the 
enemy at that point were repulsed. Gen. 
Peck held his position until late in the 
afternoon, when he was relieved by the 
other two brigades of Couch's division, 
and they were in quiet possession of tlie 
ground when night closed the contest. 
The vigorous action of these troops re- 
lieved (jen. Hooker considerably. Gen. 
Emory had been left with his command 
on the night of the 4th, to guard the 
branch of the Lee's mill road which leads 
to Allen's farm ; and on the morning of the 
5th it was ascertained that by this route 
the enemy's right could be turned. A re- 
quest for infantry for this purpose was 
made to Gen. Heintzelman, who, late in 
the afternoon, sent four regiments and two 
batteries of Kearney's division — the first 
disposable troops he had — and directed 
Gen. Emory to make the attack. With 
these re-inl'orcemeuts his force amounted 
about 3,000 men and three batteries, (len. 
Emory, on account of want of knowledge 
of the ground, and the lateness of the hour, 
did not succeed in this movement. It in- 
volved some risks, but, if successful, might 
have produced important results. 

At 11a. m., as before mentioned. Gen. 
Smith received orders from Gen. Sumner 
to send one brigade across a dam on our 
right, to occupy a redoubt on the left of 
the enemy's line. Hancock's brigade was 
selected for this purpose. He crossed the 
dam, took possession of the first redoubt, 
and afterwards, finding the second one 
vacated, he occupied that also, and sent 
for re-inforcem.ents to enable him to ad- 
vance further and take the next redoubt, 
which commanded the plain between his 
position and Fort Magruder. and would 
have enabled him to take in reverse and 
citt the communication of. the troops en- 
gaged with Gens. Hooker and Kearney. 

The enemy soon began to show himself 
in streiigth before him, and as his rear and 
right flank were somewhat exposed, he 
repeated his request for re-inforcements. 
Gen. Smith was twice ordered to join him, 
with the rest of his division, but each time 
the order was countermanded at the mo- 
ment of execution. Gen. Sumner not being 
willing to weaken the centre. At length 
in reply to Gen. Hancock's repeated mes- 
sages for more troops, Gen. Sumner sent 
him an order to fall back to his first posi- 
tion, the execution of which Gen. Hancock 
deferred as long as possible, being unwil- 
ling to give up the advantage already 
gained, and fearing to expose his command 
by such a movetnent. 

During the progress of those events, I 
had remained at Yorktowu to complete 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAK 



67 



thp preparations for the dopartnre of Gen. 
Franklin's and othor troops to West Point 
by water, and to make the necessary ar- 
rangements with the naval commander for 
his co-operation. 

By pushing Gen. Franklin, well sup- 
ported by water, to the right bank of the 
Pamunkey, opposite West Point, it was 
hoi)ed to force the enemy to abandon 
whatever works he might have on the 
Peninsula below that pomt, or be cut off. 
]t was of paramount importance that the 
arrangements to this end should be 
promptly made at an early hour of the 
morning. 1 had sent two of my aids (Lieut.- 
(Jol. Sweitzer and Major Ilainmerstein) to 
observe the operations in front, with in- 
structions to report to me everything of 
importance that might occur. I'received 
no information from them leading me to 
suppose that there was anything occurring 
of more importance than a simple afiair of 
a rear-guard, until about one o'clock p. m., 
when a despatch arrived from one of them 
that everything was not progressing favor- 
ably. This was confirmed a few minutes 
later by the reports of Gov. Sprague and 
Maj. Hammerstein, who came directly 
from the scene of action. 

Completing the necessary arrange- 
ments, 1 returned to my carnp without 
delay, rode rapidly to the front, a distance 
of some fourteen miles, through roads 
much obstructed by troops and wagons, 
and reached the field between four and five 
p. M., in time to take a rapid survey of 
the ground. I soon learned that there 
was no direct communication between our 
centre and the left under Gen. Heintzel- 
man ; the centre was chiefly in the neurer 
edge of the woods, situate between us and 
the enemy. As heavy firing was heard in 
the direction of (ien. Hancock's command. 
I immediately ordered Gen. .Smitli to pro- 
ceed with Ills two remaining brigades to 
support that part of the line. Gen. Naglee. 
T.ith his brigade, received similar orders. 
1 then directed our centre to advance to 
the further edge of the woods mentioned 
above, which was done, and I attempted to 
open direct communication with (ien. 
Heintzelman, but was prevented by the 
marshy state of the ground in the direction 
in which the attempt was made. 

Before Gen.s. Smith and Naglee could 
reach the field of Gen. Hancock's opera- 
tions, although they moved with great 
rapidity, he had been confronted by a 
superior force. Feigning to retreat slowly, 
he awaited their onset, and then turne'd 
upon them, and after some tei'rific volleys 
of musketry, he charged them with the 
bayonet, routing and dispersing their 
whole force, killing, wonndinir and caii- 



turing from 500 to 600 men, he himself 
losing only 31 men. 

This was one of the most brilliant en- 
gagements of the war, and Gen. Hancock 
merits the highest praise for the soldierly 
qualities displayed, and his perfect appre- 
ciation of the vital importance of his 
position. 

Night put an end to the operations here, 
and all the troops M-ho had been engaged 
in this contest slept on the muddv field, 
without shelter, and many without food. 

Notwitstanding the report I received 
from Gen. Heintzelman, during the night, 
that Gen. Hooker's division had suffered 
so much that it could not be relied on the 
next day, and that Kearney's could not do 
more than hold its own without re-enforce- 
ments— being satisfied that the result 
of Hancock's engagement was to give us 
possession of the decisive point of the 
battlefield during the night, I counter- 
manded the order for the "advance of the 
divisions of Sedgwick and Richardson, 
and directed them to return to Yorktown, 
to proceed to West Point by water. 

Our loss during the day. the greater 
part of which was sustained by Hooker's 
division, was as follows : 

Killed, 456 ; wounded, 1,400 ; missing, 
372 ; total, 2,228. 

On the next morning we found the 
enemy's position abandoned, and occupied 
Fort Magruder and the town of Williams- 
burg, which was filled with the enemy's 
wounded, to whose assistance eighteen of 
their surgeons were sent by Gen. J. F. 
Johnson, the officer in connuand. Several 
guns and caissons, which the enemy could 
not carry off on account of the mud, were 
secured. Col. Averill was sent forward at 
once with a strong cavalry force to en- 
deavor to overtake the enemy's rear-guard. 
He found several guns abandoned, and 
picked up a large number of stragglers, 
but the coudition of the roads and the 
state of the supplies forced him to return, 
after advancing a few miles. 

It is my opinion that the enemy opposed 
us here with only a portion of his army. 
When our cavalry first appeared there was 
nothing but the enemy's rear-guard in 
Williamsburg. Other troops were brouglit, 
back during the night and the next day (o 
hold the works as long as possible, in 
order to gain time for the trains, &c., 
already well on the way to Eichraond, to 
make their escape. Our troops were 
greatly exhausted by the laborious march 
through the mud from their positions in 
front of Yorktown, and by the protracted 
battle through which they had just passed. 
Many of them were out of rations and 
ammunition, and one division, in its 
anxiety to make a prompt movement, h.ul 



63 



REPOKT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. MTLELLAN. 



marclied with empty haversacks. The 
supply trains had been forced out of the 
roads on the fourth and fifth to allow the 
troops and artillery to pass to the front, 
and the roads were now in such a state, 
after thirty-six hours' continuous rain, 
that it was almost impossible to pass even 
empty wag-ons over them. Gen. Hooker's 
division had suffered so severely that it 
was in no condition to follow the enemy, 
even if the roads had been good. Under 
these circumstances, an immediate pursuit 
was impossible. 

Steps were at once taken to care for and 
remove the wounded, and to bring up 
provisions, ammunition, and forage. 

The condition of the roads, as has been 
said, rendered it next to impossible to ac- 
complish this by land from Yorktown. A 
temporary depot was therefore promptly 
established on Queen's creek, and supplies 
drawn, and the wounded shipped from that 
place. 

The divisions of Franklin, Sedgwick, 
Porter, and Richardson were sent from 
Yorktown by water to tlie right bank of 
the Pamunkey, in the vicinity of West 
Point. The remaining divisions, the 
trains, and the reserve artillery moved 
subsequently by land. 

Early on the morning of the 7th Gen. 
Franklin had completed the disemliarca- 
tion of his division, and had placed it in a 
good position to cover the lauding place, 
both his flanks and a large portion of his 
front being protected by water. 

I>ana's brigade of Sedgwick's division 
arrived during the morning. 

At about 9 A. M. a large force of the 
enemy appeared, consisting of Whiting's 
divisions and other troops, and between 
10 and 11 they attacked the part of the 
line held by Newton's brigade. 

The action continued until 3 p. m.. when 
the enemy retired, all his attacks having 
been repulsed. This affair, the most im- 
portant in which the division had yet l>een 
engaged, was highly creditable to Gen. 
Franklin and his command. For the 
details I refer to his report, which is here- 
with submitted. Our loss was 49 killed, 
104 wounded, and 41 missing. Total 194, 
which includes a large proportion of 
officers. 

Cavalry reconnoissances were sent out 
from Williamsburg on the Gth and 7th, and 
on the 8th (Jen. Stonenian moved with an 
advance guard of cavalry, artillery, and 
infantry to open counuunication with Gen. 
Franklin. 

As soon as our supplies had been re- 
ceived and the condition of the roads had 
become a little better, though still very 
bad, the advance of the remain-ng troops 
was begun, Smith's division moving on the 



Hth. On the 10th headquarters were at 
Roper's church, 19 miles from Williams- 
burg, all the divisions wliich had moved by 
land, except Hooker's, being in the vicinity 
of that place. 

We were now in direct communication 
with the portion of the army which had 
gone by water, and we began to draw 
supplies from them. 

On account of the small number and 
narrowness of the roads in this neigh- 
borhood, movements were difficult and 
slow. 

On the l.^th, headquarters and the divi- 
sions of Franklin, Porter, Sykes, and 
Smith reached Cumberland, which was 
made a temporary depot. Couch and 
Casey were then near New Kent Court 
House, Hooker and Kearney near Roper's 
church, and Richardson and Sedgwick 
near Eltham. 

On the 14th and 1.5th much rain fell. 

On the 1,5th and 16th the divisions of 
Franklin, Smith, and Porter were with 
great difficulty moved to White House, 
five miles in advance. So bad was the 
road that the train of one of these divisions 
required thirty-six hours to pass over this 
short distance, (xen. Stoneman had oc- 
cupied this place some days before, after 
several successful skirmishes, in which our 
cavalry proved superior to that of the ene- 
my. The reports of these atfairs are ap- 
pended. 

About this time, with the consent of the 
President, two additional corps were or- 
ganized, viz : the 5th provisional corps, 
consisting of the divisions of Porter and 
Sykes, and the reserve artillery, under the 
command of Gen. F. J. Porter, and the 
6th provisional corps, consisting of the 
divisions of Franklin and Smith under the 
command of Gen. W. B. Franklin. 

Headquarters reached White House on 
the 16th, and a permanent depot was at 
once organized there. 

On the 19th, headquarters and the corps 
of Porter and Franklin moved to Tunstall's 
station, five iniles from White House. - 

On the 20th more rain fell. 

On the 21st the position of the troops 
was as follows : Stoneman's advance guard, 
one mile from New Bridge ; Franklin's 
corps three miles from New Bridge, with 
Porter's corps at supporting distance in 
its rear ; Sumner's corps, on the railroad 
about three miles from the (Jhickahominy, 
connecting the right with the lett ; Keyes's 
corps, on New Kent road near Bottom's 
bridge, with Heintzelman's corps at sup- 
porting distance in the rear. 

The ford at Bottom's bridge was in our 
possession, and the rebuilding of the 
bridge, which had been destroyed by the 
enemy, was commenced. 



TxEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX, 



69 



On the 22d, headquarters moved to Coal 
Harbor. 

Oa the 26th the railroad was in opera- 
tion as far as the Chickahominy. and the 
railroad bridge across that stream nearly 
completed. 

CHAPTER n. 

When, on the 20th of May. onr advanced 
light troops reached the banks of the 
Chickahominy river, at Bottom's bridge, 
they found that this as well as the railroad 
Vnidge. about a mile above, had been de- 
stroyed by the enemy. 

The Chickahominy in this vicinity is 
about forty feet wide, fringed with a dense 
growth of heavy forest trees, and bordered 
by low marshy bottom lands, varying from 
half a mile to a mile in width. 

Our operations embraced that part of 
the river between Bottom's and Meadow 
bridges, which covered the principal ap- 
proaches to Richmond from the east. 

Within these limits the firm ground lying 
above high-water mark seldom approaches 
near the river on either bank, and no lo- 
cality was found within this section where 
the high ground came near the stream on 
both sides. It was subject to frequent, 
sudden, and great variations in the volume 
of water, and a rise of a few feet over- 
flowed the bottom lands on both sides. 

At low water it could be forded at almost 
any point ; but during high water it was 
above a fording stage, and could then be 
crossed oidy at the few points where 
bridges had been constructed. These 
bridges had all been destroyed by the 
enemy on our approach, and it was neces- 
sary not only to reconstruct these, but to 
build several others. 

The west bank of the river opposite the 
New and Mechanicsville bridges was 
bordered by elevated blufifs, which afiforded 
the enemy commanding positions to fortify, 
establish his batteries, enfilading the ap- 
jiroaches upon the two principal roads to 
Richmond on our right, and resist the re- 
construction of the important bridges. 
'I'his obliged us to select other less ex- 
posed points for our crossings. 

As the enemy was not in great force op- 
posite Bottom's bridge on the arrival of 
our left at the point, and as it was im- 
portant to secure a lodgment np<m the 
right bank before he should have time to 
concentrate his forces and contest the 
passage. I forthwith ordered Casey's divi- 
sion to ford the river and occupy the 
opposite heights. This was promptly done 
on the 20th. and reconnoissances were at 
once pushed out in advance. 

These troops were directed to throw up 
defences in an advantageous position to 
secure our left dauk. Gen. Heiutzelmans 



corps was thrown forward in support, and 
Bottom's bridge immediately rebuilt. 

In the mean time our centre and right 
were advanced to the river above, and on 
the 24th we carried the village of Me- 
chanicsville, driving the enemy out with 
our artillery, and forcing them across 
the bridge, which they destroyed. Gen. 
I Naglee on the same day dislo^ed a force 
I of the enemy from the vicinity of the 
'•Seven Pines," on the Bottom's bridge 
' i*oad. and our advance on the left secured 
' a strong position near that place. 
I All the information obtained from de- 
J serters. negroes, and spies, indicated that 
I the enemy occupied m force all the ap- 
proaches to Richmond from the east, and 
that he intended to dispute every step of 
our advance beyond the Chickahominy, 
' and the passage of the stream opposite 
! our right. That their army was superior 
1 to ours in numbers, did not admit of a 
j doubt. Strong defences had been con- 
structed around Richmond. 

Impressed by these facts with the ne- 
cessity of strengthening the army for the 
struggle, I did not fail to urge repeatedly 
upon my superiors the importance of re- 
enforcing the army of the Potomac with 
every disposable man, in order to insure 
the success of our attack upon the rebel 
capital. 

On the 10th of May I telegraphed aa 
follows : 

, "Camp at Eweli/s Farm. 3 yiu.r.s beyond 
I " Williamsburg, May 10, 1862 — 5 a. m. 
i " From the information reaching me 
' from every source, I regard it as certain 
that the enemy will meet us with all his 
force on or near the Chickahominy. They 
can concentrate many more men than 1 
have, and are collecting troops from all 
quarters, especially well-disciplined troop:* 
from the south. Casualties, sickness, gar- 
risons, and guards have much reduced 
our numbers, and will continue to do so. 
I shall fight the rebel army with whatever 
' force I may have, but duty requires me to 
' urge that every effort to be made to re-en- 
} force me without delay with all the disposa- 
ble troops in Eastern Virginia, and that we 
I concentrate all ou,r forces, as far as possi- 
i ble. to fight the great battle now impend- 
i ing, and to make it decisive. 
I " It is possible that the enemy may 
abandon Richmond without a serious 
struggle : but I do not believe he will, and 
[ it would be unwise to count upon any- 
thing but a stubborn and desperate de- 
j fence — a life and death contest. I see no 
I other hope for him than to fight this 
I battle, and we must win it. I shall fight 
i them whatever their force may be, but I 
! ask for every man that the department 



TO 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



can send me. No troops should now be 
left uuemployed. Those who entertain 
the opinion that the rebels will abandon 
Richmond without a struggle, are, in my 
judgment, badly advised, and do not com- 
prehend their situation, which is one re- 
quiring desperate measures. 

" 1 beg that the President and Secretary 
will maturely M^eigh what I say, and leave 
nothing undone to comply with my request. 
If J am not re-enforced, it is probable that 
1 will bo obliged to fight nearly double my 
r.umbers strongly intrenched. I do not 
think it will be at all possible for me to 
bruig more than (70,000) seventy thousand 
men upon the field of battle. 

" GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

"Maj. Gen. Commanding. 

"Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Sec. of U'ar." 

On the 14th of May I sent the following 
telegram to the President : 

" Camp at Cumberland, 

•May 14, 1862. 

" I have more than twice telegraphed to 
the Secretary of War, stating that, in my 
opinion, the enemy were concentrating all 
their available force to fight this army in 
front of Richmond, and that such ought to 
be their policy. I have received no reply 
whatever to any of these telegraphs. I beg 
leave to repeat their substance to your ex- 
cellency, and to ask that kind considera- 
tion which you have ever accorded to my 
representations and views. All my infor- 
mation from every source accessible to me 
establishes the fixed purpose of the rebels 
to defend Richmond against this army by 
offering us battle with all the troops they 
can collect from east, west, and south, and 
my own opinion is confirmed by that of all 
my commanders whom I have been able to 
consult 

"Ca6ualties,sickness,garrisons and guards 
have much weakened my force, and will 
continue to do so. I cannot bring into 
actual battle against the enemy more than 
eiuhty thousand men at the utmost, and 
with them I must attack in position, 
probably intrenched, a much larger force, 
j)erhaps double my numbers. It is possible 
that Richmond may be abandoned without 
a serious struggle ; but the enemy are 
actually in great strength between here 
and there, and it would be unwise, and even 
insane, for me to calculate upon anything 
but a stubborn and desperate resistance. 
If they should abandon Richmond, it may 
well be that it is done with the purpose of 
making the stand at some place in Virginia 
south or west of there, and we should be in 
condition to press them without delay. The 
confederate leaders must employ their ut- 
most efforts against this army in Virginia, 
and they will be supported by the whole 



body of their military officers, among whom 
there may be said to be no Union feeling, 
as there is also very little among the higher 
class of citizens in the seceding States. 

" I have found no fighting men left in this 
Peninsula. All are in the ranks of the 
opposing foe. 

" Even if more troops than I now have 
should prove unnecessary for purposes of 
military occupation, our greatest display 
of imposing force in the capital of the rebel 
government will have the best moral eSect. 
I most respectfully and earnestly urge upon 
your excellency that the opportunity has 
come for striking a fatal blow at the ene- 
mies of the Constitution, and I beg that 
you will cause this army to be re-enforced 
without delay by all the disposable troops 
of the government. I ask for every man 
that the War Department can send me. 
Any commander of the re-enforcements 
whom your excellency may designate will 
be acceptable to me, whatever expression I 
may have heretofore addres;;ed to you on 
that subject. 

" I will fight the enemy whatever their 
force may be, with whatever force I may 
have; and I firmly believe that we shall 
beat them, but our triumph should be made 
decisive and complete. The soldiers of this 
army love their government, and will fight 
well in its support. You may rely upon 
them. They have confidence in me as their 
general, and in you as their President. 
Strong re-enforcements will at least save 
the lives of many of them. The greater our 
force the more perfect will be our combina- 
tions, and the less our loss. 

" For obvious reasons I beg you to give 
immediate consideration to this communi- 
cation, and to inform me fully at the earliest 
moment of your final determinatiou. 
•' GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 

"His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, 
President of the United Stales." 

To which, on the 18th of May, I received 
this reply: 

" Washington, May 18 — 2 p. m. 

" General: Your despatch to tlie Presi- 
dent, asking re-enforcements, has been re- 
ceived and carefully considered. 

'•'J'he President is not willing to uncover 
the capital entirely; and it is believed that 
even if this were prudent, it would require 
more time to effect a junction between 
your army and that of the Rappahannock 
by the way of the Potomac and York river 
th;ui by a land march. In order, therefore, 
to increase the strength of the attack upon 
Richmond at the earliest moment. Gen. 
McDowell has been ordered to march upon 
that city by the shortest route. He is 
ordered, keeping himself always in position 
to save the capital from all possible attack, 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'QEELLAX. 



■[ 



so to operate as to pat his left wing in com- 
munication with your right wing, and you 
are iunlructed to co-operate so as to estab- 
lish this coininiinicLitiun as soon as possible 
by extending yuur right wing to the north 
of Richmond. 

" It is believed that this communication 
can be safely established either north or 
south of the Pamunkey river. 

"In any event, you will be able to pre- 
vent the main body of the enemy's forces 
from leaving Richmond, and falling in 
overwhelming force upon Gen McDowell. 
He will move with between thirty-five (35) 
and forty thousand (40.000) men 

"A copy of the instructions to Gen. 
McDowell are with this. The specific task 
assigned to his command has been to pro- 
vide against any danger to the capital of 
the nation. 

" At your earnest call for re- enforce- 
ments, he is sent forward to co-operate in \ 
the reduction of Richmond, but charged, j 
in attempting this, not to nncover the city ; 
of Washington, and you will give no order, 
either before or after your junction, which 
cin put him out of position to cover this 
city. You and he will communicate with 
each other by telegra])h or otherwise, as 
frequently as may be necessary for suffi- 
cient co-operation. AVhen (Jen. McDowell 
is in position on your right, his supplies 
must be drawn from West Point, and you 
will instruct your staff officers to be pre- 
pared to supply him by that route. 

" The President de.^ires that Gen. Mc- 
Dowell retain the command of the depart- 
ment of the Rappahannock, and of the 
forces with which he moves forward. 

'•By order of the President. 

" EDWIN M. STANTON, 
" Secretary of War. 

"Maj. Gen. Geo. B. McCLELLA.v.Com'ding 
Army Potomac, before Richmond." 

It will be observed that this order ren- 
dered it impossible for me to use the James 
river as a line of operations, and forced 
me to establish our depots on the Pa- 
munkey, and to approach Richmond from 
the north. 

1 had advised, and preferred, that re- 
enforcements should be sent by water, for 
the reasons that their arrival would be more 
safe and ceriain, and that 1 would be left 
free to rest tne army on the .lames river 
whenever the navigation of that stream 
should be opened. 

Tlie land movement obliged me to ex- 
pose my right in order to secure the junc- 
tion ; and as the order for Gen. McDowell's 
march was soon counuTnianded, 1 incurred 
great risk, of v.hich the eiiemy finally took 
advantage, -.md frustrated the plan of cam- 
paign, llad Gen. McDowell joined me by 



water, I could have approached Richmond 
by the .James, and thus avuided the delays 
and losses incurred in bridging the Chicka- 
homiiiy, and would have had the army 
massed in one body instead of being neces- 
sarily divided by that stream. 

The following is a copy of the instruc- 
tions to Gen. >icDowell : 
'•War Dkpaktmext. 

•' Wa.shington, May 17. 1862. 
" Gknerat, : Upon being joined by Gen. 
Shield's division, you will move upon Rich- 
mond by the general route of the Rich- 
mond and Fredericksburg railroad, co-oj>- 
erating with the forces under Gen. McClei- 
lan. now threatening Richmond from the 
line of the Pamunkey and York rivers. 

" While seeking to establish as soon a« 
possible a communication between your 
left wing and the right wing of Gen. 
Mc(Jlellan. you will Jiold yourself always 
in such position as to cover the capital of 
the nation against a sudden dash of any 
body of the rebel forces. 

"Gen. McClellan will be furni.shed with 
a copy of these instructions, and will be 
direcled to hold himself in readiness to 
establish communication with your left 
wing, and to prevent the main body of the 
enemy's army from leaving Richmond, and 
throwing itself upon your column, before a 
junction of the two armies is effected. 

" A copy of his instructions in regard to 
the employment of your force is annexed. 
" By order of the Presidont. 

'•EDWIN M. STANTON. 

Sec. of War. 
" On. McDowKTJ,, 

" Com. Depart, of Rappahannock.'" 
Having some doubts, from the wording 
of the foregoing orders, as to the extent of 
my authority over the troops of Gen. 
McDowell, and as to the time when I might 
anticipate his arrival, on the 'Jlst of May 
I sent this dispatch : 

" Ueadquartek's Aumv of the Potomac, 
" Camji near Tuiistall's Station, Va., 
'•May 21, 1862—11 p. m. 
" Your despatch of yesterday, respecting 
our situation and the batteries of Forr 
Darling, was received while I was absent 
with liie advance, where I have been all 
this day. I liave communicated personally 
i with {'apt. Goldsborough, and by letter 
! with Capt. Smith. The vessels can do 
nothing without co-operating on land, 
which J will not be in condition to afford 
for several days. Circumstances must de- 
termine the propriety of a land attack. 

"It rained again last night, and rain on 
this soil soon makes the roads increditabiy 
bad for army trans])ori;ition. I person- 
ally crossed the (,'hickahominy to-day at 
Bottom's bridge ford, and went a mile be- 



12 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. n'OLELLAJS". 



. yond, the cnomy boiiif^ about half a mile in 
front. I have three resiiments on the 
other bank guarding- the re-buildi'ig of the 
bridge. Keyes's corps is on the New 
Kent road, near Bottom's bridge. Heint- 
zelinan is on the same road, wiUun support- 
ing distance. .Sunnier is oiWne railroad, 
connecting- right with left. Ston"man, 
\iith advanced guard, is within one mile of 
New bridge. Franklin, with two divisions, 
is about two miles this side of Stoneraan. 
i'orter's division, with the reserves of in- 
fantry and artillery, is within sui)porting 
distance. Headquarters will probably be 
at Coal Harbor to-morrow, one mile this 
.>-ide of Franklin. All the bridges over the 
( 'hickahoniiny are destroyed. The enemy 
are in force on every road leading to Rich- 
mond, within a mile or two west of the 
stream. Their main body is on the road 
from New bridge, encamped along it for 
four or five miles, spreading over the open 
"ground on both sides. Johnston's head- 
quarters arc about two miles beyond the 
Ijridge. 

"All accounts report their numbers as 
greatly e.xceeding our own. 'I'lie position 
of the rebel forces, the declaration of the 
confederate authorities, the resolutions of 
tiie Yirginia legislature, the action of the 
city government, the conduct of the citi- 
zens, and all other sources of information 
accessible to me, give positive assurance 
that our approach to Richmond involves a 
desperate battle between the opposing 
armies. 

" All our divisions are moving towards 
the foe. 1 shall advance steadily and care- 
i'ully, and attack them according to my 
best judgment, and in such manner as to 
employmy greatest force. 

•' 1 regret the state of things as to Gen. 
McDowell's command. AVe must beat the 
enemy in front of Richmond. One division 
added to this army for that effort would do 
iiior(; to protect Washington than this 
wliole force can possibly do anywhere else 
in the tield. The rebels are concentrating 
from all points for the two battles at Rich- 
mond and Corinth. I would still, most 
respectfully, suggest the policy of our con- 
centrating here by movements on water. 
1 have heard nothing as to the probabil- 
ities of the contemplated junction of 
McDowell's force with mine. I have no 
idea when he can start, what are his means 
of transportation, or when he may be ex- 
pected to reach this vicinity. I fear there 
is little hope that he can join me over land 
in time for the coming battle. Delays on 
my part will be dangerous. I fear sickness 
and demoralization. This region is un- 
lieallhy for northern men. and unless kept 
mnving. I fear that our soldiers may be- 
come discour.iged At present our "num- 



bers are weakening from disease, but our 
men rem.iin in good heart, 

'• I regret also the configuration of the 
department of the Rappahannock. it 
includes a portion even of the city of Rich- 
mond. I think that my own department 
should embrace the entire field of military 
operations designed for the capture and 
occupation of that city. 

" Again, I agree with your excellency 
that one bad general is better than two 
good ones. 

" I am not sure that I fully comprehend 
your orders of the 17th instant addressed 
to myself and Gen. McDowell If a junc- 
tion is effected before we occupy Rich- 
mond, it must necessarily be east of the 
railroad to Fredericksburg and within my 
department. This fact, my superior rank, 
and the express language of the (j2d article 
of war, will place his comnand under my 
orders, unless it is otherwise specially 
directed by your excellency ; and I con- 
sider that he will be under my command, 
except that 1 am not to detach any portion 
of his forces, or give any orders which can 
put him out of position to cover Washing- 
ton. If I err in my construction, I desire 
to be at once set right. Frankness com- 
pels me to say, anxious as 1 ain for aa 
increase of force, that the march of Mc- 
Dowell's column upon Richmond by the 
shortest route will, in my opinion, uncover 
Washington, as to any interposition by it, 
as completely as its movement by water. 
The enemy cannot advance by Fredericks- 
burg on Washington. 

"Should they attempt a movement, 
which to me seems utterly improbable, 
their route would be by (lordonsville and 
^Manassas. I desire that the extent of my 
authority over McDovell may be clearly 
defined, lest misunderstandings and c0!i- 
flicting views may produce some of those 
injurious results which a divided command 
lias so often caused. 1 would respectfully 
suggest that this danger can only be surely 
guarded against by explicitly placing Cen. 
McDowell under my orders in the ordinary 
way. and holding me strictly responsible 
for the closest observance of your instruc- 
tions. I hope, Mr. President, that it is not 
necessary for me to assure you that your 
instructions would be observed in the 
utmost good faith, and that I have no per- 
sonal feelings which could influence me to 
disregard them in any particular. 

" 1 believe there is a great struggle before 
this army, but 1 am neither dismayed nor 
discouraged. I wish to strengthen its 
force as much as I can, but in any event I 
shall fight it with all the skill, caution and 
determination that I possess, and I trust 
that the result may either obtain for me the 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE R. M'CLELLAN. 73 



permanent confidence of my government, 
or that it mav close my career. 

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

' Major-Gen. Commanding. 
" His E.xcellency Abraham Lincoln, 
"President of the United States." 

On the 24th I received the following 
reply : 

" May 24. 1862. (From Washington, 24th ) 

" I left Gen. McDowell's camp at dark 
1 ist evening. Shield's command is there, 
l)ut it is so worn that he cannot move be- 
fore Monday morning, the twenty-sixth 
(■JGth.) We have so thinned our line to 
get troops for other places that it was 
broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a 
jirobable loss to us of one (1) regiment in- 
fantry, two (2) companies cavalry, putting 
Gen. Banks in some peril. 

•'The enemy's forces, under Gen. An- 
derson, now opposing Gen. McDowell's 
advance, have, as their line of supply and 
retreat, the road to Richmond. 

'•If, in conjunction with McDowell's 
movement against Anderson, you could 
send a force from your right t^ cut off the 
enemy's supplies from Richmond, preserve 
the railroad bridges across the two (2) 
forks of the Painunkey and intercept the 
enemy's retreat, you will prevent the army 
now opposed to you from receiving an 
accession of numbers of nearly fifteen thou- 
sand (15,0(10) men; and if you succeed in 
saving the bridges, you will secure a line 
of railroad for supplies in addition to the 
one you now have. Can you not do this 
almost as well as not, while you are build- 
ing the Chicahominy bridges ? McDowell 
and Shields both say they can, and posi- 
tively will, move Monday morning. I wish 
you to movK cauliously a>id safdy. 

"You will have command of McDowell, 
after he joins you, precisely as you indica- 
ted in your long despatch to us of the 
twenty-first, (21st.) 

'•A. TJNCOLX. President. 

" Major-Gen. G. B. McCi.rllan." 

This information that McDowell's corps 
would march for Fredericksburg on the 
following Monday, (the 2fith), and that he 
would be under my command, as indicated 
in my telegram of the 21st, was cheering 
news, and i now felt confident that we 
would on his arrival be sufficiently strong 
to overpower the large army confronting us. 

At a later hour on the same day I re- 
ce.ved the following 

"May 24, 1862. (from Washington. 4 p.m.) 
" In consequence of Gen. Banks's criti- 
cal position, 1 have been compelled to sus- 
pend Gen. McDowell's movements to join 
you. The enemy are making a desperate 



push tipon Harper's Ferrj', and we are 
trying to throw Gen. Fremont's force, and 
part of Gen. McDowell's, in their rear. 
" A. LINCOLN, President. 
"Major-Gen. Gko B. McClellan." 

From which it will be seen that I conid 
not expect Gen. McDowell to join me in 
time to participate in immediate operations 
in front of Richmond, and on the s;une 
evening I replied to the President that I 
would make my calculations accordingly. 

It then only remained for me to make 
the best use of the forces at my disposal, 
and to avail myself of all artificial auxilia- 
ries to compensate as much as possible for 
the inadequacy of men. I concurred fully 
with the President in the injunction con- 
tained in his telegram of the" 24th, that it 
was necessary with my limited force to 
move "cautiously and safely." In view of 
the peculiar character of the Chicahominy, 
and the liability of its bottom land to sud- 
den inundation, it became necessary to 
construct between Bottom's bridge and 
Mechanicsville eleven (11) new bridges, all 
long and difficult, with extensive log-way 
approaches. 

The entire army could probably have 
been thrown across the Chickahom'iny im- 
mediately after our arrival, but this would 
have left no force on the left bank to guard 
our communications or to protect our right 
and rear. If the communication with our 
supply depot had been cut by the eneoty, 
with our army concentrated upon the right 
bank of the Chicahominy, and the stage of 
water as it was for many days after our 
arrival, the bridges carried away, and our 
means of transportation not furnishing a 
single day's sup])lies in advance, the troops 
must have gone without rations, and the 
animals without forage, and the army would 
have been paralyzed. 

It is true I might have abandoned my 
communications and pushed forward to- 
wards Richmond, trusting to the speedy 
defeat of the enemy and the consequent fall 
of the city for a renewal of supplies; but 
the ai)proaches were fortified, and the town 
itself was surrounded with a strong line of 
intrenchments, requiring a greater lengtlj 
of time to reduce than our troops could 
have dispensed with rations. 

Under these circumstances, I decided to 
retain a portion of the army on the left 
bank of the river until our bridges were 
completed. 

It will be remembered that the order for 
the co-operation of Gen. McDowell wa.s 
simply suspended, not revoked, and there- 
fore I was not at liberty to abandon the 
northern approach. 

A very dashing and successful recon- 
noissance was made near New Bridge, on 



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76 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAK 



Church by a road running to Hanover 
Court House, parallel to the Panumkey. 

After a fatij^uing march of fourteen 
miles through the mud and rain, Gen. 
Kniory, at noon, reached a point about 
two miles from Hanover Court House 
where the road forks to Ashland, and 
formed in line across the Hanover Court 
J louse road. 

Gen. Emory had, before this, been 
joined by the 25th New York, (of Mar- 
tindale's brigade,) and Berdau's sharp- 
shooters ; these regiments were deployed 
with a section of Benson's battery, and 
advanced slowly towards the enemy 
until re-inforced by Gen. Butterfield with 
i'our regiments of his brigade, when 
the enemy was charged and quickly 
routed, one of his guns being captured 
by the 17th New York, under Col. Lan- 
sing, after having been disabled by the fire 
of Benson's battery. The firing here lasted 
aljout an hour. The cavalry and Ben- 
son's battery were immediately ordered 
in pursuit, followed by Morell's infantry 
and artillery, with the exception of Mar- 
tiudale's brigade. Warren's brigade hav- 
ing been delayed by repairing bridges, 
etc., now arrived, too late to participate in 
this affair ; a portion of this command was 
sent to the Pamunkey to destroy bridges, 
and cajjtured quite a number of prisoners ; 
the remainder followed Morell's division. 
In the meantime Gen. Martindale, with 
the few remaining regiments of his brig- 
ade and a section of artillery, advanced 
on the Ai.-ihlaud road, and found a force 
of the enemy's infantry, cavalry, and artil- 
lery, in position near Beake's station, on 
the Virginia Central Railroad ; he soon 
forced them to retire towards Ashland. 

The 25th New York having been ordered 
lo rejoin him, Gen. Martindale was direct- 
ed to form his brigade and move up the 
I lilroad to rejoin the rest of the com- 
i.<and at Hanover Court House. 

He sent one regiment up the railroad, 
bat remained with the 2d Maine, after- 
wards joined by the 2hth New York, to 
g lard the rear of the main column. 
^ The enemy soon returned to attack 
(ren. Martindale, who at once formed the 
2il Maine, 25th New York, and a portion 
oi" the 44th New York, with one section 
of Martin's battery, on the New bridge 
road, facing his own position of the morn- 
ing, and then held his ground for an hour 
against large odds until re-inforced. 

Gen. Porter was at Hanover Court 
House, near the head of his column, when 
he learned that the rear had been attack- 
ed by a large force. He at once faced the 
whole column about, recalled the cavalry 
Beat in pursuit towards Ashland, moved 
the 13th and Uth New York and GrifSu's 



battery direct to Martindale's assistance, 
pushed the 9th Massachusetts and 62d 
Pennsylvania, of McQuade's brigade, 
through the woods on the right, (our ori- 
ginal left,) and attacked the flank of the 
enemy, while Butterfield, with the 8Md 
Pennsylvania and 16th Michigan, hastened 
towards the scene of action by the rail- 
road, and through the woods, further to 
the right, and completed the route of the 
enemy. During the remainder of thiSj 
and the following day our cavalry was 
active in the pursuit, taking a number of 
prisoners. 

Capt. Harrison, of the 5th United 
States cavalry, with a single company, 
brought in as prisoners two entire com- 
panies of infantry with their arms and am- 
munition. A part of Rush's lancers also 
captured an entire company with their 
arms. 

The immediate results of these affairs 
were, some two hundred of the enemy's 
dead buried by our troops, seven hundred 
and thirty prisoners sent to the rear, one 
12-pound howitzer, one caisson, a large 
number of small arms, and two railroad 
trains, captured. 

Our loss amounted to 53 killed, 344 
wounded and missing. 

The force encountered and defeated 
was Gen. Branch's division, of North 
Carolina and Georgia troops, supposed to 
have been some 9,000 strong. 

Their camp at Hanover Court House 
was taken and destroyed. 

Having reason to believe that Gen. 
Anderson, with a strong force, was still at 
Ashland, I ordered Gen. Syke's division 
of regulars to move on the 28th from New 
bridge toward Hanover Court House, to 
be in position to support Gen. Porter. 
They reached a point within three miles 
of Hanover Court House, and remained 
there until the evening of the 29th, when 
they returned to their original camp. 

On the 28th Gen. Stoneman's command 
of cavalry, horse artillery, and two regi- 
ments of infantry, were also placed under 
Gen. Porter's orders. 

On the same day I visited' Hanover 
Court House, whence I sent the following 
despatch : 

" Hanover Court House, 

" May 28—2 p. m. 

"Porter's action of yesterday was truly 
a glorious victory; too much 'credit can- 
not be given to his magnificent division 
and its accomplished leader. The rout of 
the rebels was complete ; not a defeat, 
but a complete rout. Prisoners are con- 
stantly coming in ; two companies have 
this moment arrived with excellent arms. 

" There is no doubt that the enemy are 
concentrating everything on Richmond. I 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



n 



will do my bes*' to cut off Jackson, but am 
doubtful whether I can. 

•■ It is the policy and the duty of the 
(Jovernment to send me by water all the 
well-drilled troops available. I am confi- 
dent that Washington is in no danger. 
P^ngines and cars in large numbers have 
been sent up to bring down Jackson's 
command. 

■' I may not be able to cut them off, but 
will try; we have cut all but the Freder- 
icksburg and Richmond railroad. The 
real issue is in the battle about to be 
fought in front of Richmond. All our 
available troops should be collected here, 
not raw regiments, but the well-drilled 
troops. It cannot be ignored that a des- 
perate battle is before us ; if any regi- 
ments of good troops remain unemployed, 
it will be an irreparable fault committed. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

"Major General. 
"Hon. E. M. Stanton, Sec. of War." 

Having ascertained the state of affairs, 
instructions were given for the operations 
of the following day. 

On the 28th a party under Maj. Williams, 
6th United States cavalry, destroyed the 
common road bridges over the Pamunkey, 
and Virginia Central railroad bridge over 
the South Ann. 

On the 29th he destroyed the Fredericks- 
burg and Richmond railroad bridge over 
the South Ann. and the turnpike bridge 
over the same stream. 

On the same day, and mainly to cover 
the movement of Maj. Williams, General 
Emory moved a column of cavalry towards 
Ashland, from Hanover Court House. 
The advance of this column under Captain 
Chambliss, 5th United States cavalry, en- 
tered Ashland, driving out a party of the 
enemy, destroyed the railroad bridge over 
Stoney creek, broke up the railroad and 
telegraph. 

Another column of all arms, under Col. 
Warren, was sent on the same day by the 
direct road to Ashland, and entered it 
shortly after Gen. Emory's column had 
retired, capturing a small party there. 
' Gen. Stoncman on the same day moved on 
Ashland by Leach's station, covering well 
the movements of the other columns. 

The objects of the expedition having 
been accomplished, and it being certain 
that the 1st corps would not join us at 
once, Gen. Porter withdrew his command 
to their camps with the main army on the 
evening of the 29th. 

On the night of the 27th and 28th I sent 
the following despatch to the Secretary of 
War. 



''Headquartfrs Army of the Potomac, 
" Camp near New J'ridsre, 
May 28. ISG2—V2.:')<) a. m. 
"Porter has gained two complete victo- 
ries over superior forces, yet 1 feel obliged 
to move in the morning with re-inforce- 
ments to secure the complete destruction 
of the rebels in that quarter. Li doing so, 
I run so7ne risk here, but I cannot help it. 
The enemy are even in greater force than 
I had supposed. I will do all that quick 
movements can accomplish, l)ut you must 
send me all the troops you can, and leave 
to me full latitude as to the choice of com- 
manders. It is absolutely necessary to 
destroy the rebels near Hanover Court 
House before I can advance. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

"Major General. 
"Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

"Secretary of War." 

In reply to which, I received the follow- 
ing from the President : 

" Washington, May, 28, 1862. 

"I am very glad of Gen. F. J. Porter's 
victory; still, if it was a total rout of the 
enemy, I am puzzled to know why the 
Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad 
was not seized again, as you say you have 
all the railroads but the Richmond and 
Fredericksburg. I am puzzled to see how, 
lacking that, you can have any, except the 
scrap from Richmond to West Point. The 
scrap of the Virginia Central, from Rich- 
mond to Hanover Junction, without more, 
is simply nothing. 'J'hat the whole of the 
enemy is concentrating on Richmond. I 
think, cannot be certainly known to you or 
me. Saxton, at Har])er's Ferry, informs 
us that large forces, supposed to be Jack- 
son's and Ewell's, forced his advance from 
Charleston to-day. Gen. King telegraphs 
us from Fredericksburg that contrabands 
give certain information that fifteen thou- 
sand left Hanover Junction i\londay morn- 
ing to re-enforce Jackson. 1 am painfully 
impressed M'ith the importance of the 
struggle before you, and shall aid you all 
I can consistently with my view of due re- 
gard to all points. 

"A. LINCOLN. 

"Maj. Gen. McClellan." 

At 6 p. m. of thj 29th I sent the Secre- 
tary of War the following despatch: 

"Headquarters Ar.my of tue Potomac, 
May 29, 18G2— 6p. m. 

" Gen. Porter has gained information 
that Gen. Anderson left his position in 
vicinity of Fredericksburg at 4 a. m. Sun- 
day with the following troops: 1st South 
Carolina, Col. Hamilton; one battalioa 
South CaroUna rifles; 34th and 38th North 
Carolina; 45th (Jeorgia; 12th, 13th, and 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX. 



14th South Carolina; 3d Louisiana; two 
batteries of lour guns each, namely, 
Letcher's Virginia and Mcintosh's Siuth 
Carolina batteries. Gen. Anderson and 
his command passed Ashland yesterday 
evening en route for Richmond, leaving 
men behind to destroy bridges over the 
telegraph road which they travelled. This 
information is reliable. It is also posi- 
tively certain that Branch's command was 
from Gordonsville, bound for Richmond, 
whither they have now gone. 

" It may be regarded as positive, I think, 
that tliere is no rebel force between Fred- 
ericksbunr and Junction. 

" "G. B. McCLELLAN, 
'•Major General. 

"Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War." 

The following was also sent on the same 
day: 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

May 29, 1802. 
"A detachment from (!en. F. J. Porter's 
command, under Maj. "Williams, 6th cav- 
alry, destroyed the South Ann railroad 
bridge at about 9 a. m to-day; a large 
♦juantity of confederate public property 
was also destroyed at Ashland this morn- 
iug. 

"R. B. MARCY, 
" Chief of Staff. 
"Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War." 

In reply to which, the following was 
received: 

"WAsmxGTON, May 29, 1862. 

"Your despatch as to the South Ann 
and Ashland being seized by our forces 
this morning is received. Understanding 
these points to be on the Richmond and 
Fredericksburg railroad, I heartily con- 
gratulate the country, and thank General 
-McClellan and his armv for tlieir seizure. 
*"A. LINCOLN. 

" Gen. R. B. Marcy." 

On the 30th I sent the following: 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
May 30, 18C2. 

"From the tone of your despatches, and 
the President's I do not think that you at 
all appreciate the value and magnitude of 
Porter's victory. It has entirely relieved 
my right flank, which was seriously threat- 
ened; routed and demoralized a consider- 
able portion of the rebel forces ; taken 
over seven hundred and fifty prisoners; 
killed and wounded large numbers; one 
gun, many small arms, and much baggage 
taicen. It was one of the liundsomest 
thmgs in the war, both in itself and in its 
results. Porter has returned, and my 



army is again well in hand. Another day 
will make the probable field of battle pas- 
sable for artillery. It is quite certain that 
there is nothing in front of McDowell at 
Fredericksburg. 1 regard the burning of 
South Anna bridges as the least important 
result of Porter's movement. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

"Major General. 
"Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" &crefary of War." 

The results of this brilliant operation of 
Gen. Porter were the dispersal of Gen. 
Branch's division, and the clearing of our 
right flank and rear. It was rendered im- 
possible for the enemy to communicate by 
rail with Fredericksburg, or with Jacicson 
via Gordonsville. except by the very cir- 
cuitous route of liynchbure. and the rc'd 
was left entirely open for the advance of 
McDowell had he been permitted to join 
the army of the Potonuic. His withdrawal 
towards Front Royal was. in my judgment, 
a serious and fatal error ; he could do no 
good in that direction, while, had he been 
permitted to carry out the orders of May 
17th. the united forces would have driven 
the enemy within the immediate intrench- 
ments of Richmond before Jackson could' 
have returned to its succor, and probably 
would have gained possession promptly of 
that place. I respectfully refer to the re- 
ports of Gen. Porter and his subordinate 
commanders for the names of the ofiicers 
who deserve especial mention for the part.s 
they took in these affairs, but I cannot 
omit here my testimony to the energy and 
ability here displayed by Gen. Porter on 
this occasion, since to him is mainly due 
the successes there gained. 

On the 20th of May, a reconnoissance 
was ordered on the .south side of the 
Chickahominy towards James river. This 
was accomplished by Brig. Gen. H. M. 
Naglee. who crossed his brigade near 
Bottom's bridge, and pushed forM'ard to 
within two miles of James river without se- 
rious resistance, or finding the enemy in 
force. The rest of the 4th corps, com- 
manded by Gen. E. D. Keyes, crossed the 
Chickahominv on the 23d of May. 

On the 24tli, 25th, and 26th, a very gal- 
lant reconnoissance was pushed by (-ien 
Naglee, with his brigade, beyond the Seven 
Pines, and on the 2.5th the 4th corps was 
ordered to take up and fortify a position in 
the vicinity of the Seven Pines. The 
order was at once obeyed ; a strong line of 
rifle-pits opened, and an abatis constructed 
a little in the rear of the point where the 
nine-mile road comes into the Williams- 
burg road. 

On the same day Gen. Hcintzelman was 
ordered to cross with his corps, (the 3d,) 



REPORT OP GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



T9 



and take a position two milos in advance 
of Bottom's bridge, watchins!; the erossing 
of White Oak swamp, and covering the 
left and the rear of the left wing- of the 
army. Being the senior ofticcr on that 
side of the river, he was placed in com- 
mand of both corps, and ordered to hold 
the Seven Pines at all hazards, but not to 
withdraw the troops from the crossings of 
White Oak swamp unless in an emer- 
gency. 

On the 28th Gen. Keyes was ordered to 
advance Casey"s division to Fair Oaks, on 
the Williamsburg road, some three-quar- 
ters of a mile in front of the Seven Pines, 
leaving Gen. Couch's division at the line 
of ritle-pits. A new line of rifle-pits and 
a small redoubt for six field guns were 
commenced, and much of the timber in 
front of this line was felled on the two 
days following. 'J'he picket line was estab- 
lished, reaching from the Cbickahominy to 
Wiiite Oak swamp. t 

On the 30th Gen. Heintzelman, repre- 
senting that the advance had met with 
sharp opposition in taking up their posi- 
tion, and that he considered the point a 
critical one. recpiested and obtained au- 
tliority to make such dispositions of his 
troops as he saw fit to meet the emergency. 
He immediately advanced two brigades of 
Kearney's division about the fourth of a 
mile in front of kSavage's station, thus plac- 
ing tliein within supporting distance of 
t Casey's, division, which held the advance 
of the 4th corps. 

On the 30th, the troops on the south 
siile of the Chickahomiuy were in position 
as follows : Casey's division on the right of 
the AV'iiliamsburg road, at right angles to 
it, tlie centre at Fair Oaks; Couch's divi- 
sion at the Seven Pines ; Kearney's division 
on the railroad, from near Savage's station 
towards the bridge; Hooker's division on 
the borders of White Oak swamp. Con- 
stunt skirmishing had been kept tip be- 
tween our pickets and those of the enemy: 
wliile these Hues were being taken up and 
strengthened, large bodies of confederate 
troops were seen innuediately to the front 
and right of Casey's position. 

During the day and night of the 80th of 
.May a very violent storm occurred, the 
rain falling in torrents rendered work on 
the riile-pits and bridges impracticable; 
made the roads almost hnpassable, and 
threatened the destruction of the bridges 
over the Chickaliominy, 

The enemy perceiving the unfavorable 
position in Mhich we were placed, and the 
possibility of destroying that part of our 
army which was a]>"parently cut off from 
the main body by the rai)idly rising stream; 
threw an overwhelming force, (grand divi- 
sions of Gens. D. li. Mill, ilug.u-, Long- 



street, and (t. W. Smith,) upon the posi- 
tion occupied by Casey's division. 

It appears from the official reports of 
Gen. Keyes and his subordinate conuiiand- 
ers that at 10 o'clock a. m., on the !{lst of 
May. an aide-de-camp of Gen. J. E. John- 
ston was caj)tured by Gen. Naglee's pick- 
ets. But little information as to the move- 
ments of the enemy was ol)tained from him, 
but his presence so near our lines e.xciled 
suspicion and caused increased vigilance, 
and the troops were ordered by (Jen. Keyes 
to be under arms at eleven o'clock. Be- 
tween eleven and twelve o'clock it was V'- 
ported to Gen. Casey that the enemy were 
approaching in considerable force on the 
Williamsburg road. At this time (Casey's 
division was disposed as follows ; Naglee's 
brigade extending from the Williamsburg 
road to the Garnett field, having one regi- 
ment across the railroad; Gen. Wessel's 
brigade in the rifle-pits, and Gen. Palmer's 
in the rear of Gen. Wessel's; one battery 
of artillery in advance with Gen. Ntiglee; 
one battery in rear of rifle-pits to the right 
of the redoubt ; one battery in rear of the 
redoubt, and another battery unharnessed 
in the redoubt. Gen. Couch's division, 
holding the second line, had Clen. Aber- 
crombie's brigade on the right, along the 
nine-mile road, with two regiments and 
one battery across the railroad near Fair 
Oaks station ; Gen- Peck's brigade on the 
right, and Gen. Devon's in the centre. 

On the approach of the enemy, (ron. 
Casey sent forward one of Gen. Palmer's 
regiments to support the picket line, but 
this regiment gave way without making 
much, if any resistance. Heavy firing at 
once* commenced, and the pickets were 
driven in. Gen. Keyes ordered Gen. Couch 
to move Gen. Peck's brigade to occupy 
the ground on the left of the Williams- 
burg road, which had not before been oc- 
cupied by our forces, and thus to support 
Gen. Casey's left, where the first attack 
was the most severe. The enemy now 
came on in heavy force, attacking (-Jen. 
Casey simultaneously in front and on 
both flanks, (icn. Keyes sent to iicu. 
Heintzelman for reinforcements, but the 
messenger was delayed, so that orders 
were not sent to Gens. Kearney and 
Hooker until nearly 3 o'clock, and it was 
nearly 5 p. m., when Gens. Jameson and 
Perry's brigades of Geu. Kearney's divi- 
sion arrived on the field. Gen. Birney was 
ordered up the railroad, but by (Jen. 
Kearney's order halted his brigade before 
arriving at the scene of action. Orders 
were also despatched for Gen. Hooker to 
move up from White Oak swamp, and he 
arrived after dark at Savage's station. 

As soon as ihe firing was heard at head 
quarters, orders were sent to Gen. Sunmer 



BO 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN, 



to get his command under arms and be | 
ready to move at a mome||f s warning. His j 
corps, consisting of Gens. Richardson's [ 
and Sedgwicli's divisions, was encamped i 
on the north side of the Chickahorainy, j 
some six miles above Bottom's bridge ; 
each division had thrown a bridge over { 
the stream opposite to its own position. i 

At one o'clock (ien. Sumner moved the i 
two divisions to their respective bridges, 
with instructions to halt and await further ' 
orders. At two o'clock orders were sent 
from headquarters to cross these divisions 
without delay, and push them rapidly to 
Uen. Heintzelman's support. This order 
was received and communicated at half 
past two, and the passage was immediately 
commenced. In the mean time Gen. 
Naglee's brigade, with the batteries of 
Gen. Casey's division, which Gen. Naglee 
directed, struggled gallantly to maintain 
the redoubt and rifle-pits against the over- 
whelming masses of the enemy. They 
were re-enforced by a regiment from Gen. 
Peck's brigade. The artillery under com- 
mand of (;ol. G. D. Bailey, 1st New York 
artillery, and afterwards of Gen. Naglee, 
did good execution on the advancing 
column. The left of this position was, 
however, soon turned, and a sharp cross- 
fire opened upon the gunners and men in 
the rifle pits. Col. Bailey, Maj. Van Val- 
kenberg, and Adj. Ramsey, of the same 
regiment, were killed : some of the guns 
in the redoubt were taken, and the whole 
line was driven back upon the position 
occupied by Gen. Couch. The brigades 
of Gens. AVessel and Palmer, with the 
re-enforcements which had been sent them 
from Gen. Couch, had also been driven 
from the field with heavy loss, and the 
whole position occupied by Gen. Casey's 
division was taken by the enemy. 

Previous to this time Gen. Keyes ordered 
Gen. Couch to advance two regiments to 
relieve the pressure upon Gen. Casey's 
right flank. In making this movement, 
Gen. Couch discovered large masses of the 
enemy pushing towards our right and 
crossing the railroad, as well as a heavy 
column which had been held in reserve, 
and which was now making its way towards 
Fair Oaks station. Gen. Couch at once 
engaged this column with two regiments ; 
but. though re-enforced by two additional 
regiments, he was overpowered, and the 
enemy pushed between him and the main 
body of his division. With these four 
regiments and one battery Gen. Couch fell 
back about half a mile towards the Grape- 
vine bridge, where, hearing that Gen. Sum- 
ner had crossed, he formed line of battle 
facing Fair Oaks station, and prepared to 
hold the position. 

Gens. Berry and Jameson's brigades had 



by this time arrived in front of the Seven 
Pines. Gen. Berry was ordered to take 
possession of the woods on the left, and 
push forward so as to have a flank tire on 
the enemy's lines. This movement was 
executed brilliantly, Gen. Berry pushing 
his regiments forward through the wood? 
until their rifles commanded the left of 
the camp and works occupied by (Jen. 
Casey's division in the morning. Their 
fire on the pursuing columns of the enemy 
was very destructive, and assisted materi- 
ally in checking the pursuit in that part of 
the field. He held his position in these 
woods against several attacks of superior 
numbers, and after dark, being cut off by 
the enemy from the main body, he fell 
back towards White Oak swamp, and by a 
circuit brought his men into our lines in 
good order. 

Gen. Jameson, with two regiments, (the 
other two of his brigade having been 
detached — one to Gen. Peck and one to 
Gen. Birney,) moved rapidly to the front 
on the left of the AV'illiamsburg road, and 
succeeded for a time in keeping the abatis 
clear of the enemy. But large numbers of 
the enemy pressing past the right of his 
line, he, too. was forced to retreat through 
the woods towards White Oak swamp, and 
in that way gained camp under cover of 
night. 

Brig.-Gen. Devens, who had held tlie 
centre of Gen. Couch's division, had made 
repeated and gallant efforts to regain 
portions of the ground lost in front, but 
each time was driven back, and finally 
withdrew behind the rifle pits near Seven 
Pines. 

Meantime Gen. Sumner had arrived with 
the advance of his corps. Gen. Sedgwick's 
division, at the point held by Gen. Conch 
with four regiments and one battery. The 
roads leading from the bridge were so 
miry that it was only by the greatest ex- 
ertion Gen. Sedgwick had been able to get 
one of his batteries to the front. 

The leading regiment (1st Minnesota, 
Col. Sully) was immediately deployed to 
the right of Couch, to protect the flank, 
and the rest of the division formed in line 
of battle, Kirby's battery near the centre, 
in an angle of the woods. One of Gen. 
Couch's regiments was sent to open com- 
munication with Gen. Heintzelman. No 
sooner were these dispositions made than 
the enemy came in strong force and opened 
a heavy fire along the line. He made 
several charges, but was each time repulsed 
with great loss by the steady fire of the 
infantry and the splendid practice of the 
battery. After sustaining the enemy's 
fire for a considerable time, Gen. Sumner 
ordered five regiments (the .'Mth New York, 
Col. Sinter : 82d New York. Lieut.-Col 



RErORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX. 



97 



A little after noon Gen. Sumner united his 
forces with those of Gen. Franklin, and 
assumed command. 

I had ordered Gen. Heintzelman, with 
his corps, to hold the Williamsburij road 
until dark, at a point where were several 
field-works, and a skirt of timber between 
these works and the railroad ; but he fell 
back before night, and crossed White Oak 
swamp at Brackett's ford. 

Gen. Sumner in his report of the battle 
of Savage's station says : 

"When the enemy appeared on the Wil- 
liamsburg road, I could not imaarine why 
Geu. Heintzelman did not attack him, and 
not till some time afterwards did I learn, 
to my utter amazement, that Gen. Heint- 
zelman had left the field, and retreated 
with his whole corps (about 15,000 men) 
before the action commenced. Tliis defec- 
tion might have been attended with the 
most disastrous consequences ; and although 
we beat the enemy signally and drove hira 
from the field, we should certainly have 
given him a more crushing blow if Gen. 
Heintzelman had been there with his 
corps." 

Gen. Heintzelman in his report of the 
operations of his corps says : 

" On the night of the 28th of June, I 
received orders to withdraw the troops of 
my corps from the advanced position they 
had taken on the 2.5th of June, and to j 
occupy the intrenched lines about a mile in j 
rear. A map was sent me, showing the 
positions Geu. Sumner's and Gen. Frank- | 
lin's corps would occupy. ; 

" About sunrise the next day, our troops j 
slowly fell back to the new position, cau- ! 
tiously followed by the enemy, taking pos- ; 
session of our camps as soon as we left j 
them. 

''From some misapprehension Gen. 
Sumner held a more advanced position i 
than was indicated on the map furnished 
me, thus leaving a space of about three- : 
fourths of a mile between the right of his 
corps and Gen. Smith's division of Gen. 
Franklin's corps. i 

■x- ****** [ 

" At 11 A. M. on the 29th. the enemy : 
commenced an attack on Gen. Sumner's | 
troops, a few shells falling within my lines, 
l^ate in the forenoon, reports reached me 
that the rebels were in possession of Dr. 
Trent's house, only a mile and a half from 
Savage's station. I sent several cavalry 
reconnoissances, and finally was satisfied 
of the fact. Gen. I'rankliu came to my 
headquarters, when I learned of the interval 
between his left and Gen. Sumner's right, 
in which space Dr. Trent's house is ; also 
that the rebels had repaired one of the 



bridges across the Chicahominy, and were 
advancing. 

******* 

" I rode forward to see Gen. Sumner, and 
met his troops falling back on the Wil- 
liamsburg road through my lines. Gen. 
Sumner informed me that he intended to 
make a stand at Savage's station, and for 
me to join hira to determine upon the 
position. 

" This movement of Gen. Sumner's un- 

j covering my right flank, it became neces- 

I sary for me to at once withdraw my troops. 

j "I rode back to find Gen. Sumner. 
After some delay, from the mass of troops 

; in the field, I found him, and learned that 
the course of action had been determined 
on ; so I returned to give the necessary 
orders for the destruction of the railroad 
cars, ammunition, and provisions still re- 
remaining on the ground. 

******* 

" The whole open space near Savage's 
station was crowded with troops — more 
than I supposed could be brought into 
action judiciously. An aid from the com- 
manding general had in the morning 
reported to me to point out a road across 
the White Oak swamp, starting from the 
left of Gen. Kearney's position and leading 
by Brackett's ford. * * * * ^ 

" 'I"he advance of the column reached 
the Charles City road at Gj p. m., and the 
rear at 10 p. m., without accident." 

The orders given byme to Gen. Sumner, 
Heintzelman, and Franklin, were to hold 
the positions assigned them until dark. As 
stated by Gen. Heintzelman, Gen. Sumner 
did not occupy the designated position ; 
but, as he was the senior officer present on 
that side of the White Oak swamp, he 
may have thought that the movements of 
the enemy justified a deviation from the 
letter of the orders. It appears from his 
report that he assumed command of all the 
troops near Savage's station, and deter- 
mined to resist the enemy there ; and tlitil 
he gave Gen. Heintzelman orders to hnld 
the same position as 1 had assigned him. 

The aid sent by me to (Jen. lleintzelman 
to point out the road across the swamp was 
to guide him in retiring after dark. 

On reaching Savage's station, Sumner's 
and Franklin's commands were drawn up 
in line of battle in the large open field ti> 
the left of the railroad, the left resting on 
the edge of the woods, and the right ex- 
tending down to the railroad. Gen. 
Brooks, with his brigade, held the woods 
to the left of the field, where he did excel- 
lent service, receiving a wound, but re- 
taining his command. 

Gen. Hancock's brigade was thrown into 
the woods on the right and front. At 4 
r. w. the enemy commenced his attack iu 



98 



RErORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



large force by the Williamsburg road. It 
•was gallantly met by Gen. Burns's brigade, 
supported and re-enforced by two lines in 
reserve, and finally by the New York 69th, 
Hazzard's and Pettit's batteries again 
doing good service. Osborn's and Bram- 
hall's batteries also took part effectively in 
this action, which was continued with great 
obstinacy until between 8 and 9 p. m.. when 
the enemy were driven from the field. 

Immediately after the battle the orders 
were repeated for all the troops to fall 
buck and cross White Oak swamp, which 
was accomplished during the night in good 
order. By midnight all the troops were on 
the road to White Oak swamp bridge, 
Gen. French, with his brigade, acting as 
rear guard, and at 5 a. m. on the 30th all 
had crossed and the bridge was destroyed. 

On the afternoon of the 29th I gave to 
the corps commanders their instructions 
for the operations for the following day. 
As stated before, Porter's corps was to 
move forward to James river, and, with 
the corps of Gen. Keyes, to occupy a po- 
sition at or near Turkey Bend, on a line 
perpendicular to the river, thus covering 
the Charles City road to Richmond, open- 
ing communication with the gunboats, and 
covering the passage of the supply trains, 
which were pushed forward as rapidly as 
possible upon Haxall's plantation. The 
remaining corps were pressed onward, and 
posted so as to guard the approaches from 
Richmond, as well as the crossings of the 
White Oak swamp, over which the army 
has passed. Gen. Franklin was ordered to 
hold the passage of White Oak swamp 
bridge, and cover the withdrawal of the 
trains from that point. His command con- 
sisted of his own corps, with Gen. Richard- 
son's division and Gen. Naglee's brigade 
placed under his orders for the occasion. 
Gen. ISlocum's division was on the right 
of the Charles City road. 

On the morning of the 30th I again gave j 
to the corps commanders within reach in- 
structions for posting their troops. I found 
that, notwithstanding all the efforts of my 
personal staff and other officers, the roads 
were blocked by wagons, and there was j 
great difficulty in keeping the trains in | 
motion. ' 

The engineer officers whom I sent for- 
ward on the '28th to reconnoitre the roads i 
had neither returned nor sent me any re- 
ports or guides. Gens. Keyes and Porter j 
had been delayed — one by losing the road, 
and the other by repairing an old road — 
and had not been able to send any infor- j 
niation. We then knew of but one road j 
for the movement of the troops and our j 
immense trains. 

It was therefore necessary tr post the ' 
troops in advance of this road a© well as i 



our limited knowledge of the ground per- 
mitted, so as to cover the movement of the 
trains in the rear. 

I then examined the whole line from the 
swamp to the left, giving final instructions 
for the posting of the troops and the ob- 
structions of the roads toward Richmond, 
and all corps commanders were directed 
to hold their positions until the trains had 
passed, after which a more concentrated 
position was to be taken up near James 
river. 

Our force was too small to occupy and 
hold the entire line from the White Oak 
swamp to the river, exposed as it was to 
be taken in reverse by a movement across 
the lower part of the swamp, or across 
the Chickahominy, below the swamp. 
Moreover, the troops were then greatly 
exhausted, and required rest in a more 
secure position. 

I extended my examinations of the cotm- 
try as far as Haxall's, looking at all the 
approaches to Malvern, which position I 
perceived to be the key to our operations 
in this quarter, and was thus enabled to 
expedite very considerably the passage of 
the trains, and to rectify the positions of 
the troops. 

Everything being then quiet, I sent aids 
to the different corps commanders to in- 
form them what I had done on the left, 
and to bring me information of the condi- 
tion of affairs on the right. I returned 
from Malvern to Haxall's, and having 
made arrangements for instant communi- 
cation from Malvern by signals, went on 
board of Capt. Rodger's gunboat, lying 
near, to confer with him in reference to 
the condition of our supply vessels, and 
the state of things on the river. It was 
his opinion that it would be necessary for 
the army to fall back to a position below 
City Point, as the channel there was so 
near the southern shore that it would not 
be possible to bring up the transports, 
should the enemy occupy it. Harrison's 
landing was, in his opinion, the nearest 
suitable point. Upon the termination of 
this interview I returned to Malvern hill, 
and remained there until shortly before 
daylight. 

BATTLE OF "nelson's FARM" OR "GLE.VDALE." 

On the morning of the 3ttth Gen. Sum- 
ner was ordered to march with Sedgwick's 
division to Glendale (''Nelson's farm.") 
Gen. McCall's division (Pennsylvania re- 
serves) was halted during the morning on 
the New Market road, just in advance of 
the point where the road turns off to Qua- 
ker church. 'I'his line was formed perpen- 
dicularly to the New Market road, with 
Meade's brigade on the right, Seymour's 
on the left, and Reynold's brigade, com- 



REPORT OP GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAK 



99 



manded by Col. S. G. Simmons, of the 5th 
Pennsylvania, in reserve; Randall's regu- 
lar battery on the right, Kern's and Coo- 
per's batteries opposite the centre, and 
Dietrich's and Kanerhuu's batteries of the 
artillery reserve on the left — all in front 
of the infantry line. The country in Gen. 
McCall's front was an open field, inter- 
sected towards the right by the New Mar- 
ket road, and a small strip of timber par- 
allel to it ; the open front was about 800 
yards, its depth about 1.000 yards. 

On the morning of the 30th Gen. Heint- 
zelman ordered the bridge at Brackett's 
ford to be destroyed, and trees to be felled 
across that road and the Charles City road. 
Gen. Slocum's division was to extend to 
the Charles City road. Gen. Kearney's 
left to connect with Gen. Slocum's left. 
Gen. McCall's position was to the left of 
the Long bridge road, in connexion with 
Gen. Kearney's left. Gen. Hooker was 
on the left of Gen. McCall. Between 12 
and 1 o'clock the enemy opened a fierce 
cannonade upon the divisions of Smith 
and Richardson, and Neglee's brigade, at 
White Oak swamp bridge. This artillery 
fire was continued by the enemy through 
the day, and he crossed some infantry be- 
low our position. Richardson's division 
suffered severely. Capt. Ayres directed 
our artillery with great effect. Capt. Haz- 
zard's battery, after losing many can- 
noneers, and Capt. Hazzard being mor- 
tally wounded, was compelled to retire. 
It was replaced by Pettit's battery, which 
partially silenced the enemy's guns. 

Gen. Franklin held his position until 
after dark, repeatedly driving back the 
enemy in their attempts to cross the 
White Oak swamp. 

At two o'clock in the day the enemy 
were reported advancing in force by the 
Charles City road, and at half past two 
o'clock the attack was made down the 
road on Gen. Slocum's left, but was 
checked by his artillery. After this the 
enemy, in large force, comprising the divi- 
sions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, at- 
tacked Gen. McCall, whose division, after 
severe fighting, was compelled to retire. 

Gen. McCall, in his report of the battle, 

says : 

* * * * * * * 

" About half past two ray pickets were 
driven in by a strong advance, after some 
skirmishing, without loss on our part. 

" At three o'clock the enemy sent for- 
ward a regiment on the left centre and 
another on the right centre to feel for a 
weak point. They were under cover of a 
shower of shells, and boldly advanced, but 
were both driven back — on the loft by the 
12th regiment, and on the right by the 7th 
regiment 



■ " For nearly two hours the battle raged 
hotly here." * * * " j^i j^st 
the enemy was compelled to retire before 
the well-directed musketry fire of the re- 
serves. The (ierman batteries were driven 
to the rear, but I rode up and sent thera 
back. It was, however, of little avail, and 
they were soon after abandoned by the 
cannoneers." ***** 

" The batteries in front of the centre 
were boldly charged upon, but the enemy 
was speedily forced back." * * * 

" Soon after this a most determined 
charge was made on Randall's battery by 
a full brigade, advancing in wedge shape, 
without order, but in perfect recklessness. 
Somewhat similar charges had, I have sta- 
ted, been previously made on Cooper's and 
Kern's batteries by single regiments with- 
out success, they having recoiled before 
the storm of canister hurled against them, 
A like result was anticipated by Randall's 
battery, and the 4th regiment was re- 
quested not to fire until the battery had 
done with them. 

" Its gallant commander did not doubt 
his ability to repel the attack, and hig 
guns did, indeed, mow down the advancing 
host, but still the gaps were closed, and 
the enemy came in upon a run to the very 
muzzle of his guns. 

" It was a perfect torrent of men, and 
they were in his battery before the guns 
could be removed. Two guns that were, 
indeed, successfully limbered, had their 
horses killed and wounded and were over- 
turned on the spot, and the enemy, dash- 
ing past, drove the greater part of the 4th 
regiment before them. 

" The left company, (B.) nevertheless, 
stood its ground, with its captain, Fred. 
A. Conrad, as did, likewise, certain men 
of other companies. I had ridden into the 
regiment and endeavored to check them, 
but with only partial success." 
******* ■* 

" There was no running, but my division, 

reduced by the previous battles to less 

than six thousand, (6,000.) had to contend 

with the divisions of Longstreet and A. P. 

Hill, considered two of the strongest and 

best among manv of the confederate army, 

numbering that 'day 18,000 or 20,000 men, 

and it was reluctantly compelled to give 

way before heavier force accumulated 

upon them." « 

*^* *** * * * * 

Gen. Heintzelman states that about 6 
o'clock p. M., Gen. McCall's division wag 
attacked in large force, evid^^ntly the prin- 
cipal attack ; that in less than an hour the 
division gave way, and adds : " Gen Hooker 
being on his left, by moving to his right, 
repulsed the rebels in the handsomest 
manner with great slaughter. Cen. Sum- 



100 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



ner, who was with Gen. Sedgwick in 
McCall's rear, also greatly aided with his 
artillery and infantry in driving back the 
enemy. They now renewed their attack 
with vigor on Gen. Kearney's left, and 
were again repulsed with heavy loss." 
* *** *** * 

" This attack commenced about 4 p. m., 
and was pushed by heavy masses with the 
utmost determination and vigor. Captain 
Thompson's battery, directed with great 
precision, firing double charge, swept them 
back. The whole open space, two hund- 
red paces wide, was filled with the enemy ; 
each repulse brought fresh troops. The 
third attack was only repulsed by the 
rapid volleys and determined charge of the 
63d Pennsylvania, Col. Hays, and half of 
the 37th New York volunteers." 

Gen. McCall's troops soon began to 
emerge from the woods into the open field. 
Several batteries were in position and be- 
gan to fire into the woods over the heads 
of our men in front. Capt. DeRussey's 
battery was placed on the right of Gen. 
Sumner's artillery with orders to shell the 
woods. Gen. Burns's brigade was then 
advanced to meet the enemy, and soon 
drove him Ijack ; other troops began to 
return from the White Oak swamp. Late 
in the day, at the call of Gen. Kearney, 
den. Taylor's first New Jersey brigade, 
Slocum's division, was sent to occupy a 
I)ortion of Gen. McCall's deserted position, 
a battery accompanying the brigade. T'hey 
soon drove back the enemy, who shortly 
after gave up the attack, contenting them- 
selves with keeping up a desultory firing 
till late at night. Between 12 and 1 
o'clock at night Gen. Heintzelman com- 
menced to withdraw his corps, and soon 
after daylight both of his divisions, with 
(ieu. Slocum's division and a portion of 
Gen. Sumner's command, reached Malvern 
hill. 

On the morning of the 30th Gen. Sum- 
ner, in obedience to orders, had moved 
])roniptly to Glendale, and upon a call 
from (ien. Franklin for rc-inforcements, 
sent him two brigades, which returned in 
time to participate and render good ser- 
vice in the battle near Glendale. General 
Sunnier says of this battle : 

" The battle of (ilendale was the most 
severe action since the battle of Fair 
Oaks. About 3 o'clock ^ m., the action 
commenced, and after a furious contest, 
lasting till after dark, the enemy was routed 
at all points and driven from the field." 

The rear of the supply trains and the 
reserve artillery of the army reached Mal- 
vern hill about 4 r. m. At about this time 
the enemy began to appear in Gen. Por- 
ter's front, and at 5 o'clock advanced in 
large force against his left flank, posting 



artillery under cover of a skirt of timber, 
with a view to engage our force on Mal- 
vern hill, while with his infantry and some 
artillery he attacked Col. Warren's brig- 
ade. A concentrated fire of about thirty 
guns was brought to bear on the enemy, 
which, with the infantry fire of Col. War- 
ren's command, compelled him t6 retreat, 
leaving two guns in the hands of Colonel 
Warren. The gunboats rendered most 
efficient aid at this time, and helped to 
drive back the enemy. 

It was very late at night before my- aids 
returned to give me the results of the 
day's fighting along the whole line, and the 
true position of affairs. While waiting to 
hear from Gen. Franklin, before sending 
orders to Gens. Sumner and Heintzelman, 
I received a message from the latter that 
Gen. Franklin was falling back ; whereupon 
I sent Col. Colburn, of my staff, with 
orders to verify this, and if it were true, 
to order in Gens. Sumner and Heintzel- 
man at once. He had not gone far when 
when he met two officers sent from Gen. 
Franklin's headquarters with the informa- 
tion that he was falling back. Orders 
were then sent to Gens. Sumner and 
Heintzelman to fall back also, and definite 
instructions were given as to the move- 
ment which was to commence on the right. 
The orders met these troops already en 
route to Malvern. Instructions were also 
sent to Gen. Franklin as to the route he 
was to follow. 

Gen. Barnard then received full instruc- 
tions for posting the troops as they ar- 
rived. 

I then returned to Hoxall's, and again 
left for Malvern soon after daybreak. Ac- 
companind by several general officers, I 
once more made the entire circuit of the 
position, and then returned to Haxall's, 
whence I went with Capt. Rodger^ to 
select the final location for the army and 
its depots. I returned to Malvern before 
the serious fighting commenced, and after 
riding along the linos, and seeing most 
cause to feel anxious about the right, 
remained in that vicinity. 

BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL. 

The position selected for resisting the 
further advance of the enemy on the first 
of July was with the left and centre of our 
lines resting on Malvern hill, while the 
right curved backwards through a wooded 
country towards a point below Haxall's, 
on James river. Malvern hill is an ele- 
vated plateau about a mile and a-half by 
three-fourths of a mile in area, well cleared 
of timber, and with several converging 
roads running over it. In front are numer- 
ous defensible ravines, and the ground 
slopes gradually toward the north and 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



101 



east to the woodland, giving clear ranges 
for artillery in those directions. Towards 
the northwest the plateau falls off more 
abruptly into a ravine which extends to 
James river. From the position of the 
enemy his most obvious lines of attack 
would come from the direction of Kich- 
mond and White Oak swamp, and would 
almost of necessity strike us upon our left 
wing. Here, therefore, the lines were 
strengthened by massing the troops and 
collecting the principal part of the artil- 
lery. Porter's corps held the left of the 
line, (Sykes's division on the left, Morell's 
on the right,) with the artillery of his two 
divisions advantageously posted, and the 
artillery of the reserve so disposed on the 
high ground that a concentrated fire of 
some sixty guns could he brought to bear 
on any point in his front or left. Colonel 
Tyler also had, with great exertion, suc- 
ceeded in getting ten of his siege guns in 
position on the highest point of the hill. 

Couch's division was placed on the 
right of Porter : next came Kearney and 
Hooker ; next Sedgwick and Richardson ; 
next Smith and Slocum ; then the re- 
mainder of Keyes's corps, extending by a 
backward curve nearly to the river. 'I'he 
Pennsylvania reserve corps was held in 
reserve, and stationed behind Porter's and 
Couch's position One brigade of Porter's 
was thrown to the left on the low ground 
to protect that flank from any movement 
direct from the Richmond road. The line 
was very strong along the whole front of 
the open plateau, but from thence to the 
extreme right the troops were more de- 
ployed. This formation was huperative, as 
an attack would probably be made upon 
our left. The right was reiulered as se- 
cure as possible by slashing the timber and 
by barricading the roads. Commodore 
Rodgers, commanding the flotilla on James 
river, placed his gunboats so as to pro- 
tect our flank, and to command the ap- 
proaches from Richmond. 

Between 9 and 10 a. m., the enemy com- 
menced feeling along our whole left wing, 
with his artillery and skirmishers, as far to 
the right as Hooker's division. 

About 2 o'clock a column of the enemy 
was observed moving towards our right, 
within the skirt of woods in front of Heint- 
zelman's corps, but beyond the range of 
our artillery. Arrangements were at once 
made to meet the anticipated attack in 
that quarter, but, though the column was 
long, occupying more than two hours iu 
passing, it disappeared, and was not again 
neard of. The presumption is, that it re- 
tired by the rear, and participated in the 
attack afterwards made on our left. 

About 3 p. M., a heavy fire of artillery 
opened on Kearney's left and Couch's di- 



vision, speedily followed up by a brisk at^ 
tack of infantry on Couch's front. The 
artillery was replied to with good effect by 
our own, and the infantry of Couch's divi- 
sion remained lying on the ground until 
the advancing column was within short 
musket range, when they sprang to their 
feet and poured in a deadly volley which 
entirely broke the attacking force and 
i drove them in disorder back over their 
own ground. This advantage was followed 
up until we had advanced tlie right of our 
line some seven or eight hundred yards, and 
rested upon a thick clump of trees, giving 
us a stronger position and a better fire. 

Shortly after four o'clock the firing 
ceased along the whole front, but no dis- 
position was evinced on the part of the 
enemy to withdraw from the field. Cald- 
well's brigade, having been detached from 
Richardson's division, was stationed upon 
Couch's right by Gen. Porter, to whom he 
had beeu ordered to report. The whole 
line was surveyed by the general, and 
everything held in readiness to meet the 
coming attack. At six o'clock the enemy 
suddenly opened upon Couch and Porter 
with the whole strength of his artillery, 
and at once began pushing forward his 
columns of attack to carry the hill. Bri- 
gade after brigade, formed under cover of 
the woods, started at a run to cross the 
open space and charge our batteries, but 
the heavy fire of our guns, with the cool 
and steady volleys of our infantry, in every 
case sent them reeling back to shelter, and 
covered the ground with their dead and 
wounded. In several instances our in- 
fantry withheld their fire until the attack- 
ing column, which rushed through the 
storm of canister and shell from our 
artillery, had reached within a few 
yards of our lines. They then poured in a 
single volley and dashed forward with the 
bayonet, capturing prisoners and colors, 
and driving the routed columns in confu- 
sion from the field. 

About 7 o'clock, as fresh troops were 
accumulating in front of Porter and 
Couch, Meagher aiul Sickles were sent 
with their brigades, as soon as it vvas con- 
sidered prudent to withdraw any portion 
of Sumner's and Ileintzelman's troops, to 
re-enforce that part of the line and hold 
the position. These brigades relieved such 
regiments of Porter's corps and (^ouch's 
division as had expended their amunition, 
and batteries from the reserve were pushed 
forward to replace those whose boxes 
were empty. Until dark the enemy per- 
sisted in his eflTorts to take the position so 
tenaciously defended ; but, despite his 
vastly superior numbers, his repeated and 
desperate attacks were repulsed with fear- 
ful loss, and darknesd ended the battle of 



102 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



Malvern hill, though it was not until after 
9 o'clock that the artillery ceased its fire. 

During the whole hattle Commodore 
Rodgers added greatly to the discomfiture 
of the enemy, by throwing shell among 
his reserves and advancing columns. 

As the army in its movement from the 
Chickahominy to Harrison's landing was 
continually occupied in marching by night 
and fighting by day, its commanders found 
no time or opportunity for collecting data 
which would enable them to give exact 
returns of casualities in each engagement. 

The aggregate of our entire losses from 
the 26th of June to the 1st of July, inclu- 
sive, was ascertained, after arriving at 
Harrison's landing, to be as follows : 

List of the killed, womided, and misning in the army 
of the Potnmnc from, the 2HtU of June, to the 1st of 
July, 1SG2, incluffive. 



Corps. 




'a 

3 

1 


d 




1st. McCall's division* 


2.j3 

187 


1,240 
1,076 

],or.i 

507 

2,460 

l,31.i 

2 

60 

7,709 


l,r)Sl' 3,074 
848 2,111 




189 

63 

621) 

2S5 


833 1 2.073 


4th. Keyes's 

/ith. Porter's 


201 
1,198 
1,179 


777 
4,278 
2,737 




21 

97 


Cavalry 


.19 

1,582 


176 


Total 


5,9.58 


15,249 



* Pennsylvania Re.serves. 

Although the result of the battle of 
Malvern was a complete victory, it was, 
nevertheless, necessary to fall back still 
further, in order to reach a point where 
our supplies could be brought to us with 
certainty. As before stated, in the opin- 
ion of Capt. Rodgers, commanding the 
gunboat flotilla, this could be only done 
l)elow City Point ; concurring in his opin- 
ion, I selected Harrison's bar as the new 
position of the army. The exhaustion of 
our supplies of food, forage and ammuni- 
tion, made it imperative to reach the trans- 
ports immediately. 

The greater portion of the transporta- 
tion of the army having been started for 
Harrison's landing during the night of the 
80th of June and 1st of July, the order 
for the movement of the troops was at once 
issued upon the final repulse of the enemy 
at Malvern Hill. The order prescribed a 
movement by the left and rear, Gen. 
Keyes's corps to cover the manoeuvre. It 
was not carried out in detail as regards the 
divisions on the left, the roads being some- 
what blocked by the rear of our trains. 
Porter and Couch were not able to move 
out as early as had been anticipated, and 
Porter found it necessary to place a rear 
guard between his command and the 
enemy. Col. Averill, of the 3d Pennsyl- 
vania cavalry, was intrusted with this deli- 
cate duty. He had under his command 



his own regiment and Lieut. Col. Buchan- 
an's brigade of regular infantry and one 
battery. By a judicious use of the resour 
ces at his command he deceived the enemy 
so as to cover the withdrawal of the 
left wing without being attacked, re- 
maining himself on the previous day's bat- 
tle-field until about 7 o'clock of the 2d of 
July. Meantime Gen. Koyes, having re- 
ceived his orders, commenced vigorous 
preparations for covering the movement 
of the entire army and protecting the 
trains. It being evident that the immense 
number of wagons and artillery carriages 
pertaining to the army could not move 
with celerity along a single road, Gen. 
Keyes's took advantage of every accident 
of the ground to open new avenues and to 
facilitate the movement. He made prepa- 
rations for obstructing the roads, after the 
army had passed, so as to prevent any ra- 
pid pursuit, destroying effectuallj' Turkey 
bridge, on the main road, and rendering 
other roads and approaches temporarily 
impassable by felling trees across thc*m. 
He kept the trains well closed up, and di- 
rected the march so that the troops could 
move on each side of the roads, not ob- 
structing the passage, but being in good 
position to repel an attack from any quar- 
ter. His dispositions were so successful 
that, to use his own words, " I do not 
think more vehicles or more public pro- 
perty were abandoned on the march from 
Turkey bridge than would have been left, 
in the same state of the roads, if the army 
had been moving toward the enemy in- 
stead of away from him. And when it is 
understood that the dlrriages and teams 
belonging to this army, stretched out in 
one line, would extend not far from forty 
miles, the energy and caution necessary 
for their safe withdrawal from the presence 
of an enemy, vastly superior in numbers, 
will be appreciated." The last of the 
wagons did not reach the site selected at 
Harrison's bar until after dark on the 3d 
of July, and the rear guard did not move 
into their camp until everything was se- 
cure. The enemy followed up with a small 
force, and on the 3d threw a few shells at 
the rearguard, but were quickly dispersed 
by our batteries and the fire of the gun- 
boats. 

Great credit must be awarded to Gen. 
Keyes for the skill and energy which 
characterized his performance of the im- 
portant and delicate duties instrusted to 
his charge. 

High praise is also due to the officers 
and men of the 1st Connecticut artillery, 
Col. Tyler, for the manner in which they 
withdrew all the heavy guns during the 
seven days, and from Malvern hill. Owing 
to the crowded state of the roads the 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX. 



103 



teams could not be brought within a couple 
of miles of the position, but these energetic 
soldiers removed the guns by hand for 
that distance, leaving nothing behind. 



THIRD PERIOD 



On the 1st July I received the follow 
ing from the President : 
'• Washington, July 1, 18G2— 3.30 p. m. 

" It is impossible to re-enforce you for 
your present emergency. If we had a 
million of men wc could not get them to 
you in time. We have not the men to send. 
If you are not strong enough to face the 
enemy, you must find a place of security, 
and wait, rest and repair. Maintain your 
ground if you can, but save the army at 
all events, even if you fall back to Fort 
Monroe. We still have strength enough 
in the countrv, and will bring it oiat. 

"A. LINCOLiN^. 

" Maj.-Gen. G. B. McCi-kllan." 

In a despatch from the President to me, 
on the 2d of July, he says : 

" If you think you are not strong enough 
to take Richmond just now, I do not ask 
you to. Try just now to save the army, 
material and personnel, and 1 will strengthen 
it for the offensive again as fast as I can. 
The governors of eighteen States offer me 
a new levy of three hundred thousand, 
which I accept." 

On the 3d of July the following kind 
despatch was received from the President: 
[Extract.] 
" Washington, July 3, 1862—3 p. m. 
"Yours of 5.30 yesterday is just re- 
ceived. I am satisfied that yourself, 
officers and men, have done the best you 
could. All accounts say better fighting 

was never done. Ten thousand thanks for 
u * * * * 

" A. LINCOLN. 

" Maj.Gen. G. B. McClkllax." 

On the 4th I sent the following to the 
President : 

" Headqcarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Harrison's Bar, James River, July 4, '62. 

" I have the honor to acknowledge the 
receipt of your despatch of the 2d instant. 

"I shall make a stand at this place, and 
endeavor to give my men the repose they 
60 much require. 

" After sending my communication on 
Tuesday, the enemy attacked the left of 
our lines, and a fierce battle ensued, last- 
ing until night; they were rejiulsed with 
great slaughter. Had their attack suc- 
ceeded, the consequence would have been 
disastrous in the extreme. This closed the 



hard fighting which had continued from 
the afternoon of the 26th ultimo, in a daily 
series of engagements wholly unparalleled 
on this continent for determiualiou and 
slaughter on both sides. 

" The mutual loss in killed and wounded 
is enormous. 'I'hat of the enemy certainly 
greatest. On 'J'uesday morning, the 1st, 
our army commenced its movement from 
Haxall's to this point, our line of defence 
there being too extended to be maintained 
by our weakened forces. Our train was 
immense, and about 4 p. m. on the 2d a 
heavy storm of rain began, which con- 
tinued during the entire day and until th.e 
forenoon of yestei'day. 

'• The roads became horrible. Troops, 
artillery, and wagons moved on steadily, 
and our whole army, men and material, was 
finally brought safe into this camp. 

" The last of tiie wagons reached here 
at noon yesterday. The exhaustion was 
very great, but the army preserved its 
morale, and would have repelled any attack 
which the enemy was in condition to make. 

" We now occupy a line of heights, 
about two miles from the James, a plain 
extending from there to the river ; our 
front is about three miles long ; these 
heights command our whole position, and 
must be maintained. The gunboats can 
render valuable support upon both flanks. 
If the enemy attack us in front we musl 
hold our ground as we best may, and at 
whatever cost. 

" Our pc^sitions can be carried only by 
overwhelming numbers. The spirit of the 
army is excellent; stragglers are finding 
their regiments, and the soldiers exhibit 
the best results of discipline. Our position 
is by no means impregnable, especially as 
a morass extends on this side of the high 
ground from our centre to the James on 
our right. The enemy may attack in vast 
numbers, and if so, our front will be the 
scene of a desperate battle, which, if lost, 
will be decisive. Our army is fearfully 
weakened by killed, woundeil and prisoner,-^. 

" I cannot now approximate to any state- 
ment of our losses, but we were not beaten 
in any conflict. 

■' The enemy were unable, by their 
utmost efforts, to drive us from any field. 
Never did such a change of base, involving 
a retrograde movement, and umler in- 
cessant attacks from the most determined 
and vastly more numerous foe, partake so 
little of disorder. We have lost no guns 
except 2.5 on the field of battle, 21 of 
which were lost by the giving way of 
McCall's division, under the onset of 
fciuporior numbers. 

"Our communications by the JamcK 
river arc not secure. There are points 
where the enemy can establish themselves 



104 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAI^. 



with cannon or musketry and command 
the river, and where it is not certain that 
our gunboats can drive them out. In 
case of this, or in case our front is broken, 
I will still make every effort to preserve, 
at least, the personnel of the army, and 
the events of the last few days leave no 
question that the troops will do all that 
their country can ask. Send such re-en- 
forcements as you can ; I will do what I can. 
We are shipping our wounded and sick, 
and landing supplies. The Navy Depart! 
ment should co-operate with us to the ex- 
tent of its resources. Capt. Rodgers is 
doing all in his power in the kindest and 
most efficient manner. 

'' When all the circumstances of the case 
are known, it will be acknowledged by all 
competent judges that the movement just 
completed by this army is unparalleled in 
the annals of war. Under the most diffi- 
cult circumstances we have preserved our 
trains, our guns, our material, and, above 
all, our honor. 

"G. E. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 

•'The President." 



To which I received the following reply : 

" Washington, July .5, 1862—9 a. m. 

" A thousand thanks for the relief your 
two despatches, of twelve and one p. .\i. 
yesterday, gave me. Be assured the hero- 
ism and skill of yourself and officers and 
men is, and forever will be, appreciated. 

"If you can hold your present position 
we shall hive the enemy yet. 

" A. LINCOLN. 

"Maj. Gen. G. B. McClellan, Com'd'g 
Army Potomac." 

The following letters were received from 
his Excellency the President : 

" War Department, 
" Washington City, D. C. July 4, 1862. 
" I understand your position as stated in 
your letter, and by Gen. Marcy. To re- 
enforce you so as to enable you to resume 
the offensive within a month, or even six 
weeks, is impossible. In addition to that 
arrived and now arriving from the Poto- 
mac, (about ten thousand men, I suppose,) 
and about ten thousand, I hope, you will 
have from liurnside very soon, and about 
tive thousand from Hunter a little later, I 
do not see how I can send you another mkn 
withm a month. Under these circumstances 
the defensive, for the present, must be your 
only care. Save the army, first, where you 
are, if you can, and, secondly, by removal, 
if you must. You, on the ground, must be 
the judge as to which you will attempt, 
and ot the means for effecting it. I but 
give It as my opinion, that with the aid of 
the gunboats and the re-enforcements men- 
tioned above, you can hold your present 



position ; provided, and so long as you can 
keep the James river open below you. If 
you are not tolerably confident you can 
keep the James river open, you had better 
remove as soon as possible. I do not re- 
member that you have expressed any ap- 
prehension as to the danger of having your 
communication cut on the river below you, 
yet I do not suppose it can have escaped 
your attention. . 

" Yours, very truly, 

"A LINCOLN. 

"Maj. Gen. McClellan." 

" P. S. — If at any time you feel able to 
take the offensive, you are not restrained 
from doing so. 

"A. L." 

The following telegram was sent on the 
iih: 



"Headquarters Army of the Potomac 
" Berkeley. July 7. 18(;2— 8.30 a. m. ' 

" As boat is starting. I have only time to 
acknowledge receipt of despatch by Gen. 
Marcy. Enemy have not attacked. My 
position is very strong, and dailv becoming 
more so. If not attacked to-day, I shall 
laugh at them. I have been anxious about 
my communications. Had long consulta- 
tion about it with Flag-Officer (ioldsbo- 
rough last night; he is confident he can 
keep river open. He should have all gun- 
boats possible. Will see him again this 
morning. My men in splendid spirits and 
anxious to try it again. 

"Alarm yourself as little as possible 
about me, and don't lose confidence in thi.s 
army. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 
" A. Lincoln, President." 

While general-in-chief, and directing the 
operations of all our armies in the field, I 
had become deeply impressed with the im- 
portance of adopting and carrying out cer- 
tain views regarding the conduct of the 
war, which, in my judgment, were essential 
to its objects and its success. 

During an active campaign of three 
months in the enemy's country, these were 
so fully confirmed 'that I conceived it a 
duty, in the critical position we then occu- 
pied, not to withhold a candid expression 
of the more important of these views from 
the commander-in-chief, whom the Consti- 
tution places at the head of the armies and 
navies, as well as of the government of the 
nation. 

The following is a copy of my letter to 
Mr. Lincoln : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Camp near Harrison's Landing, Va., 

"July 7, 1862. 
' Mk. President: You have been fully 

informed that the rebel army is in the 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAK 105 



front, with the purpose of overwhelming 
us by attacking our positions or reducing 
us by blocking our river connnunications. 
I cannot but regard our condition as criti- 
cal, and I earnestly desire, in view of pos- 
sible contingencies, to lay before your ex- 
cellency, for your private consideration, 
my general views concerning the existing 
state of the rebellion, although they do not 
strictly relate to the situation of this army, 
or strictly come within the scope of my 
ofTicial duties. These views amount to con- 
victions, and are deeply impressed upon my 
mind and heart. Our cause must never be 
abandoned ; it is the cause of free institu- 
tions and self-government. The Constitu- 
tion and the Union must be preserved, 
whatever may be the cost in time, treasure 
and blood. If secession is successful, 
other dissolutions are clearly to be seen 
in the future. Let neither military disaster, 
political faction, nor foreign war, shake 
your settled purpose to enforce the equal 
operation of the laws of the United States 
upon the people of every State. 

" The time has come when the govern- 
ment must determine upon a civil and mili- 
t-jiry policy, covering the whole ground of 
our national trouble. 

"The responsibility of determining, de- 
claring and supporting such civil and mili- 
tary policy, and of directing the whole 
course of national affairs in regard to the 
rebellion, must now be assumed and exer- 
cised by you, or our cause will be lost. The 
Constitution gives you power, even for the 
present terrible exigency. 

" This rebellion has assumed the char- 
acter of a war ; as such it should be re- 
garded, and it should be conducted upon 
the highest principles known to Christian 
civilization. It should not be a war look- 
ing to the subjugation of thepeople of any 
State, in any event. It should not be at 
all a war upon population, but against 
armed forces and political organizations. 
Neither confiscation of property, political 
executions of persons, territorial organi- 
zations of States, or forcible abolition of 
slavery, should be contemplated for a 
moment. 

In prosecuting the war, all private prop- 
erty and unarmed persons should be strict- 
ly protected, subject only to the necessity 
of military operations ; all private prop- 
erty taken for military use should be paid 
or receipted for ; pillage and waste should 
be treated as high crimes ; all unnecessary 
trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive 
demeanor by the military towards citizens 
promptly rebuked. Military arrests should 
not be tolerated except in places where 
active hostilities exist; and oaths, not re- 
quired by enactments, constitutionally 



made, should be neither demanded nor re- 
ceived. 

" Military government should be con- 
fined to the preservation of public order 
and the protection of political right. Mili- 
tary power should not be allowed to in- 
terfere with the relations of servitude, 
either by supporting or impairing the 
authority of the master, except for re- 
pressing disorder, as in other cases. — 
Slaves, contraband, under the act of Con- 
gress, seeking military protection, should 
receive it. The right of the government 
to appropriate permanently to its own ser- 
vice claims to slave labor should be as- 
serted, and the right of the owner to com- 
pensation therefor should be recognized. 
This principle might be extended, upon 
grounds of military necessity and security, 
to all the slaves of a particular State, thus 
working manumission in such State ; and 
in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia 
also, and possil)ly even in Maryland, the 
expediency of such a measure is only a 
question of time. A system of policy thus 
constitutional, and pervaded by the influ- 
ences of Christianity and freedom, would 
receive the support of almost all truly 
loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel 
masses and all foreign nations, and it might 
be huml)ly hoped that it would commend 
itself to the favor of the Almighty. 

" Unless the principles governing the 
future conduct of our struggle sliall be 
made known and approved, the effort to 
obtain requisite forces will be almost hope- 
less. A declaration of radical views, es- 
pecially upon slavery, will rapidly disin- 
tegrate our present armies. TliQ policy of 
the government must be supported by 
concentrations of military power. The 
national forces should not be dispersed in 
expeditious, posts of occupation, iind nu- 
merous armies, but should be mainly col- 
lected into masses, and brought to bear 
upon the armies of the Confederate States. 
Those armies thoroughly defeated, the 
political structure which they support 
would soon cease to exist. 

" In carrying out any system of policy 
which you may form, you will require a 
commander-in-chief of tne army, one who 
possesses your confidence, understands 
your views, and who is competent to exe- 
cute your orders, by directing the military 
forces of the nation to the accomplish- 
ment of the objects by you proposed. I 
do not ask that place for myself. I ara 
willing to serve you in such position as 
you may assign me, and I will do so as 
faithfully as ever subordinate served su- 
perior. 

" 1 may be on the brink of eternity ; and 
as I hope forgiveness from my Maker, I 
have written this letter with sincerity 



106 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. MTLELLAN. 



towards yoa and from love for my coim- 
try. 

"Very respectfully, your obedient ser- 
vant, 

" GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Maj. Gen. Com. 
" His Excellency A Li>colw, President" 

I telegraphed the President on tlie 11th 
as follows : 

" Hbadqcastbbs Aaar of thb Potomac, 

" Berkeley, July 11, 1860 — 3 f. m. 
* * " * * * 

■' We are very strong here now, so fex 
as defensive is concerned. Hope you will 
soon make us strong enough to advance 
aoi try it affain. All in fine spirits. 
"G.B. McCLELLAN, 
" Maj. Gen. Com. 

•' A LrscoLir, President." 

These telegrams were sent on the 12th, 
ITth. and ISth, to his Excellency the Presi- 
dent: 

'' HEADQrAJlTEBS AhMT OF THB PoTOMAC, 

"Berkeley, July 12. 1S62— 7.15 a. ». 

" HjH and Longstreet crossed into New 
Kent county via Long bridge. I am still 
ignorant what road they afterwards took, 
but will know shortly. 

"Nothing else of interest since last 
despatch. Rain ceased, and everytiiing 
quiet. Men restin«: welL but beginning 
to be impatient for anotKer fig-ht. 

" I am more and more convinced that 
tiiis army ought not to be withdrawn from 
here, but promptly ire-enforced and thrown 
again upon Bichmond. If we have a little 
more than half a chance we can take it. 

" I dread the effects of any retreat upon 
the morale of the men. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Maj. Gren. Com. 

" A Lrsxrour, President.'' 

" Headquarters Asmt of the Potomac, 
" Berkeley. July 17, 1862 — 8 p. hl 
" I have consulted fully with. G^n. Burn- 
side, and would commend to your favorable 
consideration the general's pian for brings 
ing (7) seven additional regiments from 
North Carolina by Leaving Newfaem to 
the care of the gunboats. It appears 
manifestiy to be our policy to concentrate 
here everything we can possibly spare 
from. less important points, to make sure 
of crushing tiie enemy at Eichmond, which 
seems clearly to be the most important 
point in rebeldom. Nothing akould be 
left to chance here. I would recommend 
that G^n. Bumside, with all his troops, be 
ordered to this army, to enable it to as- 
sume the offensive as soon as popsibie. 
" G. B. McCLELLAN, 
"Maj. Gen- Com. 
A LEBTCoxjr. President," 



"HbADQCARTKRS AB-MT of thb PoTOJtAC. 

Berkeley. July 18, 1862 — 8 a. m. 

"No change worth reporting in the state 
of affairs. Some (20,1)00) twenty thou- 
sand to (25,000) twenty-five thousand of 
the enemy at Petersburg, and others thence 
to Richmond. 

" Those at Petersburg say they are part 
of Beauregard's army. New troops ar- 
riving via Petersburg. Am anxious to 
have determination of government that 
no time may be lost in preparing for it. 
Hours are very precious now, and perfect 
unity of action necessary. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 
"Maj. Gen- Com. 

" A. LrscoLJf, President." 

The following was telegraphed to Gen. 
Halleck on the 2Sth. : 

'• Headqcabtehs Arxy of the Potomac. 
" Berkeley. July 28, 1862—8 a. m. 
" Nothing especially new except cor- 
roboration of reports that re-enforcements 
reaching Richmond from south. It is not 
confirmed that any of Bragg's troops are 
yet here. My opinion is more and more 
firm that here is the defence of Washing- 
ton, and that I should be at once re-^'U- 
forced by all available troops to enable 
me to advance. Retreat would be disas- 
trous to the army and the cause. I am 
confident of that. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN. Maj.-G*n. 
"Major-Cj^n. H. W. Hallhck, 
" Comd'g U. S. Army, Washington D. C 

On tihe 30th I sent the following to the 
general^n-chdef, 

"HjEADQCJkHTBHS AbMT OF THE PoTOMAC, 

" Berkeley, July 30, 1862 — 7 a, m. 
******** 

"I h-ope that it may soon be decided 
what is to be done by this army, and 
that the decision may be to re^enforce it 
at once. We are Losiiig much, valuable 
time, and that at a moment when energy 
and decision are sadly needed. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj-Gen. 
"Maj .-Gen. H. W. H.ii.i.ECK: 
" Comd'g U. S. Army, Waishingtoo, D. C 

About half an hour after midnight on 
the morning of August 1, the enemy 
brousrht some light batteries to Goggin'a 
peijjt and the Coles house, on the right 
bank of the James river, directly opposite 
Harrison's landing, and opened a heavy 
fire upon our shipping and encampments. 
It was continued rapidly for about thirty 
minutes, wjien they were driven back by 
the fire of our guns ; this affair was re- 
ported ia the following despatch : 



jjr, 



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108 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



Richmond in that direction, as well as to 
prevent a repetition of midnight can- 
nonades. 

To carry out Gen. Halleck's first order, 
of July 30, it was necessary first to gain 
possession of Malvern hill, which was oc- 
cupied by the enemy, apparently in some 
little force, and controlled the direct ap- 
proach to Richmond. Its temporary oc- 
cupation, at least, was equally necessary 
in the event of a movement upon Peters- 
burg, or even the abandonment of the 
Peninsula. Gen. Hooker, with his own 
division, and Pleasonton's cavalry, was 
therefore directed to gain possession of 
Malvern hill on the night of the 2d of 
August. 

He failed to do so, as the following des- 
patch recites : 
"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Berkeley, Aug. 3, 1862—10.20 p. m. 

"The movement undertaken up the 
river last night failed on account of the 
incompetency of guides. 

" 'I'he proper steps have been taken to- 
day to remedy this evil, and I hope to be 
ready to-morrow night to carry out your 
suggestions as to pressing, at least to ac- 
complish the first indispensable step. 
"G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. Com'g. 

"Maj. Gen. Halleck, 

" Comd'g U. S. Army." 

On the 4th Gen. Hooker was re-enforced 
by Gen. Sedgwick's division, and having 
obtained a knowledge of the roads, he suc- 
ceeded in turning Malvern hill, and driving 
the ertemy back towards Richmond. 

The following is my report of this affair 
at the time : 

" Malvern Hill, Aug. 5, 1862—1 p. m. 

" Gen. Hooker, at .5.30 this morning, 
attacked a very considerable force of in- 
fantry and artillery stationed at this place, 
and carried it handsomely, driving the 
enemy towai'ds Newmarket, which is four 
miles distant, and where it is said they 
have a large force. We have captured 
100 prisoners, killed and wounded several. 
with a loss on our part of only three killed 
and eleven wounded; among the latter, 
two officers. 

" I shall probably remain here to-night, 
ready to act as circuinstances may require, 
after the return of my cavalry recou- 
noisances. 

" 'J'he mass of the enemy escaped under 
the cover of a dense fog ; but our cavalry 
are still in pursuit, and I trust may suc- 
ceed in capturing many more. 

"This is a very advantageous position 
to cover an advance on Richmond, and 
only 14| miles distant; and I feel confi- 
dent that with re-enforcements I would 
march this army there in five days. 



" I this instant learn that several brig- 
ades of the enemy are four miles from here 
on the Quaker road, and 1 have taken 
steps to prepare to meet them. 

" Gen. Hooker's dispositions were ad- 
mirable, and his ofiRcers and men displayed 
their usual jrallantry. 
" G. B. MrCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. Com'g. 

"Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 

" Comd'g U. S. Army." 

" Malvern Hill, Aug. 5, 1862—8 p. m. 

"Since my last despatch Col. Averill 
has returned from a reconnoissance in the 
direction of Savage's station, towards 
Richmond. He encoimtered the 18th 
Virginia cavalry near White Oak swamp 
bridge, charged and drove them some dis- 
tance towards Richmond, capturing 28 
men and horses, killing and wounding 
several. 

" Our troops have advanced (12) twelve 
miles in one direction, and (17) seventeen 
in another, towards Richmond to-day. 

" We have secured a strong position at 
Coggin's point, opposite our quartermas- 
ter's depot, which will effectually prevent 
the rebels from using artillery hereafter 
against our camps. 

" I learn this evening that there is a 
force of 20,000 men about six miles back 
from this point, on the south bank of the 
river. What their object is I do not 
know, but will keep a sharp lookout on 
their movements. 

" I am sending off sick as rapidly as our 
transports will take them. I am also 
doing everything in my power to carry 
out your orders, to push reconnoisances 
towards the rebel capital, and hope soon 
to find out whether the reports regarding 
the abandonment of that place are true. 
•'G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 

" Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 

" Comd'g U. S. Army." 

To the despatch of 1 p. m., Aug. 5, the 
following answer was received : 

" Washington, Aug. 6, 1862 — 3 a. m. 
"I have no re-enforcements to send 
you. H. W. HALLECK, Maj. Gen. 
"Maj. Gen. G. B. McClellan." 

And soon after the following : 

" Washington, Aug. 6, 1862. 
" You will immediately send a regiment 
of cavalry and several batteries of artillery 
to Burnside's command at Aquia creek. 
It is reported that Jackson is moving 
north with a very large force. 

" H. W. HALLECK, Maj. Gen. 
"Maj. Gen. G. B. McClellan." 

On the 4th I had received Gen. Hal- 
leck's order of the 3d, .(which appears be- 
low,) directing me to withdraw the army 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



109 



to Aquia, and on the same day spiit an 
earnest protest against it. A lew hours 
before this, Gen. Hooker had hifornied me 
that his cavalry pickets reported large 
bodies of the enemy advancing and driving 
them in, and that he would probably be 
attacked at daybreak. 

Under these circumstances I had de- 
termined to support him ; but as 1 could 
not get the whole army in position until 
the next afternoon, I concluded, upon the 
receipt of the above telegram from the 
general-in-chief, to withdraw Gen. Hooker, 
that there might be the least possible de- 
lay in conforming to Gen. Halleck's or- 
der's. I therefore sent to Gen. Hooker 
the following letter: 

" Headquarters Army op the Potomac, 
"Berkeley, Aug. 6, 1862—10 p. m. 

My Dear General : I find it will not be 
possible to get the whole army into posi- 
tion before some time to-morrow afternoon, 
which will be too late to support you, and 
hold the entire position, should the enemy 
attack in large force at daybreak which 
there is strong reasons to suppose he in- 
tends doing. 

" Should we fight a general 1)attlc at 
Malvern, it will be necessary to abandon 
the whole of our works here, and run the 
risk of getting back here. 

" Under advices I have received from 
Washington. I think it necessary for you 
to abandon the position to night, getting 
everything away before daylight. 

"Please leave cavalry pickets at Mal- 
vern, with orders to destroy the Turkey 
creek bridge when they are forced back. 

"The roads leading into Haxall's from 
the right should be strongly watched, and 
Haxall's at least held by strong cavalry 
force and some light batteries as long as 
possible. 

" I leave the manner of the withdrawal 
entirely to your discretion. 

" Please signal to the fleet when the 
withdrawal is about completed. 

" Report frequently to these head- 
quarters. 

" Gen. Sumner was ordered up to sup- 
port you, but will halt where this passes 
him, and will inform vou where he is. 

G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj.-Gen. 
'' Gen. J. Hooker, 

" Comd'g at Malvern Hill." 

And the following reply was sent to Gen. 
Halleck: 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
"Berkeley, Aug. 6, 1^62—11.30 p. m. 

" Despatch of to-day received. I have 
not quite four thousand (4,000) cavalry 
for duty in cavalry division, so that 1 can- 
not possibly spare any more. 



" I really need many more than I now 
have to carry out your instructions. 

" The enemy are moving a large force 
on Malvern hill. In view of your de- 
spatches, and the fact that I cannot place 
the whole army in position before day- 
break, I have ordered Hooker to withdraw 
during the night if it is possible ; if he 
cannot do so, I must support him. 

" Until this matter is developed I can- 
not send any batteries ; I hope I can do so 
to-morrow if transportation is on hand. 

" I will obey the order as soon as cir- 
cumstances permit. My artillery is none 
too numerous now. I have only been able 
to send off some twelve hundred (1,200) 
sick. No transportation. There shall be 
no delay that I can avoid. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj.-Gen. Com. 
" Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 

" Comd'g U. S. Army." 

Five batteries, with their horses and 
equipments complete, were embarked on 
the 7th and 8th, simultaneously with Gen. 
Hooker's operations upon Malvern. 

I despatched a cavalry force under Col. 
Averill towards Savage's station, to ascer- 
tain if the enemy were making any move- 
ments towards our right flank. 

He found a rebel cavalry regiment near 
the White Oak Swamp l>ridge, and com- 
pletely routed it, pursuing well towards 
Savage's station. 

These important preliminary operations 
assisted my preparations for the removal 
of the array to Aquia creek ; and the send- 
ing off our sick and supplies was pushed 
l)oth day and night as rapidly as the means 
of transportation permitted. 

On the sul)ject of the withdrawal of the 
army from Harrison's landing, the follow- 
ing correspondence passed between the 
geueral-in-chief and uiyself, while the re- 
connoissances towards Richmond were in 
progress. 

On the 2d of August I received the fol- 
lowing : 

Washington, Aug. 2, 1862, 3.45 p. m. 

"You have not answered my telegram 
of July 30, 8 p. M., about the removal of 
your sick. Remove them as rapidly as 
possible, and tel-cgra])h me when they will 
he out of your way. The President wishes 
an answer as soon as j^ossible. 

"H. W. Halleck, Maj.-Gen. 
"Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan." 

'i'o which this reply was sent : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
"Berkeley, Aug. 3 — U p. m. 

"Your telegram of (2) second is re- 
ceived. The answer (to despatch of July 
30,) was sent this morning. 

"We have about (12,500) twelve thou- 



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112 



REPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX. 



'HSADQUARTERS AeMT OF THE PoTOMAC, 

" Berkeley, Aug. 5. 1862 — 7 a. m. 

'• Your telegram of yesterday received, 

and is being carried out as promptly as 

possible. With the means at my command, 

DO human po\<"er could have moved the sick 

in the time you say you expected them to 

be moved. 

***** 

'■ G. B. McCLELLAX. Maj. Gen. 

'• Maj. Gen. H. W. Hallbck, Com'd'g 
U. S. Army." 

My efforts for bringing about a change 
of policy were unsuccessful, as will be seen 
from the following telegram and letter re- 
ceived by me in reply to mine of 12 m. of 
the 4th :' 

•• TTashingtox. Aug. 5. 1S62— 12 m. 

"You cannot regret the order of the 
withdrawal more than I did the necessity 
of giving it. It will not be rescinded, and 
you will be expected to execute it with all 
possible promptness. It is believed that it 
can be done now without serious danger. 
This may not be so, if there should be any 
delay. I will write you my views more 
fully bv mail. 

'^H. W. HALLECK. 
"Maj. Gen. Com"d"g U. S. Armv. 
" Maj. Gen. G. B. McClellax." 

The letter was as follows : 

•' Headquaeters of the AR>rr. 
"Washington. Aug. 6. 1862. 

" General : Your telegram of yesterday 
was received this morning, and I immedi- 
iately telegraphed a brief reply, promising 
to write you more fully by mall. 

" You. general, certainly could not have 
Vjeen more pained at receiving my order 
than I was at the necessity of issuins it. 
1 was advised by high officers, in whose 
judgment I had great confidence, to make 
the order immediately on my arrival here, 
but I determined not" to do so until I could 
learn your wishes from a personal inter- 
view. And even after that interview I 
tried every means in my power to avoid 
withdrawing your army, and delayed my 
decision as long as I dared to delay it. 

"I assure you. general, it was not a 
hasty and inconsiderate act. but one that 
caused me more anxious thoughts than anv 
other of my life. But after full and mature 
consideration of all the pros and cons. I was 
reluctantly forced to the conclusion that 
the order must be issued— there was to my 
mind no alternative. 

'• Allow me to allude to a few of the 
facts in the case. 

'• You and your officers at one inter- 
view estimated the enemy's forces in and 
around Richmond at two hundred thou- 
Eand men. Since then, you and others re- 
port that they have received and are receiv- 



ing large re-enforcements from the south. 
Gen. Pope's army, covering Washington, 
is only about forty thousand. Your effect- 
ive force is only about ninety thousand. 
You are thirty miles from Richmond, and 
Gen. Pope eighty or ninety, with the enemy 
directly between you. ready to fall with his 
superior numbers upon one or the other as 
he may elect : neither can re-enforce the 
other in case of such an attack. 

'* If Gen. Pope's army be diminished to 
re-enforce you, Washington, Maryland and 
Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and 
exposed. If your force be reduced to 
strengthen Pope, you would be too weak 
to even hold the position you now occupy, 
should the enemy turn round and attack 
you in full force. In other words, the old 
army of the Potomac is split into two parts 
with the entire force of the enemy directly 
between them. They cannot be united by 
land without exposing both to destruction, 
and yet they «aust be united. To send 
Pope's forces by water to the Peninsula 
is. under present circumstances, a military 
impossibility. The only alternative is to 
send the forces on the "Peninsula to some 
point by water, say Fredericksburg, where 
the two armies can be united. 

" Let me now allude to some of the ob- 
jections which you have urged : you say 
that the withdrawal from the present posi- 
tion will cause the certain demoralization 
of the army, • which is now in excellent 
discipline and condition.' 

'• I cannot understand why a simple 
change of position to a new and by no 
means, distant base will demoralize an 
army in excellent discipline, unless the 
officers themselves assist in that demorali- 
zation, which I am satisfied they will not. 

"Your change of front from your ex- 
treme right at Hanover Court House to 
your present condition was over thirty 
miles, but I have not heard that it demor- 
alized your troops, notwithstanding the 
severe losses they sustained in effecting it. 

" A new base on the Rappahannock at 
Fredericksburg brings you within about 
sixty miles of Richmond, and secures a re- 
enforcement of forty or fifty thousand fresh 
and disciplined troops. 

"'I'he change with such advantages will. 
I think, if properly represented to your 
army, encourage rather than demoralize 
your troops. Moreover you yourself sug- 
gested that a junction might be effected at 
Yorktown, but that a flank march across 
the isthmus would be more hazardous than 
to retire to Fort Monroe. 

" You will remember that Yorktown is 
two or three miles further than Fredericks- 
burg is. Besides, the latter is between 
Richmond and Washington, and covers 
Washington from any attack of the enemy. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAX. 113 



•• The political - ~ " --•--• - - - - - 
B»ij at arst be 
th^'^ '■ -.--^ - 

m - _ _ . ^____ : .„ 

its separate -. 

-Bat to:. _■. witj ncrt !'-L-':r:- 

me here, so ifiit I ljc strike " 

from TTv pr=--"i'- -■---'>;- - » T 

TO" 

th - . . 

yoTi LL^: :: 
mauT- Yo^: 
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tL 

• -id, as the eoemj »as being largely re- 
..-■jrced. 

~Ifvour'=- - rTQT's strength 

re :. . 

t. :. _- - _ 

an'i or^&fLLZdi, Wmicfi. wuuiu rci^airc scTcr*. 

weeks. 



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tioo or" 
a'mosi 

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ar* i — 

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r> 

a* 

L:-_ -^- - 

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to the 

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■ ief- 


'-H. W HALLECK O- ---Chiet 
"Ma-- - 

On the Ttfl i recerred the t'oUowiaf teie- 
zram : 

'- Washfnrton, Aug-. 7, 18€2 — ^10 a. ». 

-Toti will 'i ■' -.-.m- 
ber of sick s- ay 






- ay 



irmj in 



- ^t)teaiber 



Mij.jr-Gea. G. B. McGlsixa.v." 

To whic-h I made this reply : 
■" HgLUHirAKTsss Ak'st op the Poto«ac. 
-August 7. 1?<)2 — 10.4J) pjt 

—at 






»1 trv I f?-r«i<1 



of 



a 



reported to me. 

the BOTemer '.. 

originally a ^sr Peain- 

sola aov sl^ 

- 1 kaTe : ' " 

to know, by 

sous the AT La;- .:' *—=.- i''_ ::::_— ^^ 
rated into twu parts ■■ith the t 
between tliem. I ain>t lake thia^s is i 
6ad thera. 

-I finithf ' -■- ^ - ■ - - ■ ■ --^ -■ 
msite them. 

a,- 

1 -:- . 

all of your rcemems 

which it is 1^ ; ^ - .a. It is 



"i are no ' 
_ . ^Iry. ir ! - 
dars. .-. 

shall sei. . 

-After ijirr 



lAQiry. 

Lire be.. 



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At 
t« 

_;-oftJig priscaers 



114 



KEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



rtf war, and have only become avtuiable 
tor the sick to-dav. 

'■(i. n. MrCLELLAN. Major-Gen. 
•Major-Gen. II. W. IIallkck. 

•' Com. U. S. A." 

The report of my chief (luartermaster 
upon the subject is as follows : 

•' llK.ADQfARTKRS ArMY OK THK PoTOMAC, 

'• OtTice of Chief C) uartcrmaster, 
"Harri.*on's Landing. Aug. 7, 1862. 
" (rK.NKRAt, : I have the honor to return 
the papers herewith which you sent me, 
with the followintr remarks : 

• We are embarking five batteries of 
artillery, with their horses, basrjraare, <fee., 
which requires the detailing of most of our 
available boats, except the ferry-boats. 
The medical department has ten or twelve 
of our largest transport vessels, which, if 
i! disposable, could carry 12.00(1 men. Be- 
sides, there are some heavy draft steamers 
at Fort Monroe that cannot come to this 
point, but which can carry 8.00^ or 10,000 
infantry. 

•' 1 have ordered all up here that can 
ascend to this depot. They will be here 
to-morrow evening. As it now is. after 
the details already made, we cannot trans- 
port from this place more lliau 5,000 in- 
fantry. 

■There are no transports now available 
for cavalry. From and after to-morrow, 
if the vessels arrive. I could transport 
10.000 infantry. In two or three days a 
regiment of cavalry can be sent if required. 
If you wait, and ship from Yorktown or 
Fort Monroe after the sick and wounded 
transports are at my disposal, we can 
transport 2.^.000 at a time. The number 
that can be transported is contingent ou 
circumstances referred to. 

" Ma«t of the propellers here are laden 
with commissary or other supplies, and 
most of the tugs are necessary to tow ofl" 
bail craft also laden with supplies. 

• 1 am. very respectfully, your most 
obedient s<?rvant. 

"RUFUSTNGALLS, 

" Chief Quartermaster. 

•• Gen. R. B. Marct. Chief of btaff." 

On the 9th I received this dispatch: 

••Washington, ^ng. 9. 1862- 12.4.T p. m. 

. •• I am of the opinion that the enemy is 

massing his forces in front of Gens. Pope 

and Burnside. and that he expects to crush 

them and move forward to the Potomac. 

•' You must send re-enforcements in- 
stantly to A<inia creek. 

•• Considering the amount of transporta- 
tion at your disi)osal. your delay is not 
8ati.sfactory. You must move with all 
possible celerity. 

■H. W'. HALLECK, Maj. Gen. 

"Maj. Gen. G. B. MoCi.ella.n.'' 



To which I sent the following reply : 

"Headquarters Army of the PoTOMAr. 
•• Berkeley. Aug. 10. 1862—8 a. m. 

" Telegram of yesterday received. The 
batteries sent to Burnside took the last 
available transport yesterday morning. 
Enough have since arrived to ship one 
regiment of cavalry to-day. The sick are 
being embarked as rapidly as possible. 
There has been no unnecessary delay, as 
you assert — not an hour's — but everything 
has been and is being pushed as rapidly as 
possible to carry out your orders. 

•• G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. Com. 
"Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck. 
'• Com. U. S. Army." 

The following report, made on the same 
day by the officer then in charge of the 
transports, exposes the injustice of the 
remark in the despatch of the general-in- 
chief. that. •• considering the amount of 
transportation at your disposal your delay 
is not satisfactory." 

" Assistant Quartermaster's OrnrR, 

•• Army of the Potomac, 

" Harrison's Landing.Va., Aug. 10, 1862. 

" Col. Ingalls. being him.self ill, has re- 
quested me to telegraph to you concerning 
the state and capacity of the transports 
now here. On the night of the 8th I de- 
spatched eleven steamers, principally small 
ones, and six schooners, with five batteries 
of heavy horse artillery, none of which 
have yet returned. 

'• Requisition is made this morning for 
transportation of one thousand cavalry to 
Aquia creek. All the schoojiers that had 
been chartered for carrying horses have 
been long since discharged, or changed 
into freight vessels. 

•■' A large proportion of the steamers 
now here are still loaded with stores, or ai e 
in the floating hospital service engaged in 
removing the sick. To transport the one 
thousand cavalry to-day will take all the 
available steamers now here not engaged 
in the service of the harbor. These steam- 
ers could take a large number of infantry, 
i but are not well adapted to the carrying 
of horses, and much space is thus lost. 
Several steamers are expected here to-day, 
and we are unloading schooners rapidly ; 
most of these are not chartered, but are 
being taken for the service required, at 
same rates of pay as other chartered 
schooners. If you could cause a more 
speedy return of the steamers sent away 
from here, it would facilitate matters. 
" C. G. SAWTELLE, 

" Capt. and Assist. Quar. Cora. Depot. 
" Gen. M. C. Meigs, 

"Quar. Gen. U. S. Army, Washiagton.* 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX. 115 



Oar wharf Hioilitios at TTarrison's land- 
ing wore very limited, admitting but few 
vessels at one time. These, wore continn- 
ally in use as Ion? as there were disposable 
vessels, and the officers of the medical and 
quartermaster's departments, with all their 
available forces, were incessantly occupied 
day and niirht in embarkinsr and sending off 
the sick men. troops, and material. 

Notwithstanding the repeated represen- 
tations f made to the general-in-chief that 
euch were the facts, on the 10th I received 
the following : 

"Washington. Aug. 10.1862—12 p. m. 

" The enemy is crossing the Rapidan in 
large force. They are fighting Gen. Pope 
to-day ; there must be no further delay in 
your movements ; that which has already 
occurred was entirely unexpected, and 
must be satisfactorily explained. Let not 
a moment's, time be lost, and telegraph me 
daily what progress you have made in 
executing the order to transfer vour troops. 
"H. W. HALL?:('K. Maj. Uen. 

" Maj. Gen. G. B. >[rCLF.Lr,AN.'" 

To which I sent this reply : 

" HEADQrARTERS ArMY OF THE PoTOMAO, 

" Berkeley. Aug. 10. 1862— 11. HO p. m. 

" Your despatch of to-day is received. 
I assure you again that there has not been 
any unnecessary delay in carrying out j'our 
ordors. 

•' You are probably laboring nnder some 
great mistake as to the amount of trans- 
portation available here. 

'• I have pushed matters to the utmost 
ill getting off our sick, and the troops you 
ordered to Burnside. 

" Col. Ingalls has more than once in- 
formed the Quartermaster Gen. of the con- 
dition of our water transportation. From 
the fact that yon directed me to keep the 
order secret. I took it for granted that you 
would take the steps necessary to provide j 
the re(inisite transportation. | 

" A large number of transports for all \ 
arms of service, and for wagons, should at 
once be sent to Yorktown and Fort Mon- 
roe. 

'• T shall be ready to move the whole 
army by land the moment the sick are dis- 

Sosed of. You may be sure that not an 
our's delay will occur that can be avoided. 
1 fear you 'do not realize the difficulty of 
the operation proposed. 

"The regiment of cavalry for Burnside 
has been in course of embarcation to-day 
and tohight; (10) ten steamers wore re- 
quired fur the iiurpose; (I.2r)S) twelve hun- 
dred and fifty-eight .-=ick loaded to-day and 
to-night. 

" Our means exhausted, except one ves- 
sel returning to Fort Monroe in the morn- 



ing, which will take some (.500) five hnn- 
dred cases of slight sickness. 

"The present moment is probably not 
the proper one for me to refer to the un- 
necessary, harsh, and nnjust tone of yoor 
telegrams of late. It will, however, make 
no difference to mv official action. 

" G. B. Mc(JL1:LLAX, Maj. Gen. Com. 
" Maj. Gen. H. W. IJam.eck, 
Com. U. S. Army." 

On the eleventh this report was made : 

'• Headqcarteks Army of the Potomat, 
"Berkeley, Aug. 11, 1862—11.30 p. ir. 

"The embarcation of (850) eight hun- 
dred and fifty cavalry, and (1) one brigade 
of infantry will be completed by (2; two 
o'clock in the morning; (500) five hundred 
sick were embarked to-day. Another 
vessel arrived to-night, and (GOO) six hun- 
dred more sick are now being embarked. 
I still have some (4000) lour thousand 
sick to dispose of. You have been greatly 
misled as to the amount of transportation 
at my disposal. 

" Vessels loaded to their untmost 
capacity with stores, and others indispen- 
sable for service here, have been repurtf^d 
to you as available for carrying sick and 
well. I am sending off all that can be un- 
loaded at Fort Monroe to have thorn 
return hore. I repeat that I have lost no 
time in carr\-ing out your orders. 

•■G. B. McCLELLAX, 

" Maj.-Gen. Comdg. 

" Maj.-Gen. H. AV. Hai.leck, 

" Comdg. U. S. Army." 

On the same day I received the following 
from the quartermaster in charge of the 
depot. 

"Assist. Qr. M.'s Office, Army Potomac, 
" Harrison's Landing, Aug. 11, 1862. 

" CoLO.NEii : In reply to the communica- 
tion from Gen. Marcy, which was referre<l 
to me by you, I have to state that there 
are now in this harbor no disposable 
transports not already detailed, either for 
the use of the hospital department, for the 
transportation of the 1st N. Y. cavalry, 
or for the necessary service of the harbor. 
I think the steameK loading and to be 
loaded with cavalry could take in addition 
three thousand infantry. These boats are. 
however, directed to leave as fast as fhoy 
are loaded ; some have already started. 
The embarcation of this cavalry regiment 
is going on very slowly, and it is not in my 
power to hurry the matter, although f 
have had several agents of thedepartuK'nt 
and one commissioned officer at the wharf, 
to render all the assistance pissible. The 
entire army is this morning turning in, to 
be stored on vessels, knapsacks, officers' 
baggage, and other surplus property, and 



116 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAK 



with our limited wharf facilities it is im- 
possible, unless the regular issues of 
forage, &c., are suspended to avoid great 
confusion and delay with what is already 
ordered to be done. Of course, if any in- 
fantry is ordered to embark on these 
transports, the confusion and dfficulties 
will be increased. 

" I know of no boats that may be ex- 
pected here to-day, except the South 
America and Fanny Cadwalader, a pro- 
peller which M'as ordered to be sent back 
from Fort Monroe." 

"The transports with the artillery left 
for Aquia creek on the night of the 8th 
and the morning of the 9th. They were 
ordered to return innnediately. 

" I am, very respectfully, you obedient 
servant. 

"0. G. SAWTELLE, 

" Capt. and A. Q. M.,Comdg. Depot. 
"Lieut.-Col. RuFus Ingalls, 
" A. D. C. and Chief Qr.M. Army Potomac." 

On the 12th I received the following : 
" Washington, August 12, 1862 — 12 m. 

" The Quarterwaster Gen. informs me 
that nearly every available steam vessel in 
the country is now under your control. 
'I'o send more from Philadelphia, Balti- 
more and New York, would interfere with 
the transportation of army supplies and 
break up the channels of travel by which 
we are to bring forward the new troops. 
]>urnside moved nearly thirteen thousand 
(13,000) troops to Aquia creek in less 
than two (2) days, and his transports were 
immediately sent back to you. All vessels 
in the James river and the Chesapeake 
1)ay were placed at your disposal, and it 
was supposed that (8) eight or (10) ten 
thousand could be transported daily. 

" In addition to steamers, there is a large 
fleet of sailing vessels which could- be used 
as transports. 

" The bulk of your material on shore it 
was thought could be sent to Fort Monroe, 
covered by that part of the army which 
could not get water transportation. Such 
were the views of the government here ; 
perhaps we were misinformed as to the 
facts. If so, the delay could be explained. 
^ Nothing in my telegram was intentionally 
harsh or unjust, but the delay was so un- 
expected that an explanation was required. 
There has been, and is. the most urgent 
necessity for despatch, and not a single 
moment must be lost in getting additional 
troops in front of Washington. 

"H. W. HALLECK, Maj.-Gen. 

"Maj.-Gen. G. B. McGlellax." 

I telegraphed the following reply : 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

'• Berkeley, Aug. 12, 1862—11. p. m. 

" Your despatch of noon to-day received. 



It is positively the fact that no more men 
could have been embarked hence than 
have gone, and that no unnecessary delay 
has occurred. Before your orders were 
received. Col. Ingalls directed all available 
vessels to come from Monroe. Officers 
have been sent to take personal direction. 
Have heard nothing here of Burnside'a 
fleet. 

" There are some vessels at Monroe, 
such as Atlantic and Baltic, which draw 
too much to come here. Hospital accom- 
modations exhausted this side New York. 
Propose filling Atlantic and Baltic with 
serious cases, for New York, and to en- 
camp slight cases for the present at Monroe. 
In this way can probably get off the (3,400) 
thirty-four hundred sick, still on hand, by 
day after to-morrow night. 

" I am sure that you have been misin- 
formed as to the availability of vessels on 
hand. We cannot use heavily loaded 
supply vessels for troops or animals ; and 
such constitute the mass of those here, 
which have been represented to you as 
capable of transporting this army. 

" I fear you will find very great delay in 
embarking troops and material at York- 
town and Monroe, both from want of 
vessels and of facilities of erabarcation ; 
at least two adelitional wharves should at 
once be built at each place. I ordered two 
at the latter some (2) two weeks ago, but 
you countermanded the order. 

'• I learn that wharf accommodations at 
Aquia are altogether inadequate for landing 
troops and supplies to any large extent. 
Not an hour should be lost in remedying 
this. 

" Great delay will ensue there from 
shallow water. You will find a vast de- 
ficiency in horse transports. We had 
nearly two hundred when we came here ; 
I learn of only (20) twenty provided now ; 
they carry about (50) fifty liorses each. 
More hospital accommodations should be 
provided. We are much impeded here 
because our wharves are used night and 
day to land current supplies. At Monroe 
a similar difficulty will occur. 

" With all the facilities at Alexandria 
and Washington, (6) weeks about were 
occupied in embarking this army and its 
material. 

" Burnside's troops are not a fair 
criterion for rate of embarcation. All his 
means were in hand, his outfit specially 
prepared for the purpose, and his men 
habituated to the movement. 

" There shall be no unnecessary delay, 
but I cannot manufacture vessels. I stale 
these difficulties from experience, and 
because it appears to me that we have 
been lately working at cross purposes 
because you have not been properly iu- 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 117 



I 



formed hy those around yon. who oufrht to 
know the hiherent difficulties of such an 
undertaking. It is not possible for any 
one to place this army where you wish it, 
ready to move, in less than a month. 

" If Washington is in danger now, this 
army can scarcely arrive in time to save 
it ; it is in much better position to do so 
from here than from Aquia. 

" Our material can only be saved by 
using the whole army to cover it, if we are 
pressed. If sensibly weakened by detach- 
ments, the result might be the loss of much 
material and many men. I will be at the 
telegraph office to-morrow morning 

" GEO. B. MrCLELLAN, Major Gen. 
"Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 

" Washington, D. C." 

To the reasons given in the foregoing 
lespatch. to show why Gen. Biirnside's 
movement from Fort Monroe was not a 
fair criterion for our operations, the fol- 
lowing may be added : 

He was not encumbered by either si 
or wounded men. 

He had no cavalry, artillery, wagons 
teams. His force consisted of infantry 
alone, with a few ambulances and officers' 
horses. 

His baggage was already on the trans- 
ports, where it had remained since his ar- 
rival from North Carolina, and his men had 
only to resume their places on board. 

The cavalry and artillery mentioned in 
my despatches of the 7th, lOth and 11th, 
were sent to supply his total deficiency in 
those arms. 

I may also repeat that the vessels used 
by Gen. Burnside had not returned from 
Aquia creek when the army left Harrison's 
bar. 

It will be seen by the concluding para- 
graph of the foregoing despatch that in 
order to have a more direct, speedy, and 
full explanation of the condition of affairs 
in the army than I could by sending a sin- 
gle despatch by steamer to the nearest tel- 
egraph office at Jamestown island, some 
seventy miles distant, and waiting ten 
hours for a reply, I proposed to go in per- 
Bon to the office. This 1 did. 

On my arrival at Jamestown island there 
was an iuterruption in the electric current, 
which rendered it necessary for me to con- 
tinue on to Fort Monroe, and across the 
Chesapeake bay to Cherry Stone inlet, on 
the '• Eastern Shore," where 1 arrived late 
in the evening, and immediately sent the 
annexed despatches : 
" Chekky Stone, Aug. 13, J8G2— 11 .30 p.m. 

" Please come to office ; wish to talk to 
you. What news from Pope? 

"GEO. B. MrCLELLAN, Major-Gen. 
"Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, Washing'n." 



" Cherry Stone Inlet, Aug. 14, 1862 — 

12.30 A. M. 

" Started to Jamestown island, to talk 
with you ; found cable broken and came 
here. Please read my long telegram. 
(See above despatch of August 12, 11 p. 
M.) All quiet at camp. Enemy burned 
wharves at City Point yesterday. No rebel 
pickets within eight (8) miles of Coggin'a 
point, yesterday. 

" Richmond prisoners state that large 
force with guns, left Richmond northward 
on Sunday. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 
" Maj. Gen. 
" Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 

Washington." 

To which the following reply was re- 
ceived : . 
" Washington, August 14, 1802 — 1.40 a.m 

" I have read your despatch. '1 here is 
no change of plans. You will send up your 
troops as rapidly as possible. There is no 
difficulty in landing them. According to 
your own accounts, there is now no diffi- 
culty in withdrawing your forces. Do so 
with all possible rapiditv. 

"H. W.'HALLECK, 

" Maj. Gen. 
Maj. Gen, G. B. McClellan." 

Before I had time to decipher and reply 
to this despatch, the telegraph operator in 
Washington informed me that Gen. Hal- 
leck, had gone out of the office immediately 
after writing this despatch, without leav- 
ing any intimation of the fact for me, or 
waiting for any further information as to 
the object of my journey across the bay. 
As there was no possibility of other com- 
munication with him at that time, 1 sent 
the following despatch, and returned to 
Harrison's landing : 

" Cherry Stone Inlet, Aug. 14, 1862 — 

1.40 A. M. 

" Your orders will be obeyed. I return 
at once. I had hoped to have had a longer 
and fuller conversation with you, after 
travelling so far for the purpose. 

•'G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 
" Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 

Washington, D. C." 

On the 14th and 1.5th, and before we had 
been able to embark all our sick men, two 
army corps were put in motion towards 
Fort Monroe. This was reported iu the 
annexed despatch : 

" Headquarters Army op the Potomac, 
"Berkeley, Aug. 14, 1862—11 p. m. 
" Movement has commenced by land and 
and water. All sick will be away to-mor- 
row night. Everything being done to carry 
out your orders. I don't like Jackson'a 
movement ; he will suddenly appear when 



118 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



least expected. Will telegraph fully and 
uuderstandiuo'lv in the morninjr. 

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

"Maj. Gen. 
" Maj. Gen. H. W. IIai.leck, 

Washington, D. C." 

The phrase " movement has commenced " 
it need not be remarked, referred obvious- 
ly to the movement of the main army, after 
completing the necessary preliminary 
movements of the sick, <fec., &c. 

The perversion of the term, to vrhich the 
general-in-chief saw fit to give currency in 
a letter to the Secretary of War, should 
have been here rendered impossible by the 
despatches which precede this of the 14th, 
which show that the movement really be- 
gun immediately after the receipt of the 
order of August 4th. , 

The progress made in the movement on 
the 15th was reported in the following de- 
apatches : 

'• Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

' August, 1.5, 1862—12 m. 

" Col. Ingalls this moment reports that 
after embarking the remaining brigade of 
McCall's division, with the sick, who are 
cuustantly accumulating the transports now 
disposable, will be all consumed. 

" Two of my army corps marched last 
night, and this morning en route for York- 
town — one via .Jones's bridge, and the other 
via Barrett's Ferry, where we have a pon- 
toon bridge. The other corps will be 
pushed forward as fast as the roads are 
cleared ; and I hope before to-morrow morn- 
ing to have the entire army in motion. 

" A report has just been received from 
my pickets that the enemy in force is ad- 
vancing on us from the t'hickahominy, 
but I do not credit it; shall know soon. 
Should any more transports arrive here 
l)efore my departure, and the enemy do 
not show such a force in our front as to 
ri_-quire all the troops 1 have remaining to 
insure the safety of the land movement 
with its imnien.se train, I shall send every 
mau by water that transports will carrv. 
"G. B. McCLELLAN,' 
" Maj. Gen. Com. 

'• Maj. Gen. H. W. Hau.kck, 

'• Commanding U. S. A." 

'• Hkadquarters Army of the Potomac, 
"^Berkeley, Aug. 1.5, 1862_L30 p. m. 
•The advanced corps and trains are 
fairly started. I learn nothing more in 
relation to reported advance of rebels via 
Jones's bridge. Shall push the movement 
as rapidly as possible. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Maj. Gen. 
" Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 

" Washington, D. C." 



" Hkadquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Berkeley, Aug, 15, 1862 — 10 p. m. 

" Coggin's point is abandoned. The 
whole of McCall's division, with its artil- 
lery, is now en route for Burnside. We 
have not yet transportation sufficient for 
our sick. I hope we will get it to-morrow. 

'• Porter is across the Chickahominy, 
near its mouth, with his wagons and re- 
serve artillery. Heintzelman at Jones's 
bridge with a portion of his corps. They 
will all be up by jnorning. 

" AveriU's cavalry on the other side. 
All quiet thus far. I cannot get the last 
of the wagons as far as Charles City Court 
House before some time. to-morrow after- 
noon. 

" I am hurrying matters with the utmost 
rapidity possible. Wagons will move all 
night. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

"Maj. Gen. 

" Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 

" Washington, D. C." 

^^fter the commencement of the move- 
ment, it was continued with the utmost 
rapidity, until all the troops and material 
were en route both by land and water, on 
the morning of the 16th. 

Late in the afternoon of that day, when 
the last man had disappeared from the 
deserted camps, I followed with my per- 
sonal staff in the track of the grand army 
of the Potomac ; bidding farewell to the 
scenes still covered with the marks of its 
presence, and to be forever memorable in 
history as the vicinity of its most brilliant 
exploits. 

Previous to the departure of the troops 
I had directed Capt. Duane, of the engi- 
neer corps, to proceed to Barrett's ferry, 
near the mouth of the Chickahominy, and 
throw across the river at that point a 
pontoon bridge. This was executed 
promptly and satisfactorily under the cover 
of gunboats; and an excellent bridge of 
about two thousand feet in length waa 
ready for the first arrival of troops. 

The greater part of the army, with its 
artillery, wagon trains, &c., crossed it 
rapidly, and in perfect order and safety, 
so that on the night of tlie 17th everything 
was across the Chickahominy, except the 
rear guard, which crossed early on the 
morning of the 18th, when the pontoon 
bridge was immediately removed. 

Gen. Porter's corps, which was the first 
to march from Harrison's landing, had 
l)een pushed forward rapidly, and on the 
16th reached Williamsburg, where I had 
directed him to halt until the entire army 
was across the Chickahominy. 

On his arrival at Williamsburg, how- 
ever, he received an intercepted letter, 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



110 



which led to the belief that Gen. Pope 
woukl have to conteiHl against a very heavy 
force then in his front. Gen. Porter, 
therefore, very properly took the respon- 
sibility of contiuuing his march directly 
on to Newport News, which place he 
reached on the niorninn: of the 18th of 
August, having marched his corps sixty 
niiies in tiie short period of three days j 
and one niuht, halting one day at the 
crossing of the Chickahominy. I 

The cmbarcatiou of this corps com- ! 
menced as soon as transports were ready, 1 
and on the 20th it had all sailed for Aquia ' 
creek. I made the following report from 1 
Barrett's ferry : 

" Hkadquaktkrs Army of the Potomac,! 

" Barrett's Ferry, Chickahominy, 1 

"Aug. 17, 18()2 — 11 A. M. I 

" Everything is removed from our camp 
at Harrison's bar. No property nor men 
left behind. 

"The (5th) fifth corps is at Williams- 
burg, with all its wagons and reserve ar- 
tillery. The (3d) third corps is on its 
march from Jones's bridge to Williams- 
burg, via Diascund bridge, and has proba- 
bly passed the latter before this hour. 
AveriU's cavalry watches everything in 
that direction. 

" The mass of the wagons have passed 
the ])ontoon bridge here, and are parked 
on the other side. Peck's wagons are now 
crossing ; his division will soon be over. 
Headquarters wagons follow Peck's. I 
hope to have everything over to-night, and 
the bridge removed by daylight. May be 
delayed beyond that time. Came here to 
gee Burnside. otherwise should have re- 
mained with the rear guard. Thus far all 
is quiet, and not a shot that 1 know of 
since we began the march. 

•' I shall not feel entirely secure until 1 
have the whole army beyond the Chicka- 
hominy. I will then begin to forward 
troops by water as fast as transportation 
permits. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Maj. Gen. Com. 

"Maj. Gen. H. W. Hallkck, 

"Cora. U. S. A., Washington, D. C." 

■ On 'the 18th and 19th our march was 
continued to Williamsburg and Yorktown, 
and on the 20th the remainder of the army 
was ready to eml)ark at Yorktown, For- 
tress Monroe and Newport News. 

'i'he movement of the main body of the 
army on this march was covered by (ien. 
Pleasonton with his cavalry ;ind horse ar- 
tillrry. That officer remained at llaxall's 
until' the army had passed Charl(>s City 
Court House, when he gradually fell back. 
j)i,'-king up the stragglers as he proceeded, 
and crossed the bridge over the Chicka- 



hominy after the main body had marched 
towards Williamsburg. . His troops wer«? 
the last to cross the bridge, and he de- 
serves great credit for the maimer w 
which he performed his duty. 

(ien, Averill did a similar service, in the 
same satisfactory way, in covering the 
march of the Hd corps. 

As the campaign on the Peninsula ter- 
minated here, 1 cannot close this part of 
my report without giving an exjjression of 
my sincere thanks aiul gratitude to the 
officers and men whom I had the honor to 
command. 

From the commencement to the termi- 
nation of this most arduous campaign, the 
army of the Potomac always evinced the 
most perfect subordination, zeal, and alac- 
rity in the performance of all the dutie.s 
recjuircd of'it. 

The amount of severe labor accomplished 
by this army in the construction of in- 
trenchments, roads, bridges. &c. was enor- 
mous ; yet all the work was performed 
with the most gratifying cheerfulness and 
devotion to the interests of the service. 

During the campaign ten severely con- 
tested and sanguinary battles had been 
fought, besides numerous smaller engage- 
ments, in which the troops exhibited t\\e 
most determined enthusiasm and bravery. 
They subjiiitted to exi)osure. sickness, and 
even death, without a murmur. Indeed 
they had become veterans in their coun- 
try's cause, and richly deserved the warm 
commendation of the govermnent. 

It was in view of these facts tliat thi.<» 
seemed to me an a])propriate occasion for 
the general-in-chief to give, in general 
orders, some appreciative expression of 
the services of the army while upon the 
Peninsula. Accordingly, on the Ibth. 1 
sent him the following despatch : 

"Headquarters Army ok thr Potomac, 
"Aug. 18. 1862—11 y. m. 

"Please say a kind word to my army 
that I can repeat to them in general order!< 
in retrard to their conduct at Yorktown. 
Williamsburg, West Point, Hanover Court 
House, and on the Chickahominy, as well 
as in regard to the (7) seven days and the 
recent retreat. 

" No one has over said anything 1o 
cheer them but myself. Say nothing 
about me. Merely give my men and ofli- 
cers credit for what they have done It 
will do you much, good, and will strenglheii 
you much with them if you issue ahiud- 
some order to them in regard to wliat they 
have accomplished. They deserve it. 
" (;. B. MrC;LEELAN, Maj.-Geri. 

" Maj.-Gen. Hai.i,k('K, 

" Washington, 1). C" 

As no reply was received to this com- 



120 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



munication, and no order was issued by 1 
the ffeneral-in-chief, I conclude that sug- j 
trostion did not meet with his approbation. 
Ail the personnel and material of the 
army had been transferred from Harrison's 
iund'inf,^ to the different points of embarca- 
tion in the very brief period of five days 
without the slightest loss or damage. 
I'orter's troops sailed from Newport News 
on the l'.)th iiud '20th. Heintzelmau's corps 
sailed from Yorktown on the 21st. On 
that day I received the following telegram 
from the general in chief : 

" WAsiiiNGTo>f, Aug. 21, 1862 — 6 p. m. 

'• Tjcave such garrisons in Fortress Mon- 
roe, Yorktown, <tc., as you may deem pro- 
per. They will be replaced by new troops 
as rapidly as possible. 

"'I'he forces of Burnside and Pope are 
liard pushed, and require aid as rapidly as 
you can send it. Come yourself as soon 
as you can. 

''By all means see that the troops sent 
have plenty of ammunition. We have no 
time here to supply them. Moreover, 
they may have to fight as soon as they 
laud. 

"H. W. ITALLECK, 
" Maj -Gen. Comd"g U. S. Army. 

" Gen. MoClellan." 

To which the following are replies : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"Fortress Monroe, Aug. 21, 1862, 

7,80 p. M. 

"Your despatch of (6) six p.m. received. 
I have not lost an hour in sending troops, 
nor will I. Franklin is here, and I will try 
to get some of his troops on board to-nisjht. 
1 had already ordered all the ammunition 
forward. 

" I will put headquarters on board ship 
early to-morrow morning, so that I can 
leave at a moment's notice. I hope that 
1 can get oft' to-morrow. Shall I go in 
person to A([uia, or do you wish to see me 
first at A^'asllington ? If you wish it I can 
probably ship (juite an amount of ammu- 
nition for other troops than tliis army. 

"(t. B. McOLKLLAN, Maj-Gen. 

" Maj.-Gen. Hai.i.eck, 

Washington, D, C. 

" Hkadqtartrrs Army of the Potomac, 
"Fort Monroe. Aug. 21, 1862 — 10,25 p. m. 

" I have ample supplies of ammunition 
for infantry and artillery, and will have it 
up in time. 1 can supply any deficiency 
that may exist in (^en. Po|)e's army. Quite 
a number of rified field guns are on hand 
here. 

"The forage is the only question for you 
to attend to; please have that ready for 
me at Aquia. 1 want many-more schooners 



for cavalry horses; they should have water 
on hand when they come here. 

"If you have leisure, and there is no 
objection, please communicate to me fully 
the state of affairs, and your plans. I will 
then be enabled to arrange details under- 
standingly. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 
"Maj.-Gen. Halleck, Washington." 
Immediately on reaching Fort Monroe, 
I gave directions for strengthening the 
defences of Yorktown, to resist any attack 
from the direction of Richmond, and left 
Gen. Keyes, with his corps, to perform the 
work, and temporarily garrison the place. 

I telegraphed as follows on the 22d : 
"Headqcarters Army of the Potomac. 
" Fort Monroe, Aug. 22, 1862—2,1.') p. m. 

" Despatch of to-day received. Frank- 
lin's corps is embarking as rapidly as pos- 
sible. Sumner's corps is at Newport News, 
ready to embark as fast as transjiortation 
arrives. Keyes is still at Yorktown, 
putting it in a proper state of defence. I 
think that all of Franklin's corps will get 
off to-day, and hope to commence with 
Sunmer to-morrow. I shall then push off 
the cavalry and wagons. 

G. B. McGLFLLAN, Maj.-Gen. 

"Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halt.eck, 

"Washington, D. C. 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"Fort Monroe, 'Aug. 22. 1862—3,40 p. m. 

"Two (2) good ordnance sergeants are 
needed immediately at Yorktown and 
Gloucester. The new defences are ar- 
ranged and commenced. 

" I recommend that (.5,000) five thou- 
sand new troops be sent immediately to 
garrison Yorktown and Gloucester. They 
should be commanded by an experienced 
general officer, who can discipline and in- 
struct them. About (900) nine hundred 
should be artillery. I recommend that a 
new regiment, whose colonel is an artillery 
officer, or graduate, be designated as 
heavy artillery, and sent there. A similar 
regiment is absolutelv necessary here. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj.-Gen. 

"Maj. Gen. H. W. Hai.i.ec^k. 
" Comd'g U. S. Army." 

On the 23d Franklin's corps sailed. I 
reported this in the following despatch : 

"Headquartfjis Army of the Potomac, 

"Fort Monroe, Aug. 23, 1862—1.30 p. m. 

"Franklin's corps has started. I shall 

start for Aquia in about half an hour. No 

transports yet for Sumner's corps. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

"Major General. 
" Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
" Comd'g U. S. Army." 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



121 



On t'lat PveniiiEr I sailed with my staff 
for Aquia creek, whore I arrived at <hiy- 
light on the I'olloAviug morning, reporting 
as I'd lows : 

"Heaiiquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Aquia Creek, Aug. 24, 18G2. 
" I have reached here, and respectfully 
report for orders. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

"Major General. 
" Maj. Gen. H. "W. Halleck, 
" Comd'g U. S. Army." 

I also telegraphed as follows : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Aquia ('reek, Aug. 24, 1862—2 p. m. 

" Your telegram received. Mftrell's 
scouts report Rappahannock station 
burned and abandoned by Pope, without 
any notice to Morell or Sykes. This was 
telegraphed you some hours ago. Rey- 
nolds, Reno, and Stevens are supposed to 
be with Pope, as nothing can be heard of 
them to-day. Morell and Sykes are near 
Morrisville Post Office, watching the lower 
, fords of Rappahannock, with no troops 
* between there and Rappahannock station, 
which is reported abandoned by Pope. 

" Please inform me immediately exactly 
where Pope is, and what doing? until i 
know that I cannot regulate Porter's 
movements ; he is much exposed now, and 
decided measures should be taken at once. 
Until I know what my command and posi- 
tion are to be. and whether you still intend 
to place me in the command indicated in 
your first letter to me, and orolly through 
Geu. Burnside, at the Chickaliominy, I 
cannot decide where 1 can be of most use. 
If your determination is unchanged. I 
ought to go to Alexandria at once. Please 
define my position and duties. 

"G. B. MoCLELLAN, 

"Major General. 

"Maj. Gen. H. W. Hau.eck, 
"ConuVg U. S. Army." 

To which I received the following reply : 

" Washingtov, Aug. 24, 1862. 
"You ask me for information that I 
cannot give. I do not know either where 
Gen. Pope is, or where the enemy in force 
i.s. These are matters wliich I have all 
day been most anxious to ascertain. 

" H. W. HALLECK, 

" Gen. in-Chief. 

" Maj. Gen. McCleu.an." 
On the 26th I received the followiilg : 
"Washington, Aug. 26, 1862 — 11 a. m. 
" There is reason to believe that the 
enemy is moving a large force into the 



Shenandoah valley. Reconnoissances will 
soon determine. (Ion. lleintzelman's corps 
was ordered to report to Gen. Pope, and 
Kearney's will probably be sent to-day 
against the enemy's flank. Don't draw 
any troops down the Rappahannock at 
present ; we shall probably want them all 
in the direction of the Shenandoah. IVr- 
haps you had better leave (ren. Burns'ide 
in charge at Aquia creek, and come to 
Alexandria, as very great irregularities 
are reported there. Gen. Franklin's corps 
will march as soon as it receives trans- 
portation. 

" H. W. HALLECK. Gen.-in-Chief. 
"Maj. Gen. G. B. McClellan." 

On the receipt of this I immediately 
sailed for Alexandria and reported as fol- 
lows : 

" Alexandria, Aug. 27, 1862—8 a. m. 
" I arrived here last night, and have 
taken measures to ascertain the stute of 
affairs here, and that proper remedies may 
be applied. Just received a rumor that 
railway bridge over Bull run was burned 
last night. 

G. B. MoCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
" Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
" Comd'g U. S. Army." 

" Alexandria, Aug. 27, 1862—9.40 a. m. 

" The town is quiet, altliough quite full 
of soldiers, who are said to be chiefly con- 
valescents. 

" The affairs of the quartermaster's de- 
partment are reported as going on well. 

"It is said that the Bull's run bridge 
Avill be repaired by to-morrow. The dis- 
embarcation of Sumner's corps commenced 
at Acpiia yesterday afternoon. I found 
that he could reach Ra])pahannock station 
earlier that way than from here. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

'• Major General. 

" Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
" Comd'g U. S. Army." 

On the same day I received the follow- 
ing : 

" AVashington, Aug. 27, 1862. 

" Telegrams from (Jen. Porter to (Jon. 
Burnside, just received, say that Banks is 
at Fayetteville , McDowell, Sigel, and 
Rioketts near Warrenton ; R>no on his 
right. Porter is marching on Warrenton 
Junction, to re-inforce Pope. Nothing 
said of Heintzelman. Porter reports a 
general battle imminent. Franklin's corps 
should move out by forced marches, car- 
rying three or four day's provisions, and 
to be supplied as far as* possible, by rail- 
road. Perhaps you may prefer some other 



122 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



road than Centreville. Col. Haupt has 
just telegraphed about sending out troops. 
Please see him, and give him your direc- 
tious. There has been some serious neg- 
lect to guard the railroad, which should 
be immediately remedied. 

'• H. W. HALLECK, 

" Gen.-in-Chief. 

" Maj. Gen. McClellan." 

I replied as follows : 

'• At,exandria, Aug. 27, 1862 — 10 a. m. 

" Telegram this moment received. I 
have sent orders to Franklin to prepare to 
march with his corps at once, and to re- 
pair here in person to inform me as to 
ills means of transportation. 

•' Kearney was yesterday at Rappahan- 
nock station ; Porter at Bealton, Kellip, 
Barnell's, &c. Sumner will commence 
reaching Falmouth to-day. Williams's 
^ Massachusetts cavalry will be mostly at 
Falmouth to-day. 

•• I loaned Burnside my personal escort 
(one squadron 4th regulars) to scout down 
Ilappahannock. 

•' 1 have sent for Couch's division to 
come at once. As fast as I gain any in- 
formation I will forward it, although you 
may already have it. 

* " G. 13. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 

Maj. Gen. H. W. Halt.eck, 

"Washington, 1). C." 

] also received the following telegrams : 
"Washington, Aug. 27, 1862. 

" Direct Gen. Casey to furnish you about 
five thousand of the new troops under his 
command. 

"'J'ake entire direction of the sending 
out of the troops from Alexandria. 

" Determine questions of priority in 
transportation, and the places they shall 
occupy. Pope's headquarters are near 
Warrenton Junction, but I cannot ascer- 
t.ain the present position of his troops. 
" H. W. IIAELECK, Gen.-in-Chief. 

" Maj. Gen. McClellan." 

"Washington, Aug. 27, 1862. 

"I can get ho satisfactory information 
from the front, either of the enemy or of 
our troops. There seems to have been 
great neiriect and carelessness about Man- 
a.-..sas Franklin's corps should march in 
that direction as soon as possible. A 
competent officer should be sent to take 
direction of affairs in that vicinity. 

-H. W. HALLECK, Gen.-in-Chief. 

" IVIaj.-Gen. McClellan." 

Upon the receipt of these I immediately 
Bent the following telegram to Gens. 
Heintzclman and Porter : 
" Alexandria, Aug. 27, 18G2— 10.30 a. m. 

" Where are you, and what is state of 



affairs — what troops in your front, right, 
and left? Sumner is now landing at 
Aquia. Where is Pope's left, and what 
of enemy? Enemy burned Bull run 
bridge last night with cavalrv force. 

"G B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 

" Maj. Gen. Heintzelman, Warrenton. 

" Maj. Gen. Porter, Bealton. 

" P. S. — If these general officers are not 
at the places named, nearest operator will 
please have message forwarded." 



to the general-in 



I also telegraphed 
chief as follows : 
"Alexandria, Aug. 27, 1862—10.50 a. m. 

" I have sent all the information I pos- 
sess to Burnside, instructing him to look 
out well for his right flank, between the 
Rappahannock and Potomac, and to send 
no trains to Porter without an escort. I 
fear the cavalry who dashed at Bull run 
last night may trouble Burnside a little. 
I have sent to communicate with Porter 
and Heintzelman, via Falmouth, and hope 
to give you some definite information in a 
few hours. I shall land the next cavalry 
I get hold of here, and send it out to keep 
oi)en the communication between Pope <<i» 
and Porter, also to watch vichiity of Man- 
assas. Please send me a number of copies 
of the best maps of present field of opera- 
tions. I can use fifty (.^0) to advantage. 
" G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj.-Gen. 

"Maj. Gen. Halleck, 

"Comd'g U. S. Army." 

"Alexandria, Aug. 27, 1862—12.50 a. m. 
" In view of Burnside's despatch, just 
received, would it not be advisable i« 
throw the mass of Sumner's corps here, to 
move out with Franklin to Centreville or 
vicinity ? If a decisive battle is fought 
at Warrenton, a disaster would leave any 
troops on lower Rappahannock in a dan- 
gerous position. 

"They would do better service in front 
of Washington. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 
"Maj. Gen. Halleck, 

" Washington, D. C." 

"Alexandria, Aug. 27, 1862—12.5 p. m. 
" My aid has just returned from Gen. 
Franklin's camp; reports that Gens. 
Franklin, Smith, and Slocum are all in 
Washington. He gave the order to the 
next in rank to place the corps in readi- 
ness to move at once. I learn that heavy 
firing has been heard this morning at 
Centreville, and have sent to ascertain the 
truth. I can find no cavalry to send out 
on the roads. Are the works garrisoned 
and ready for defence ? 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 

"Maj. Gen. Halleck, Washington." 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



123 



"Ai.KXANDRiA, Aug. 27, 1862—12.20 i-. m. 

''What bridges exist over Bull run? 
Have steps been taken to construct bridges 
((>r the advance of troops to re-enforce 
I'ope, or to enable him to retreat if in 
trouble ? 

"Tliere should be two gunboats at 
Aquia creek at once. Shall I push the 
rest of Sumner's corps here, or is Pope so 
strong as to be reasonably certain of suc- 
ceos ? I have sent to inspect the works 
near here and their garrisons. 

•'As soon as I can find Gen. Casey, or 
some other commanding officer. I will see 
to tlie railway, <!cc. It would be well to 
have them report to me, as I do not know 
wliere they are. I am trying to find them, 
and will lose no time in carrying out your | 
orders. Would you like to see Burnside?i 
" a. B. McCLKLLAN, Maj. Gen. j 
*' Maj. Gen. 11. W. IIalleck, Washing'n." 

" Alexaxdria, Aug. 27, 18G2 — 1.1.5 p. m. ] 

"Franklin's artillery have no horses,.! 
except for (4) four guns without caissons. | 
I can pick up no cavalry. In view of these 
facts, will it not be well to push Sumner's 
corps here by water as rapidly as possible, 
to make immediate arrangements for 
placing the works in front of Washing- 
ton in an efficient condition of defence ? 
I have no means of knowing the enemy's 
force between Pope and ourselves. 

'• Can Franklin, without liis artillery or 
Crtvalry, eifect any useful purpose in front? 

" Should not Burnside take steps at once 
to evacuate Falmouth and Aquia, at the 
game time covering the retreat of any of 
Pope's troops who may fall back in that 
directions ? 

" 1 do not se that we have force enough 
in hand to form a connexion with Pope, 
whose exact position we do not know. Are 
we safe in the direction of tlie vallev? 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 
"Maj. Gen. Halleck, Washington." 

" Alexandria, Aug. 27, 18G2 — 1.3,5 p. m. 

" 1 learn that Taylor's brigade, sent this 
morning to Bull run bridge, is either cut 
to pieces or captured. 

•• That the force against tliem had many 
ffuns, and about (5, 000) five thousand in- 
fantry, receiving re-enforcements every 
minute ; also, that (xainesville is in posses- 
sion of the enemy. Please send some 
cavalry out toward Drainsville, via Chain 
bridge, to watch Lewinsville and Drains- 
ville, and go as far as they can. If you 
will give me even one squadron of good 
cavalry here I will ascertain the state of 
the case. I think our policy now is to 
make these works perfectly safe, and mo- 
bilize a couple of corps as soon as possible. 
but not to advance them until they can 



have their artillery and cavalry. I have 
sent lor Col. Tyler to place his artillery- 
men in the works. 

•' Is Fort Marcy securely held ? 

"(}. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 
'' Gen. Halleck." 

"Alexaxdria, Aug. 27, 1862—2.30 r. m. 

" Sumner has been ordered to send here 
all of his corps that are within reach. Or- 
ders have i)een sent to Couch to come 
here from Yorktown with the least possi- 
ble delay. But one sipuulron of my cav- 
alry has arrived ; that will be disembarked 
at once and sent to tlie front. 

"If there is any cavalry in Washington 
it should be ordered to report to me at 
once. 

"I still thuik that we should first pro- 
vide for the immediate defence of Wash- 
ington on both sides of the Potomac. 

"I am not responsible for the past, and 
cannot be for the future, unless I receive 
authority to dispose of the available troops 
according to my judgment. Please inform 
me at once what my position is. 1 do not 
wish to act in the dark. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 
"Maj. Gen. H. W. Hallkck, 

"Comd'g U. S. Army." 

" Alexandria, Aug. 27, 1862 — 6 p. m. 

" T have just received the copy of a des- 
patch from Gen. Pope to you, dated 10 
A. M. this morning, in which he says : ' All 
forces now sent forward should be sent to 
my right at Gainesville.' 

"I now halve at my disposal here a>)Out 
(10,000) ten thousand men of Franklin's 
corps, about (2.800) twenty-eight hundred 
of Gen. Tyler's brigade and Col. 'J'yler's 
first Connecticut artillery, which 1 recom- 
mend should be held in hand for the de- 
fence of Washington. 

" If you wish me to order any part of 
this force to the front, it is in readiness to 
march at a moment's notice to any point 
you may indicate. 

" In view of the existing state of things 
in our front, I have deemed it best to or- 
der Gen. Casey to hold his men for York- 
town in readiness to move, but not to send 
them off till further orders. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 
"Maj. Gen. H. W. IIalleck, 

" Comd'g U. S. Army." 

On the 28th I telegraphed as follows . 
" Headquarters Camp near Alexandria, 
" Aug. 28, 1862—4.10 p. w. 

" Gcn» Franklin is with me here. I will 
know in a few minutes the condition of ar- 
tillery and cavalry. 

" We are not yet in condition to move ; 
may be by to-morrow morning. 

" Pope must cut through to-day, or adopt 



1?4 REPORT OF GESTP.AL GEORGE B. ATCLELILAX 

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126 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN". 



" Orders have been given for railway 
and wagon trains to move to Pope with 
lea.st possible delay. 

•'lam having inspections made of all 
the forts around the city by members of 
my staff, with instructions to give all requi- 
site orders. 

" I inspected Worth and Ward myself 
this evening; fo\ind them in good order. 

" Reports, so far as heard from, are fav- 
orable as to condition o: works. 

•'(;. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 

"Maj. Gen. Halleck, Washington." 

" Camp near Alexandria, 

" Aug. 29, 1862—10 p. m. 

" Your despatch received. Franklin's 
corps has been ordered to march at 6 
o'clock to-morrow morning. Sumner has 
about fourteen thousand infantry, without 
cavalry or artillery, here. Cox''s brigade 
of four regiments is here, with two bat- 
teries of artillery. Men of two regiments, 
mu<>h fatigued, came in to-day. Tyler's 
brigade of three new regiments, but little 
drilled, is also here ; all these troops will 
be ordered to hold themselves ready to 
nuxrch to-morrow morning, and all except 
Franklin's to await further orders. 

" If you wish any of them to move to- 
wards Manassas, please inform me. 

" Col. Wagner, 2d New York artillery, 
has just come in from the front. He re- 
ports strong infantry and cavalry force of 
rebels near Fairfax Court Ho\]se. Re- 
ports rumors from various sources that 
Lee and Stuart, with large forces, are at 
Manassas. 

"That the enemy.' with 120,000 men, in- 
tend ajivancing on the forts near Arling- 
ton and Chain bridge, with a view of attack- 
ing Washington and Baltimore. 

*' Cen. Barnard telegraphs me to-night 
that the length of the line of fortifications 
on this side of the Potonuic requires 2,000 
additional artillerymen, and additional 
troops to defend intervals, according to 
circumstiinces ; at all events, he says an old 
re<;iment should be added to tlie force at 
Chain bridge, and a few regiments distrib- 
uted along the Hues to give confidence to 
our new troops. I agree with him fully. 
and think our fortifications ahuigthe upper 
part of our line on this side the river very 
unsafe with their present garrisons, anil 
the movements of the enemy seem to indi- 
cate an attack upon those works. 

"C. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 

"Gen. H. W. HAi.LEcrc, Gen."-in-Chief 
U. S. Army, Washington, D. C." 

" Camp near Alexandria, 
"Aug. 30, 18G2— 11..W A.M. 
"Your telegram of 9 a. m. received. 
Ever since Gen. Franklin rece-'vcd notice 
thai he was to march from Alexandria, he 



has been endeavoring to get transporta- 
tion from the quartermaster at Alexan- 
dria, but he has uniformly been told that 
there was none disposable, and his com- 
mand marched without wagons. After the 
( departure of his corps he procured twenty 
wagons to carry some extra ammunition, 
by unloading Banks's supply train. 

"Gen. Sunnier endeavored, by applica- 
tion upon the quartermaster's department, 
to get wagons to carry his reserve am.mn- 
nitxOn,but without success, and was obliged 
to march with what he could carry in his 
cartridge-boxes. 

"I have this morning directed that ail 
my headquarters wagons that are landed be 
at once loaded with ammunition for Sum- 
ner and Franklin ; but they will not go far 
towards supplying the deficiency. 

"Eighty-five wagons were got together 
by the quartermasters last night, loaded 
with subsistence, and sent forward at 1 a. m. 
with an escort via Anandale. Every effort 
has been made to carry out your orders 
promptly. The great difficulty seems to 
consist in the fact that the greater part of 
the transport.ation on hand at Alexander 
and AVashington has been needed for cur- 
rent supplies of the garrisons. Such is 
the state of the case as represented tome 
by the quartermasters, and it appears to 
be true. 

"I take it for granted that this has not 
been properly explained to you. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 

" Maj. Gen. Halleck, Gen.-in-Chief." 

On the morning of the 30th heavy artil- 
lery firing was heard in the direction of 
Fairfax Court Hcmse, which I reported to 
the general-in-chief. 

At 11 A. M. the following telegram was 
sent : 

"Camp near Alexandria, 
Aug. 30, 18G2--11 A. M. 

"Have ordered Sumner to leave (1) one 
I brigade in vicinity of Chain bridge, and 1o 
move the rest via Columbia pike on Anan- 
dale and Fairfax Court House. 

"Is this the route you wish them to take? 
He and Franklin are both instructed to 
join Pope as promptly as possible. 

"Shall Couch move out also when he 
arrives? 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. (^en. 

" Maj. Gen. Halleck, Washington." 

On the same day I received the follow- 
ing : 

"Washington, Aug. 30, 1862—1.45 p.m. 

"Ammunition, and particularly for artil- 
lery, must be immediately sent forward to 
Centreville for Gen. Pope. It must be 
done with all possible despatch. 

"H. W. HALLECK, Gcn.-in-Chief. 

" Gen. McClellaji"." 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 127 



To which this r-oply was made: 

" Camp NEAR Alkxandria, 

"Aug. -M, 1HG2— 2.10 i>. m. 

" I know nothing of the calibres of Pope's 
aa'tillery. All 1 can do is to direct my 
wdnance officer to load up all the wagons 
Bciit to him. 1 have already sent all my 
headquarters wagons. You will have to 
Bee that wagons are sent from ^Vashing- 
toii. I can do nothing more than give the 
order that every available wagon in Alex- 
andria shall be loaded at once. 

'•The order to the brigade of Sumner 
that I directed to remain near Chain bridge 
ajtid Tenallytovvn should go from your 
head(iuarters to save time. I understand 
you to intend it also to move. 1 liave no 
sharpshooters except the guard around 
my camp. 1 have sent off every man but 
those, and will now send them with the 
train as you direct. I will also send my 
only remaining squadron of cavalry with 
Ce'i. Sunnier. 1 can do more. You now 
have every man of the army of the Po- 
tomac who is within my reach. 

"C. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 

'•Maj. Gen. Ji. W. Hai.lkck." 

At 10. ,30 p. M. the following telegram was 
sent : 

"Camp nkar Ai.kxanorta, 
"Aug. ;J0, 18(52—10.30 p. m. 

"I have sent to the front all my troops 
with the exception of Couch's division, 
and have given the orders necessary to iiir 
sure its tieing disposed of as you directed. 
I hourly expect the return of one of jny 
aids, who will give authentic news from the 
field of battle. 

" 1 cannot express to you the pain and 
mortification I have experienced to-day in 
listening to th(! distant sound of the firing 
of my m'n. As I can be of no further use 
here, 1 respectfidly ask that, if there is a 
probability of the conflict binng renewed 
to-morrow, I may be permitted to go to 
the scene of battle with my staff, merely 
to be with my own men, if nothing more; 
they will fight none the worse for nw being 
with them. If it is not deemed l^est to 
intrust me with tlu; command even of my 
o'Yii army,! simply ask to be permitted to 
share their fate on the field of liattle. 

" Please reply to this to-night. 

" I have been engaged for the last few 
hours in doing what I can to make arrange- 
meut.s for the wounded. 1 have started 
out all the ambuhincos now landed. As I 
have sent my escort to the front, I would 
be glad to take some of Gregg's cavalry 
with 'me, if allowed to go. 

"G. B. McCLKLLAN, Maj. Gen. 

"Maj. Gen. II. W. IIai.i.ei'k, 

"Uomdg. U.S. Army, Washington, D.C." 



To which, on the following day, I re- 
ceived this answer : 

"Washington, Aug. 31, 1862—9.18 a. m. 

"I have just seen your telegram of 1 1..^) 
last night. The substance was stated to 
me when received, but 1 did not know that 
you asked for a reply immediately. I can- 
not answer without seeing the President, 
as (len. Pope is in command, by his orders, 
of the department. 

"I think Couch's division should go for- 
ward as rapidly as possible and find the 
battle-field. 

" H. W. HALLECK, Gcn.-in-Chicf. 

"Maj. Gen. McClellan," 

On the same day the following was re- 
ceived : 

" Washin-oton, Aug. .31. 18G2— 12.« p. v. 

"The subsistence department are making 
Fairfax station their princi])al depot. It 
siiould be well guarded. The officer in 
charge should be directed to secure the 
depot by abatis against cavalry. As many 
as possible of the new regiments should be 
prepared to take the field. Perhaps some 
more should be sent to the vicinity of 
Chain bridge. 

" IT W. HAIvLECK, Cicn.-in-Chief. 

"Maj. C(^n. McCj.kij-an." 

At 2.30 p. M. the following despatch w;is 
teli'graphed : 

" Camp near Alexandria, 
" August 31, 18()2— 2.30 p. m. 
"Major llaller is at F'airfax station 
with my provost and headquarters guard 
and other troops. I have requested (4) 
fourmore companies to be sent at once, 
and the precautions you direct to be taken. 
" Under the War Department order of 
yesterday 1 have no control over anytliing 
except my staff, some one hundred men in 
my camp here, and the few remaining nejir 
Fort Monroe. I have no control over the 
new regiments — do not know where they 
! are, or anything about them, except those 
I near here. Their commanding officers and 
I those of the works are not under me. 
I " Where I have seen evils existing under 
I my eye I have corrected them. I think it 
is the business of Gen. Casey to prepare 
the new rigiments for the field, and a 
] matter between him and (jcn. Barnard to 
order others to the vicinity of (Jhain 
bridge. Neither of them is under my 
command, and by th6 War Department 
order I have no right to give them orders. 
"CJ. B. .McCLELLAN, Major-l.'eu. 
"(Jen. IIallkok, Washington." 

To which the following is an answer : 
"Washington, Aug. 31, 1862—10.7 p. k 

" Since receiving your despatch, relating 
to command, I have not been able to an 
swer any not of absolute necessity. I have 



128 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



not seen the order as published, but -will 
write to you in the morning. You will 
retain the command of everything in this 
vicinity not temporarily belonging to 
Pope's army in the field. 

'• I beg of you to assist me in this crisis 
with your ability and experience. 1 am 
entirely tired out. 

"H. W. HALLECK, Gen .-in-Chief. 

"Gen. McClkli-an." 

The order referred to in the preceding 
despatch was as follows : 

"War Department, Aug. 30, 1862. 

" The following are the commanders of 
ihfi. armies operating in Virginia: 

"Gen. Burnside* commands his own 
corps, except those that have been tempo- 
rarily detached and assigned to Gen. 
Pope. 

" Gen. McClellan commands that portion 
of the army of the Potomac that has not 
been sent forward to Gen. Pope's com- 
mand. 

" Gen. Pope commands the army in Vir- 
ginia and all the forces temporarily attach- 
ed to it. All the forces are under the 
command of Major-Gen. Halleck, Gen.-in- 
Chief. 

" E. J. TOWNSEND, Ass't Adj. Gen. 

I was informed by Col. Townsend that 
the above was published by order of the 
Secretary of War. 

At 11.30 p. M. I telegraphed the follow- 
ing : 

" Camp near Alexandria, 
" August 31, 1862—11.30 p. m. 

"The sqimdron of 2d regular cavalry 
that I sent with Gen. Sumner was captured 
to-day about 2 p. m., some three miles from 
Fairfax Court House, beyond it on the 
Little river pike, by Fitz Hugh T>ee. with 
three thousand cavalry and three light 
batteries. 

" 1 have conversed with the 1st sergeant, 
who says that when he last saw them they 
were within a mile of Fairfax. Pope had 
no troops on that road ; this squadron 
getthig there by mistake. There is no- 
thing of ours on the right of Centreville 
but -Sumner's corps. There was much 
artillery firing during the day. A rebel 
major told the sergeant that the rebels had 
driven in our entire left to-day. He says 
the road is filled with wagons and strag- 
glers coming Towards Alexandria: 

" It is clear from the sergeant's account 
that we were badly beaten yesterday, and 
that Pope's right is entirely exposed. 

" I recommend that no more of Couch's di- 
vision be sent to the front, that Burnside be 
brought here as soon as practicable, and that 
everything available this side of Fairfax be 
drawn in at once, including the mass of 



the troop's on the railroad. I apprehend 
that the enemy will, or have by this timp 
occupied Fairfax Court House and cut off 
Pope entirely, unless he fall back to-night 
vui Sangster's and Fairfax station. 

" I think these orders should be sent at 
once. I have no confidence in the dispo- 
sitions made as I gather them. To speak 
frankly — and the occasion requires it — 
there appears to be a total absence of 
brains, and I fear the total destruction of 
the army. I have some cavalry here that 
can carry out any orders you may have to 
send. The occasion is grave, and demands 
grave measures. The question is, th« sal- 
vation of the country. I learn that our 
loss yesterday amounted to fifteen thou- 
sand. We cannot afford such losses with- 
out an object. 

" It is my deliberate opinion that the 
interests of the nation demand that Pope 
should fall back to-night if possible, and 
not one moment is to be lost. 

" I will use all the cavalry I have to 
watch our right. Please answer at once. 
I feel confident that you can rely upon the 
information I give you. 

"I shall be up all night, and ready to 
obey any orders you give me. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, Major-Gen. 
" Gen. Halleck, Washington." 

To which this reply was received : 

" Washington. Sept. 1, 1862—10 a. m. 

" Burnside was ordered up very early 
yesterday morning. Retain remainder of 
Couch's forces, and make arrangements to 
stop all retreating troops in line of works, 
or where you can best establish an entire 
line of defence. My news from Pope was 
up to 4 p. M. ; he was then all right. I 
must wait for more definite information 
before I can order a retreat, as the falling 
back on the line of works must necessar- 
rily be directed in case of a serious disaster. 
Give me all additional news that is relia- 
ble. 

" I shall be up all night, and ready to 
act as circumstances may require. I am 
fully a'^are of the gravity of the crisis, and 
have been for weeks. 

"H. W. HALLECK, Gen.-in-Chief. 

"Major-Gen. McClellan." 

It will be seen from what has preceded 
that I lost no time that could be avoided 
in moving the army of the Potomac from 
the Peninsula to the support of the army 
of Virginia ; that I spared no effort to 
hasten the embarcation of the troops at 
Fort Monroe, Newport News and York- 
town, remaining at Fort Monroe myself 
until the mass of the army had sailed ; 
and that, after my arrival at Alexandria. 
I left nothing in my power umlone to for- 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. MCLELLAX. 



139 



ward supplies and re-enforcements to Gen. 
Pope. I sent, with the troops that moved, 
all the cavalry I could get hold of. Even 
my personal escort was sent out upon the 
line of the railway as a guard, with the 
provost and camp giiards at head-quarters, 
retaining less than one hundred men. many 
of whom were orderlies, invalids, members 
of bands, etc. • All the headquarters teams 
that arrived were sent out with supplies 
and ammunition, none being retained even 
to move the headquarters camp. The 
squadron that habitually served as my per- 
sonal escort was left at Falmouth with 
Gen. Burnside, as he was deficient in cay- 
airy. 

♦-• — ■ 

FOURTH PERIOD. ' 



On the 1st of September I went into 
Washingtou, where I had an interview with 
the general-in-chief, who instructed me, 
Ycrbally, to take command of its defences, 
expressly limiting my jurisdiction to the 
works and their garrisons, and prohibiting 
me from es^ercising any control over the 
troops actively engaged in front under 
Gen. Pope. During this interview with 
the general-in-chief, the necessity of his 
going in person or sending one of his 
personal staff, to the army under Gen. 
Pope, for the purpose of ascertaining the 
exact condition of affairs; he sent Col. 
Kelton. his assistant adjutant general. 

During the afternoon of the same day I 
received a message from the general-in- 
chief, to the effect that he desired me to go 
at' once to his house to see the President. 

The President informed me that he had 
reason to believe that the army of the Po- 
tomac was not cheerfully co-operating with 
and supporting Gen. Pope : that he had 
•• always been a friend of mine :" and now 
asked me, as a special favor, to use my in- 
fluence in correcting this state of things. 
1 replied, substantially, that I was confi- 
dent that he was misinformed : that I was 
sure, whatever estimate the army of the 
Potomac might entertain of Gen. Pope, 
that they would obey his orders, support 
him to the fullest extent, and do their 
whole duty. The President, who was 
much moved, asked me to telegraph to 
" Fitz-John Porter, or some other of ray 
friends." and try to do away with any feel- 
ing that might exist ; adding, that I could 
rectify the" evil, and that no one else 
could. 

I thereupon told him that I would cheer- 
fully telegraph to Gen. Porter, or do any- 
thing else in my power to gratify his 
wishes and relieve his anxiety ; upon 
which he thanked me verv warmly, assured 
9 



me that he could never forget my action in 
the matter. &c.. and left. 

I then wrote the following telegram to 
Gen. Porter, which was sent to him by the 

general-Ln-chief: 

"WASHtNGTOx, Sept. 1, 1S62. 

" I ask of you. for my sake, that of the 
country, and the old army of the Potomac, 
that you and all my friends will lend the 
fullest and most cordial co-operation to 
Gen. Pope, in all the operations now going 
on. The destinies of our country, the 
honor of our arms, are at stake, and ail 
depends now upon the cheerful co-opera- 
tion of all in the field. This week is the 
crisis of our fate. Say the same thing to 
my friends in the army of the Potomac, 
and that the last request I have to make 
of them is, that, for their country's sake, 
they will extend to Gen. Pope the same 
support they ever have to me. 

'• I am in charge of the defences of 
Washington, and am doing all I can to 
render your retreat safe should that be- 
come necessary. 

•• GEO. B. McCLELLAN. 

•' Maj Gen. Poster." 

To which he sent the following reply : 

" Fairfax Cocrt House, 10 a. m., 
"Sept. 2, 1862. 
"You may rest assured that all your 
friends, as well as every lover of his coun- 
try, will ever give as they have given, to 
Gen. Pope their coi'dial co-operation and 
constant support in the execution of all 
orders and plans. Our killed, wounded. 
and enfeebled troops attest our devoted 
dutv. 

"F. J. PORTER. 
" Gen. Geo. B. McClella.v. 
" Maj. Gen. Commanding, Washington." 

Neither at the time I wrote the telegram. 
nor at any other time, did I think for one 
moment that Gen. Porter had been, or 
would be, in any manner derelict in the 
performance of his duty to the nation and 
its cause. Such an impression never en- 
tered my mind. The despatch in question 
was written purely at the request of the 
President. 

On the morning of the 2d.* the Presi 
dent and Gen. Halleok came to my house. 
when the President informed me that Coi. 



* The following order was published on the 2d of 
September. It w»s accidentally omitted by Gea. 
McClelUn in preparing the report : 

" Wax r-?AHTJls."fT. 



'.Ad 



'. s olBoe, 
pt. i 1J62. 
daad of th» 

troops for tfa« 



"Maj G-^n. McClellan - 

fjrtificati-oc:« of Washin^toa i- i 
defenw of the capital. 

•• By order of Maj. Gen. HALLECK ; 

E. D. TOWTTSEJO. 

Auiitant Adjauat General 



130 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN, 



Kelton liad returned from the front ; that 
our affairs were in a bad condition ; that 
the army was in full retreat upon the de- 
fences oi Washington ; the roads filled 
with stragglers, &c. He instructed me to 
take stepsat once to stop and collect the 
stragglers ; to place the works in a proper 
Btate of defence, and to go out to meet 
and take command of the army, when it 
approached the vicinity of the works, then 
to place the troops in the best position — 
committing everything to my hands. 

I immediately took steps to carry out 
these orders, and sent an aid to Gen. 
Pope with the following letter : 

" Headquarters, Washington, 

" Sept. 2, 1862. 
" General : Gen. Halleck instructed rae 
to report to you the order he sent this 
morning to withdraw yonr army to Wash- 
ington, without unnecessary delay. He 
feared that his messenger might miss you, 
and desired to take this double precaution. 
'• In order to bring troops upon ground 
with which they are already familiar, it 
would be best to move Porter's corps upon 
Uptons hill, that it may occiipy Hall's 
hill, itc; McDowell's to Upton's hill; 
Franklin's to the works in front of Alex- 
andria ; Heintzelman's to the same vicinity; 
Couch to Fort Corcoran, or, if practicable 
to the Chain bridge ; Sumner either to Fort 
Albany or to Alexandria, as it may be 
most convenient. 

" la ?iasTe, general, very truly yours, 
'• GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 
"Maj. Gen. United States Army. 
" Maj. Gen. John Pope. 

"Commanding Army of Virginia." 

In the afternoon I crossed the Potomac 
and rode to the front, and at Upton's hill 
met the advance of McDowell's corps, and 
with it Cens. Pope and ^McDowell. After 
getting what information I could from 
ihem. I sent the few aids at my diposal to 
the left to give instructions to the troops 
approaching in the direction of Alexan- 
dria: and hearing artillery firing in the 
direction of the Vienna and Langley road. 
by which the corps of Sumner. Porter, 
and .Sigel were returning, and learning 
from Gen. Pope that Sumner was probably 
engaged, I went with a single aid and three 
orderlies, by the shortest line to meet that 
column. I reached the column after dark, 
and proceeded as far ar Lewinsville, where 
I became satisfied that the rear corps 
(Sumner s) would be able to' reach its in- 
tended position without any serious moles- 
tation. 

I therefore indicated to Gens. Porter 
and Sigel the positions they were to oc- 
cupy, sent instructions to Geu. Sumner, 



and at a late hour of the night returned 
to Wasshington. 

Next day I rode to the front of Alexan- 
dria, and was engaged in rectifying the 
positions of the troops, and giving orders 
necessary to secure the issuing of the ne- 
cessary supplies, &c. 

j I felt sure on this day that we could re- 
pulse any attack made by the enemy on 

' the south side of the Potomac. 

On the 3d, the enemy had disappeared 

; from the front of Washington, and the in- 
formation which I received induced me to 

j believe that he intended to cross the upper 

I Potomac into Maryland. This materially 
changed the aspect of affairs, and enlarged 

: the sphere of operations ; for in case of a 
crossing in force, an active campaign 

; would be necessarj- to cover Baltimore, 
prevent the invasion of Pennsylvania, and 

; clear Maryland. 

: I therefore, on the third, ordered thp 

! 2d and 12th corps to Tenallytown, and 
the 9th corps to a point on the Seventh 
street road near Washington, and sent 
such cavalry as was available to the fords 
near Poolsville. to watch and impede the 
enemy in any attempt to cross in that 
vicinity. 

' On September .'), the 2d and 12th corps 

' were moved to Eockville. and Couch's 

division (the only one of the 4th corps that 

had been brought from the Peninsula) to 

Offut's cross-roads. 

On. the 6th the 1st and 9th corps were 
ordered to Leesburg; the 6th corps, and 
I Sykes's division of the 5th corps, to Ten- 
j allytown. 

I On the 7th the 6th corps was advanced 
to Rockville. to which place my head-quar- 
ters were moved on the same day. 
; All the necessary arrangments for the 
' defence of the city, under the new condi- 
; tion of things, had been made, and Gen. 
Banks was left in command, having receiv- 
his instructions from me. 

I left Wa.<hington on the 7th of Septem- 
ber. At this time it was known that the 
mass of the rebel army had passed up the 
the south side of the Potomac in the direc- 
tion of Leesburg, and that a portion of 
that army hud crossed into Maryland; bat 
whether it was their intention to cross 
their whole force with a view to turn 
j Washington by a flank movement down 
I the north bank of the Potomac, to move 
i on Baltimore, or to invade Pennsylvania, 
were questions which, at that time, we had 
no means of determining. This uncertain- 
ty as to the intentions of the enemy obli- 
ged me, up to the 13th of September, to 
march cautiously and to advance the army 
in such order as continually to keep Wash- 
ington and Baltimore covered, and at the 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX. 



131 



same time to hold the troops well in hand 
BO as to be able to concentrate and follow 
rapidly if the enemy took the direction of 
Pennsylvania ; or to return to the defence 
of Washington, if as was greatly feared by 
the authorities, the enemy should be mere- 
ly making a feint with a small force to 
draw of our army, while with their main 
forses they stood ready to seize the first fa- 
vorable opportunity to attack the capital. 
In the mean time the progress of re-or- 
ganization, rendered necessary after the 



demoralizing effects of the disastrous cam- 
paign upon the other side of the Potomac, 
was rapidly progressing ; the troops were 
regaining confidence, and their former sol- 
dierly appearance and discipline were fast 
returning. My cavalry was pushed out 
continually in all directions, and all possi- 
ble steps were taken to learn the positioM 
and movements of the enemy. 

The following table shows the move- 
ments of the array, from day to day, up to 
the 14th of September : 



I Sept. i. 



BURKSIDE. 

9th corps, 
ReDo 

l»t corps. 
Hooker.... 

SUIIKER. 

12th corps, 
WiUiams.. 

Sd corps. 
Sumner. . . 

FEAXKLIS. 

<th corps, 
FraukUn.. 

Couch's div. 



ScT'nthft.r'd 
Upton hill.... 



Sept. 9. I Sept. 10. 



Leesburg.. BrootviUc.. 
Leesburg.. BrookvlUe. 



TenallytowTi.iRockvllle. Middlebnrg Damascus.. 

I I 

Tenallytow-n . Rockville. Mlddleburg Clarksburg. 



Alex. Sem'y.. 
Tenallytown. 



Tenallyt'n Damest 'wn 
Offut'sC.RiM'thScneca 



Sykes'sdiT Tenallyt'n Rockville. ■ RocVville 



BamestowD , 
Poolesville. 



Sept. 11. 



Sept 12. 



New-Maritet ' Frederick. . 



Damascus. . . 
Clarksburg.. 



Bamesrille. 
Poolesville. . 



Ridseville.N. 
Market, camp 
on .Monocacy. 

IjamsvlUe C. 

Riads 

Urbana 



L I c k e nwell 

C. Roads .. 

Bamesville.. 



Middlebnrg..' Urbana Frederick.. Middletowu 



Sept. 13. Sept. 14. 



Middle-b'rg S.MonnUln 

Frederick . . , S . HoaDtala 

Frederick.. S. Mountain 
Frederick.. S. Moontklo 



Bnokeyst'n BurkettBvT* 
SicksT'le — Burkettsv'la 



The right wing, consisting of the 1st! I think we must be very cautious about 
and 9th corps, under the command of Maj. : stripping, too much, the forts on the Vir 



Gen. Burnside, moved on Frederick ; the 
Ist corps via Brooksville, Cooksville and 
Ridgeville. and the 9th corps via Damas- 
cus and New Market. 

The 2d and 12th corps, forming the 
centre, under the command of Gen. Sum- 
ner, moved on Frederick ; the former via 
Clarksburg and Urbana. the 12th corps on 
a lateral road between Urbana and New 



ginia side. It may be the enemy's object 
to draw off the mass of our forces and 
then attempt to attack from the Virginia 
side of the Potomac. Think of this." 



Again, on the 11th of September, Gen. 
Halleck telegraphed me as follows : 

forward Keyes or 
main force of the 



" Why not order 
Sia-el ? I think the 



Market, thus maintaining the communica- enemy is in your front ; more troops can 

tion with the right wing, and covering the be spared from here." 

direct road from Frederick to Washington. ; This despatch, as published by the Oom- 

The 6th corps, under the command of Gen. mittee on the Conduct of the War, and 

Franklin, moved to Buckeystown via furnished by the general-in-chief, reads as 

Darnestown. Dawsonville and Bamesville, J follows : 

covering the road from the mouth of the " Why not order forward Porter's corps 

Monocacy to Rockville, and being in a or Sigel's ? If the main force of the 

position "to connect with and support the enemy is in your front, more troops can be 



centre, should it have been necessary, (as 
•was supposed,) to force the line of the 
Monocacy. 

Couch's division moved by the "river 
road." covering that approach, watching 
the fords of the Potomac, and ultimately 
following and supporting the 6th corps. 

The following extracts from telegrams 
received by me after my departure from 
Washington, will show how little was 
known there about the enemy's move- 
ments, and the fears which were enter- 
tained for th^ safety of the capital. On 
the 9th of September, Gen. Halleck tele- 
graphed me as follows : 

Until we can "-et better advices about 



spared from here." 

I remark that the original despatch, as 
received by me from the telegraph opera- 
tor, is in the words quoted above, " I think 
the main force of the enemy,'' &c. 

In accordance with this suggestion 1 
asked, on the same day, that all the troops 
that could be spared should at once be 
sent to re-inforce me, but none came. 

On the 12th I received the following 
telegram from his excellency the Presi- 
dent : " Gov. Curtin telegraphs me, ' I 
have advices that Jackson is crossing the 
Potomac at Williamsport, and probably 
the whole rebel array will be drawn from 
Maryland.'" The President adds: " Re- 



ihe numbers of the enemy at Drainsville, j ceiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or 



132 



EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAK 



Martiiisburg to-day, and positive informa- 
tion from Wheeling that the line is cut, 
corroborates the idea that the enemy is 
re-crossing the Potomac. Please do not 
let him get off without being hurt." 

On the 13th Gen. Halleck telegraphed 
as follows : " Until you know more cer- 
tainly the enemy's force south of the Poto- 
mac, you are wrong in thus uncovering the 
capital. I am of the opinion that the 
enemy will send a small column towards 
Pennsylvania to draw your forces in that 
direction, then suddenly move on Wash- 
ington with the forces south of the Poto- 
mac and those he may cross over." Again 
on the 14th, Gen. Halleck telegraphed me 
that " scouts report a large force still on 
the Virginia side of the Potomac. If so, 
I fear you are exposing your left and 
rear." 

Again, as late as the 16th, after we had 
the most positive evidence that Lee's 
entire army was in front of us, I received 
the following : 

" War Department, 
"Sept. 16, 1862— 12.3 p. m. 

" Yours of 7 A. M., is this moment re- 
ceived. As you give me no information in 
regard to the position of your forces, 
except that at Sharpsburg, of course I 
cannot advise. I think, however, you will 
find that the whole force of the enemy in 
your front has crossed the river ; I fear 
now mofe than ever that they will re-cross 
at Harper's Ferry, or below, and turn your 
left, thug cutting you off from Washing- 
ton. This appeared to me to be a part 
of their plan, and hence my anxiety on the 
subject; a heavv rain might prevent it. 
" H. W. HALLECK, Gen.-in-Chief. 

" Maj. Gen. McClellan." 

The importance of moving with all due 
caution, so as not to uncover the national 
capital until the enemy's position and 
plans were developed, was, I believe, fully 
appreciated by me ; and as my troops ex- 
tended from the Baltimore and Ohio rail- 
road to the Potomac, with the extreme 
left flank moving along that stream, and 
with strong' pickets left in rear to watch 
and guard all the available fords, I did 
not regard my left or rear as iu any degree 
exposed. But it appears from the fore- 
going telegrams that the general-in-chief 
was of a different opinion, and that my 
movements were, in his judgment, too pre- 
cipitate, not only for the safety of Wash- 
ington, but also for the security of my left 
and rear. 

The precise nature of these daily in- 
junctions against a precipitate advance 
may now be perceived. The general-in- 
chief, in b's testimony before the Commit- 



tee on the Conduct of the War, says : " In 
respect to Gen. McClellan going too fast 
or too slow from Washington, there caa 
be found no such telegram from me to 
him. He had mistaken the meaning of 
the telegrams I sent him. I telegraphed 
him that he was going too far, not from 
Washington, but from the Potomac, leav- 
ing Gen. Lee the opportunity to come 
down the Potomac and get between him 
and Washington. I thought Gen. McClel- 
lan should keep more on the Potomac, and 
press forward his left rather than his right, 
so as the more readily to relieve Harper's 
Ferry." 

As I can find no telegram from the 
general-in-chief recommending me to keep 
my left flank nearer the Potomac, I am 
compelled to believe that when he gave 
this testimouy he had forgotten the pur- 
port of the telegrams above quoted, and 
had also ceased to remember the fact, 
well known to him at the time, that my 
left, from the time I left Washington, al- 
ways rested on the Potomac, and my 
centre was continually in position to re- 
inforce the left or right, as occasion might 
require. Had I advanced my left flank 
along the Potomac more rapidly than the 
other columns marcl«?d upon the roads to 
the right, I should have thrown that flank 
out of supporting distance of the other 
troops, and greatly exposed it. And if I 
had marched the entire army in one column 
along the bank of the river instead of 
upon five different parallel roads, the 
column, with its trains, would have ex- 
tended about fifty miles, and the enemy 
might have defeated the advance before 
the rear could have reached the scene of 
action. Moreover, such a movement 
would have uncovered the communications 
with Baltimore and Washington on our 
right, and exposed our right and rear. I 
presume it will be admitted by every 
military man that it was necessary to move 
the army in such order that it could at 
any time be concentrated for battle ; and 
I am of opinion that this object could not 
have been accomplished in any other way 
than the one employed. Any other dis- 
position of our forces would have sub- 
jected them to defeat in detached frag- 
ments. 

On the 10th of September, I received 
from my scouts information which render- 
ed it quite probable that Gen, Lee's army 
was in the vicinity of Frederick, but 
whether his intention was to move towards 
Baltimore or Pennsylvania was not then 
known. On the 11th 1 ordered General 
Burnside to push a strong reconnoissance 
across the National road and the Balti- 
more and Ohio railroad, towards New 
Market, and, if he learned that the enemy 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 133 



had moved towards Hagerstown, to press 
OH rapidly to Frederick, keeping his troops 
constantly ready to meet the enemy in 
force. A corresponding movement of all 
the troops in the centre and on the left 
was ordered iu the direction of Urbana 
and Poolsville. 

On the 12th a portion of the right wing 
entered Frederick, after a brisk skirmish 
at the outskirts of the city and in the 
streets. 

On the 13th the main bodies of the right 
wing and centre passed through Frederick. 
It was soon ascertained that the main 
body of the enemy's forces had marched 
out of the city on the two previous days, 
taking the road to Boonsboro' and Har- 
per's Ferry, thereby rendering it neces- 
sary to force the passes through the Ca- 
toctin and South Mountain ridges, and gain 
possession of Boonsboro' and Rohrersville 
before any relief could be extended to 
Col. Miles at Harper's Ferry. 

On the 13th an order fell into my hands 
issued by Gen. Lee, which fully disclosed 
his plans, and I immediately gave orders 
for a rapid and vigorous forward move- 
ment. 

The following is a copy of the order re- 
ferred to : 

"special orders kg. 191. 
"Headquarters Army of 
Northern Virginia, Sept. 9, 1862. 

" The army will resume its march to- 
morrow, taking the Hagerstown road, 
(ien. Jackson's command will form the ad- 
vance, and, after passing Middletown, with 
such portion as he may select, take the 
route towards Sharpsburg, cross the Poto- 
mac at the most convenient point, and, by 
Friday night, take possession of the Balti- 
more and Ohio railroad, capture such of 
the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and 
intercept such as may attempt to escape 
from Harper's Ferry 

"Gen. liongstreet's command will pursue 
the same road as far as Boonsboro', where 
it will halt with the reserve, supply and 
baggage trains of the army. 

"Gen. McLaws, with his own division 
and that of Gen, R. H. Anderson, will 
follow Gen. Longstreet ; on reaching 
Middletown, he will take the route to 
Harper's Ferry, and, by Friday morning, 
possess himself of the Maryland heights, 
and endeavor to capture the enemy at 
Harper's Ferry and vicinity. 

" (ien. Walker, with his division, after 
accomplishing the object in which he is 
now engaged, will cross the Potomac at 
Cheek's ford, ascend its right_ bank to 
Lovettsville, take possession of lAmdon 
heights, if practicable, by Friday morning ; 
Keys's ford on his left, and the road between 



the end of the mountain and the Potomac 
on his right. He will, as far as practicable, 
co-operate with Gen. McLaws and Gen. 
Jackson in intercepting the retreat of the 
enemy. 

" Gen. D. H. Hill's division will form the 
rear guard of the army, pursuing the road 
taken by tlie main body. The reserve 
artillery, ordnance and supply trains, &c., 
will precede Gen. Hill. 

" Gen. Stuart will detach a squadron of 
cavalry to accompany the commands of 
Gens. liongstreet, Jackson and McLaws, 
and, with the main body of the cavalry, 
will cover the route of the army, and bring 
up all stragglers that may have been left 
behind. 

" The commands of Gens. Jackson, 
McLaws and Walker, after accomplishing 
the objects for which they have been 
detached, will join the main body of the 
army at Boonsboro' or Hagerstown. 

" Each regiment on the march will 
habitually carry its axes in the regimental 
ordnance wagons, for use of the m6n at 
their encampments, to procure wood, &c. 

" By command of Gen. R. E. Lee. 
-R. H. CHILTON, 

Assist. Adj. Gen. 

" Maj.-Gen. D. Hill, 

" Commanding Division." 

In the report of a military commission, of 
which Maj.-Gen. D. Huuter was president, 
which convened at Washington for the 
purpose of investigating the conduct of 
certain ofBcers in connexion with the 
surrender of Harper's Ferry, I find the 
following : 

"The commission has remarked freely 
on Col. Miles, an old officer, who has been 
killed in the service of his country, and it 
cannot, from any motives of delicacy, re- 
frain from censuring those in high com- 
mand when it thinks such censure deserved. 

" The general-in-chief has testilied that 
Gen. McCiellan, after having received 
orders to repel the enemy invading the 
State of Maryland, marched only six miles 
per day, on an average, wlien pursuing this 
invading army. 

" The general-in-chief also testifies that, 
in his opinion, he could and should have 
relieved and protected Harper's Ferry, and 
in this opinion the commission fully concur.' 

I have been greatly surprised that this 
commission, in its investigations, never 
called upon n.e, nor upon any officer of my 
staff", nor, so far as I know, upon any 
officer of the army of the Potomac able 
to give an intelligent statement of the 
movements of that army. But another 
paragraph in the same report makes 
testimony from such sources quite super- 
fluous, it is as follows : 



134 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



" By reference to the evidence it will be 
seen that, at the very moment CoL Ford 
abandoned Maryland heights, his little 
army was in reality relieved by Gen. Frank- 
lin's and .Sumner's corps at Crampton's 
gap, within seven miles of his position." 

The corps of Gens. Franklin and Sum- 
ner were a part of the army which I at 
that time had the honor to command, and 
they were acting under my orders at 
Orampton's gap and elsewhere ; and if as 
the commission states, Col. Ford's " little 
army was in reality relieved" by those 
ofiBcers, it was relieved by me. 

I had on the morning of the 10th, sent 
the following despatch in relation to the 
command at Harper's Ferry : 

" Camp near Rockviixe, 
" Sept. 10, 18G2— 9.4.5 a. m. 
" Col. Miles is at or near Harper's Ferry, 
as I understand, with nine thousand troops. 
He can do nothing where he is, but could 
be of great service if ordered to join me. 
r suggest that he be ordered to join me by 
the most practicable route. 

GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 
" Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 

" Washington, D. 0." 

To this I received the following reply : 
" There is no way for Col. Miles to join 
you at present ; his only chance is to 
defsnd his works till you can open commu- 
nication with him. 

" H. W. HALLECK." 
" Geo. B. MoClellan, Maj. Gen." 
It seems necessarj% for a distinct under- 
standing of this matter, to state that I 
was directed on the 12th to assume com- 
mand of the garrison of Harper's Ferry 
as soon as I should open communication 
with that place, and that when I received 
this order all communication from the 
direction in which I was approaching was 
out off. Up to that time, however, Col. 
Miles could, in my opinion, have marched 
his command into Pennsylvania, by cross- 
ingthe Potomac at Williamsport or above ; 
and this opinion was confirmed by the fact 
that Col. I)avis marched the cavalry part 
of Col. Miles's command from Harper's 
Ferry on the 14, taking the main road to 
Hagerstown, and he encountered no enemy 
except a small picket near the mouth of 
ihe Antietara. 

Before I left Washington, and when 
there certainly could have been no enemy 
to prevent the withdrawal of the forces of 
Col. Miles, I recommended to the proper 
authorities that the garrison of Harper's 
Perry should Ije withdrawn via Hagers- 
town, to aid in covering the Cumberland 
valley ; or that, taking up thr pontoon 
bridge and obstructing the railroad bridge, 



it should fail back to the Maryland heights, 
and there hold out to the last. 

In this position it ought to have main- 
tained itself for many days. It was not 
deemed proper to adopt either of these 
suggestions, and when the matter was left 
to my discretion it was too late for me to 
do anything but endeavor to relieve the 
garrison. I accordingly directed artillery 
to be fired by our advance at frequent in- 
tervals as a signal that relief was at hand. 
This was done, and, as I afterwards learned, 
the reports of the cannon were distinctly 
heard at Harper's Ferry. It was confi- 
dentially expected that Col. Miles would 
hold out until we had carried the mountain 
passes, and were in a condition to send a 
detachment to his relief. The left was 
therefore ordered to move through Cramp- 
ton's pass in front of Burkettsville, while 
the centre and right marched uponTurner's 
pass in front of Middletown. 

It may be asked by those who are not 
acquainted with the topography of the 
coimtry in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, 
why Franklin, instead of marching his 
column over the circuitous road from 
Jeft'erson via Burkettsville and Browns- 
ville, was not ordered to move along the 
direct turnpike to Knoxville, and thence 
up the river to Harper's Ferry. 

It was for the reason that I had re- 
ceived information that the enemy were 
anticipating our approach in that direc- 
tion, and had established batteries on the 
south side of the Potomac which com- 
manded all the approaches to Knoxville ; 
moreover the road from that point winds 
directly along the river bank at the foot of 
a precipitous mountain, where there was 
no opportunity of forming in line of battle, 
and where the enemy could have placed 
batteries on both sides of the river to 
enfilade our narrov,' approaching columns. 

The approach through Crampton's pass, 
which debouches into Pleasant valley in 
rear of Maryland heights, was the only one 
which aflorded any reasonable prospect of 
carrying that formidable position ; at the 
same time, the troops upon that road were 
in better relation to the main body of our 
fore es. 

On the morning of the 14th a verbal 
message reached me from Col. Miles, which 
was the first authentic intelligence I had 
received as to the condition of things at 
Harper's Ferry. The messenger informed 
me that on the preceding afternoon Mary- 
land heights had been abandoned by our 
troops after repelling an attack of the 
rebels, and that Col. Miles's entire force 
was concentrated at Harper's Ferry, the 
Maryland, Loudon, and I3olivar heights 
having been abandoned by him, and occu- 
pied by the enemy. The messenger also 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



135 



stated that there were no apparent reason 
for the abauJonment of the Maryhuid 
heights, and tliat Col. Miles instructed 
hin> to say that he could hold out with 
certainty two days lon.£fer. 

I directed him to make his way back, if 
possible, with the information that 1 was 
approaching rapidly, and felt coutiilent 1 
could relieve the place. 

On the same afternoon I wrote the fol- 
lowing letter to Col. Miles, and despatchecl 
tliree copies by tliree difterent couriers on 
different routes. I did not, however, learu 
that any of these men succeeded in reach- 
ing Harper's Ferry : 

"Middletown, Sept. 14, 1802. 

" Colonel : Tiie army is being rapidly 
concentrated here. We are now attack- 
ing the pass on the Hagerstown road over 
the Blue ridge. A column is about at- 
tacking the Burkettsville and Boonslioro' 
pass. You may count on our nuiking 
every effort to relieve you. You may 
rely upon my speedily accomplishing that 
object. Hold out to the last extremity. 
If it is possible, re-occupy the Maryland 
heights with your whole force. If you can 
do that, I will certainly be able to relieve 
you. As the Catoctin valley is in our 
possession, you can safely cross the river 
at Berlin or its vicinity, so far as oppo- 
sition on that side of the river is concerned. 
Hold out to the last. 

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN. 

'•Maj. Gen. Com. 

"Col. D. S. Miles." 

On the previous day I had sent Gen. 
Franklin the following instructions: 

•' Headquartkrs Army of tiik Potomac, 

" Camp near Frederick, 

"Sept. la, 18G2— 6.20i'. m. 

■' Genp.ral : I have now full information 
as to movements and intentit)ns of the 
enemy. Jackson has crossed the upper 
Potomac to capture the garrison at Mar- 
tinsburg and cat off Miles's retreat towards 
the west. A division on the south side of 
the Potomac was to carry Loudon heights 
and cut off his retreat in that direction. 
McLaws with his own command and the 
division of R. H. Anderson was to move 
by Boonsboro' and llohrersville to carry 
the Maryland heights. The signal officers 
inform me that he is now in Pleasant 
valley. The firing shows that Miles still 
holds out. Longstreet was to move to 
Boonsboro', and there halt with the reserve 
corps ; I). H, Hill to form the rear guard; 
Stuart's cavalry to bring up stragglers, 
&c. We have cleared out all the cavalry 
thia side of the raot'.ntains and north of 
us. The last I heard from Pleasonton he 
occupied Middletown, after several sharp 
skirmishes. A division of Burnside's 



command started several hours ago to 
support him. The mIioIc of Burnside's 
command, including Hooker's corps, march 
this evening and early to-morrow morn- 
ing, followed by the corps of Simmer and 
Baid\S, and Sykes's division, upon Boon.s- 
boro' to carry that position. Couch has 
been ordered to concentrate his division 
and join you as rapidly as possible. With- 
out waiting for the whole of that division 
to join, you will move at daybreak in tho 
morning by Jefferson and Jiurkettsvilla 
upon the road to Rohrersvillc. 1 havu 
reliable information that the mountain 
pass by this road is practicable for artil- 
lery and wagons. If this pass is not occu- 
pied by the enemy in force, seize it as soon 
practicable, and debouch u]>on llohrers- 
ville in order to cut off the retreat of or 
destroy McLaw's command. If you find 
this pass held by the enemy in large force, 
make all your dispositions for the attack 
and commence it about half an hour after 
you hear severe firing at the pass on thu 
Hagerstown pike, where the main body 
will attack. Having gained the pass, your 
duty will be first to cut off, destroy, or 
capture McLaws's command and relieve 
Colonel Miles. If you effect this you will 
order him to join you at once with all hia 
disposable troops, first destroying the 
bridges over the Potomac, if not already 
done, and, leaving a sufficient garriscm to 
prevent the enemy from passing the ford, 
you will then return by llohrersville on ths 
direct road to Boonsboro', if the main 
column has not succeeded in its attack. 
H' it has succeeded, take the road to Roh- 
rersville, to Sharpsburg and Willianisport, 
in order either to cutoff the retreat of Hill 
and Longstreet towards tho Potomac, or 
prevent the repassage of Jackson. My 
general idea is to cut the enemy in two and 
beat him in detail. I believe I have suffi- 
ciently explained my intentinns. I ask of 
you, at this important moment, all your 
intellect and the utmost activity that u 
general can exercise. 

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Maj. Cen. Com. 
"Maj. Gen. W. B. Fra.nklin, 

" Commanding (Jth Corps." 

Again, on the I4th, 1 sent him the fol 
lowing : 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
"Frederick, Sept., 14, 1862—2 p.m. 

" Your despatch of 12.30 just received. 
Send back ta hurry up (louch. Mass 
your troops and carry Burkettsville at any 
cost. We shall have strong oi)position at. 
both passes. As fast as the troops como 
up I will hold a reserve in readiness to 
support you. If you find the enemy iu 
very great force at" any of these passes let 
me know at once, and amuse them as best 



136 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAX. 



jou can so &s to ret&in them there. In 
that event I will probably throw the mass 
of the anuT od thie pass in front of here. 
If I carrr that it wili dear the way for 
yon, and you must follow the enemy as 
rapidlv as possible. 

" • GEO. B. MoCISLLAS^. 

" Maj. Gen. Com. 

- Mai. G*a. FaAXKUX." 
■ Gen. Franklin plashed his corps rapidly 
forward "OTraris Cramptoii'? pass, and ai 
ab«?cit 12 oeloek on the 14th arrived at 
Borkeusriiie, immediately ia rear of which 
he found the enemy's infantry posted in 
force on both sides of the road, with artil- 
lery in strong positions to defend the ap- 
proaches to the pass. Sloeum's division 
was formed npon the right of the road 
leading through the gap. and Smith's upon 
the left. A line formed of Bartletr's and 
Torbett's brigades, supported by Newton. 
whose aetiTify was conspicuous, advanced 
steadily upon the oiemy at a charge on 
the right.* The enemy were driven from 
their position at the base of the mountain, 
where they were protected by a stone 
walU steadily forced back up the slope 
until they reached the position of their 
battery on the road, well up the mountain. 
There they made a stand. They were, 
however, driven back, retiring their artil - 
!ery in echelon until, after an action of 
three tours, the crest was gained, and the 
enemy hastily fled down the mountain on 
the other side. 

On the left of the road. Brooks's and 
Irrin's brigades, of Smith's division, form- 
ed for the protection of Slocum's flank, 
chaig^ up the mountain in the same 
steady manner, driving the enemy before 
Them until the crest was carried. Four 
hundred prisoners from seventeen difleren: 
organizations, seven hundred stand of 
arms, one piece of artillery, and three co- 
lors, were captured by our troops in this 
brilliant action. It was conducted by 
*^r. Franklin in all its details. These 
j.re giveai in a repcMt of <ien. Prank- 
-rewith submitted, and due credit 
awarded to the gallant oScers and men 
engs 



The los 


^-anklin's corps was 


one hn35'irb 


en killed, four hun- 


dreda- 


-ied. and two miss- 


ing. 1 


es was about the 


sane. 


oosition was such 


that o- 


i not be used with 


aayef 


of the action found 


<;en.F 


-je in Pleasant val- 


iej on 


" -*h. within three 


aada z 


: on Maryland 


heighi- 


" - - sme night 


or on ": 


.e formed 



a jmc:. Harper's 

ferry iuuk it uoi been previously vitlt- 



drawn from Maryland heights, and "sithic 
six miles oi Hariers Ferry. 

On the nigki Vf the l-ttr. : ; 

despatch was sent to Gca. F: 

"Bolivar, Sept. 15 — 1 a. m. 

•Gesskai.: * * * * * 

•• The commanding general directs tbut 
yoQ occnpy, with your command, the road 
fi>?m Rohrersviile to Harpers Ferry, 
placing a sufficient force at Rolirersville 
to hold that position in case it should be 
attacked by the enemy from Boonsboro.' 
Endeavor to open communication with 
CoL Miles at Harper's Ferry, attacking 
and destroying such of the enemy as you 
may find in Pleasant valley. Should you 
succeed in opening communication with 
CoL Miles, direct him to join you with his 
whole command, with all the guns aad 
public property that he can carry with 
him. The remainder of the gnns will be 
spiked or destroyed : the rest of the pub- 
lic property will also be destroyed. You 
will then proceed to Boonsboro'. which 
place the commanding general intends to 
attack to-morrow, and join the main body 
of the army at that place ; should you find, 
however, that the enemy have retreated 
from Boonsboro' towards Sharpsburg. you 
will endeavor to fall npon him and cut off 
his retreat. 

" By conmiand of Maj. Gen. McClellan. 
GEO. D. SUGGLES, 
" GoL and Aide-de-Gamp. 

" Gen Feaxklis." 

On the 15th the following were received 
from Geo. Franklin : 

"At thb foot of MorxT Pleasaxt, 

"In Pleasant Valley, three miles from 
^ Bohrersville, Sept. 15 — 8.50 .a. m 

'• General : My command started at day- 
light this morning, and I am waiting to 
have it closed up here. Gen. Couch ar- 
rived about 10 o'clock last night, I hare 
ordered one of his brigades and one bat- 
tery to Bohrersville or to the strongest 
point in its vicinity. The enemy is drawn 
up in line of battle about two miles to our 
front, one brigade in sight. As soon as I 
am sure that Bohrersville is occupied I 
shall move forward to attack the enemy. 
This may be two hours from now. iJf 
HarpersFerry Las fallen — and the cessa- 
tion of firing makes me fear that it has — 
it is my opinion that I should be strongly 
re-enforced. 
******** 

• W. B. FBAXKLIX. 
" Maj.-Gen. Commaiiding Corps. 
"Gen-G. B. McClsllax.' 

" Skptbmbes. 1.5 — 11 A. )C 
"General : I have received your despatch 
' by Capt. O'fieefe. Hie enemy is in large 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B MCLELLAN. 137 

force in mv frojit. in two lines of bsirtl^ l - 



per's Ferry. ^ 

one. It '="111 ::._... 

sue tbe enemy under ihe - 

I shall commiiiiicate - 

■OOQ as possible. In ih-E 

wait here antil I leara t^. 

pect of re-enforcement. I t^ve 

force to justify an artick on ihe : 

see in fr'^nt. I tave Lid a ver 

view of it, and its position is Terr ; - 

" W. B. FRANKirS'. Mai.-Gen. I 
*- Gen. G. B. McCi.Eij^v. C ' . 

CoL Miles surrendered H:. 
at 6 A. M 

the arir.^ 
was - - 

wax: 



atter sen.. 
keiehts. 

jcsi b^eri -i-.s.r-L-i werr ti- . 
Crampt^-ni^ tip :ae trorr> ^ 

■ad ri^ht wine, which h- _: Trei- 

Click OB the 13th. were , . in the 
contest for the rcv^se^s:. - _ - 

On the ncrnii.?- of ::. . - _ - 

aatoQ w..- 

bngade .. x.— Axt_ery : 



stai - 

had " 

rec: . 

citeiBv. 

the: 
rai -•■ 

noo- 

apr ?. 

He ~ 

f:de, 

hiK. 

anc-: " - 

T: ~ 
abc-: ... ■ _ - 

penerai . ist w »*s ^ 

eoathwe:^' - Frei- O^'t 

•hck to iiai?rrsio-«u ,:v>^<^*L^ .: -riTlval 
rigitt as^.es thro-gh Tuxiiers ^r^:'. * ie~ 
pressicn. which is sciae four handreti »et 
ia der-'h. 

T " " -"-""- - - ^ 

Mir.: ;, - - - 1 

ridccs. :-^ /.i.-r.i ■--•.' — -\; "" 

«ieep at the pa.^ Dcvc-cks a ^ 7 "^ «•* serrxe 



az^ 



138 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAK 



during the day against the enemy's bat- 
teries in the gap. Col. Scammon's brigade 
was deployed! and well covered by skir- 
mishers, moved up the slope to the left of 
the road with the object of turning the 
enemy's right, if possible. It succeeded 
in gaining the crest and establishing itself 
there, in spite of the vigorous efforts of 
the enemy, who was posted behind stone 
walls and in the edge of timber, and the 
fire of a battery which poured in canister 
and case shot on the regiment on the right 
of the brigade. Col. Crooke's brigade 
marched in columns at supporting dis- 
tance. A section of McMullan's battery, 
under Lieut. Croome. (killed while serving 
one of his guns,) was moved up with great 
difficulty, and opened with canister at very 
short range on the enemy's infantry, by 
whom (after having done considerable ex- 
ecution) it was soon silenced and forced 
to withdraw. 

One regiment of Crooke's brigade was 
now deployed on Scammon's left, and the 
other two in his rear, and they several 
times entered the first line and relieved 
Ihe regiments in front of tlriem when hard 
pressed. A section of Sumner's V)attery 
was brought up and placed in the open 
space in the woods, where it did good ser- 
vice during the rest of the day. 

The enemy several times attempted to 
retake the crest, advancing with boldness, 
but were each time repulsed. They then 
withdrew their battery to a point more to 
the right, and formed columns on both our 
flanks. It was now about noon, and a lull 
occured in the contest which lasted about 
two hours, during which the rest of the 
corps was coming up. Gen. Wilcox's 
division was the first to- arrive. When he 
reached the base of the mountain. Gen. 
Cox advised him to consult Gen. Fleason- 
ton as to a position. The latter indicated 
that on the right, afterwards taken up by 
Gen. Hooker. Gen. Wilcox was in the 
act of moving to occupy this ground, when 
he received an order from Gen. Eeno to 
move up the old Sharpsburg road and take 
a position to its right, overlooking the 
turnpike. Two regiments were detached 
to support Gen. Cox, at his request. One 
section of Cooke's battery was placed in 
])Osition near the turn of the road, (on the 
crest,) and opened fire on the enemy's bat- 
teries across the gap. The division was 
])roceeding to deploy to the right of the 
road, when the enemy suddenly opened 
(at one hundred and fifty yards) Mith a 
battery which enfiladed the road at this 
j)oint, drove off Cooke's cannoners with 
their limbers, and caused a temporary 
panic in which the guns were nearly lost. 
But the 79th New York and 17th Michi- 
gan promptly rallied, changed front under 



a heavy fire, and moved out to protect the 
guns with which (-apt. Cooke had re- 
mained. Order was soon restored, and 
the division formed in line on the right of 
Cox, and was kept concealed as much as 
possible under the hillside until the whole 
line advanced. It was exposed not only 
to the fire of the battery in front, but also 
to that of the batteries on the other side 
of the turnpike, and lost heavily. 

Shortly before this time Gens. Burnside 
and Eeno arrived at the base of the moun- 
tain ; and the former directed the latter to 
move up the divisions of Gens. Sturgia 
and Rodman to the crest held by Cox and 
Wilcox, and to move upon the enemy's 
position with his whole force as soon as he 
was informed that Gen. Hooker (who had 
just been directed to attack on the right) 
was well advanced up the mountain. 

Gen. Reno then went to the front and 
assumed the direction of aff'airs, the posi- 
tions having been explained to him by 
Gen. Pleasonton. Shortly before this time 
I arrived at the point occupied by Gen. 
Burnside; and my headquarters were loca- 
ted there until the conclusion of the 
action. Gen. Sturgis had left his camp at 
one 1 p. M., and reached the scene of action 
about 3^ p. M. Clark's battery, of his divi- 
sion, was sent to assist Cox's left, by order 
of Gen. Reno, and two regmients (2d 
Maryland and 6th New Hampshire) wero 
detached by Gen Reno and sent forward 
a short distance on the left of the turnpike. 
His division was formed in rear of Wil- 
cox's, and Rodman's division was divided ; 
Col. Fairchilds's brigade being placed on 
the extreme left, and Col. Harland's, un- 
der Gen. Rodman's personal supervision, 
on the right. 

My order to move the whole line forward 
and take or silence the enemy's batteries 
in front was executed with enthusiasm. 
The enemy made a desperate resistance, 
charging our advancing lines with fiere- 
ness, but they were everywhere rented and 
fled. 

Our chief loss was in Wilcox's division. 
The enemy's battery was found to be across 
a gorge and beyond the reach of our in- 
fantry; but its position was made untena- 
ble, and it was hastily removed and not 
again put in position near us. But the 
batteries across the gap still kept up a 
fire of shot and shell. 

Gen. Wilcox praises very highly the 
conduct of the 17th Michigan in this 
advance — a regiment which had been or- 
ganized scarcely a month, but which 
charged the advancing enemy in flank in 
a manner worthy of veteran troops; and 
also that of the 45th Pennsylvaui,a which 
bravely met them in front. 

Cook's battery now re-opened tire. Stur- 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 139 



eis's division was moved to the front of 
Wilcox's, occupying the new ground gained 
on the further side of the slope, aud his 
artillery opened on the batteries across 
the gap. The enemy made an effort to 
turn our left about dark, but were repulsed 
by Fairchilds's brigade and Clark's bat- 
tery. 

At about 7 o'clock the enemy made 
another effort to regain the lost ground, 
attacking along Sturgis's front aud part 
of Cox's. A lively fire was kept up until 
nearly 9 o'clock, several charges being 
made by the enemy and repulsed with 
slaughter, and we finally occupied the 
highest part of the mountain. 

Gen. lleno was killed just before sunset, 
while making a reconnoissance to the 
front, and the command of the corps de- 
volved upon Gen. Cox. In Gen. Reno 
the nation lost one of its best general offi- 
cers. He was a skilful soldier, a brave 
and honest man. 

There was no firing after 10 o'clock, and 
the troops slept on their arms ready to 
renew the fight at daylight ; but the enemy 
quietly retired from our front during the 
night, abandoning their wounded, and 
leaving their dead in large numbers scat- 
tered over the field. While these opera- 
tions were progressing on the left of the 
main column, the right under Gen. Hooker 
was actively engaged. His corps left the 
Monocacy early in the morning, and its 
advance reached the Catoctin creek about 
1 p. M. Gen. Hooker then went forward to 
examine the ground. 

At about 1 o'clock Gen. Meade's divi- 
gioa was ordered to make a diversion in 
favor of Reno. The following is the order 
sent: 

" September 14 — 1 p. m. 

"General; Gen. Reno requests that a 
division of yours may move up on the right 
(north) of the main road. Gen. McCIellan 
desires you to comply with this request, 
holding your whole corps in readiness to 
Bupport the movement and taking charge 
of it yourself. 

"Suuiuer's and Bank's corps have com- 
menced arriving. Let Gen. McCIellan be 
informed as soon as you commence your 
movement. "GEO. D. RUGGLES, 

" Col., A. A. G., and A. D. C. 

"Maj.-Gen Hooker." 

Meade's division left Catoctin creek 
about two o'clock, and turned off to the 
right from the main road on the old Ha- 
gerstown road to Mount Tabor church, 
where Gen. Hooker was, a*id deployed a 
short distance in advance, its right resting 
about one and a half mile from the tarn- 
pike. The enemy fired a few shots from 
a battery on the mountain side, but did 
no considerable damage. Cooper's bat- 



tery " B," 1st Pennsylvania artillery, waa 
placed in position on high ground at about 
three and a half o'clock, and fired at tho 
enemy on the slope, but soon ceased by 
order t)f Gen. Hooker, and the position of 
our lines prevented any further i;se of ar- 
tillery by us on this part of the field. The 
first Massachusetts cavalry was sent up 
the valley to the right to observe the 
movements, if any, of the enemy in that 
direction, and one regiment of Meade's 
division was posted to watch a road 
coming in the same direction. The other 
divisions were deployed as they came up, 
Gen. Hatch's on the left, and Gen. Rick- 
etts's, which arrived at 5 p. m., in the rear. 
Gen. Gibbons's brigade was detached from 
Hatch's division by Gen. Burnside, for 
the purpose of making a demonstration on 
the enemy's centre, up the main road, as 
soon as the mo.vements on the right and 
left had sufficiently progressed. The Ist 
Pennsylvania riiles of Gen. Seymour's 
brigade were sent forward as skiruiishera 
to feel the enemy, and it was found that 
he was in force. Meade was then directed 
to advance his division to the right of the 
road, so as to out-flank them if possible, 
and then to move forward and attack, 
while Hatch was directed to take with his 
division the crest on the left of the old 
Hagerstown road, Ricketts's division being 
held in reserve. Seymour's brigade waa 
sent up to the top of the slope, on the 
right of the ravine through whi<h the road 
runs ; and then moved along the summit 
parallel to the road, while Col. Gallagher's 
and Col. Magilton's brigades moved in the 
same direction along the slope and in the 
ravine. 

The ground was of the most difficult 
character for the movement of troops, the 
hillside being steep and rocky, aud ob- 
structed by stone walls and timber. Tho 
enemy was very soon encountered, and in 
a short time the action became general 
along the whole front of the division. The 
line advanced steadily up the mountain- 
side, where the enemy was posted behind 
trees and rocks, from which he was gra- 
dually dislodged. During this advance 
Col. Gallagher, commanding od brigade, 
was severely wounded; and the command 
devolved upon Lieut.-Col. Robert An- 
derson. 

Gen. Meade having reason to believe 
that the enemy were attempting to out- 
flank him on his right, applied to Gen- 
Hooker for re-enforcements. Gen Duryea'a 
brigade of Ricketts's division was ordered 
up, but it did not arrive until the close 
of the action. It was advanced on Sey- 
mour's loft, but only one regiment could 
open fire before the enemy retired and 
darkness intervened. 



140 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



Gen. Meade speaks highly of Gen. Sey- 
mour's skill in handling his brigade on the 
extreme right, securing by his manoeuvres 
the great object of the movement, the out- 
flanking of the enemy. 

While Gen. Meade was gallantly dri- 
ving the enemy on the right, Gen Hatch's 
division was engaged in a severe contest 
for the possession of the crest on the left 
of the ravine ; it moved up the mountain 
in the following order : two regiments of 
Gen. Patrick's brigade deployed as skir- 
mishers, with the other two regiments of 
the same brigade supporting them. Col. 
Phelps's brigade in line of battalions in 
mass at deploying distance. Gen. Double- 
day's brigade in the same order bringing 
up the rear. The 21st New York having 
gone straight up the slope instead of 
around to the right, as directed, the 2d 
United States sharpshooters was sent out 
in its place. Phelps's and Doubleday's 
brigades were deployed in turn as they 
reached the woods, which began about 
half up the mountain. Gen. Patrick with 
his skirmishers soon drew the fire of the 
enemy, and found him strongly posted be- 
hind a fence which bounded the cleared 
space on the top of the ridge, having on 
his front the woods through which our line 
was advancing, and in his rear a cornfield 
full, of rocky ledges, which afforded good 
cover to fall back to if dislodged. 

Phelps's brigade gallantly advanced, 
under a hot fire, to close quarters, and 
after ten or fifteen minutes of heavy firing 
on both sides (in which Gen. Hatch was 
wounded while urging on his men) the 
fence was carried by a charge, and our 
line advanced a few yards beyond it, some- 
what sheltered by the slope of the hill. 

Doubleday's brigade, now under the 
command of Lieut.-Col. Hoffman, (Col. 
Wainwright having been wounded.) re- 
lieved Phelps, and continued firing for 
an hour and a half; the enemy behind 
ledges of rocks, some thirty or forty 
paces in our front, making a stubborn re- 
sistance, and attempting to charge on the 
least cessation of our fire. About dusk 
Col. Christian's brigade of Ricketts's divi- 
sion came up and relieved Doubleday's 
brigade, which fell back into line behind 
Phelps's. Christian's brigade continued 
the action for thirty or forty minutes, 
when the enemy retired, after having made 
an attempt to tiank us on the left, which 
was repulsed by the 75th New York and 
7th Indiana. 

The remaining brigade of Ricketts's di- 
vision (Gen. Hartsuff's) was moved up in 
the centre, and connected Meade's left 
with Doubleday's right. We now li'ad 
possession of the summit of the firrt ridge 
which commanded the turnpike on both 



sides of the mountain, and the troops were 
ordered to hold their positions until fur- 
ther orders, and slept on their arms. Late 
in the afternoon Gen. Gibbon, with his 
brigade and one section of Gibbon's batr 
tery, (B, 4th artillery,) was ordered to 
move up the main road on the enemy's 
centre. He advanced a regiment on each 
side of the road preceded by skirmishers, 
and followed by the other two regiments 
in double column; the artillery moving on 
the road until within range of the enemy's 
guns, which were firing on the column 
from the gorge. 

The brigade advanced steadily, driving 
the enemy from his positions in the woods 
and behind stone walls, until they reached 
a point well up towards the top of the 
pass, when the enemy, having been re-en- 
forced by three regiments, opened a heavy 
fire on the front and on both flanks. The 
fight continued until 9 o'clock, the enemy 
being entirely repulsed ; and the brigade, 
after having suffered severely, and having 
expended all its ammunition, including 
even the cartridges of the dead and 
wounded, continued to hold the ground it 
had so gallantly won until 12 o'clock, 
when it was relieved by Gen. Gorman's 
brigade of Sedgwick's division, Sumner's 
corps, (except the 6th Wisconsin, which 
remained on the field all night.) Gen. Gib- 
bon, in this delicate movement, handled his 
brigade with as much precision and cool- 
ness as if upon parade, and the bravery of 
his troops could not be excelled. 

The 2d corps (Sumner's) and the 12th 
corps (Williams's) reached their final posi- 
tions shortly after dark. Gen. Richard- 
sou's division was placed near Mount Ta- 
bor church, in a position to support our 
right, if necessary ; the 12th corps and 
Sedgwick's division bivouacked around 
Bolivar, in a position to support our centre 
and left. 

Gen. Sykes's division of regulars and 
the artillery reserve halted for the night 
at Middletown. Thus, on the night of the 
14th, the whole army was massed in the 
vicinity of the field of battle, in readiness 
to renew the action the next day, or to 
move in pursuit of the enemy. At day- 
light our skirmishers were advanced, and 
it was found that he had retreated during 
the night, leaving his dead on the field, and 
his wounded uucarcd for. 

About fifteen hundred prisoners were 
taken by us during the battle, and the loss 
to the enemy i^ killed was much greater 
than our own, and, probably, also in 
wounded. It is believed that the force 
opposed to us at Turner's gap consisted of 
D. H. Hill's corps, (15,000,) and a part, if 
not the whole, of Longstreet's, and per- 



EErORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 141 



haps a portion of Jackson's, probablv some 
30,000 in ail. 

We went into action with abont 30,000 
men, and our losses amounted to 1,568 ag- 
gregate, (312 killed, 1,234 wounded, and 22 
missing.) 

On the next day I had the honor to re- 
ceive the following very kind despatch from 
his Excellency the President : 

"War Department, 
" Washington, Sept. 1.5, 1862—2.45 p.m. 
" Your despatch of to-day received. God 
bless you, and all with you ; destroy the 
rebel army if possible. 

"A. LINCOLN. 
" Maj. Gen. McClellan." 

" ANTIETAM." 

On the night of the battle of South 
Mountain, orders were given to the corps 
commanders to press forward the pickets 
at early dawn. This advance revealed the 
fact that the enemy had left his positions, 
and an immediate pursuit was ordered ; 
the cavalry, under Gen. Pleasouton, and 
the three corps under Gens. Sumner, 
Hooker, and Mansfield, (the latter of whom 
had arrived that morning and assumed 
command of the 12th, Williams's corps,) 
by the national turnpike and Boonsboro' ; 
the corps of Gens. Burnside and Porter 
(the latter command at that time consist- 
ing of but one weak division, Sykes's) by 
the old Sharpsburg road, and Gen. Frank- 
lin to move into Pleasant valley, occupy 
Rohrersville by a detachment, and endeavor 
to relieve Harper's Ferry. 

Gens. Burnside and Porter, upon reach- 
ing the road from Boonsboro' to Rohrers- 
ville to re-enforce Franklin, or to move on 
Sharpsburg, according to circumstances. 

Franklin moved towards Brownsville 
and found there a force of the enemy, 
much superior in numbers to his own, 
drawn up in a strong position to receive 
him. At this time the cessation of firing 
at Harper's Ferry indicated the surrender 
of that place. 

The cavalry overtook the enemy's cav- 
alry in Boonsboro', made a daring charge, 
killing and wounding a number, and cap- 
turing 250 prisoners and two guns. 

Gen. Richardson's division of the 2d 
corps pressing the rear guard of the enemy 
with vigor, passed Boonsboro' and Keedys- 
ville. and came upon the main body of the 
enemy, t)ccupying in large force a strong 
position a few miles beyond the latter 
place. 

It had been hoped to engine the enemy 
during the 15th. Accordingly, instructions 
were given that if the enemy were over- 
taken on the march they should be attacked 
at once; if found in heavy force and in 



position, the corps in advance should be 
placed in position for attack, and await 
my arrival. On reaching the advanced 
position of our troops, I found but two 
divisions, Richardson's and Sykes's, in 
position ; the other troops were halted in 
the road ; the head of the column some dis- 
tance in rear of Richardson. 

The enemy occupied a strong position 
on the heights, on the west side of Antie- 
tam creek, displaying a large force of in- 
fantry and cavalry, with numerous bat- 
teries of artillery, which opened on our 
columns as they appeared in sight on the 
Keedj-sville road and Sharpsburg turnpike, 
which fire was returned by Capt. Tidball's 
light battery, 2d United States artillery, 
and Pettit's battery, 1st New York artil- 
lery. 

The division of Gen. Richardson, follow- 
ing close on the heels of the retreating foe, 
halted and deployed near Antietam river, 
on the right of the Sharpsburg road. Gen. 
Sykes, leading on the division of regulars 
on the old Sharpsburg road, came up and 
deployed to the left of Gen. Richardson, 
on the left of the road. 

Antietam creek, in this vicinity, is crossed 
by four stone liridges — the up])er one on 
the Keedysville and Williamsport road; 
the second on the Keedysville and Sharps- 
burg turnpike, some two and a half miles 
below ; the third about a mile below the 
second, on the Rohrersville and Sharps- 
burg road ; and the fourth near the mouth 
of Antietam creek, on the road leading 
from Harper's Ferry to Sharpsburg, some 
three miles below the third. The stream 
is sluggish, with few and difficult fords. 
After a rapid examination of the position. 
I found that it was too late to attack that 
day, and at once directed the placing of the 
batteries in position in the ci'ntre, and in- 
dicated the bivouacs for the difi'erent corps, 
massing them near and on both sides of the 
Sharpsburg turnpike. The corps were not 
all in their positions until the next morn- 
ing after sunrise. 

On the morning of the 16lh, it was dis- 
covered that the enemy had changed the 
position of his batteries. The masses of, 
his troops, however, were still concealed 
behind the opposite heights. Their left and 
centre were upon and in front of the Sharps- 
burg and Hagerstown turnpike, hidden liy 
woods and irregularities of the ground; 
their extreme left resting upon a wooded 
eminence near the cross-roads to the north 
of J. Miller's farm; their left i-csting upon 
the Potomac. Their line extended south, 
the right resting upon the hills to the south 
of Sharpsburg, near Shaveley's farm. 

The bridge over the Antietam, described 
as No. 3, near this point, was strongly 
covered by riflemen protected by rifle-pits, 



142 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



Btone fences. &c., and enfiladed by artil- 
lery. The ground in front of this line con- 
risted of undulating hills, their crests in 
turn commanded by others in their rear. 
On all favorable points the enemy's artil- 
lery was posted and their reserves hidden 
from view by the hills, on which their line 
of Ijattle was formed, could manoeuvre 
unobserved by our army, and from the 
ehortness of their line could rapidly re- 
enforce any point threatened by our attack. 
Their position, stretching across the angle 
formed by the Potomac and Antietam, 
their flanks and rear protected by these 
etreams, was one of the strongest to be 
found in this region of country, which is 
well adapted to defensive warfare. 

On the right, near Keedysville, on 'both 
sides of the Sharpsburg turnpike, were 
Sumner's and Hooker's corps. In advance, 
on the right of the turnpike and near the 
Antietam river, CJen. Richardson's division 
of Gen. Sumner's corps was posted. Gen. 
Sykes's division of Gen. Porter's corps was 
on the left of the turnpike and in line with 
Gen. Richardson, protecting the bridge 
No. 2, over the Antietam. The left of the 
line, opposite to and some distance from 
bridge No. 3, was occupied by Gen. Burn- 
side's corps. 

Before giving Gen. Hooker his orders 
to make the movement which will presently 
be described, I rode to the left of the line 
to satisfy myself that the troops were pro- 
perly posted there to secure our left flank 
from any attack made along the left bank 
of the Antietam, as well as to enable us 
to carry bridge No. 3. 

I found it necessary to make consider- 
able changes in the position of Gen. Burn- 
side's corps, and directed him to advance 
to a strong position in the immediate 
vicinity of the bridge, and to reconnoitre 
the approaches to the bridge carefully. 
In front of Gen. Sumner's and Hooker's 
corps, near Keedysville, and on the ridge 
of the iirst line of hills overlooking the 
Antietiirn, and between the turnpike and 
Fry's house on the right of the road, were 
placed Capt. Taft's, Langner's, Von Kleiz- 
er's and Lieut. Weaver's batteries of 
twenty-pounder Parrott guns. On the 
crest of the hill in the rear and right of 
bridge No. 8. Capt. Weed's three-inch and 
Lieut. Benjamin's twenty-pounder bat- 
teries. Gen. Franklin's corps and Gen. 
Couch's division held a position in Pleas- 
ant valley in front of Brownsville, with a 
etrong force of the enemy in their front. 
Gen. Morell's division of Porter's corps 
was en route from Boonsboro', and Gen. 
Humphrey's division of new troops en 
route from Frederick, Maryland. About 
daylight on the 16th the enemy opened a 
heavy fire of artillery on our guns in posi- 



tion, which was promptly returned ; their 
fire was silenced for the time, but was fre- 
quently renewed during the day. In the 
heavy fire of the morning, Maj. Arndt, 
commanding first battalion first New York 
artillery, was mortally wounded while 
directing the operations of his batteries. 

It was afternoon before I could move 
the troops to their positions for attack, 
being compelled to spend the morning in 
reconnoitring the new position taken up 
by the enemy, examining the ground, find- 
ing fords, clearing the approaches, and 
hurrying up the ammunition and supply 
trains, which had been delayed by the 
rapid march of the troops over the few 
practicable approaches from Frederick. 
These had been crowded by the masses of 
infantry, cavalry and artillery pressing on 
with the hope of overtaking the enemy 
before he could form to resist an attack. 
Many of the troops were out of rations on 
the previous day, and a good deal of their 
ammunition had been expended in the 
severe action of the 14th. 

My plan for the impending general en- 
gagement was to attack the enemy's left 
with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, 
supported by Sumner's, and if necessary 
by Franklin's ; and, as soon as matterB 
looked favorably there, to move the corps 
of Burnside against the enemy's extreme 
right, upon the ridge running to the south 
and rear of Sharpsburg, and having car- 
ried their position, to press along the crest 
towards our right ; and whenever either 
of these flank movements should be suc- 
cessful, to advance our centre with all the 
forces then disposable. 

About 2 p. M., (ien. Hooker, with his 
corps, consisting of Gen. Rickett's, Meade'8 
and Doubleday's divisions, was ordered to 
cross the Antietam at a ford, and at bridge 
No. 1, a short distance above, to attack, 
and, if possible, turn the enemy's left. 
Gen. Sumner was ordered to cross the 
corps of Gen. Mansfield (the 12th) during 
the night, a,nd hold his own (the 2d) corps 
ready to cross early the next morning. On 
reaching the vicinity of the enemy's left, a 
sharp contest commenced with the Penn- 
sylvania reserves, the advance of Gen. 
Hooker's corps, near the house of D. Mil- 
ler. The enemy were driven from the strip 
of woods where he was first met. The 
firing lasted until after dark, when Gen. 
Hooker's corps rested on their arms on 
ground won from the enemy. 

During the night Gen. Mansfield's corps, 
consisting of Gen. Williams's and Green's 
divisions, crowed the Antietam at the same 
ford and bridge that Gen. Hooker's troops 
had passed, and bivouacked on the farm 
of J. Poffenberger, about a mile in rear of 
Gen. Hooker's position. At daylight on 



\ 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 143 



the 17th the action was commenced by the 
fikirmishers uf the Pennsylvania reserves. 
The whole of Gen. Hooker's corps was 
eoon eng-a,2:ed, and drove the enemy from 
the open field in front ot the first line of 
woods into a second line of woods beyond 
which runs to the eastward of and nearly 
parallel to the Sharpsburg and Hagers- 
town turnpike. 

This contest was obstinate, and as the 
troops advanced the opposition became 
more determined and the number of the 
enemy greater. Gen. Hooker then ordered 
up the corps of Gen. Mansfield, which 
moved promptly toward the scene of ac- 
tion. 

The first division. Gen. AVilliams's, was 
deployed to the right on approaching the 
enemy ; Gen. Crawford's brigade on the 
right, its right resting on the Hagerstown 
turnpike ; on his left Gen. Gordon's brig- 
ade. The second division, Gen. Green's, 
joining the left of Gordon's extended as 
far as the burnt buildings to the north and 
east of the v^fhite church on the turnpike. 
During the deployment, that gallant vete- 
ran Uen. Mansfield fell mortally wounded, 
while examining the ground in front of his 
troops. Gen. llartsufl', of Hooker's corps, 
was severely wounded, while bravely press- 
ing forward his troops, and was taken from 
the field. 

The command of the twelfth corps fell 
upon Gen. Williams. Five regiments of 
first division of this corps were new troops. 
One brigade of the second division was 
sent to support Gen. Doubleday. 

The one hundred and twenty-fourth 
Pennsylvania volunteers were pushed 
across the turnpike into the woods beyond 
J. Miller's house, with orders to hold the 
position as long as possil>le. 

The Hue of battle of this corps was 
formed, and it became engaged about seven. 
A. M., the attack being opened by Knapp's 
(Pennsylvania.) (Jothran's (New York,) 
and Hampton's (Pittsburg) batteries. To 
meet this attack the enemy had pushed a 
strong column of troo])S into the open 
fields in i'ront of the turnpike, while he 
occupied the woods on the west of the turn- 
pike in strong force. The woods (as was 
found by subsequent observation) were 
traversed by outcropping ledges of rock. 
Several hundred yards to the right and 
rear was a hill which commanded the de- 
bouciie of the woods, and in the fields 
between was a long line of stone fences, 
continued by breastworks of rails, which 
covered the enemy's infantry from our 
musketry. The same woofls formed a 
ecreeu behind which his movements were 
concealed, and his batteries on the hill and 
tJie rifle works covered from the fire of our 
artillery in front. , 



For about two hours the battle raged 
with varied success, the enemy endeavor- 
ing to drive our troops into the second 
line of wood, and ours in turn to get pos- 
session of the line in front. 

Our troops ultimately succeeded in 
forcing the enemy back into the woods 
near the turnpike. Gen. Gnmn with his two 
brigades crossing into the woods to the 
left of the Dunbar church. During this 
conflict Gen. Crawford, commanding first 
division after Gen. Williams took com- 
mand of the corps, was wounded and left 
the field. 

Gen. Green being much exposed and 
applying for re-enforcements, the thir- 
teenth New Jersey, twenty-seventh In- 
diana, and the third Maryland were sent 
to his support with a section of Knapp's 
battery. * 

At about nine o'clock a. m. Gen. Sedg- 
wick's division of Gen. Sumner's corps 
arrived. Crossing the ford previously 
mentioned, this division marched in three 
columns to the support of the attack on 
the enemy's left. On nearing the scene of 
action the columns were halted, faced to 
the front, and established by (Jen. Sumner 
in three parallel lines by "brigade, facing 
toward the south and west; (jcn. Gorman's 
brigade in front, Gen. Dana's second, and 
Gen. Howard's third, with a distance be- 
tween the lines of some seventy pacoe. 
The division was then put in motion and 
moved upon the field of battle, under fire 
from the enemy's concealed batteries on 
the hill beyond the roads. Passing diago- 
nally to the front across the open space 
and to the front of the first division of 
Gen. Williams's corps, this latter division 
withdrew. 

Kntciring the woods on the west of the 
turnpike, and driving the enemy before 
them, the first line was met with heavy 
fire of musketry and shell from the enemy's 
breastworks and the batteries on the hill 
commanding the exit from the woods ; 
meantime a heavy column of the enemy 
had succeeded in crowding back the troops 
of Gen. Green's division, and appeared in 
rear of the left of Sedgwick's division. 
By counnand of Gen. Sumner, Gen. Howard 
faced the third line to the rear preparatory 
to a change of front to meet the column 
advancing on the left ; but this line now 
suflering from a destructive fire lioth in 
front and on its left, which it was unable 
to return, gave way towards the right and 
rear in considerable confusion, and was 
soon followed by the first and second 
lines. 

Gen. Gorman's brigade, and one regi- 
ment of Gen. Dana's, soon rallied and 
checked the advance of the enemy on the 
right. The second and third lines now 



144 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAK 



formed on the left of Gen. Gorman's bri- 
gade, and poured a destructive fire upon 
the enemy. 

During Gen. Sumner's attack, he or- 
dered Gen. Williams to support him. 
Brig. Gen. Gordon, with a portion of his 
brigade, moved forward, but when he 
reached the woods, the left of Gen. Sedg- 
wick's division had given way : and finding 
himself, as the smoke cleared up, opposed 
to the enemy m force with his small com- 
mand, he withdrew to the rear of the bat- 
teries at the second line of woods. As 
Gen. Gordon's troops unmasked our bat- 
teries on the left, they opened with canis- 
ter; the batteries of Cap. Cothran, 1st 
New York, and 1, 1st artillery, commanded 
by Lieut. Woodruff, doing good service. 
Unable to withstand this deadly fire in 
front and the musketry fire from fhe right, 
the enemy again sought shelter in the 
woods and rocks beyond the turnpike. 

During this assault Gens. Sedgwick and 
Dana were seriously wounded and taken 
from the field. Gen. Sedgwick, though 
twice wounded, and faint from loss of 
blood, retained command of his division 
for more than an hour after his first wound, 
animating his command by his presence. 

About the time of Gen. Sedgwick's ad- 
vance. Gen. Hooker, while urging on his 
command, was severely wounded in the 
foot and taken from the field, and Gen. 
Meade was placed in commaVid of his corps. 
Gen. Howard assumed command after Gen. 
Sedgwick retired. 

The repulse of the enemy offered oppor- 
tunity to rearrange the lines and reorganize 
the commands on the right, now more or 
less in confusion. The batteries of the 
Pennsylvania reserve, on high ground, 
near J. Poffenberger's house, opened fire, 
and checked several attempts of the enemy 
to establish batteries in front of our right, 
to turn that flank and enfilade the lines. 

While the conflict was so obstinately 
raging on the right, Gen. French was push- 
ing his division against the enemy still 
further to the left. This division crossed 
the Antietara at the same ford as Gen. 
Sedgwick, and immediately in his rear. 
' Passing over the stream in three columns, 
the division marched about a mile from the 
ford, then facing to the left, moved in three 
lines towards the enemy: Gen. Max We- 
ber's brigade in front ; Col. Dwight Mor- 
ris's brigade of raw troops, undrilled, and 
moving for the first time under fire, in the 
second, and Gen. Kimball's brigade in the 
third. The division was first assailed by a 
tire of artillery, but steadily advanced, 
driving in the enemy's skirmishers, and 
encountered the infantry in some force at 
the gr.pup of houses on Iloulette.'s farm. 
Gen. Weber's brigade gallantly advanced 



with an unwavering front and drove the 
enemy from their position about the houses. 

While Gen. Weber was hotly engaged 
with the first line of the enemy, Gen. 
French received orders from Gen. Sumner, 
his corps commander, to push on with re- 
newed vigor to make a diversion in favor 
of the attack on the right. Leaving the 
new troops, who had been thrown into 
some confusion from their march through 
cornfields, over fences, &c.. to form as a 
reserve, he ordered the brigade of Gen 
Kimball to the front, passing to the left of 
Gen. Weber. The enemy was pressed 
back to near the crest of the hill, where 
he was encountered in greater strength 
posted in a simken road forming a natural 
rifle-pit running in a northwesterly direc- 
tion. In a cornfield in rear of this road 
were also strong bodies of the enemy. As 
the line reached the crest of the hill a 
galling fire was opened on it from the 
sunken road and cornfield. Here a terrific 
fire of musketry burst from both lines, and 
the battle raged along the whole line with 
great slaughter. 

The enemy attempted to turn the left of 
the line, but were met by the 7th Virginia 
and 132d Pennsylvania volunteers and re- 
pulsed. Foiled in this, the enemy made a 
determined assault on the front, but were 
met by a charge from our lines which drove 
them back with severe loss, leaving in our 
hands some three hundred prisoners and 
several stand of colors. The enemy having 
been repulsed by the terrible execution of 
the batteries and the musketry fire on the 
extreme right, now attempted to assist the 
attack on Uen. French's division by as- 
sailing him on his right and endeavoring to 
turn this flank, but this attack was met 
and checked by the 14th Indiana and 8th 
Ohio volunteers, and by canister from 
Cap. Tompkin's battery, 1st Rhode Island 
artillery. Having been under an almost 
continuous fire for nearly four hours, and 
the ammunition nearly expended, this di- 
vision now took position immediately be- 
low the crest of the heights on which they 
had so gallantly fought, the enemy making 
no attempt to regain their lost gronnd. 

On the left of Gen. French, Gen. Rich- 
ardson's division was hotly engaged. Hav- 
ing crossed the Antietam about 9.30 a. m. 
at the ford crossed by the other divisions 
of Sumner's corps, it moved on a line 
nearly parallel to the Antietam. and 
formed in a ravine behind the high grounds 
overlooking Roulette's house ; the 2d (Irish) 
brigade, commanded by (ien. Meagher, on 
the right; tht ijd brigade, commanded by 
Gen. Caldwell, on his left, and the brigade 
commanded by Col. Brooks, 53d Pennsyl- 
vania volunteers, in support. As the di- 
visiou moved forward to take its position 



RErORT OF GENERAL GEORGE D. M'CLELLAX. 145 



on the field, the enemy directed a fire of 
artillery ao^ainst it, but owing to the irregu- 
larities of the gromul did but little damage. 

Meagher's brigade advancing steadily 
soon became engaged with the enemy 
posted to the left and in front of Rou- 
lette's house. It continued to advance fin- 
der a heavy fire nearly to the crest of the 
hill overlooking Piper's house, the enemy 
being posted in a continuation of the 
eanken road and cornfield before referred 
to. Here the brave Irish brigade opened 
upon the enemy a terrific musketry tare. 

All of Gen. Sumner's corps was now 
engaged : Gen. Sedgwick on the right ; 
Gen. French in the centre, and Gen. Rich- 
ardson on the left. The Irish brigade 
sustained its well-earned reputation. After 
Buffering terribly in officers and men. and 
strewing the ground with their enemies as 
they drove them back, their ammunition 
nearly expended, and their commander, 
Oea. Meagher, disabled by the fall of his 
horse shot under him, this brigade was 
ordered to give place to Gen. Caldwell's 
brigade, which advanced to a short distance 
in its rear. The lines were passed by the 
Irish brigade breaking by company to the \ 
rear, and Gen. Caldwell's by company to | 
the front as steadily as on drill. Col. I 
Brooks's brigade now became the second i 
line. I 

The ground over which Gens. Richard- , 
eon's and French's divisions were fighting | 
was very irregular, intersected by numer- 1 
oua ravines, liills covered with growing ! 
corn, enclosed by stone .walls, behind which I 
the enemy could advance unobserved upon j 
any exposed point of our lines. Taking • 
advantage of this, the enemy attempted to i 
gain the right of Richardson's position in \ 
a cornfield near Roulette's house, where | 
the division had become separated from i 
that of (xen. French's. A chan^'-e of front i 
l)y the .52d New York and 2d Delaware ■ 
volunteers, of Col. Brooks's brigade, under | 
t'ol. Frank, and the attack made by the ! 
!'>M Pennsylvania volunteers, sent further i 
to the right by {'ol. Brooks to close this | 
i!:-jt]} in the line, and the movement of the 
I'S-ld Pennsylvania and 7th Virginia volun- 
teers of Gen. French's divisidn. before 
referred to. drove the enemy from the corn- 
field and restored the line. 

The brigade of Gen. Caldwell, with 
dei.ermined gallantry, pushed the enemy 
back opposite the left and centre of this 
division, but sheltered in the sunken road, 
they still lield our forces on the right of 
(Jaldwell in check. Col. Barlow command- 
ing the 61st and G4th New York regiments 
of Caldwell's brigade, seeing a favorable 
opportunity, advanced the regiments on 
the left, taking the line in the sunken road 
iii flank, and compelling them to surread<^r, 
10 



capturing over three hundred prisoners 
and three stands of colars. 

The whole of the brigade, with the 57th 
and GOth New York regiments of Col. 
Brooks's brigade, who had moved these 
regiments into the first line, now advanced 
with gallantry, driving the enemy before 
them in confusion into the cornfield beyond 
the sunken road. The left of the division 
was now well advanced, when the enemy, 
concealed by an intervening ridge en- 
deavored to turn its left and rear. 

Col. Cross, 5th New Hampshire, by a 
change of front to the left and rear, 
brought his njgiment facing the advancing 
line. Here a spirited contest arose to 
gain a commanding height, the two op- 
posing forces moving parallel to each 
other, giving and receiving fire. Tlie 5th 
gained the advantage, faced to the right 
and delivered its volley. The enemy 
staggered, but rallied and advanced desper- 
ately at a charge. Being re-enforced by 
the 8 1st Pennsylvania, these regiments 
met the advance by a counter charge. 
The enemy fied leaving many killed, 
wounded, and prisoners, and the colors of 
the 4lh North (^arolina, hi our hands. 

Another column of the enemy, ad- 
vancing under shelter of a stone wall and 
cornfield, pressed down on the right of thf 
division ; but Col. Barlow again advanced 
the Gist and G4th New York against these 
troops, and with the attack of Kimball's 
brigade on the right, drove them from this 
position. 

Oiu- troops on the left of this part of 
the line having driven the enemy far back, 
they, with re-enforced numbers, made a 
determined attack directly in front. To 
meet this, Col. Barlow brought his two 
regiments to their position in line, and 
drove the enemy through the cornfield into 
the orchard beyond, under a heavy fire of 
musketry, and a fire of canister from two 
pieces of artillery in the orchard, and a 
battery further to the right, throwing shell 
and case shot. This advance gave us 
possession of Piper's house, tlie strong 
point contended for by the enemy at this 
part of the line.it being a defensible build- 
ing several hundred yards in advance of 
the sunken roatl. The musketry fire at 
this point of the line now ceased. Holding 
Piper's house, (ien. Richardson withdrew 
the Hue a little way to the crest of a hill, 
a more advantageous position. Uj) to this 
time the division was without artillery, 
and in the new jiosition suffered severely 
from artillery fire which could not be 
replied to. A section of Robertson's hors*' 
battery, commanded by IJent. Vincent, 2d 
artillery, now arrived' on the ground and 
did ex'cellent service. SubscqiM-ntly a 
battery of brass guns, commanded by Gapl. 



146 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M-CLELLAJT. 



Graham, 1st artillery, arrived, and was 
posted on the crest of the liill. and soon 
silenced the two fjiins in the orchard. A 
heavy fire soon ensued between the battery 
further to the right and our own. Capt. 
<Traham's battery was bravely and skill- 
I'ully served, but unable to reach the enemy, 
who had rifled guns of greater range than 
onr smooth-bores, retired by order of Gen. 
Richardson, to save it from useless sacrifice 
of men and horses. 'J'he brave general 
wa,s himself mortally wounded while per- 
sonally directing its fire. 

(icn Hancock was placed in command 
of the division after the fall of Gen. Rich- 
ardson. Gen. Meagher's brigade, now 
("ommanded by Col. Burke, of the 63d 
New York, having refilled their cartridge- 
boxes, was again ordered forward, and 
took position in the centre of the line. 
The division now occupied one line in close 
])roximity to the enemy, who had taken up 
a position in the rear of Piper's house. 
Col. Dwight Morris, with the 14th Con- 
necticut and a detachment of the lOSth 
N'ew York, of (ren. French's division, was 
sent ))y (Jen. French to the support of 
(Jen. Richardson's division. This command 
was now placed in an interval in the line 
between Gen. Caldwell's and the Irish 
l)rigades. 

The requirements of the extended line 
of battle had so engaged the artillery that 
the application of Gen. Hancock for 
artillery for the division could not be com- 
plied with immediately by the chief of 
artillery or the corps commanders in his 
vicinitj'. Knowing the tried courage of 
the troops, Gen. Hancock felt confident 
that he could hold his position, although 
suffering from the enemy's artillery, but 
was too weak to attack, as the great 
length of the line he was obliged to hold 
prevented him from forming more than one 
line of battle, and, from his advanced 
]tosition, this line was already partly en- 
filaded by the lotteries of the enemy on 
the right, which were protected from our 
batteries opposite . them by the woods at 
the Dtiiiker church. 

Seeing a body of the enemy advancing 
on some of our troops to the left of his 
position. (Jen. Hancock obtained Hexam- 
er's battery from (len. Franklin's corps, 
which assisted materially in frustrating 
this attack. It also assisted the attack of 
the Tth Maine of Franklin's corps, which, 
without other aid, made an attack against 
the enemy's line, and drove in the skir- 
mishers who were annoying our artillery 
and troops on the riglit. Lieut. Woodruff, 
with battery I, 2d artillery, relieved Capt. 
Hexamer, wh«se ammunition was ex- 
pended. The enemy at one time seemed 
to be about making an attack in force 



upon this part of the line, and advanced a 
long column of infantry towards this 
division ; but on Hearing the position. Gen. 
Pleasonton opening on them with sixteen 
guns, they halted, gave a desultory fire, 
and retreated, closing the operations on 
this portion of the field. I return to the 
incidents occurring still further to the 
right. 

Between 12 and 1 p. m. (^en. Franklin's 
corps arrived on the field of battle, having 
left their camp near Crampton's pass at 6 
A. M., leaving Gen. Couch with orders to 
move with his division to occupy Maryland 
heights. Gen. Smith's division led the 
column, followed by (Jon. Slocum's. 

It was first intended to keep this corps in 
reserve on the east side of the Antietam, 
to operate on either flank or on the centre, 
as circumstances might require ; but on 
nearing Keedysville, the strong opposition 
on the right, developed by the attacks of 
Hooker and Sumner, rendered it necessai-y 
at once to send this corps to the assist- 
ance of the right wing. 

On nearing the field, hearing that one of 
our batteries, (A,) 4th United States ar- 
tillery, commanded by Lieut. Thomas, who 
occupied the same position as Lieut. 
Woodruff's battery in the morning, was 
hotly engaged without supports, Gen. 
Smith sent two regiments to its relief from 
(jcn. Hancock's brigade. On inspecting 
the ground, (Jen. Smith ordered the other 
regiments of Hancock's brigade, with 
Frank's and Cowen's batteries. 1st New 
York artillery, to the threatened position. 
Lieut. Thomas and ('apt. Cothran, com- 
manding batteries, bravely held their posi- 
tions against the advancing enemy, hand- 
ling their batteries with skill. 

Finding the enemy still advancing, the 
3d brigade of Smith's division, commanded 
by Col. Irwin, 49th Pennsylvania volun- 
teers, wasordered up, and pa.«sed through 
Lieut. Thomas's battery, charged upon 
the enemy, and drove back the advance 
until abreast of the Hunker church. As 
the right of the brigade came ojiposite the 
woods it received a destructive fire, which 
checked the advance and threw the brigade 
somewhat into confusion. It formed again 
behind a rise of ground in the open space 
in advance of the batteries. 

Gen. French having reported to Gen. 
Franklin that his ammnnition was nearly 
expended, that officer ordered (Jen. Brooks, 
with his brigade, to reinforce him. (ien. 
Brooks formed his brigade on the right of 
Gen. French, where they remained during 
the remainder of the day and night, fre- 
quently under the fire of the enemy's ar- 
tillery. 

It was soon after the brigade of Col. 
Irwin had fallen back behind the rise of 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX. 147 



gronnd that the 7th Maine, by order of 
Col. Irwin, made the gallant attack already 
referred to. 

The advance of Gen. Franklin's corps 
was opportune. The attack of the enemy 
on this position, but for the timely arrival 
of his corps, must have been disastrous, 
had it succeeded in piercing the line be- 
tween Gens. Sedgwick's and French's di- 
visions. 

Gen. Franklin ordered two brigades of 
Gen. Slocam's division. Gen. Newton's and 
(Jol. Torbert's. to form in column to assault 
the woods that had been so hotly contested 
before by Gens. Sumner and Hooker. 
(Jen. Bartlett's brigade was ordered to 
form as a reserve. At this time Gen. 
Sumner, having command on the right, 
directed further offensive operations to be 
postponed, as the repulse of this, the only 
remaining corps availal)le for attack, would 
peril the safety of the whole army. 

Gen. Porter's corps, consisting of den. 
Syke's division of regulars and volunteers, 
and Gen. Morell's division of volunteers, 
occupied a position on the east side of An- 
tietam creek, upon the main turnpike 
loading to Sharpsburg, and directly oppo- 
Bite the centre of the enemy's line. This 
corps filled the interval between the right 
wing and Gen. Burnside's command, and 
guarded the main approach from the 
enemy's position to our trains of supply. 
It was necessary to watch this part of our 
line with the utmost vigilance, lest the 
enemy should take advantage of the first 
exhibition of weakness here to push upon 
usi a vigorous assault, for the purpose of 
piercing our centre and turning our rear, 
as w(!ll as to capture or destroy our supply 
trains. Once having penetrated this line, 
the enemy's passage to our rear could ha%'e 
m^t with but feeble resistance, as there 
were no reserves to reinforce or close up 
the gap. 

Towards the middle of the afternoon, 
proceeding to the right, I found that Sum- 
ner's, Hooker's and Mansfield's corps had 
met with serious losses. Several general 
officers had been carried from the field 
severely woimded, and the aspect of affairs 
was anything but promising. At the risk 
of greatly exposing our centre, I ordered 
two brigades from Porter's corps, the only 
available troops, to reinforce the right. 
Six battalions of Syke's regulars had been 
thrown forward across the Antietam 
bridge on the main road to attack and 
drive back the enemy's sharpshooters, 
who were annoying Pleasonton's horse 
batteries in advance of the bridge ; War- 
ren's brigade, of Porter's corps, was de- 
tached to hold a position on Burnside's 
right and rear; so that Porter was left at 
one time with only a portion of Sykes's 



division and one small brigade of Morell's 
division (but little over three thousand 
men) to hold his important position. 

(Jen. Sumner expressed the most decided 
opinion against another attempt during 
that day to assault the enemy's position in 
front, as portions of our troops were so 
much scattered and demoralized. In view 
of these circumstances, after making 
changes in the position of some of the 
troops, I directed the different commanders 
to hold their positions, and being satisfied 
that this could be done withiuit the as'^ist- 
auce of the two brigades from the centre, 
I countermanded the order, which was in 
course of execution. 

Gen. Slocum's division replaced a por- 
tion of Gen. Sumner's troops, and positions 
were selected for batteries in front of the 
woods. The enemy opened several heavy 
fires of artillery on the position of our 
troops after this, but our batteries soon 
silenced them. 

On the morning of the 17th, Gen. Plea- 
sonton. with his cavalry division and the 
horse batteries, under (lapts. Robertson, 
Tidball, and Lieut. Haines, of the 2d ar- 
tillery, and Uapt. Gibson, 3d artillery, was 
ordered to advance on the turnpike to- 
wards Sharpsburg, across bridge No. 2, 
and support the left of Gen. Sumner's line. 
Tlie bridge being covered by a fire of 
artillery and sharpshooters, cavalry skir- 
mishers were thrown out, and Capt. Tid- 
ball's battery advanced by piece and drove 
off the sharpshooters with canister suffi- 
ciently to establish the batteries above 
mentioned, which opened on the enemy 
with effect. The firing was kept up for 
about two hours, when, the enemy's fire 
slackening, the batteries were relieved by 
RandaU's and Van Reed's batteries. United 
States artillery. About 3 o'clock Tidbiill, 
Robertson and Haines returned to their 
positions on the west of Antietam, Capl,. 
Gibson having been placed in position on 
the east side to guard the approaches to 
the bridge. These batteries did good ser- 
vice, concentrating their fire on the column 
of the enemy al)out to attack (Jen. Han- 
cock's position, and compelling it to find 
shelter behind the hills in rear. 

(ien. Sykes's division had been in posi- 
tion since' the l.'ith, exposed to the enemy's 
artillery and sharpshooters. Gen. Morell 
had come up on the 16th, and relieved 
Gan. Richardson on the right of (Jen. 
Sykes. Continually, under the vigi iini, 
watch of the enemy, this corps guarded a 
vital point. 

The position of the batteries under (Jon. 
Pleasonton being one of great exposure, 
the battalion of the 2d and 10th United 
States infantry, under Capt. Pollard, 2^d 
infantry, was sent to his support. Subse- 



148 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



quently four battalions of regular infantry, 
under Capt. Dryer, 4th infantry, were sent 
across to assist in driving off the sharp- 
shooters of the enemy. 

The battalions of the 2d and 10th in- 
fantry, advancing far beyond the batteries, 
compelled the cannoneers of a battery of 
the enemy to abandon their guns. Few in 
numbers, and unsupported, they were un- 
able to bring them off. The heavy loss of this 
small body of men attests their gallantry. 

The troops of Gen. Burnside held the 
left of the line opposite bridge No. 3. The 
attack on the right was to have been sup- 
ported by an attack on the left. Prepara- 
tory to this attack, on the evening of the 
16th, Gen. Burnside's corps was moved 
forward and to the left, and took up a 
position nearer the bridge. 

I visited Gen. Burnside's position on the 
16th, and after pointing out to him the 
proper dispositions to be made of his troops 
during the day and night, informed him 
that he" would probably be required to 
attack the enemy's right on the following 
morning, and directed him to make careful 
reconnoissances. 

Gen. Burnside's corps, consisting of the 
divisions of Gens. Cox. Wilcox, Rodman, 
and Sturgis, was posted as follows : Col. 
Brooks's brigade, Cox's division, on the 
right. Gen. Sturgis's division immediately 
in rear. On the left was Gen. Rodman's 
division, with Gen. Scammon's brigade, 
Cox's division, in support. 

Gen. Wilcox's division was held in re- 
serve. 

The corps bivouacked in position on the 
night of the 16th. 

Early on the morning of the 17th, I 
ordered Gen. Burnside to form his troops, 
and hold them in readiness to assault the 
bridge in his front, and to await further 
orders. 

At 8 o'clock an order was sent to him 
by Lieut. Wilson, topographical engineers, 
to carry the bridge, then to gain posses- 
sion of the heights beyond, and to advance 
along their crest upon Sharpsburg and its 
rear. 

After some time had elapsed, not hear- 
ing from him, I despatched an aid to as- 
certain what had been done. The aid re- 
turned with the information that but little 
progress had been made. I then sent him 
back with an order to Gen. Burnside to 
assault the bridge at once, and carry it all 
hazards. The aid returned to me a second 
time with the report that the bridge was 
still in the possession of the enemy. Where- 
upon I directed Col. Sackett, inspector 
general, to deliver to Gen. Burnside my 
positive order to push forward his troops 
without a moment's delay, and, if neces- 
sary, to carry the bridge at the point of 



the bayonet ; and I ordered Col. Sackett 
to remain with Gen. Burnside and see that 
the order was executed promptly. 

After these three hours' delay, the bridge 
was carried at one o'clock by a brilliant 
charge of the 51st New York and Slst 
Pennsylvania volunteers. Other troops 
were then thrown over, and the opposite 
bank occupied, the enemy retreating to the 
heights beyond. 

A halt was then made by Gen. Burn- 
side's advance until 3 p. m., upon hearing 
which I directed one of my aids, Col. Key, 
to inform Gen. Burnside that 1 desired him 
to push forward his troops with the utmost 
vigor, and carry the enemy's position oa 
the heights ; that the movement was vital 
to our success ; that this was a time when 
we must not stop for loss of life, if a great 
object could thereby be accomplished. 
That if, in his judgment, his attack would 
fail, to inform me so at once, that his troops 
might be withdrawn and used elsewhere on 
the field. He replied that he would soon 
advance, and would go up the hill as far as 
a battery of the enemy on the left would 
permit. Upon this report, I again imme- 
diately sent Col. Key to Gen. Burnside 
with orders to advance at once, if possible 
to flank the battery, or storm it and carry 
the heights; repeating that if he consid- 
ered the movement impracticable, to in- 
form me so, that his troops might be re- 
called. The advance was then gallantly 
resumed, the enemy driven from the guns, 
the heights handsomely carried, and a por- 
tion of the troops even reached the out- 
skirts of Sharpsburg. By this time it was 
nearly dark, and strong re-enforcements 
just then reaching the enemy from Har- 
per's Ferry, attacked Gen. Burnside's 
troops on their left flank, and forced them 
to retire to a lower line of hills nearer the 
bridge. 

If this important movement had been 
consummated two hours earlier, a position 
would have been secured upon the heights, 
from which our batteries might have enfi- 
laded the greater part of the enemy's line, 
and turned their right and rear, our vic- 
tory might thus have been much more de- 
cisive. 

The following is the substance of Gen. 
Burnside's operations, as given in his re- 
port : 

Col. Crook's brigade was ordered to 
storm the bridge. This bridge. No. 3, is a 
stone structure of three arches with stone 
parapets. The banks of the stream on the 
opposite side are precipitous, and com- 
mand the eastern approaches to the bridge. 
On the hill-side, immediately by the bridge, 
was a stone fence running parallel to the 
stream ; the turns of the roadway, as it 
wound up the hill, were covered by rifle- 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAK 149 



pits and breastworks of rails. <fec. These 
works, and the woods that covered the 
slo[)es, were tilhul with the enemy's rifle- 
men, and batteries were in position to en- 
fihide the bridije and its approaches. 

Gen. Rodman was ordered to cross the 
ford below the l)ridtre. From Col. t 'rook's 
position it was found impossible to carry 
the bridjje. 

(Jen. iSturffis was ordered to make a de- 
tail from his division for that purpose. He 
pent forward the 2d Maryland and the 6th 
New Hampshire. These rec'iments made 
several successive attacks in the most gal- 
lant style, but were driven back. 

The artillery on the left were ordered to 
concentrate their fire on the woods above 
the bridge. Col. Crook brought a section 
of Capt. Simmons's battery to a position 
to command the bridge. The 51st New 
York and 51st Pennsylvania were then 
ordered to assault the bridge. Taking ad- 
vantage of a small spur of the hills which 
ran parallel to the river, they moved to- 
wards the bridge. From the crest of this 
spur they rushed with bayonets tixed and 
cleared the bridge. 

The division followed the storming party, 
also the brigade of Col. Crook's as a sup- 
port. The enemy withdrew to still higher 
ground, some five or six hundred yards be- 
yond, and opened a fire of artillery on the 
"troops in the new position on the crest of 
the hill above the bridge. 

Gen. Rodman's division succeeded in 
crossing the ford after a shar]) tire of mus- 
ketry and artillery, and joined on the left 
of S'turgis, Scammon's brigade crossing as 
support. Gen. Wilcox's division was or- 
dered across to take position on (ien. Stur- 
gis's right. 

These dispositions being completed about 
3 o'clock, the command moved forward, 
except Sturgis's division, left in reserve. 
Clark's and Durell's batteries accompanied 
Rodman's division; Cook's battery with 
Wilcox's division, and a section of Sim- 
mons's liattery with Col. Crook's brig^ide. 
A section of Simmons's battery and Mul- 
leuburgh's and McMuUan's batteries were 
in position. The order for the advance 
was obeyed by the troops with alacrity. 
Gen. Wilcox's' division, with Crook in sup- 
port, moved up on both sides of the turn- 
pike leading from the bridge to Sharps- 
burg, Gen. Rodman's division, supported 
bv Scaramon's brigade, on the left of (xen. 
Wilcox. The enemy retreated before the 
advance of the troops. Tiie 9th New 
York, of Gen. Rodman's division, cap- 
lured one of the enemy's batteries and 
held it for some time. As the command 
was driving the enemy to the main heights 
on the left'of the tovvn, the light division 
of Gen. A. P. Hill arrived upon the tield 



of battle from Harper's Ferry, and with a 
heavy artillery fire made a strong attack 
on the extreme left. To meet this attack 
the left division diverged from the line of 
march intended, and o])ened a gaj) between 
it and the right. To fill up this it was 
necessary to order the troops from the 
second line. During these movements Gen. 
Rodman was mortally wounded. Colonel 
Harland's brigade, of Gen. Rodman's divi- 
sion, was driven back. Col. Scammon's 
brigade, by a change of front to rear on 
his right flank, saved the left from being 
driven com])letely in. The fresh troops of 
the enemy pouring in, and the accumul'.i- 
tion of artillery against this comnumd, de- 
stroyed all hope of its being able to accom- 
plish anything more. 

It was now nearly dark. Gen. Sturgis 
was ordered forward to support the left. 
Notwithstanding the hard work in the early 
part of the day, his division moved for- 
ward with spirit. "With its assistance the 
enemy were checked and held at bay. 

The command was ordered to fall back 
by (ien. Cox, who commanded on the field 
the troops engaged in this affair beyond 
the Antietam. The artillery had been well 
served during the day. Night closed the 
long and desperately contested battle of 
the 17th. Nearly two hundred thousand 
men and five hundred pieces of artillery 
were for fourteen hours engaged in this 
memorable battle. We had attacked the 
enemy in a position selected by the exper- 
ienced engineer then in person directing 
their operations. We had driven them 
from their line on one flank, and secured a 
footing v.ithin it on the other. The army 
of the Potomac, notwithstanding thetnoral 
effect incident to previous reverses, had 
achieved a victory over an adversary in- 
vested with the prestige of recent success. 
Our soldiers slept that night conquerors! 
on a field won by their valor and covered 
with the dead and wounded of the enemy. 

The night, however, brought with it 
grave responsibilities. AVhether to renew 
the attack on the 18th, or to defer it, even 
with the risk of the enemy's retirement, 
was the question before me. 

After a night of anxious deliberation 
and a full and careful survey of the situa- 
tion and condition of our army, the strenirth 
and position of the enemy, I concluded 
that the success of an attack on the IHlh 
was not certain. I am aware of the fact 
that, under ordinary circumstances, a gene- 
ral is expected to risk a battle if he has a 
reasonable prospect of success ; but at 
this critical juncture I should have had a 
narrow view of the condition of the coun- 
try had I been willing to hazard another 
battle with less than an absolute assurance 
of success. At that moment — Virginia 



150 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. MCLELLAN. 



losx, Washingion menaced. Marvland in- 1 
vided — the national cause could afiord no } 
risks of defeat. One battle lost, and al- 
most all 'wonid have been lost. Lee's , 
army might then have marched as it 
pleased on Wuc^hinzton. Baltimore. Phila- , 
delphia. or New York. It could have 
levied its supplies from a fertile and unde- ; 
vastated country: extorted tribute from 
wealthy and populous cities ; and nowhere 
easT of the Alleg-hanies was there another 
oreranized force able to arrest its march. 

The followin? are among- the considera- 
tions which led me to doubt the certainty 
of success in attacking before the 19th: 

The troops were greatly overcome by the 
fatigue and exhaustion attendant upon the 
Ions continued and severely contested bat- 
tle of the 17th. together with the long d=iy 
and night marches to wMch they had been 
subjected dnriiig the previous three days. 

The supply trains were in the rear, and 
many of the troops had suffered from hun- 
ger. They required rest and refreshment. 

One division of Sumner's and all of 
Hookers corps, on the right, had, after 
fishting most valiently for several hours. 
J>een overpowered by numbers, driven back 
in great disorder, and much scattered, so 
that they were for the time somewhat de- 
moralized. 

In Hookers corps, according to the re- 
tarn made by Gen. ileade. commanding, 
there were but 6.729 men present on the 
18th ; whereas, on the morning of the22d, 
there were 13.093 men present for duty in 
the same corps, showing that previous to 
aad during the battle 6.364 men were sepa- 
rated from their command. 

Gen. Meade, in an official communication 
cpon this su"t>ject, dated September ISth. 
It62. says : 

'■ I enclose a field return of the corps 
made this afternoon, which I desire you 
will lay before the commanding generaL I 
am satisfied the great redaction in the 
corps since the recent engag^ements is not 
due solely to the casualities of battle, and 
that a considerable number of men are still 
ia the rear, some havinar dropped out on 
the march, and many dispersing and leav- 
ing yesterday during the fight. I think 
t ife efficiency of the corps, so far as it goes. 
g»X)d. To resist an attack in our present 
strong position I think they may be de- 
l-ended on. and I hope they will perform 
duty in case we make an attack, though I 
do not think their morale is as good for an 
offensive as a defensive movement." 

One division of Sumner's corps had also 
been overpowered, and was a good deal 
scattered and demoralized. It was not 
deemed by its corps commander in proper 
condition to attack the enemy vigorously 
tiie next day. 



Some of the new troops ou the left, al- 
thouffh many of them fought well daring 
the battle, and are entitled to great credit, 
were at the close of the action, driven 
back, and their morale impaired. 

On the morning of the ISih Gen. Burn- 
side requested me to send him another di- 
vision to assist in holding his position on 
the other side of the Antietam. and to en- 
able him to withdraw his corps if he should 
be attacked by a superior force. He gave 
me the impression that if he were attacked 
again that morning he would not be able 
to make a very vigorous resistance. I 
visited his position early, determined to 
send Gen. Morell's division to his aid, and 
directed that it should be placed on this 
side of the Antietam. in order that it 
might cover the retreat of his own corps 
from the other side of the Antietam. should 
that become necessary, at the same time 
it was in position to re-enforce our centre 
or right, if that were needed. 

Late in the afternoon I found that, al- 
though he had not been attacked, Gen- 
Bnmside had withdrawn his own corps to 
this side of the Antietam. and sent over 
Morell's division alone to hold the oppo- 
site side. 

A lar^e number of our heaviest and 
most efficient batteries had consumed all 
their ammunition on the 16th and 17th, 
and it was impossible to supply them until 
late on the following day. 

SuppUes of provisions and forage had to 
be brought up and issued, and infantry 
ammunition distributed. 

Finally, re-enforcements to the number 
of 1LOO<3 men — to say nothing of troops 
expected from Pennsylvania — had not ar- 
rived, but were expected during the day. 

The ISth was. therefore, spent in col- 
lecting the dispersed, giving rest to the 
fatigued, removing the wounded, burying 
the dead, and the necessary preparations 
for a renewal of the battle. 

Of the re-inforcements. Couch's division, 
marching with commendable rapidity, came 
up into position at a late hour in the morn- 
ing. Humphrey's division of new troops, 
in their anxiety to participate in the bat- 
tle which was racing, when they received 
the order to march from Frederick at about 
half-past three p. m., on the ITth, pressed 
forward during- the entire night, and the 
mass of the division reached the army du- 
ring the following morning. Having 
marched more than twenty-there miles 
after half-past four o'clock on the preceding 
afternoon, they were of course, greatly 
exhausted, and needed rest and refresh- 
ment. Large re-inforcements expected 
from Pennsylvania never arrived. During 
the 18th. orders were given for a renewal 
of the attack' at dayUght on the 19th. 



BE PORT OF GEyEEAL GEORGE B. MCLELLAN 

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153 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX. 



An estimate of the forces under the con- 
federate Gen. Lee. made up by direction 
of (ien. Banks, frc ni information obtained 
))_v the e.xaminaTion of prisoners, deserters, 
spies, itc, previous to the Laltle of An- 
tietam, is as foHows : 

Gen. J J. JmcUsou'.': corps 24.77S men. 

(lon. James I,<ings;reet'.s eorps 23,342 " 

• rpn D. II. Hill's 2d divisiou 'id,n25 " 

<.iea J. E. B Stuait, cavalry ri,400 " 

Gen. Ransom's ami .Ipnkiu.s's brigade 3,000 " 

yortvsix reiiiinents nut included in above.lS.400 " 

Artillery, estimated at 400 guns t),009 " 



Total 97.44d " 

These estimate? give the actual number 
of men present and fit for duty. 

Our own forces at the battle of Antietam 
were as follows : 

1st corps 14,R.5'i men. 

2d corps 1S,'1.8 " 

Otli corps lone division not arrived). 12,930 " 

■ th corps.. 12,.'?iH) " 

9th corps l:?,S19 " 

l-2th corps 10,12 i " 

'"avalry division 4,.'V20 " 



Total in action S7,l'4 " 

When our cavalry advance reached the 
river on the morning of the 19th, it was 
discovered that nearly all the enemy's 
forces had crossed into Virginia during the 
night, their rear esca]jing under cover of 
eight batteries, placed in strong positions 
upon the elevated bluffs on the opposite 
bank. Gen. Porter, commanding the .5th 
'n<rps. ordered a detachment from (griffin's 
and Barnes's brigades, under Gen. Griffin, 
to cross the river at dark, and carry the 
enemy's batteries. This was gallantly 
done under the fire of the enemy ; several 
guns, caissons, kc. were taken, and their 
supports driven back half a mile. 

The information obtained during the 
progress of this affair indicated that the 
ma.«s o the enemy had retreated on the 
Charle.^town and Martinsburg roads, to- 
>\ards Winchester. To verify this, and to 
ascertain how far the enemy had retired, 
(ien. I'orter was authorized to detach 
Irom his corps, on the morning of the 20th, 
a reconnoitring party in greater force. 
This detachment crossed the river, and 
advanced about a mile, when it was at- 
tacked by a large body of the enemy lying 
in ambush in the woods, and driven back 
across the river with considerable loss. 
This reconnoissance showed that the enemy 
was still in force on the Virginia bank of 
ihe Potomac, prepared to resist our fur- 
ther advance. 

It was reported on the 19tl\, that 
Gen. Stuart had made his appearance at 
Williamsport with some tour thousand 
cavalry and six pieces of artillery, and that 
t«n thousand infantry Were nmrching on 
the same point from the direction of Win- 
chester. 1 ordered Gen. Couch to march 
itt once with his division, and a part of 



Pleasonton's cavalry, with Franklin's 
corps, within supporting distance, for the 
purpose of endeavoring to capture this 
force. Gen, Couch made a prompt and 
rapid march to Williamsport, and attacked 
the enemy vigorously, but they made their 
escape across the river. 

I despatched the following telegraphic 
report to the general-in-chief : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
•' Sharpsburg, Sept. 19, 1862'. 

" I have the honor to report that Mary- 
land is entirely freed from presence of the 
enemy, who has been driven across the 
Potomac. No fears need now be enter- 
tained for the safety of Pennsylvania. I 
shall at once occupv Harper's Ferrv. 

" G. B. McCLf]LLAX. Maj.-Geii. Cora. 
'• Maj.-Geu. H. W, Hai.leck, 

Com. U. S. Army." 

On the following day I received this 
telegram : 

" W.4SHixGT0\, Sept. 20, 1862—2 p. m. 

" We are still left entirely in the dark 
in regard to your own movements and 
those of the enemy. This should not bo 
so. You should keep me advised of both, 
so far as vou kno-n- them. 

"H. W. HALLFX'K, Gen.-in-Chief. 

"Maj. Gen. G. B. McClellan." 

To which 1 answered as follows : 

'• Hkadquarter's Army of the Potomac. 
" Near Sharpsburg, Sept. 20, 18G2 — 8 p. m. 

" Your telegram of to-day is received. 
I telegraphed you yesterday all I knew 
and had nothing to inform you of until this 
evening. A^^illiaIT^s's corps (Banks's) oc- 
cupied Maryland heights at 1 p. m. to-day. 
The rest of the army is near here, except 
Couch's division, which is at. this moment 
engaged with the enemy in front of Wil- 
liamsport ; the enemy is retiring, via Char- 
lestown and Martiusburg. on Winchester. 
He last night reoccupied Williamsport by 
a small force, but will be out of it by morn- 
ing. I think he has a force of infantry 
near Shepherdstown. 

" I regret that you find it necessary 1o 
couch every despatch I have the honor to 
receive from you in a spirit of fault-finding, 
and that you have not yet found leisure to 
say one word in commendation of the recent 
achievements of this army, or even to al- 
lude to them. 

" I have abstained from giving the num- 
ber of guns, colors, small arms, prisoners. 
&c.. captured, luitil I could do so with 
some accuracy. I hope by to-morro\y 
evening to be able to give at least an ap- 
proximate statement. 

'•G. B. McCLELLAN, 

Maj. Gen. Comdg. 

"Maj. Gen. H. W. Ham.eck, 

" General-inChief." 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELX.AN. 153 



On the same day I telegraphed as fol- 
lows : 

" Headqcarters Army of the Potomac, 

"Sept. 20, 1862. 
" As the rebel army, now on the Vir- 
ginia side of the Potomac, mnst in a great 
measure be dependent for supplies of am- 
munition and provisions upon Richmond, 
I would respectfully suggest that General 
Banks be directed lo send out a cavalry 
force to cut their supply communication 
opposite "Washington. This would seriously 
embarrass their operations and will aid 
this armv materiallv. 

"G. B. McCLELLAX, 

" Maj. Gen. Com'd'g. 
" Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
" Comd'g U. S. Army." 

Maryland heights were occupied by 
Gen. Williams's corps on this day. and ou 
the 22d Gen. Sumner took possession of 
Harper's Ferry. 

It will be remembered that at the time 
I was assigned to the command of the 
forces for the defence of the national capi- 
tal, on the 2d day of September. l>fG2. the 
greater part of all the available troops 
were sufferin;; under the disheartening in- 
fluences of the serious defeat they had 
encountered during the brief and unfortu- 
nate campaign of Gen. Pope. Their num- 
bers were greatly reduced by casualties. 
their confidence was much shaken, and 
they had lost something of that *■ esprit du 
corps," which is indispensable to the effi- 
ciency of an army. Moreover, they had 
left behind, lost, or worn out. the greatest 
part of their clothing and camp equipage, 
which required renewal before they could 
be in proper condition to take the field 
again. 

The intelligence that the enemy was 
crossing the Potunuic into Maryland was 
received in Washington on the -ith of Sep- 
tember, and the army of the Potomac was 
again put in motion, under my direction, 
on the following day. so that but a very 
brief interval of time was allowed to re- 
organize or procure supplies. 

The sanguinary battles of South Moun- 
tain and Antietam fought by this army a 
few days afterwards, with the reconnois- 
Bances immediately following, resulted in 
a loss to us of ten general officers, many 
regimental and company officers, and a 
large number of enlisted men. amounting 
in the aggregate to fifteen thousand two 
hundred and twenty. (15.220.) Two army 
corps had been sadly cut up, scattered. 
and somewhat demoralized in the action 
on the ITth. 

In Gen- Sumner's corps alone forty-one 
(41) commissioned officers and eight hund- 
red and nineteen enlisted men had been 



killed ; four (4) general officers, eighty- 
nine (89) other commissioned officers, ai»d 
three thousand seven hundred and eifrht 
(3.708) enlisted men had been wounded, 
besides five hundred and forty-eight {b4^) 
missing ; making the aggregate loss in thift 
splendid veteran corps, in this one battle, 
five thousand two hundred and nine. (.^209.) 

In Gen. Hooker's corps the casualties 
of the same engagement amounted to two 
thousand six hundred and nineteen, (2.619.) 

The entire amiy had been greatly ex- 
hausted by unavoidable overwork, fatigu- 
ing marches, huneer. and want of sleep 
and rest, previous to the last battle. 

AVbenthe enemy recrossed the Potomac 
into Virginia the means of transportation 
at my disposal were inadequate to furnish 
a single day's supply of subsistence in 
advance in advance. 

Many of the troops were new levies, 
some of whom had fought like veterans, 
but the morale of others had been a good 
deal impaired in those severely contested 
actions, and they required time to recover 
as well as to acquire the necessary drill 
and discipline. 

Under these circumstances I did not 
feel authorized to cross the river with the 
main army over a very deep and difficult 
ford in pursuit of the retreating enemy, 
knowr to be in strong force on the south 
bank, and thereby place that stream, 
which was liable at any time to rise abi-ve 
a fording stage, between my army and its 
ba.^^e of supply. 

I telegraphed on the 22d to the general- 
in-chief as follows : 

'■ As soon as the exigencies of the ser- 
vice will admit of it, this army should be 
reorganized. It is absolutely necessary 
to secure its efficiency, that the old skele- 
ton regiments should be filled up at once, 
and officers appointed to supply the nu- 
merous existing vacancies. Tliere are in- 
stances where captains are commanding 
regiments, and companies are without a 
single commissioned officer." 

6b the 23d the following was telegraph- 
ed to the geueral-in. chief : 

■• Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
•• Near Shepherdstown. 
" Sept. 23, 1862—9.30 a. m. 
"From several difl'erent sources I learn 
that (ren. R. E. Lee is still opposite to my 
position at Leestuwn. between Shepherds- 
town and Martinsburg. and that General 
Jackson is on the Opequan creek, about 
three miles above its mouth, both with 
large forces. There are also indications 
of heavy re-info rcements moving towards 
them from Winchester and Charlestown. 
I have, therefore, ordered Gen. Franklin 
to take position with his corps at the 



154 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



croas-roads about one mile northeast of 
Bakersviile, on the Bakers ville and Wil- 
liamsport road, and Gen. Conch to estab- 
lish his division near Downsville, leaving 
sufficient force at Williamsport to watch 
and guard the ford at that place. The 
fact of the enemy's remaining so long in 
our front, and the indications of an advance 
of re-inforcoments, seem to indicate that 
he will give us another battle with all his 
aYailal)le force. 

'•As 1 mentioned to you before, our 
army has been very much reduced by 
casualties in the recent battles, and in my 
judgment all the re-enforcements of old 
troops that can possibly be dispensed with 
around Washington and other places 
should be instantly pushed forward by 
rail to this army. A defeat at this junc- 
ture would be ruinous to our cause. I 
cannot think it possible that the enemy 
will bring any forces to bear upon Wash- 
ington till after the question is decided 
here ; but if he should, troops can be soon 
sent back from this army by rail to re- 
enforce the garrison there. 

"The evidence I have that re-enforce- 
ments are coming to the rebel army con- 
sists in the fact that long columns of dust 
extending from Winchester to Charles- 
town and from Charlestown in this direc- 
tion, and also troops moving this way, 
were seen last evening. This is corrobo- 
rated by citizens. Gen. Sumner with his 
corps and Williams's (Banks's) occupies 
Harper's Ferry and the surrounding 
heights. I think he will be able to hold 
bis position till re-enforcements arrive. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. 

" Maj. Gen. Ham.eck, 

" Geu.-in-Chief, Washington." 

On the 27th I made the following re- 
port : 

'• Hkadquarters Army of the Potomac, 
"Sept. 27, 1862—10 a.m. 

" All the information in my possession 
goes to prove that the main body of the 
enemy is concentrated not far from Mar- 
tinsburg, with some troops at Charles- 
town ; not many in Winchester. Their 
movements of late have been an extension 
towards our right and beyond it. They 
are receiving re-enforcements in Winches- 
ter, mainly, 1 think, of Conscripts — perhaps 
entirely so. 

" This army is not now in condition to 
undertake another campaign, nor to bring 
on another battle, unless great advantages 
are offered by some mistake of the enemy, 
or pressing military exigencies render it 
necessary. We are greatly deficient in 
officers. Mgiuy of the old regiments are 
reduced to mere skeletons. The new regi- 
ments need instruction. Not a day should 



be lost in filling the old regiments — our 
main dependence — and in supplying va- 
cancies among the officers by promotion. 

" My present purpose is to hold the 
army about as it is now, rendering Har- 
per's Ferry secure and watching the river 
closely, intending to attack the enemy 
should he attempt to cross to this side. 

" Our possession of Harper's Ferry gives 
us the great advantage of a secure de- 
bouche, but we cannot avail ourselves of 
it until the railroad bridge is finished, be- 
cause we cannot otherwise supply a great- 
er number of troops than we now have on 
the Virginia side at that point. When 
the river rises so that the enemy cannot 
cross in force, I purpose concentrating 
the army somewhere near Harper's Ferry, 
and then acting according to circumstan- 
ces, viz : moving on Winchester, if from 
the position and attitude of the enemy we 
are likely to gain a great advantage by 
doing so, or else devoting a reasonable 
time to the organization of the army and 
instruction of the new troops, preparatory 
to an advance on whatever line may be de- 
termined. In any event, 1 regard it as 
absolutely necessary to send new regi- 
ments at once to the old corps, for pur- 
poses of instruction, and that old regiment.s 
be filled at once. I have no fears as to 
an attack on Washington by the line of 
Manassas. Holding Harper's Ferry as I 
do, they will not run the risk of an attack 
on their flank and rear while they have 
the garrison of Washington in their front. 

" I rather apprehend a renewal of the 
attempt in Maryland should the river re- 
main low for a great length of time, and 
should they receive considerable addition 
to their force. I would be glad to have 
Peck's division as soon as possible. T am 
surprised that Sigel's men should have 
been sent to Western Virginia without my 
knowledge. The last I heard from you on 
the subject was that they were at my dis- 
position. In the last battles the enemy 
was undoubtedly greatly superior to us in 
number, and it was only by very hard 
fighting that we gained the advantage we 
did. As it was, the result was at one 
period very doubtful, and we had all we 
could do to win the day. If the enemy 
receives considerable re-enforcements and 
we none, it is possible that I may have too 
much on my hands in the next battle. My 
own view of the proper policy to be pur- 
sued is to retain in Washington merely 
the force necessary to garrison it, and to 
send everything else availa])le to re-enforce 
this army. The railways give us the means 
of promptly re-enforcing Washington 
should it become necescary. If I am re- 
enforced, as I ask,, and am allowed to taka 
my own course, I will hold myself respou- 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 155 



Bible fur the safety of Washing-ton. Seve- 
ral persons recently from Richmond say 
that there are no troops there except con- 
scripts, and they few in number. I hope 
to give you details as to late battles by 
this evening I am about starting again 
for Harper's Ferry. 

"CEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Maj. Gen. Com, 
" Maj. Gen. H.vli-eck, 

" Gen.-in-Chief, Washington." 

Tiie work of reorganizing, drilling, and 
supplying the army, 1 began at the earliest 
moment. The diflferent corps were sta- 
tioned along the river in the best positions 
to cover and guard tlie fords. The great 
extent of the river front from near Wash- 
ington to Cumberland, (some one hundred 
and fifty miles,) together witli the line of 
the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, was to 
be carefully watched and guarded, to pre- 
vent, if possible, the enemy's raids. Ke- 
connoisances upon the Virginia side of 
the river, for the purpose of learning the 
enemy's position and movements, were 
made frequently, so that our cavalry, 
which from the time we left Washington 
had performed the most laborious service, 
and had from the commencement been de- 
ficient in numbers, was found totally inad- 
equate to the requirements of the army. 

'J'his overwork had broken down the 
greater part of the horses ; disease had 
apjl^ared among them, and but a very small 
portion of our original cavalry was fit for 
Borvice. 

To such an extent had this arm become 
reduced, that when Gen. Stuart made his 
raid iuto Pennsylvania on the 11th of Oc- 
tober with two thousand men, I could only 
mount eight hundred men to follow him. 

Harper's Ferry was occupied on the 
22d, and in order to prevent a catastrophe 
.similar to the one which liad happened to 
Col. Miles, I immediately ordered Mary- 
land, Bolivar, and Louiidoa heights to be 
strongly fortified. 'I'his was done as far 
as the time and means at our disposal per- 
mitted. 

The main army of the enemy, during 
this time, remained in the vicinity of Mar- 
tinsburg and Bunker Hill, and occui)ied 
itself in drafting and coercing every able- 
bodied citizen into the ranks, forcibly 
taking their property, where it was not 
voluntarily offered, burning bridges, and 
destroying railroads. 

On the first day of October, liis excel- 
lency the President honored the army of 
the Potomac with a visit, and remained 
several days, during which he went through 
the different encamjnnents, reviewed the 
troops, and went over the battle fields of 
kjouth Mountain and Autietam. I had 



the opportunity during this visit to de- 
scribe to him the operations of the army 
since the time it left Washington, and 
gave him my reasons for not following the 
enemy after he crossed the Potomac. 

Oi) the .'')th of October, the division of 
Gen. Cox (aliout 5.001) men) was ordered 
from my cdinmand to AVestern Virginia. 

On the 7th of October J received the fol- 
lowing telegram : 

" Washinj:ton, I). C, Oct., G. 1862. 
"I am instructed to telegra})h you &n 
follows : The President directs that yon 
cross the Potonuic and give battle to the 
enemy, or drive him south. Your army 
must move now, while the roads are good. 
If you cross the river between the enemy 
and Washington, and cover the latter by 
your o])eration. you can be re-enforced with 
oO.OOO men. If you move up the valley of 
the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 
15,000 can be sent to you. The President 
advises the interior line between Wash- 
ington and the enemy, but does not order 
it. He is very desirous that your army 
move as soon as possible. You will im- 
mediately report what line you ado])t, and 
when you intend to cross the river ; also to 
what point the re-enforcements are to be 
sent. It is necessary that the plan of your 
operations be positively determined' on. 
before orders are given for building lu-idges 
and repairing railroads. I am directed" to 
add, that the Secretary of War an.d the 
general-in-chief fully concur with the 
President in these instructions. 

"H. W. HALLECK, Gen.-in-Chief. 
" Maj. Gen. McClklla.v." 

At th\s time Gen. Averill, with the 
greater part of our efficient cavalry, was in 
the vicinity of Cumberland, and Gen. 
Kelly, the commanding officer, had that 
day reported that a large force of the 
enemy was advancing on Col. Campbell, at 
Saint John's river. This obliged me to 
order Gen. Averill to proceed with his 
force to the support of Col. Campbell, 
which delayed his return to the army for 
several days. 

On the 10th of October Stuart crossee 
the river at McCoy's Ferry, with 2,000 
cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, oq 
his raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania, 
making it necessary to use all our cavalry 
against him. 'J'his exhausting service con»- 
pletely broke down nearly all of our cavalry 
horses, and rendered a remount absolutely 
indisjjensable before we could advance ou 
the enemy. 

The following were the dispositions of 
troops made by me to defeat the purposes 
of this raid : 

" Gen. Averill, then at (Jreen Spring, on 
the upper Potomac, was ordered to mova 



156 



EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



rapidly down upon the north side of the 
river, with all his disposable cavalry, using 
every exertion to get upon the trail of the 
enemy, and follow'it up vigorously. 

Gen. Pleasonton, with the remaining 
cavalry force, was ordered to take the 
road by Cavetown. Harmon's gap, and 
Mechanicsville. and cut off the retreat of 
the enemy should he make for any of the 
fords below the position of the main army. 
Ilis orders were to pursue them with the 
utmost rapidity, not to spare his men or 
horses, and to destroy or capture them if 
possible. 

Gen. Crook, at that time commanding 
Cox's division, at Hancock, en route for 
Western Virginia, was ordered to halt, 
place his men in cars, and remain in 
readiness to move to any point above 
ehould the enemy return in that direction, 
keeping his scouts well out on all the roads 
leading from the direction of Chambers- 
burg to the upper Potomac. 

The other commanders between Hancock 
and Harper's Ferry were instructed to 
keep a vigilant watch upon all the roads 
and fords, so as to prevent the escape of 
the rebels within these limits. 

Gen. Burnside was ordered to send two 
brigades to the Monocacy crossing, there 
to remain in cars, with steam up, ready to 
move to any point on the railroad to which 
iStuart might be aiming, while Col. Rush, 
at Frederick, was directed to keep his 
lancers scouting on the approaches from 
Chambersburg, so as to give timely notice 
to the commander of the two brigades at 
the Monocacy crossing. 

Gen. Stoneman, whose headquarters 
were then at Foolsville, occupying with 
his division the different fords on the river 
below the mouth of the Monocacy, was 
directed to keep his cavalry well out on 
the approaches from the. direction of 
Frederick, so as to give him time to mass 
liis troops at any point where the enemy 
might attempt to cross the Potomac in his 
vicinity. He was informed of Gen. Plea- 
Konton's movements. 

After the orders were given for covering 
all the fords upon the river, 1 did not think 
it possible for Stuart to recross, and I 
believe that the capture or destruction of 
his entire force was perfectly certain ; but 
owing to the fact that my orders were not 
in all cases carried out as I expected, he 
effected his escape into Virginia without 
much loss. 

The troops sent by Gen. Burnside to the 
Monocacy, owing to some neglect in not 
giving the necessary orders to the com- 
mander, instead of remaining at the rail- 
road crossing, as I directed, marched four 
miles into Frederick, and there remained 
until after Stuart had passed the rxilroad, 



only six miles below, near which point it 
was said he halted for breakfast. 

Gen. Pleasonton ascertained, after his 
arrival at Mechanicsville, that the enemy 
were only about an hour ahead of him, 
beating a hasty retreat towards the mouth 
of the Monocacy. He pushed on vigor- 
ously, and, near its mouth, overtook them 
with a part of his force, having marched 
seventy-eight miles in twenty-four hours, 
and having left many of his horses broken 
down upon the road. He at once attacked 
with his artillery, and the firing continued 
for several hours, during which time he 
states that he received the support of a 
small portion of Gen. Stoneman's com- 
mand, not sufhcient to infiict any material. 
damage upon the enemy. 

Gen. Stoneman reports that, in accord- 
ance with his instructions, he gave all 
necessary orders for intercepting the retura 
of the rebels, and C!ol. Staples, command- 
ing one of his brigades, states that he sent 
two regiments of iniantry to the mouth of 
the Monocacy, and one regiment to White's 
ford; that on the morning of the 12th. 
about ten o'clock, he, by Gen. Stoneman's 
order, marched the remaining three regi- 
ments of his command from Foolsville 
towards the mouth of the Monocacy; that 
before getting into action he was relieved 
l)y Gen. Ward, who states that he reported 
to Gen. Pleasonton with his commatid, 
while the enemy was crossing the river, 
and was informed by him (Gen. Pleason- 
ton) that he was too late, and that nothing 
corrld be done then. 

Gen. Pleasonton, in his report of this 
affair, says : " It was at this time that Col. 
Ward reported to me from Gen. Stone- 
man's division, with a brigade of infantry, 
a regiment of cavalry, and a section of 
artillery. I told him that his conmiand 
could be of no use, as the enemy had then 
crossed the river. These are the only 
troops, that I know of, that were in that 
vicinity, and this was the first intimation I 
received that any troops were endeavoring 
to assist me in capturing the rebels. I 
succeeded in preventing the enemy from 
crossing at the mouth of the Monocacy, 
and drove him to White's ford, three miles 
below. Had White's ford been occupied 
by any force of ours previous to the time 
of the occupation by the enemy, the cajv 
ture of Stuart's whole force would have 
been certain and inevitable. With my 
small force, which did not exceed one- 
fourth of the enemy's, it was not practi- 
cable for me to occupy that ford while the 
enemy was in front." 

It would seem from the report of Gen. 
Stoneman, that the disposition he made 
of his troops, previous to the arrival of 
Stuart, was a good one. He stationed two 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 157 



regiments at the mouth of Monocacy, and 
two regiments at White's ford, the hitter 
in the very place where the crossing- -was 
made, and the former only three miles off, 
with a reserve of three regiments at I'ools- 
ville, some six miles distant. Gen. Plea- 
souton's report shows that from the time 
the firing commenced until the enemy wore 
across the river was about four and a half 
hours. Gen. Stoneman states that he 
started the reserve from Poolsville at 
about nine o'clock, but it appears, from 
the report of Gen. Pleasonton, that it did 
not reach him until half past one. 

At the time I received the order of 
October G, to cross the river and attack 
the enemy, the army was wholly deficient 
in cavalry, and a large part of our troops 
were in want of shoes, blankets, and other 
indispensalile articles of clothing, notwith- 
standing all the efforts that had been made 
since the battle of Antietam, and even 
prior to that date, to refit the army with 
clothing, as well as horses. I at once con- 
sulted with Col. Ingalls, the chief quarter- 
master, who believed that the necessary 
articles could be supplied in about three 
days. Orders were immediately issued to 
the different commanders who had not al- 
ready sent in their requisitions, to do so at 
once, and all the necessary steps were 
forthwith taken by me to insure a prompt 
delivery of the supplies. 'J'he requisitions 
were forwarded to the proper dej)artment 
at Washington, and I expected that the 
articles would reach our depots during the 
three days specified ; but day after day 
elapsed, and only a small portion of tlic 
clothing arrived. Corps commanders, upon 
receiving notice from the quartermasters 
that they might expect to receive their 
supplies at certain dates, sent the trains 
for them, which, after waiting, were com- 
pelled to retiu-n empty. Several instances 
occurred where these trains went back and 
forth from the camps to the depots, as 
often as four or five ditierent times, without 
receiving their supplies, and I was informed 
by one corps commander that his wagon 
train had travelled over 150 miles, to and 
from the depots, before he sur^ceeded in 
obtaining his clothing. 
- The corps of Gen. Franklin did not get 
its clotiiiug until after it had crossed the 
Potomac, and was moving into Virginia. 
Gen. Reynolds's corps was delayed a day 
at Berlin, to complete its supplies, and 
Gen. Porter only completed his on reach- 
ing the vicinity of Harper's Perry. 

I made every exertion in my pov/er, and 
my quartermasters did the same, to have 
these supplies hurried forward rapidly; 
and I was repeatedly told that they had 
filed tlie requisitions at Washington, and 
that the supplies had been forwarded. 



But they did not come to us. and of course 
were inaccessible to the army. 1 did not 
fail to make freqrient representation of 
this condition of things to the general-in- 
chief, and it appears that he referred the 
rnatter to the Quartermaster (ien. who 
constantly rejjjied that the supplies had 
been promptly ordered. Notwithstanding 
this, tiiey (lid not reach our depots. 

'J'he following extracts are from tele- 
grams upon this subject : 

"PlEADyUARTEKS ArMV OF THE PoTOMAC, 

"Oct. 11, 1862—9 A. M. 
****** 

" We have been making every effort to 
get supplies of clothing for tliis army, and 
Col. Ingalls has received advices that it 
has been forwarded by railroad ; l)ut, owing 
to bad management on the roads, or from 
some other cau.se, it comes in very slowly, 
and it will take a much longer time than 
was anticipated to get articles that are 
absolutely indispensable to the army, un- 
less the railroad managers forward sup- 
plies more rapidly. 

^•G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" ]\Iaj. Gen. 

"Maj.-Gen. H. W. ITalleck. 
" Gen.-in-Chief, Washington. 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
"Oct. 11, 'x862. 

" 1 am compelled again to call your 
attention to the great deficiency of sljoes, 
and other indispensable articles of clothing, 
that still exists in some of tlie corps in 
tliis army. Upon the assurance of the 
chief quartermaster, who based his calcu- 
lation upon information received from 
Washington, that clothing would be for- 
warded at certain times, corps command- 
ers sent their wagons to Hagerstown and 
Harper's Ferry for it. It did not arrive 
as promised, and has not yet arrived. 
Unless some measures are taken to insure 
the" prompt forwarding of these supplies, 
there will necessarily be a corresponding 
delay in getting the army ready to move, 
as the men cannot march without shoes. 
Every thing. has been done that can be 
done at these headquarters to accomplish 
the desired result. 

" GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

"Maj.-Gen. Corad'g. 

"Maj.-Gen. H. W. IIalleck, 

" Coramauder-in-Chicf, Washington." 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac. 
"Oct. 15, 18(i2— 7 p. M. 
* * * * * ♦ 

" I am using every possible exertion to 
get this army ready to move. It was onlr 
yesterday that a part of our shoes and 
clothing arrived at Hagerstown. It i« 



158 



RErORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAK 



being issued to the troops as rapidly as 
possible. 

"Gp:o. b. mcClellan, 

'■ Maj.-(jen. 
" Maj.-Gen. IT. W. Halleok, 
" Gen.-in-Chief." 

" Hbadquarters Army of the Potomac. 
" Oct. 15, 1862—7.30 p. m. 

" Gen. Franklin reports that there is by 
no means as much clothing as was called 
for at Hagerstown. I think, therefore, 
you had better have some additional sup- 
plies, especially of shoes, forwarded to 
Harper's Ferry as soon as possible. 

"R. B. MARCY, Chief of Staff. 

" Col. R Ingalls, 
"Care of Col. Rucker, Q. M. "Washington." 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Oct. 16, 1862. 

" Gen. J. F. Reynolds just telegraphs 
fts follows; 'My quartermaster reports 
that there are no shoes, tents, blankets, 
or knapsacks at Hagerstown. He was 
able to procure only a complete supply of 
overcoats and pants, with a few socks, 
drawers, and coats. This leaves many of 
the men yet without a shoe. My requisi- 
tions call for .5,2.^.^ pairs of shoes.' 

" Please push the shoes and stockings 
up to Harper's Ferry as fast as possible. 
"R. B. MARCY, Chief of Staff. 

"Col. R. Ingalls, 
"Care of Col. Rucker, Q. M.Washington." 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Camp near Knoxville, :\Id., Oct. 9, 1862. 

" You did right in sending clothing to 

Harper's Ferry. You will not be able to 

send too much or too quickly. "We want 

blankets, shoes, canteens, etc., very much. 

"RUFUS INGALLS, 

" Lieut. Col. and A. D. C, Chief Qr. M. 
" Col. C. G. Sawtklle, 

" Depot Quartermaster, Washington." 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Camp near Knoxville, Md.. Oct. 10, 1862. 

"Shipments to Hagerstown must be 
made direct through, to avoid the con- 
temptible delays at Harrisburg. If Col. 
Crosman was ordered to send clothing, I 
hope he has sent it, for the suffering and 
impatience are excessive. 

" RUFUS INGALLS. 
• " Lieut. Col. and A. D. C, Chief Qr. M. 
" Capt. Augustus Boyd, 

" Quartermaster, Philadelphia." 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Camp near Knoxville, Oct. 13, 1862. 
" Has the clothing arrived yet ? If not, 
do you know where it is ? What clothing 
was taken by the rebels at Chambersburg ? 
Did they capture any property that was 
en route to you ? Have we not got cloth- 



ing at Harrisburg ? Send an agent over 
the road to obtain information, and hurry 
up the supplies. Reply at once. 

"RUFUS INGALLS, 

" Lieut. Col. and A. D. C, Chief Qr. M. 
"George H. Weeks, 

" Depot Quartermaster, Hagerstown." 

"Sharpsburg, Oct. 15, 1862. 
" I have just returned from Ifagerstown, 
wliere I have been for the clothing for the 
corps. There was nothing there but two 
overcoats, trowsers, and a few uniform 
coats and socks. There was not any shoes, 
blankets, shirts, or shelter tents. Will 
you please tell me where and when the 
balance can be had ? Shall I send to Har- 
per's Ferry for them to-morrow?. The 
corps surgeon has just made a requisition 
for 45 hospital tents. There are none at 
Hagerstown. Will you please to inform 
me if I can tjet them at Harper's Ferry ? 
"FIELDING LOWRY, 
" Capt. and Quartermaster. 
" Gen. Ingalls." 

"Hagerstown' Oct. 15, 1862. 
" I want at least ten thousand (10,000) 
suits of clothing in addition to what I liave 
received. It should be here now. 

"G. W. WEEKS, 
" Assistant Quartermaster. 
" Col. Ingalls, Quartermaster." 

"Harper's Ferry, Oct. 22, 1862. 

" We have bootees, 12,000 ; greatcoats, 

4,000 ; drawers and shirts are gone ; blan- 

I kets and stockings nearly so ; 15,000 each 

of these four articles are wanted. 
I "ALEX. BLISS. 

I " Capt. and Assistant Quartermai^ter. 

" Gen. Ingalls. Chief Quartermaster, &c." 

" McClellan's Headquarters, 

" Oct. 24, 1862—11 A. M. 

"Please send to Capt. Bliss, at Har- 
per's Ferry, 10,000 blankets, 12.000 caps, 
5,000 overcoats, 10,000 pairs bootees, 
2,000 pairs artillery and cavalry boots, 
15,000 pairs stockings, 15.000, drawers, 
and 15,000 pants. The clothing arrives 
slowly. Can it not be hurried along 
faster ? May I ask you to obtain authority 
for this shipment ? 

"RUFUS INGALLS, 

"Lieut. Col. and A. D. C, Chief Qr. M. 
" Capt. D. G. Thomas, 

" Military Storekeeper, Washington." 

" Hagerstown, Oct. 30. 

" Clothing has arrived this morning. 

None taken by rebels. Shall I supply 

Franklin, and retain portions for Porter 

and Reynolds until called for ? 

" G. W. WEEKS, 
" Capt. and Assistant Quartermaster. 
" Col. Ingalls." 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 159 



The following' statement, takon from a 
report of the chief (inartermaster with the 
army, will show what progress was made 
in supplying the army with clothing from 
the Ist of September to the date of cross- 

Stalement of clothing and equipage received at the different drpofs of the army of 
the Potomac from September 1, 1862, to October Hi, lf<6'2. 



ing the Potomac on the ,31st of October, 
and that a greater part of the clothing 
did not reach our depots until after the 
14th of October : 



Received at tlie depot — 



Fmm Sept. 1 to Oct 6 ' 10,700' 4,000 

From Oct. 6 to Oct. l.") i 17,000 11,000 

From Oct. 1,) to Oct 2.") j 40,000 Ifl.-WO 

From Oct. 2;5 to Oct. 31 30,000 



6.200 
22,02.5 
6.i,200 
30,000 






4,190 



3,0ti0 

SOO 

1,2;J0 

1,500 



ti.OOO 
10,221 
9,0IX) 
3,003 



E=3 
2 = 



6,200 ! 6,0(K)1 4,200 

lS,32o 12,9S9 1,000 

18,876 .'),000| 2,.i00 

2,200 9,9- ol 5,000 



t;,o(xi 

3,fi(X) 
20,040 



3,(t.O 
0,000 



Total I 97,700 34,500; 123.42.'-. 4.190: 6,2.^0i 28,229' 45,301 3:!,SS9| 12,70o| 3:<,840 2:J,100 

Statement of clothing and equipage received, ^-c. — Continued. 



Received at the depot — 



From Sept. 1 to Oct. 6... 
From Oct n to Oct 15... 
From Oct 1.") to Oct 2.'>. 
From Oct 2.") to Oct. 31. 

Total 



Si; 



799, 2,0.S0[ 3,.W0 
1,.302' 2,100 12,000 
1,894 1 4,500, 14,770 



1,200 

500 
l,7.-)0 
1.000 



P,500 
4,384 1 



3,995 S, 30 30,270 ; 4,3.50 1 10,904 7,5901 9.200 44,0 o' 7. ,120 



1,300 

875 

.3,.Wi 

2,015 



i2 o 



2,2001 
7,000 



2,000 
12,0.0 
22,500 39, 

7,500; 2'., 



2,00'>| 
7,000 ! 
52,900 ' 



2,6V5 
2,421 
11. .195 



'•1,900 lr.,(74 



Col. Ingalls, chief quartermaster, in his 
report U[)on this subject, says: 

"There was great delay in receiving our i 
clothing. The orders were promptly given i 
by me. and approved by (ien. Meigs, but 
the roads wore slow to transport, particu- 
larly the Cumberland Valley road. 

" For instance, clothing ordered to Ha- 
gerstowu on the 7th of Octol)er, for the 
corps of Franklin, Porter and Reynolds, 
did not arrive there until about the 18th, 
and by that time, of course, there were 
increased wants and chantrt'S in the posi- 
tion of troo[)S. The clothing of Sumner 
arrived in gr:>at quantities near the las'; of 
October, almost too late for issue, as the 
army was crossing into Virginia. We 
finally left .oO.OOO suits at Harper's Ferry, 
parthi on the cars just arrived, and partly 
in store." 

The causes of the reduction of our cav- 
alry force have already been recited. The 
difficulty in getting new supplies from the 
usual sources led me to apply for and ob- 
tain authority for the cavalry and artillery 
officers to purchase their own horses. The 
following are the telegrams and letters on 
the subject : 

*'Headquvrter.<5 Army of the Potomac, 
"October 12, LS62— 12.45 P. M. 
"It is absolutely necessary that some 
energetic means be taken to supply the 
cavalry of this army with remount horses. 
The present rate of supply is (10.')Uj ten 



hundred and fifty per week for the entire 
army here and in front of Washington, 
From this number the artillery draw for 
their batteries. " G. B. McCLELLAN, 

"Maj. Gen. Com. 
" Maj -Gen. IT. W. IlAt^LKcK, 

" General-in-Chief." 

The general-in-chief, in a letter to me 
dated Washington. I). C, October 14, 
1862, replies to this despatch in the fol- 
lowing language : 

" I have caused the matters complained 

of in your telegrams of the Uth and 121 h 

to be investigated. 

***** 

" In- regard to horses, you say that the 
present rate of supply is only 1.^0 per 
week for the entire army here and in front 
of Washington. I find from the records 
that the issues for the last six weeks have 
been 8,754, making an average per week 
of 1,459." 

One thousand and fifty (1,050) is the 
number stated in the original despatch, 
now in my posses-ion ; and as not only 
figures were used, but the number was 
written out in full, I can hardly see how it 
is possible for the telegraphic operator to 
have made a mistake in the transmissioQ 
of the message. 

' Headquartkrs Army of thb Potomac, 
" Oct. 14, 1862—7 p. M. 
***** 

" With my small cavalry force it is im- 



160 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



possible for me to watch the line of the 
Potomac proporly, or even make the re- 
connoisances that are necessary for our 
movements. This makes it necessary for 
me to weaken my line very much by ex- 
tending the infantry to guard the innu- 
merable fords. This will continue \intil 
the river rises, and it will be next to im- 
possible to prevent the rebel cavalry raids. 
My cavalry force, as I urged this morn- 
ing, should be largely and immediately in- 
creased, under any hypothesis, whether to 
guard the river, or advance on the enemy, 
or both. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 
"Maj. Gen. 
" Maj.-Gen. H. W. Hallkck. 

" Com.-in-Chief." 

The following is an extract from the 
official report of Col. Ingalls : 

" Immediately after the battle of Antie- 
tam efforts were made to supply the defi- 
ciencies in clothing and horses. Large 
requisitions were prepared and sent in. 
The artillery and cavalry required large 
numbers to cover losses sustained iii bat- 
tle, on the march, and by diseases. Both 
of these arms were deficient when they left 
Washington. A most violent and de- 
structive disease made its appearance at 
this time, which put nearly 4.000 animals 
out of service. Horses reported perfectly 
well one day would be dead lame the next, 
and it was difficult* to foresee where it 
would end; or what number would cover 
the loss. They were attacked in the hoof 
and tongue. No one seemed able to ac- 
count for the appearance of this disease. 
Animals kept at rest would recover in time, 
but could not be ivorked. I made appli- 
cation" to send west and purchase horses at 
once, but it was refused, on the ground 
that the outstanding contracts provided 
for enough, bul they were not delivered 
suffinently fast, nor in sufficient numbers 
until late in October and early in Novem- 
ber. I was authorized to buy 2,000 late in 
October, but the delivery was not com- 
pleted until in November, after we had 
reached Warrenton." 

In a letter from Gen. Meigs, written on 
the I4th of October, and addressed to the 
general-in-chief, it is stated : "There have 
been issued, therefore, to the army of the 
Potomac, since the battles in front of 
Washington, to replace losses, (9,2.54) 
nine thousand two hundred and fifty-four 
horses." 

What number of horses were sent to 
Gen. Pope before his return to Washing- 
ton I have no means of determining ; hut 
the following statement made upon my 
order, by the chief quartermaster with the 
army, and Mho had means for gaining ac- 



curate information, force upon my mind 
the conclusion that the Quartermaster 
General was in error : 

" Headquaktkrs Armt op THn Potomac, 

" Chief Quartermaster's Offire, Oct. 31, 1863. 

"Horses purchased siace September 6, 1802. by 
Col. Ini;all.>i. Chief Quartermaster, and issued 
to the forces under the immediate comm;ind 
of JIaj -fieu. George B. McCleHan 1,200 

" Issued and turned over to the above force by 
Capt. J. J. Dana, Assistant Quarterma.ster, 
(in Washington) 2,291 

"Issued to forces at and near Washington, 

which have since joined the cotimaud 333 

" Total purchased by Col. Ingalls and issued and 
turned over by Capt. Dana to the forces Id 
this immediate command 3,i813 

" Issued by Capt. J. J. Dana, Assistant Quarter- 
master, to the forces in the vicinity of Wash- 
ington 3,:W3 

"Grand total purchased by Col. R. InijallK, 
Chief Quartermaster, and issued and turned 
over by Capt. J. J. Dana, Assistant Quarter- 
master, to the entire army of tl>.e Potomac 
and the forces around Washington 7,17fl 

About 3,000 horses have been turned 
over to the quartermaster's department 
• by officers as unfit for service ; nearly 
I 1,500 should now be turned over also, being 
j worn out and diseased. 
I Respectfully submitted. 
! "FRED. MYERS, 

I " Liei^t. Col. and Quartermaster." 

This official statement, made up from 
[ the reports of the quartermasters who re- 
i ceived and distributed the horses, exhibits 
' the true state of the case, and gives the 
total number of horses received by the 
army of the Potomac, and the troops 
around Washington, during a period of 
eight weeks as (7,176) seven thousand one 
hundred and seventy-six. or (2,078) two 
thousand and seventy-eight less than the 
number stated by the Quartermaster Gen- 
eral. 

Supposing that (1,500) fifteen hundred 
w'ere issued to the army under Cen. Pope 
previous to its return to Washington, as 
Gen. Meigs states, there would still re- 
main (578) five hundred and seventy-eight 
horses which he does not account for. 

The letter of the general-in-chief to the 
Secretary of War on the 28th of OctoDer, 
and the letter of Gen. Meigs to the gen- 
eral-in-chief on the 14th of October, con- 
vey the impression that, upon my repeated 
applications for cavalry and artillery horses 
for the army of the Potomac, I had received 
a much greater number than was really the 
case. 

It will be seen from Col. Myers's report 
that, of all the horses alluded t(> by Gen. 
Meigs, only (;^,813) three thousand eight 
hundred and thirteen came to the army 
with which I was ordered to follow and at- 
tack the enemy. Of course the remainder 
did not in the slightest degree contribute 
to the efficiency of the cavalry or artillery 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. MCLELLAX. ICl 



of the armv -witli which I was to cross the 
river. Neither did they in the least facili- 
tate any preparations for carrying out the 
order to advance upon the enemy, as the 
general-in-chiefs letter might see'm to im- 
ply. 

During the same period that we were 
receiving the horses alluded to about 
(3,000) three thousand of our old stock 
were turned into the quartermaster's de- 
partment, and 1,500 more reported as in 
such condition that they ought to be 
turned in as unfit for service ; thus leaving 
the active array some 700 short of the 
number required to make good existing 
deficiencies, to say nothing of providing 
remounts for men whose horses had died 
or been killed during the campaign and 
those previously dismounted. Notwith- 
standing all the efforts made to obtain a 
remount, there were, after deducting the 
the force engaged in picketing the river, 
but about a thousand serviceable cavalry 
horses on the 21st day of October. 

In a letter dated October 14, 1862, the 
general-iu-chief says : 

"It is also reported to me that the num- 
ber of animals with your army in the field 
is about 31,000. It is believed that your 
present proportion of cavalry and of ani- 
mals is much larger than that of any other 
of our armies."' 

What number of animals our other 
armies had I am not prepared to say. but 
military men in European armies have been 
of the opinion that an army to be efiicient, 
while carrying on active operations in the 
field, should have a cavalry force equal in 
numbers to from one-sixth to one-fourth of 
the infantry force. My cavalry did not 
amount to one-twentieth part of the army, 
and hence the necessity of giving every 
one of my cavalry soldiers a serviceable 
horse. 

Cavalry may be said to constitute the 
antennce" of an array. It scouts all the 
roads in front, on the flanks and in the 
rear of the advancing columns, and con- 
stantly feels the enemy's. The amount of 
labor falling on this arm during the Mary- 
land campaign was excessive. 

To persons not familiar with the move- 
ments of troops, and the amount of trans- 
portation required for a large array march- 
ing away from water or railroad communi- 
cations,* the number of animals mentioned 
by the general-in-chief may have appeared 
unnecessarily large; but to a military man, 
who takes the trouble to enter into an ac- 
curate and detailed computation of the 
number of pouud of subsistence and forage 
required for such an army as that of the 
Potomac, it will be seen that the 31,000 
animals were considerably less than was 
absolutelv necessary to an advance. 



As we were required to move through a 
country which could not be depended 
upon for any of our supplies, it became 
necessary to transport everything in 
wagons, and to be prepared for all emer- 
gencies. I did not consider it safe to leave 
the river without subsistence and forage 
for ten days. 

The oflBcial returns of that date show 
the aggregate strength of the army for 
duty to have been about 110.000 men of 
all arms. Tliis did not include teamsters, 
citizen employes, ofiicers" servants. «&c.. 
amounting to 'some 12,UU0, which gave a 
total of 122,000 men. 

The subsistence alone of this army for 
ten days required for its transportation 
1.830 wagons at 2,000 pounds to the wagon, 
and 10.980 animals. 

Our cavalry horses at that time amounted 
to 5,046, and our artillery horses to 6.836. 

To transport full forage for these 22.862 
animals for ten days required 17,832 addi- 
tional animals ; and this forage would only 
supply the entire number (40,694) of ani- 
mals with a small fraction over half allow- 
ance for the time specified. 

It will be observed that this estimate 
does not embrance the animals necessary 
to transport quartermasters' supplies, bag- 
gage, camp equipage, ambulances, reserve 
ammunition, forage for officers' horses, <fcc.. 
which would greatly augment the necessary 
transportation. 

It may very truly be said that we did 
make the march with the means at our 
disposal, but it will be remembered that 
we met with no serious opposition from 
the enemy : neither did we encounter de- 
lays from any other cause. The roads 
were in excellent condition, and the troops 
marched with the most commendable order 
and celerity. 

If we had met with a determined resis- 
tance from the enemy, and our progress 
had been very much retarded thereby, we 
would have consumed our supplies before 
they could have been renewed. A proper 
estimate of my responsibilities as the com- 
mander of that army did not justify me in 
basing my preparations for the expedition 
upon the' supposition that I was to have 
an uninterrupted march. On the contrary, 
it was my duty to be prepared for all 
emergencies : and not the least important 
of my responsibilities was the duty of 
making ample provision for supplying my 
men and animals with rations and forage. 

Knowing the solicitude of the President 
for an early movement, and sharing with 
him fuUv his anxiety for prompt action, 
on the 21st of October I telegraphed to 
the gt?neral-in-chief as follows : 



1C2 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX. 



" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
"Oct. 21, 1862. 

"Since the receipt of the President's 
order to move on the enemy, I have been 
making every exertion to get this army 
supplied with clothing absolutely necessary 
for marching. 

" This I am happy to say, is now nearly 
accomplished. I have also, during the 
same time, repeatedly urged iipon you the 
importance of supplying cavalry and 
artillery horses to replace those broken 
down by hard service, and steps have been 
taken to insure a prompt delivery. 

" Our cavalry, even when well supplied 
with horses, is much inferior in numbers to 
that of the enemy, but in efiSciency has 
proved itself superior. So forcibly has 
this been impressed upon our old regiments 
by repeated successes, that the men are 
fully persuaded that they are equal to twice 
their number of rebel cavalry. 

" Exclusive of the cavalry force now 
engaged in picketing the river, I have not 
at present over about one thousand (1,000) 
horses for service. Ofificei's have been sent 
in various directions to purchase horses, 
and I expect them soon. Without more 
cavalry horses our communications, from 
the moment we march, will be at the mercy 
of the large cavalry force of the enemy, 
and it would not be possible for us to cover 
our flanks properly, or to obtain necessary 
information of the position and movements 
of the enemjr, in such a way as to insure 
success. My experience has shown the 
necessity of a large and efiScient cavalry 
force. 

" Under the foregoing circimistances, I 
beg leave to ask whether the President 
desires me to march on the enemy at once, 
or to await the reception of the new horses, 
every possible step having been taken to 
insure their prompt arrival. 

" GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Maj.-Gen. Commanding. 

" Maj.-Gen. H. W. Hallece, 

" Gen.-in-Chief, Washington." 

On the same day Gen. Halleck replied 
as follows : 

"Washington, Oct. 21, 1862—3 p.m. 

"Your telegram of 12 m. has been sub- 
mitted to the President. He directs me 
to say that he has no change to make in 
his order of the 6th instant. 

" If you have not been, and are not now, 
in condition to obey it, you will be able to 
show such want of ability. The President 
does not expect impossibilities; but he is 
very anxious that all this goor". weather 
should not be wasted in inactivity. Tele- 



graph when you move, and on what lines 
you propose to march. 

" H. W. HALLECK, Gen.-in-Chief. 
" Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McCelllan." 

From the tenor of this despatch I con- 
ceived that it was left for my judgment to 
decide whether or not it was possible to 
move with safety to the army at that time ; 
and this responsibility I exercised with the 
more confidence in view of the strong as- 
surances of his trust in me, as commander 
of that; army, with which the President 
had sefo fit to honor me during his last 
visit. 

The cavalry requirements, without which 
an advance would have been in the highest 
degree injudicious and unsafe, were still 
wanting. 

The country before us was an enemy's 
country, where the inhabitants furnished to 
the enemy every possible assistance ; pro- 
viding food for men and forage for animals, 
giving all information concerning our 
movements, and rendering every aid in 
their power to the enemy's cause. 

It was manifest that we should find it, as 
we subsequently did, a hostile district, 
where we could derive no aid from the in- 
habitants that would justify dispensing 
with the active co-operation of an efiBcient 
cavalry force. Accordingly I fixed upon 
the first of November as the earliest date 
i at which the forward movement could well 
be coirmenced. 

The general-in-chief, in a letter to the 
Secretary of War, on the 28th of October, 
says : " In my opinion, there has been no 
such want of supplies in the army under 
Gen. McClellan as to prevent his compli- 
ance with the orders to advance against 
the enemy." 

Notwithstanding this opinion, expressed 
by such high authority, I am compelled to 
say again that the delay in the reception 
of necessary supplies up to that date had 
left the army in a condition totally unfit to 
advance against the enemy — that an 
advance, under the existing circumstances, 
would, in my judgment, have been attended 
■with the highest degree of peril, with 
great suffering and sickness among the men, 
with im.minent danger of being cut off 
from .our supplies by the superior cavalry 
force of the enemy, and with no reasonable 
prospect of gaining any advantage over 
him. 

I dismiss this subjeat with the remark 
that I have found it impossible to resist 
the force of my own convictions, that the 
commander of an army who from the time 
of its organization, has for eighteen months 
been in constant communication with its 
officers and men, the greater part of 
the time engaged in active service in the 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX. 



U[ 



field, and who has exercised this command 
in many battles, must certainly be con- 
sidered competent to determine whether 
his army is in proper condition to advance 
on the enemy or not ; and he must neces- 
sarily possess greater facilities for forming 
a correct judgment in regard to the wants 
of his men, and the condition of his 
supplies, than the commander-in-chief in 
his office at Washington city. The move- 
ment from Washington into Maryland, 
which culminated in the battles of South 
Mountain and Antietam, was not a part of 
an offensive campaign, with the object of 
the invasion of the enemy's territory and 
an attack upon his capital, but was defen- 
sive in its purposes, although offensive in 
its character, and would be technically 
called a " defensive-offensive campaign." 

It was undertaken at a time when our 
army had experienced severe defeats, and 
its object was to preserve the national 
capital and Baltimore, to protect Pennsyl- 
vania from invasion, and to drive the 
enemy out of Maryland. These purposes 
were fully and finally accomplished by the 
battle of Antietam, which brought the 
army of the Potomac into what might be 
termed an accidental position on the upper 
Potomac. 

Having gained the immediate object of 
the campaign, the first thing to be done 
was to insure Maryland from a return of 
the enemy; the second, to prepare our own 
army, exhausted by a series of severe 
battles, destitute to a great extent of 
supplies, and very deficient in artillery and 
cavalry horses, for a definite offensive 
movement, and to determine upon the line 
of operations for a further advance. 

At the time of the battle of Antietam 
the Potomac was very low, and presented 
a comparatively weak line of defence unless 
watched by large masses of troops. 

The reoccupation of Harper's Ferry, and 
the disposition of troops above that point, 
rendered the line of the Potomac secure 
against everything except cavalry raids. 
No time was lost in placing the army in 
proper condition for an advance, and the 
circumstances which caused the delay after 
the battle of Antietam have been fully 
enumerated elewhere. 

I never regarded Harper's Ferry or its 
vicinity as a proper base of operations for 
a movement upon Richmond. I still con- 
sidered the line of the Peninsula as the 
true approach, but for obvious reasons, did 
not make any proposal to return to it. 

On the 6th of October, as stated above, 
I was ordered by the President, through 
his general-in-chief, to cross the Potomac 
and give battle to the enemy, or drive him 
south. Two lines were presented for my 
choice : 



1st. Up the valley of the Shenandoah, 
in which case I was to have 12,000 to 
15,000 additional troops. 

2d. To cross between the enemy and 
Washington — that is, east of the Blue 
Ridge — in which event I was to be re-en- 
forced with 30,000 men. 

At first I determined to adopt the line 
of the Shenandoah, for these reasons : 
The Harper's Ferry and Winchester rail- 
road and the various turnpikes converging 
upon Winchester afforded superior facili- 
ties for supplies. Our cavalry l)eing weak, 
this line of communication could be more 
easily protected. There was no advantage 
in interposing at that time the Blue Ridge 
and the Shenandoah between the enemy 
and myself. 

At the period in question the Potomac 
was still very low, and I apprehended that, 
if I crossed the river below Harper's 
Ferry, the enemy would promptly check 
the movement by re-crossing into Mary- 
land, at the same time covering his rear by 
occupying in strong force the passes lead- 
ing through the Blue Ridge from the south- 
east into the Shenandoah valley. 

I anticipated, as the result of the first 
course, that Lee would fight me near Win- 
chester, if he could do so under favorable 
circumstances ; or else that he would 
abandon the lower Shenandoah, and leave 
the army of the Potomac free to act upon 
some other line of operations. 

If he abandoned the Shenandoah, he 
would naturally fall back upon his railway 
communications. I have since been con- 
firmed in the belief that, if I had crossed 
the Potomac below Harper's Ferry in the 
early part of October, Gen. Lee would have 
re-crossed into Maryland. 

As above explained, the army was not in 
condition to move until late in October, 
and in the mean time circumstances had 
changed. 

The period had arrived when a sudden 
and great rise of the Potomac might be 
looked for at any moment; the season of 
bad roads and difficult movements was ap- 
proaching, which would naturally deter the 
enemy from exposing himself very far from 
his base, and his movements all appeared 
to indicate a falling back from the river 
towards his supplies. Under these circum- 
stances, I felt at liberty to disregard the 
possibility of the enemy's re-crossing the 
Potomac, and determined to select the line 
east of the Blue Ridge, feeling convinced 
that it would secure me the largest acces- 
sion of force, and the most cordial sup- 
port of the President, whoso views, from 
the beginning, were in favor of that line. 

The subject of the defence of the lino 
of the upper Potomac, after the advance 
of the main army, had long occupied my 



164 KEPORT OF GEXEKAL GEO,RGE B. M'CLELLAX. 



attention. I desired to place Harper's 
Ferry and its dependencies in a strong state 
of defence, and frequently addressed the 
general-in-chief upon the subject of the 
erection of field-works and permanent 
bridges there, asking for the funds neces- 
sary to accomplish the purpose. Although 
I did my best to explain, as clearly as I 
was able, that I did not wish to erect per- 
manent works of masonry, and that neither 
the works nor the permanent bridges had 
any reference to the advance of the army, 
but solely to the permanent occupation of 
Harper's Ferry, I could never make the 
general-in-chief understand my wishes, but 
was refused the funds necessary to erect 
the field-works, on the ground that thefe 
was no appropriation for the erection of 
permanent fortifications ; and was not al- 
lowed to build the permanent bridge, on 
the ground that the main army could not 
be delayed in its movements until its com- 
pletion. 

Of course I never thought of delaying 
the advance of the army for that purpose, 
and so stated repeatedly. On the 25th of 
October I sent to the general-in-chief the 
following telegram : 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Oct. 25, 1862—10.45 p. m. 

" As the moment is at hand for the ad- 
vance of this army, a question arises for 
the decision of the general-in-chief, which, 
although perhaps impliedly decided by the 
President in his letter of the 13th, should 
be clearly presented by me, as I do not 
regard it as in my province to deter- 
mine it. 

" This question is the extent to which 
the line of the Potomac should be guarded, 
after the army leaves, in order to cover 
Maryland and Pennsylvania from invasion 
by large or small parties of the enemy. 

" It will always be somewhat difficult to 
guard the immediate line of the river, 
lowing to its great extent and the numerous 
jjussages which exist. 

'■ It has long appeared to me that the 
best way of covering this line would be by 
occupying Front Royal, Strasburg, War- 
densville and Moorefield, or the debouches 
of the several valleys in which they are 
situated. 

•' These points, or suitable places in their 
vicinity, should be strongly intrenched and 
permanently held. One great advantage 
(if this arrangement would be the covering 
the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and an 
essential part-of the system would be the 
construction of the link of railway from 
AV'inchester to Strasburg, and the rebuild- 
ing of the Manassas Gap railway bridge 
over the Shenandoah. 

•• The intrenchment of Manassas Junc- 



tion would complete the system for the de- 
fence of the approaches to Washington 
and the upper Potomac. Many months ago 
I recommended this arrangement ; in fact, 
gave orders for it to be carried into eflfect. 
I still regard it as essential under all cir- 
cumstances. 

" The views of the chief engineer of this 
army, in regard to the defences and garri- 
son of Harper's Ferry and its defences, 
are in your posession. 

" The only troops under my command, 
outside of the organization of the army 
of the Potomac, are the Maryland brigade, 
under Gen. Kenley; the 54th Pennsylva- 
nia, Col. Yoss ; 12th Illinois cavalry, and 
Col. Davis's 8th New York cavalry ; total, 
2.894 infantry, one battery, and about 900 
cavalrjTiien. 

" There are also two of my regiments of 
cavalry (about 750 men.) guarding the 
Baltimore and Ohio railroad betweeen 
Hancock and Cumberland. 

"As I have no department, and command 
simply an active army in the field, my re- 
sponsibility for the safety of the line of 
the Potomac and the States north of it 
must terminate the moment I advance so 
far beyond that line as to adopt another 
for my base of operations. The question 
for the general-in-chief to decide, and 
which I regard as beyond my province, is 
this: 

" 1st. Shall the safety of Harper's Ferry 
and the line of the Potomac be regarded 
as assured by the advance of the army 
south of the Blue Ridge, and the line left 
to take care of itself? 

" 2d. If it is deemed necessary to hold 
the line, or that hereinbefore indicated in 
advance of it, how many troops shall be 
placed there, at what points, (and in what 
numbers and of what composition at each,) 
and where ehall they be supplied — t. e., 
from the arD\y, or frum other sources ? 

" Omitting the detached troops men- 
tioned above, and the small garrisons of 
Boonsboro' and Frederick, the last returns 
show the strength of this army for duty 
to be about (116,000) one hundred and six- 
teen thousand oificers and men. This in- 
cludes the divisions of Stoneman and 
AYhipple, but does not include Heintzel- 
man, Sigel, and Bayard. 

" If Harper's Ferry and the river above 
are rendered fully secure, it is possible 
that the active army, if it supplies the 
garrison, may be reduced so much ag to be 
inadequate to the purposes contemplated. 
If it is preserved intact, ISlaryland, Penn- 
sylvania, and the Baltimore and Ohio rail- 
road may be unduly exposed. 

" I leave the decision of these grave 
questions to the general-in chief. I know 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 165 



nothing of the number of troops at Balti- 
more. &c. 

" An important element in the solution 
of this problem is the fact that a great 
portion of Bragg's army is probably now 
at liberty to unite itself with Lee's com- 
mand. 

'• I commence crossing the river at 
Berlin in the morning, and must ask a 
prompt decision of the questions proposed 
herein. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj. Gen. Com. 

"Major-Gen. Halleck, 
" Gen.-in-Chief, Washington." 

To which I received the following reply : 

•' "Washington, Oct. 26, 1862—1.35 p. m. 

" In addition to the command which you 
had when I came here, you also have the 
greater part of that of Maj. -Gen. Pope. 
Moreover, you have been authorized to 
use any troops within your reach in Gen. 
Wool's department, and in Western Vir- 
ginia. Gen. Banks's command is also 
under your direction, with the single re- 
striction that he is not to remove troops 
from Washington till he has notified me of 
his orders. 

" Since you left Washington I have ad- 
vised and suggested in relation to your 
movements, but I have given you no orders ; 
I do not give you any now. The govern- 
ment has intrusted you with defeating and 
driving back the rebel army in your front. 
I shall not attempt to control you in the 
measures you may adopt for that purpose. 
You are informed of my views, but the 
President has left you at liberty to adopt 
them or not, as you may deem best. 

" You will also exercise your own dis- 
cretion in regard to what points on the 
Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio rail- 
road are to bo occupied or fortified. I 
will only add that there is no appropria- 
tion for permanent iutrenchments on that 
line Moreover, I think it will be time 
enough to decide upon fortif}ing Front 
Royal, Strasburg, Wardeusville, and 
Moorefield. when the enemy is driven south 
of them, and they come into our posses- 
sion 

" I do not think that we need have any 
immediate fear of Bragg's aruiy. You are 
within (20) twenty miles of Lee's, while 
Bragg is distant about (400) four hundred 
miles. 

- -H. W. HALLECK, Gen.-in-Chief. 

" Maj. Gen. G. B. McClellax." 
On the 29th I sent the following : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
Oct. 29, 1862— LI 5 p. m. 
" On the 2.')th instant I sent you a des- 
patch requesting you to decide what steps 



should be taken to guard the line of t^ie 
Potomac when this army leaves here. To 
this I received your reply that I had been 
intrusted by the President with defeating 
and driving away the rebel army ; that you 
had given me no orders heretofore — did not 
give me any then, &c. Under these cir- 
cumstances I have only to make such ar- 
rangements for guarding this extended 
line as the means at my disposal will per- 
mit, at the same time keeping in view the 
supreme necessity of maintaining the 
moving army in adequate force to meet 
the rebel army before us. 

" The dispositions I have ordered are as 
follows, viz. : Ten thousand men to be left 
at Harper's Ferry ; one brigade of infan- 
try in front of Bharpsburg ; Kenley's bri- 
gade of infantry at Williamsport ; Kelly's 
brigade, including Col. Campbell's 54tk 
Pennsylvania infantry, at Cumberland ; 
and between that point and Hancock. I 
have also left four small cavalry regiment.s 
to patrol and watch the river and the Bal- 
timore and Ohio railroad from Cumberland 
down to Harper's Ferry. 

" I do not regard this force as suEBcient 
to cover securely this great extent of line, 
but I do not feel justified in detaching any 
more troops from my moving colums : I 
would, therefore, recommeifi that some 
new regiments of infantry and cavalry 
be sent to strengthen the forces left by me. 

'• There should be a brigade of infantry 
and section of artillery in the vicinity of 
Cherry run, another brigade at Hancock, 
an additional brigade at Williamsport. one 
regiment at Hagerstown and one at Cham- 
bersburg, with a section of artillery at 
each place if possible. This is on a suj)- 
position that the enemy retain a considera- 
ble cavalry force west of the Blue Ridge ; 
if they go east of it, the occupation of the 
points named in my despatch of the 25th 
instant will obviate the necessity of keep- 
ing many of these troops on the river. 

" There are now several hundred of our 
wounded, iucludiug Gen. Richardson, in 
the vicinity of Sharpsburg, that cannot 
possibly be moved at present. 

" I repeat, that I do not look upon the 
forces I have been able to leave from thi.«! 
array as sufficient to prevent cavalry raids 
intoMaryland and Pennsylvania. as cavalry 
is the only description of troops adequate 
to this service, and I am, as you are 
aware, deficient in this arm. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, Maj.-Gen. Com, 

•'Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 

" Gen.-in-Chief, Washmgton." 

To which I received on the 30th this 
reply : 

" Washin-oto.v. Oct. 30. 1862—11.30 A.Jf. 

" Your telegram of yesterday was re- 



1G6 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



ceived late last evening. The troops pro- 
posed for Thoronglifare gap will be sent to 
that place whenever you are in position 
for their co-operation, as previously stated, 
t)ut no new regiments can be sent from 
here to the upper Potomac. The guard- 
ing of that line is left to your own discre- 
tion with the troops now under your com- 
mand. 

" H. W. HALLECK, Gen.-in-Ohief. 
"Major-Gen. G. B. McClellan." 

I accordingly left the 12th corps at 
Harper's Ferry, detaching one brigade to 
the vicinity of Sharpsburg. Gen. Morell 
was placed in command of the line from 
the mouth of the Antietam to Cumber- 
land ; Gen. Slocum in command of Har- 
per's Ferry and the line east of the mouth 
of the Antietam. 

The orders given to these officers were 
as follows : 

" Headqitakters Army of the Potomac, 
" Oct. 29, 1862—1 p. M. 

" The general commanding directs that 
you send one brigade of your corps to 
march at once to the position now occupied 
by Gen. F. J. Porter's corps, in front of 
Sharpsburg, to watch and guard the line 
of the river, the ford near the mouth of 
the Antietau^ creek to the mouth of the 
Opequan creek. 

"The officer in command will also take 
steps to afford proper protection to the 
sick and wounded in the hospitals in 
the vicinity of Sharpsburg and Boons- 
boro'. The regiment now at Boonsboro' 
will be placed under his orders. Gen. 
Keuley, at Williamsport, will guard the 
river from the mouth of the Opequan alone, 
including the ford at the mouth of the 
Opequan. 

*• The commanding general also directs 
that you take immediate steps to estab- 
lish the remainder of your corps as fol- 
lows, viz. : one brigade on Maryland 
heights, one brigade on Loudon heights, 
with the remainder on Bolivar heights and 
at Harper's Ferry. 

'' These dispositions should be made at 
once, so that Gen. Couch can move with 
his corps. Please acknowledge the receipt 
of this. 

"E. B. MARCY, Chief of Staff. 
'' Gen. H. W. Slocum, 

" Com. Arutj' Corps, Harper's Ferry." 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
Oct. 31, 1862. 

" General : I am instructed by the com- 
manding general to say to you, that he has 
selected you to perform the highly im- 
portant and responsible duty of taking 
charge of and conmianding the troops left 
for the defence of the line of the Potomac 



river, from the mouth of Antietam to Cum- 
berland, as well as any other troops that 
may hereafter be sent for the protection 
of the Maryland and Pennsylvania frontier 
within the limits of the lines herein speci- 
fied. The force which has been left to 
guard the line is not deemed adequate to 
prevent cavalry raids, but it is all that the 
commanding general feels authorized to 
detach from the army of the Potomac at 
the present time, and it devolves upon you 
to make the best use of this force in your 
power. You will have four cavalry regi- 
ments under your command, which should 
be so distributed along the river as to 
watch all the available fords, and give 
timely notice to the infantry of the ap- 
proach of any force of rebels. 

" You will afford all the protection in 
your power to the Baltimore and Ohio 
railroad. 

" You will endeavor to prevent any 
cavalry raids into Maryland and Pennsyl- 
vania. 

"You will take steps to have all the 
sick and wounded of our army, as well as 
of the rebel array within our lines, pro- 
perly taken care of until they can be sent 
to general hospitals, or discharged, or 
paroled. 

"You will make your headquarters at 
Hagerstown, and occasionally visit the 
different parts of your line. 

"You will please report promptly to 
these headquarters everything of import- 
ance that occurs within the limits of your 
command, 

"The three brigades now at Cumber- 
land, Williamsport, and Sharpsburg, in- 
cluding the fifty-fourth Pennsylvania vo- 
lunteers, near Cumberland, will be under 
your command. They are commanded by 
Gens. Kelly, Kenley, and Gordon. 

" Very respectfully, your obedient ser- 
vant, S. WILLIAMS, 

" Assistant Adj. Geu. 

" Gen. G. W. Morell, 

" Commanding Upper Potomac." 

On the 25th of October the pontoon 
bridge at Berlin was constructed, there 
being already one across the Potomac, 
and another across the Shenandoah, at 
Harper's Ferry. 

On the 26th two divisions of the ninth 
corps, and Pleasonton's brigade of cavalry, 
crossed at Berlin and occupied Lovetts- 
ville. 

The first, sixth, and ninth corps, the 
cavalry, and the reserve artillery, crossed 
at Berlin between the 26th of October and 
the 2d of November. 

The second and fifth corps crossed at 
Harper's Ferry between the 29th of Octo- 
ber and the first of November. Heavy 



REPOllT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. I6t 



rains delayed the movement considerably 
in the beginning, and the first, fifth and 
sixth corps were obliged to halt at least 
one day at the crossings to complete, as 
far as possible, necessary supj)Iies that 
could not be procured at an earlier period. 

The plan of campaign I adopted during 
this advance was to move the army, well 
in hand, parallel to the Blue Ridge, taking 
Warrenton as the point of direction for 
the main army; seizing each pass on the 
Blue liidge by detachments, as we ap- 
proached it, and guarding them after we 
had passed as long as they would enable 
the enemy to trouble our communications 
with the Potomac. It was expected that 
we would unite with the eleventh corps and 
Sickles's division near Thoroughfare Gap. 
We depended upon Harper's Perry and 
Berlin for supplies until the Manassas 
(lap railway was reached ; when that oc- 
curred the passes in our rear were to be 
abandoned, and the army massed ready 
for action or movement in any direction. 

It was my intention if, upon reaching 
Ashby's or any other pass, 1 found that 
the enemy were in force between it and 
the Potomac in the valley of the Shenan- 
doah, to move into the valley and endeavor 
to gain their rear. 

I hardly hoped to accomplish this, but 
did expect that by striking in between Cul- 
pepper Court House and Little AVashing- 
ton, I could either separate their array 
and beat them in detail, or else force them 
to concentrate as far back as Gordons- 
ville, and thus place the army of the Poto- 
mac in position either to adopt the Frede- 
ricksburg line of advance upon Richmond, 
or to be removed to the Peninsula, if, as 
I aprehended, it were found impossible to 
supply it by the Orange and Alexandria 
railroad beyond Culpepper. 

On the 27th of October, the remaining 
divisions of the ninth corps crossed at 
Berlin, and Pleasonton's cavalry advanced 
to Purcellville. The concentration of the 
sixth corps, delayed somewhat by intelli- 
gence as to the movements of the enemy 
near Hedgesville, &c., was commenced on 
this day, and the first corps was already 
in motion for Berlin. 

On the 28th the first corps and the gene- 
ral headquarters reached Berlin. 

On the 29th the reserve artillery crossed 
and encamped near Lovettsville. Stone- 
man's division, temporarily attached to 
the ninth corps, occupied Leesburg ; 
Averill's cavalry brigade moved towards 
Berlin from Hagerstown; two divisions of 
the ninth corps moved to Wheatland, and 
one to Waterford. The second corps com- 
menced the passage of the- Shenandoah at 
Harper's Ferry, and moved into the valley 
east of Loudon heights. 



On the 30th the first corps erossea at 
Berlin and encamped near Lovettsville, 
and the second corps completed the pas- 
sage of the Shenandoah. The fifth corps 
commenced its march from Sharpsburg to 
Harper's Ferry. 

On the 31st the second corps moved to 
the vicinity of Hillsborough; the sixth 
corps reached IJoonsboro'; the fifth corps 
reached Harper's Ferry, one division cross- 
ing the Shenandoah. 

On the 1st of November, the first corps 
moved to Purcellville and Hamilton ; and 
second corps to Woodgrove ; the fifth 
corps to Hillsborough; the sixth corps 
reached Berlin, one division crossing. 
Pleasonton's cavalry occupied Philamont, 
having a sharp skirmish there and at 
Bloomfield. 

On November 2d, the second corps occu- 
pied Snicker's gap ; the fifth corps, Snick- 
ersville ; the sixth corps crossed the Poto- 
mac and encamped near AVheatland ; the 
ninth corps advanced to Bloomfield, Union 
and Philomont. Pleasonton drove the 
enemy out of Union. Averill was ordered 
to join Pleasonton. The enemy oflered no 
serious resistance to the occupation of 
Snicker's gap, but advanced to gain pos- 
session of it with a column of some 5,000 
to 6,000 infantry, who were driven back 
by a few rounds from our rifled guns. 

On the 3d, the first corps moved to 
Philomont, Union, Bloomfield, &c., the 
second corps to the vicinity of U])perville ; 
the fifth corps remained at Snicker's gap ; 
the sixth corps moved to Purcellville ; 
the ninth corps moved towards Upperville. 
Pleasofiton drove the enemy out of Upper- 
ville after a severe fight. 

On the 4th, the second corps took pos- 
session of Ashby's gap ; the sixth corps 
reached Union ; the ninth corps, Upper- 
ville ; the cavalry occupied Piedmont. On 
the 5th, the first corps moved to Rector- 
town and White Plains ; one division of 
the second corps to the intersection of the 
Paris and Piedmont with the Upperville 
and Barber's road ; the sixth corps to the 
Aldie pike, east of Upperville ; the ninth 
corps beyond the Manassas railroad, be- 
tween Piedmont and Salem, wilh a brigade 
at Manassas gap. The cavalry under 
Averill had a skirmish at Manassas gap, 
and the brigade of Pleasonton gained a 
handsome victory over superior numbers at 
Barber's Cross Roads. Bayard's cavalry had 
some sharp skirmishing in front of them. 

On the Gth, the 1st corps advanced to 
Warrenton ; the 2d corps to Rectortown ; 
the 5th corps commenced its movement 
from Snicker's gap to White Plains ; the 
9th corps to Waterloo, and vicinity on the 
Rappahannock; the Uth corps was at 
New Baltimore, Thoroughfare, and Hope- 



168 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 



well's gaps; Sickles's division guarding 
the Orange and Alexandria railroad from 
Manassas Junction towards Warrenton 
Junction; the cavalry near Flint hill; 
Bayard to cut off what there might be in 
Warrenton, and to proceed to the Eap- 
pahannock station. 

November 7th : Gen. Pleasonton was 
ordered to move towards Little Washing- 
ton and Sperrj^ville, and thence towards 
Culpepper Court House. 

November 8th : the 2d corps moved half 
way to Warrenton ; the 5th corps to New 
Baltimore, 

November 9 : the 2d and 5th corps 
reached Warrenton ; the 6th corps, New 
Baltimore. 

Late on the night of the 7th, I received 
an order relieving me from the command of 
the Army of the Potomac, and directing 
me to turn it over to Gen. Burnside, which 
1 at once did. 

1 had already given the orders for the 
movement of the 8th and 9th; these orders 
were carried into effect without change. 

'i'he position in which I left the army, 
as the result of the orders I had given, was 
a.s follows : 

The 1st, 2d, and 5th corps, reserve artil- 
lery and general headquarters, at Warren- 
ton ; the 9th corps, on the line of the Rap- 
pahannock, in the vicinity of Waterloo; 
the 6th corps at New Baltimore ; the 11th 
corps at New Baltimore, Gainesville, and 
Thoroughfare gap ; Sickles's division of the 
'M corps, on the Orange and Alexandria 
railroad, from Manassas Junction to War- 
renton Junction; Pleasonton across the 
Rappahannock, at Amissville, Jefferson, 
Ac, with his pickets at Hazel river, facing 
Lougstreet, six miles from Culpepper Court 
House; Bayard near Rappahannock sta- 
tion. 

The army was thus massed near War- 
renton, ready to act in any required direc- 
tion, perfectly in hand, and in admirable 
condition and spirits. I doubt whether, 
during the whole period that I had the 
honor to command the Army of the Poto- 
mac, it was in such excellent condition to 
tight a great battle. When I gave up the 
command to Gen. Burnside, the best infor- 
mation in our possession indicated that 
Longstreet was immediately in our front, 
near Culpepper ; Jackson, with one, perhaps 
both of the Hills, near Chester and Thorn- 
ton's gaps, with the mass of their force west 
of the Blue Ridge. 

The reports from Gen. Pleasonton on 
the advance indicated the possibility of 
separating the two wings of the enemy's 
forces, and either beating Longstreet sep- 
arately, or forcing him to fall back ut least 



upon Gordons ville, to effect his junction 
with the rest of the army. 

The following is from the report of Gen. 
Pleasonton : 

" At this time and from the 7th instant, 
my advance pickets were at Hazel river, 
within six miles of Culpepper, besides hav- 
ing my flank pickets towards Chester and 
Thornton's gaps extended to Gaines's Cross 
Roads and Newby's Cross Roads, with nu- 
merous patrols in the direction of Wood- 
ville, Little Washington, and Sperryville. 

" The information gained from these par- 
ties, and also from deserters, prisoners, 
contrabands, as well as citizens, established 
the fact of Longstreet, with his command, 
being at Culpepper while Jackson with D. 
H. Hill, with their respective commands, 
were in the Shenandoah valley, on the west^ 
ern side of the Blue Ridge, covering Ches- 
ter and Thornton's gap, and expecting us 
to pass through and attack them. 

" As late as the 17th of November, a con- 
traband just from Strasburjr came in my 
camp and reported that D. H. Hill's corps 
was two miles beyond that place, on the 
railroad to Mount Jackson. Hill waa 
tearing up the road and destroying the 
bridges, under the impression that we in- 
tended to follow into that valley, and was 
en route for Staunton. 

"Jackson's corps was between Stras- 
burg and Winchester. Ewell and A. P. 
Hill were with Jackson. Provisions were 
scarce, and the rebels were obliged to keep 
moving to obtain them." 

Had I remained in command I should 
have made the attempt to divide the ene- 
my, as before suggested, and could he have 
been brought to a battle within reach of 
my supplies, I cannot doubt that the result 
would have been a brilliant victory for our 
army. 

On the 10th of November Gen. Pleason- 
ton was attacked by Longstreet. with one 
division of infantry and Stuart's cavalry, 
but repulsed the attack. 

This indicates the relative position of 
our army and that of the enemy at the 
time I was relieved from command. 

It would be impossible to participate in 
operations, such as those described in the 
foregoing pages, without forming fixed 
opinions upon subjects connected with the 
organization of our armies, and the gen- 
eral conduct of military operations. 

This report would be incomplete with- 
out a brief allusion to some general con- 
siderations which have been firmly im- 
pressed upon me by the events which have 
occurred. 

To my mind the most glaring defect in 
©ur armies is the absence of system in the 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX 1.^9 



appointnieat and promotion of general 
and other officers, and the want of means 
for the theoretical instruction of the mass 
of officers. The expansion of the army 
war so great and so rapid at the com- 
mencement of the existhig war that it was 
perhaps impossible, in the great scarcity 
oi' instructed officers, to have adopted any 
other course than that which was pursued ; 
but the time has arrived when measures 
may be initiated to remedy existing de- 
fects, and provide against their recur- 
rence. 

J. think that the army should he regarded 
as a permanent one ; that is to say, its affairs 
should be administered precisely as if all 
who belonged to it had made it their pro- 
fession for life ; and those rules for promo- 
tion, &c., which have been found necessary I 
in the best foreign armies to excite honor- 1 
able emulation, produce an esprit du corps ; 
and procure efficiency, should be followed 
by us. 

All officers and soldiers should be made 
to feel that merit — that is to say, courage, 1 
good conduct, the knowledge and per- < 
ibrmance of the duties of their grade, and : 
fitness to exercise those of a superior 1 
grade — will insure to them advancement in 
their profession, and can alone secure it 
for them. ; 

Me;isures should be adopted to secure ', 
the theoretical instruction of staff officers , 
at least, who should, as far as possible, be j 
selected from officers having a military | 
education, or who have seen actual service j 
in the field. I 

The number of cadets at the Military 
Academy should be at once increased to 
the greatest extent permitted by the capa- 
city of the institution. The regular army 
should be increased and maintained com- 
plete in numbers and efficiency. 

A well-organized system of recruiting 
and of depots for instruction should be 
adopted, in order to keep the ranks of the 
regiments full, and supply promptly the 
losses arising from battle or disease. This 
is especially necessary for the artillery and 
cavalry arms of the service, which, from 
the beginning of the war, have rendered 
great services, and which have never been 
fully appreciated by any but their com- 
rades. We need also large bodies of well 
instructed engineer troops. 

In the arrangement and conduct of cam- 
paigns the direction should be left to pro- 
fessional soldiers. A statesman may, per- 
haps, be more competent than a soldier to 
determine the political objects and direc- 
tion of a campaign ; but those once de(;ided 
upon, everything should be left to tlic 
respousil)!e' military head, without inter- 
ference from civilians. Iii no other man- 
ner is success probable. The meddling of 



individual members of committees of Con- 
gress with subjects which, from lack of 
experience, they are of course incapable 
of comprehending, and which, they are too 
apt to view through the distorted medium 
of partisan or personal prejudice, can do 
no good, and is certain to produce incal- 
culable mischief. 

T cannot omit the expression of my 
thanks to the Tresident for the constant 
evidence given me of his sincere personal 
regard, and his desire to sustain the milita- 
ry plans which my judgment led mc to 
urge for adoption and execution. ] can- 
not attribute his failure to adopt some of 
those plans, and to give that support to 
others which was necessary to their suc- 
cess, to any want of confidence in me ; and 
it only remains for me to regret that other 
counsels came between the constitutional 
commander-in-chief and the general whom 
he had placed at the head of his armies — 
counsels which resulted in the failure of 
great campaigns. 

If the nation possesses no generals in 
service competent to direct its military 
affairs without the aid or supervision of 
politicians, the sooner it finds them and 
places them in position the better will it 
be for its fortunes. 

I may be pardoned for calling attention 
to the memorandum submitted by me to 
the President on the 4th of August 1861 ; 
my letter to him of July 7, 1S62 ; and other 
similar communications to him and to 
the Secretary of War. I have seen no 
reason to change in any material regard the 
views there expressed. 

After a calm, impartial, and patient con- 
sideration of the subject — a subject which 
demands the closest thought on the part 
of every true lover of his country — I am 
convinced that by the proper employment of 
our resources it is entirely possible to bring 
this war to a successful military issue. I be- 
lieve that a necessary preliminary to the 
re-establishment of the Union is the entire 
defeat or virtual destruction of the organ- 
ized military power of the confederates ; 
and that such a result should be accompa- 
nied and followed by conciliatory mea- 
sures ; and that by pursuing the political 
course I have always advised, it is possi- 
ble to bring about a permanent restoration 
of the Union — a re-union by which the 
rights of both sections shall be pr-jserved, 
and by which both parties shall preserve 
their self-respect, while they respect each 
other. 

In this report I have conBned myself to 
a plain narrative of such facts as are ne- 
cessary for the purposes of history. 

Where it was possible, I have preferred 
to give these facts in the language of dis- 



no REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLEi.LAN. 



patches, written at the time of their occur- 
rence, rather than to attempt a new rela- 
tion. 

The reports of the subordinate com- 
manders, hereto annexed, recite what 
time and space would fail me to mention 
here : those individual instances of con- 
spicuous bravery and skill by which every 
battle was marked. To them I must espe- 
cially refer, for without them this narra- 
tive would be incomplete, and justice fail 
to be done. But I cannot omit to tender 
to my corps commanders, and to other 
general officers under them, such ample 
recognition of their cordial co-operation 
and their dovoted services as those reports 
abundantly avouch. 

I have not sought to defend the army 
which I had the honor to command, nor 
myself, against the hostile criticisms once 
so rife. 

It has seemed to m6 that nothing more 
was required than such a plain and truth- 
ful narrative to enable those whose right 
it is to form a correct judgment on the 
important matters involved. 

This report is, in fact, the history of the 
army of the Potomac 

During the period occupied in the organ- 
ization of that army, it served as a barrier 
against the advance of a lately victorious 
enemy, while the fortifications of the capi- 
tal were in progress; and under the dis- 
cipline which it then received it acquired 
strength, education, and some of that ex- 
perience which is necessary to success in 
active operations, and which enabled it 
afterwards to sustain itself under circum- 
stances trying to the most heroic men. 
Frequent skirmishes occurred along the 
lines, conducted with great gallantry, 
which inured our troops to the realities of 
war. 

The army grew into shape but slowly ; 
and the delays which attended on the ob- 
taining of arras, continuing late into the 
winter of 1861-62, were no less trying to 
the soldiers than to the people of the coun- 
try. Even at the time of the organization 
of the Peninsula campaign, some of the 
finest regiments were without rifles ; nor 
were the utmost exertions on the part of 
the military authorities adequate to over- 
come the obstacles to active service. 

"When at length the army was in condi- 
tion to take the field, the Peninsula cam- 
paign was planned, and entered upon with 
enthusiasm by officers and men. Had this 
campaign been followed up as it was de- 
signed, I cannot doubt that it would have 
resulted in a glorious triumph to our arms, 
and the permanent restoration of the pow- 
er of the government in Virginia and North 
Carolina, if not throughout the revolting 



States. It was, however, otherwise or- 
dered, and instead of reporting a victorious 
campaign, it has been my duty to relate the 
heroism of a reduced army, sent upon an 
expedition into an enemy's country, there 
to abandon one and originate another and 
new plan of campaign, which might and 
would have been successful, if supported 
with appreciation of its necessities, but 
which failed because of the repeated failure 
of promised support, at the most critical, 
and, as it proved, the most fatal moments. 
That heroism surpasses ordinary description 
Its illustration must be left for the pen of 
the historian in times of calm reflection, 
when the nation shall be looking back to 
the past from the midst of peaceful days. 

For me, now, it is sufficient to say that 
my comrades were victorious on every field 
save one, and there the endurance of but 
little more than a single corps accomplished 
the object of the fighting, and, by securing 
to the army its transit to the James, left to 
the enemy a ruinous and barren victory. 

The army of the Potomac was first re- 
duced by the withdrawal from my com- 
mand of the division of Gen. Blenker, 
which was ordered to the Mountain de- 
partment, under Gen. Fremont. We had 
scarcely landed on the Peninsula when it 
was further reduced by a despatch, revok- 
ing a previous order giving me the com- 
mand at Fortress Monroe, and under 
which I had expected to take ten thousand 
men from that point to aid in our opera- 
tions. Then, when under fire before the 
defences of Yorktown, we received the 
news of the withdrawal of Gen. McDowell's 
corps of about 35,000 men. This comple- 
ted the overthrow of the original plan of 
the campaign. About one-third of my en- 
tire army (five divisions out of fourteen, 
one of the nine remaining being but little 
larger than a brigade) was thus taken from 
me. Instead of a rapid advance which I 
had planned, aided by a flank movement 
up the York river, it was only left to be- 
siege Yorktown. That siege was success- 
fully conducted by the army, and when 
these strong works at length yielded to our 
approaches, the troops rushed forward to 
the sanguinary but successful battle of 
Williamsburg, and thus opened an almost 
unresisted advance to the banks of the 
Chickahominy. Richmond lay before them, 
surrounded with fortifications, and guarded 
by an army larger than our own ; but the 
])rospect did not shake the courage of the 
brave men who composed my command- 
Relying still on the support which the 
vastness of our undertaking and the grand 
results depending on our success seemed 
to insure us, we pressed forward. The 
weather was stormy beyond precedent ; the 
deep soil of the Peninsula was at times 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX. 



171 



one vast morass; the Chukalioininy rose 
to a higher stage than had beeu known for 
years before. Pursuing the advance, the 
crossings were seized, and the right wing 
extended to effect a junction with re-en- 
forcements now promised and earnestly 
desired, and upon the arrival of which the 
complete success of the campaign seemed 
clear. The brilliant battle of Hanover 
Court House was fought, which opened 
the way for the first corps, with the aid of 
■which, had it come, we should then have 
goue into the enemy's capital. It never 
came. The bravest army could not do more, 
under such overwhelming disappointment, 
than the army of the Potomac then did. 
Fair Oaks attests their courage and endu- 
rance when they hurled back, again and 
again, the vastly superior masses of the 
enemy. But mortal men could not accom- 
plish the miracle that seemed to have beeu 
expected of them. But one course was 
left— a flank march in the face of a power- 
ful enemy to another and better base — one 
of the most hazardous movements in war. 
The armj^ of the Potomac, holding its 
own safety and almost the safety of our 
cause, in its hands, was equal to the occa- 
sion. The seven days are classical in 
American history ; those days in which 
the noble soldiers of the Union and Consti- 
tution fought an outnumbering enemy by 
day. and retreated from successive victories 
by night, through a week of battle, closing 
the terrible series of conflicts with the 
ever-memorable victory of Malvern, where 
they drove back, beaten and shattered, the 
entire eastern army of the confederacy, 
aud thus secured for themselves a place of 
rest and a point for a new advance upon 
the capital from the banks of the James. 
Richmond was still within our grasp, had 
tlie army of the Potomac been re-enforced 
and permitted to advance. But counsels, 
which I cannot but think subsequent 
events proved unwise, prevailed in "Wash- 
ington, aud we were ordered to abandon 
the campaign. Never did soldiers better 
deserve the thanks of a nation than the 
army of the Potomac for the deeds of the 
Peninsula campaign, and although that 
meed was withheld from them by the au- 
thorities, I am persuaded they have re- 
ceived the applause of the American 
people. 

The armv of the Potomac was recalled 
from withiii sight of Richmond, and incor- 
porated with the army of Virginia. The 
disappointments of the campaign on the 
Peninsula had not damped their ardor nor 
diminished their patriotism. They fought 
well, faithfully, gallantly, under General 
Pope ; vet were compelled to fall back on 
Washington, defeated and almost demor- 
olized. 



The enemy, no longer occupied it guard 
iug his own capital, poured his troops 
northward, entered Maryland, threatened 
Pennsylvania, and even Washington itself. 
Elated by his recent victories, and assured 
that our troops were disorganized and dis- 
pirited, he was confident that the seat of 
war was now permanently transferred to 
the loyal States, and that his own ex- 
hausted soil was to be relieved from the 
burden of supporting two hostile armies. 
But he did not understand the spirit which 
animated the soldiers of the Union. I shall 
not, nor can I living, forget that when I 
was ordered to the command of the troops 
for the defence of the capital, the soldiers 
with whom I had shared so much of the 
anxiety, and pain, aud suffering of the war, 
had not lost their confidence in me as their 
commander. They sprang to my call with 
all their ancient vigor, discipline, and 
courage. I led them into Maryland. Fif- 
teen days after they had fallen back de- 
feated before Washington, they vanquished 
the enemy on the rugged height of South 
Mountain, pursued him to the hard-fought 
field of Antietam, and drove him, broken 
and disappointed, across the Potomac 
into Virginia. 

The army had need of rest. Ater the 
terrible experiences of battles and marches, 
with scarcely an interval of repose, which 
they had gone through from the time of 
leaving for the Peninsula; the return to 
Washington ; the defeat in Virginia ; the 
victory at South Mountain, and again at 
Antietam, it was not surprising that they 
were in a large degree destitute of the ab- 
solute necessaries to effective duty. Shoes 
were worn out ; blankets were lost ; cloth- 
ing was in rags ; in short, the army was 
unfit for active service, aud an interval for 
rest and equipment was necessary. When 
the slowly forwarded supplies came to us 
I led the army across the river, renovated, 
refreshed, in good order and discipline, 
aud followed the retreating foe to a posi- 
tion where I was confident of decisive vic- 
tory, when, in the midst of the movement, 
while my advance guard was actually in 
contact with the enemy, I was removed 
from the command. 

I am devoutly grateful to God that my 
last campaign with this brave army was 
crowned with a victory which saved the 
nation from the greatest peril it had then 
undergone. I have not accomplished my 
purpose if, by this report, the army of the 
Potomac is not placed high on the roll of 
the historic armies of the world. Its deeds 
enoble the nation to which it belongs. 
Always ready for battle, always firm, 
steadfast, and trustworthy, I never called 
on it in vain; nor will the nation ever 



172 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAX. 



have cause to attribute its want of suc- 
cess, under myself, or under other com- 
manders, to any failure of patriotism or 
bravery in that noble body of American 
soldiers. 

No man can justly charge upon any por- 
tion of that army, from the commanding 
general to the private, any lack of devo- 
tion to the service of the United States 
govern.raent, and to the cause of the Con- 
stitution and the Union. They have proved 
their fealty in much sorrow, suffering, 
danger, and through the very shadow of 
death. Their comrades dead on all the 
fields where we fought have scarcely more 
claim to the honor of a nation's reverence 



than their survivors to the justice of a 
nation's gratitude. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, 
Your obedient servant, 

G. B. McCLELLAN, 
Major Gen. U. S. Army. 
Brigadier Gen. L. ThOiMas. 
Adj. Gen. U. S. Army. 

War Department, 
Adj. General's Office. 
Washington, Dec. 22, 1863. 
I certify that the above is a true copy 
of the oi'iginal report on file in this office. 
E. D. TOWNSENP. 
Assist. Adj. General. 



INDEX. 



Paob. 

FIEST PERIOD. 

Introductory Summary 3 

Memorandum of Operations 4-5 

Letter to the Secretary of War — 
Strength of the Ami}- of the Po- 
tomac — Plans of Advance 6-8 

Situation at Washington, July 1861.. 8 

Organization of the Army 9 

Artillery 10 

Organization of Divisions 1 1-17 

Wads worth's Command It 

Dix's Command 18 

Engineers 18 

" Topographical 19 

Medical and other departments.. 20-23 

Occupation of Drainsville 24 

The Battle of Ball's Bluff. 25 

('oast Expeditions proposed 26-7 

Burnside sent to North Carolina... 27 

Instructions to Gen. Halleck 28 

Gen. Buell 29 

" Gen. Sherman 30 

Gen. Butler 31 

President's General War Order 

No. 1 31-2 

I*resident's Special War Order 

No. 1 32 

Peninsula Route proposed 32 

Note from the President to Mc- 

Clellan 32 

Letter from McClellan to the Sec- 
retary of War 32-6 

Vessels of transport 36-7 

War Vessels on the Potomac 37 

Rebel obstructions on the Potomac. 38 

Notes explaining Operations 38-9 

President's General War Order 

No. 3 40 

Advance of the Army on Manas- 
sas 40-1 

Circular in relation to Spies, &C..41-2 

Strength of the Rebel Arni}^ 42 

President's War Order No. 3 43 

Preparations for the Peninsula 
Campaign 44 



Paqr. 

Instructions to Gen. Banks 45 

" Gen. Wadsworth..45-6 
Official Note on the Plan of Cam- 
paign 46 

Blenker's Division ordered to Fre- 
mont 47 

Troops left in front of Wash'n.. 48-50 

Security of Washington 51 

Plans for the defence of Manassas. ..52 
Military Incidents of the First 
Period .' 53 

« ^ • » » 

SECOND PERIOD. 

Embarkation at Alexandria 53-4 

Arrival at Fort Monroe 54 

Position and force of the Enem3^..55 

The Advance on Yorktown 56 

McDowell's corps detached 57 

Preparations for the Siege of 

Yorktown 58 

Letter from Gen. Ke^es to Sena- 
tor Harris 1 59-60 

The President impatient — he urges 

haste 61 

Gen. Barnard on the Fortifications 

of Yorktown 62-3 

Progress of the Siege 64 

Evacuation of Yorktown 64 

Battle of Williamsburg 66-8 

Advance to White House 68 

On the Chickahomin}' 69 

Reinforcements requested 69-70 

McDowell ordered to co-operate 70-7 1 

Instructions to McDowell 71 

McDowell's Orders Suspended 73 

Alarm at Washington about Banks 74 
Preparations for the Attack on 

Richmond 75 

Battle at Hanover Court House.... 7 6 

Advance to the Seven Pines 78 

Battle at Fair Oak,s 79-81 

Condition of the Army 83-4 

Awaiting Reinforcements 84 

The affair at Redoubt No. 3 88 

(173) 



lU 



INDEX. 



Paoe. 

Battle of Mechanicsville 90-94 

" of Gaines' Mill 95 

" Allen's Farm 96 

" Savage's Station 96-t 

Crossing White Oak Swamp 98 

Battle of Nelson's Farm 98-9 

" of Malvern Hill 100 

Losses from June 26 to July 1 102 

Retreat to Harrison's Bar 102 



THIRD PERIOD. 

Correspondence between General 
McClellan and the Presi- 
dent 103-4 

McClellan's view of the Situation.. 105 
Another call for Reinforcements... 106 

Occupation of Coggin's Point 107 

The Enemy driven from Malvern 

Hill 108 

Order for the Evacuation of Har- 
rison's Bar 109 

Remonstrance of Gen. McClellan.. 1 1 1 

Halleck's Rejoinder 112-13 

Preparations for Evacuation ..113-15 

Halleck Impatient at Delay 116 

Want of necessary Transports 116 

A Talk with Halleck by Tele- 
graph in 

The Evacuation 118 

The March to Fort Monroe 119 

McClellan asks a kind word for 

Army 119 

Embarkation at Fort Monroe 120 

McClellan at Aquia Creek 121 

Halleck alarmed about Pope 121 

McClellan arrives at Alexandria.. 121 

Preparations to aid Pope 122 

McClellan without authority to 

Act 123 

Apprehensions for the Safety of 

the Capital 125-28 



Page. 

FOURTH PERIOD. 

The Situation at Washington 129 

McClellan to Command the De- 
fences 129 

Interview with the President 129 

Telegram to Gen. Porter , 129 

The Return of Pope 130 

The Defence of Washington 130 

The Movement into Maryland 131 

Halleck fearful and complaining... 132 
Gen. McClellan reaches Frederick. 133 

Orders of the Enemy.. 133 

Situation at Harper's Ferry 134 

Instructions to Col. Miles 135 

Movements of Franklin's corps. 135-36 

Action at Burkettsville 163 

Surrender of Harper's Ferry 137 

Battle at South Mountain 137-40 

The Advance to Antietam 141-42 

The Battle of Antietam 143-49 

Retreat of the Enemy 150 

Casualties at Antietam 151 

Estimated strength of Rebel army. 152 

Strength of McClellan's array 152 

The Enemy recross the Poto- 
mac 152 

Halleck finding fault 152 

The Enemy at Martinsburg 154 

Condition of the Army 155 

Rebel Raid into Maryland 156 

McClellan ordered across the Poto- 
mac 157 

Correspondence in relation to 

Army supplies 158-62 

Plan of the Advance 164 

Guard the Potomac 165-6 

South of the Potomac 166-7 

The Army massed at Warren- 
ton 168-9 

Gen. McClellan Relieved of the 

Command 168 

Review of Events — General Con- 
siderations 169-72 



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